100th Congress, 1st Session S. Rept. No. 100-216

Report of the Congressional Committee Investigating the

Iran–Contra Affair

Appendix D: Volume 4
Testimonial Chronology:
Witness Accounts,
Supplemented By Documents

Daniel K. Inouye, *Chairman*
Senate Select Committee

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
And the Nicaraguan Opposition

November 17, 1987.—Ordered to be printed.

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United States Senate

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United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 13, 1988

Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to Senate Resolution 23, Appendix D to the final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition.

Sincerely,

Danial K. Inouye
Chairman

Warren B. Rudman
Vice Chairman

United States Senate

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Note on Citations in this Chronology

Citations appear at the end of each entry in the Long-Form Version of this *Chronology* (vols. 2-5) and refer to a variety of sources available to the Committees. These sources are noted in the corresponding entries in the Summary Version (vol. 1) only by the witness' name or by the document description or its exhibit number. The sources include:

1. JHICI. Refers to the unpublished transcripts, titled Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, that were issued daily to the Committees while the Iran-Contra Hearings were being held in May through August 1987. All page references given as "[Witness] Testim., JHICI" are to these volumes which are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C. These transcripts have recently been published by the Committees in a thirteen volume set titled *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987-88). A table converting unpublished transcript (JHICI) page numbers to published transcript (referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* as *Hearings* volumes) page numbers is included at the end of volume I of this Appendix.

2. Executive Session, JHICI. Refers to sworn hearing testimony of John Poindexter or Oliver North taken in closed session because of the classified nature of the testimony. (These witnesses also testified in sessions open to the public.) The transcripts of the closed sessions were publicly released after classified portions of the testimony were redacted. Citations to Executive Session testimony refer to the unpublished transcripts described in the preceding paragraph. These transcripts are available in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

3. Dep. A sworn deposition taken in the presence of one or more Members of the Committees and/or counsel for the Committees, and counsel for the deponent. These deposition transcripts have been published as Appendix B to the *Iran-Contra Report*.

4. Int. An unsworn interview conducted by one or more Committee Members and/or Committee counsel, with counsel for the interviewee present if the interviewee wished.

5. Ex. An exhibit used during the Iran-Contra Hearings ("JHICI Ex.____") or during a deposition ("[Witness] Dep. Ex.____").

6. PROF Notes. Messages generated on a computer system used by the National Security Council staff.

7. Document letter and number codes. Source and document file codes for materials that have been assigned a Senate letter code and stamped page number. These materials are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

8. Iran-Contra Report. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 17, 1987).

9. Tower Report. *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 26, 1987).

10. HFAC, HPSCI, or SSCI. Testimony or statements made by witnesses before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

11. CRS. A numbered report issued by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
AG	Attorney General
ARA	Inter-American Affairs (DoS)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CATF	Central American Task Force (CIA)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPPG	Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CYA	cover your ass
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (CIA)
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DDO	Deputy Director. for Operations (CIA)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
Dep.	Deposition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Directorate for Operations (CIA)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
Ex(x).	Exhibit(s)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FM	Foreign Minister
GAO	General Accounting Office
Gorba	Manucher Ghorbanifar
GPS	George P. Shultz
HAWK	Homing-All-the-Way Killer missile
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
IDEA	Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance
IG	Inspector General
Int.	Interview
IOB	Intelligence Oversight Board
Iran-Contra Report	*Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (11/87)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JHICI	Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation
JMP	John M. Poindexter
MOD	Israeli Ministry of Defense
NDR	Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
NEPL	National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
NHAO	Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
NIO	National Intelligence Officer (CIA)
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSB	National Security Briefing
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSPG	National Security Planning Group
OD	see DO
ODSM	Office Directors Staff Meeting
OEOB	Old Executive Office Building
OLN	Oliver L. North
PM	Prime Minister
PROF(S)	Professional Office (Computer) System
RCM	Robert C. McFarlane
RIG	Restricted Interagency Group
RR	President Ronald Reagan
SIG	Senior Interagency Group
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
STTGI	Stanford Technology Trading Group International
TIWG	Terrorist Incident Working Group
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile
Tower	*Report of the President's Special Review Board* (2/87) (The Tower Board)
UNO	United Nicaraguan Opposition
USG	U.S. Government

Key to Exhibit Prefix Letters

[no prefix]	Richard Secord or Robert C. McFarlane
AC	Adolfo Calero
AH	Albert Hakim
BS	Bretton Sciaroni
C	CIA (from Eggleston Summary, 6/24/87)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CG	Clair George
CJC	Charles J. Cooper
CWW	Caspar W. Weinberger
DoD	Department of Defense (Noel Koch, Henry Gaffney)
DRC	Duane R. Clarridge
DTR	Donald T. Regan
EA	Elliott Abrams
ECG	Ellen C. Garwood
EM	Edwin Meese
FH	Fawn Hall
FIR	Felix I. Rodriguez
GAR	Glenn A. Robinette
GJS	Gaston J. Sigur
GPS	George P. Shultz
JC	Joseph Coors
JKS	John K. Singlaub
JMP	John M. Poindexter
LAT	Lewis A. Tambs
OLN	Oliver L. North
RCD	Robert C. Dutton
RWO	Robert W. Owen
SS	Stanley Sporkin
TC	Tomas Castillo
WBO	William B. O'Boyle

Publications of the Senate and House Select Committees

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1 volume, 1987.

Appendix A: *Source Documents*, 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: *Depositions*, 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: *Chronology of Events*, 1 volume, 1988.
Appendix D: *Testimonial Chronology*, 5 volumes, 1988.

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Preface

This *Testimonial Chronology* records the events of the Iran-Contra Affair as recounted by the witnesses who testified before the Congressional Committees, and as disclosed in contemporaneous documents that the Committees gathered. It was prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition as an Appendix to the *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair ("Iran-Contra Report")*. Although this *Testimonial Chronology* is published by the Senate Select Committee, it is based on the evidence gathered by the two Select Committees during their joint investigation.

This *Testimonial Chronology* aims to be thorough, without passing judgment or making editorial comment on the evidence it records. It is intended to serve as a research aid, pulling together the myriad events and disparate threads of the Iran-Contra Affair in the words of the participants themselves. Accordingly, where the evidence contains multiple or differing versions of the same events, the various accounts are summarized or quoted. In every instance, the Committee has attempted to provide an accurate, objective and succinct summary of what the witnesses and the documents actually said—and not how the Committees viewed this evidence. The Committees' subjective views and conclusions are set forth in their *Iran-Contra Report*.

This *Testimonial Chronology*, while comprehensive, is not all-inclusive. The two Congressional Committees gathered hundreds of thousands of documents and took numerous depositions, not all of which could be included here. The primary source material for this *Testimonial Chronology* is the testimony of the witnesses who appeared at the Joint Hearings. Deposition testimony also has been included where the deposition transcripts were released prior to the publication of the *Iran-Contra Report*, or where the deposition transcripts discuss events referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* or in this *Testimonial Chronology*. The documents quoted or cited were introduced as exhibits during the Joint Hearings or otherwise relied upon in the *Iran-Contra Report*.

Transcript text quoted in this *Testimonial Chronology* is edited only by the use of ellipses (. . .) or by material added in brackets where necessary for clarification or completeness. Such editing has been minimal. Likewise, [sic] has been used sparingly, in recognition of the fact that witnesses gave their testimony orally, not in writing. With this in mind, [sic] has been utilized to note that a quotation which might otherwise appear mistaken is recorded accurately here. Also, where a document or testimony has been quoted inaccurately in other testimony, the accurate text is added parenthetically after the [sic].

The Summary Version of this *Testimonial Chronology* serves as an extended Table of Contents for the Long-Form Version. The Summary Version identifies topic headings in the order in which they appear in the Long-Form Version, and notes the specific witnesses whose testimony is included under each topic, as well as the documents quoted or cited.

Chronology entries are designated by nine-digit index numbers in the left margin before each entry. This number gives the date of each event. For example, 85/11/15-100 means November 15, 1985 (or mid-November 1985). The last three digits after the hyphen (100) were solely for computer sorting purposes; they need not detain the reader.

The dates used are those furnished by the witnesses or the documents; however, certain major topics (*e.g.*, the "diversion") are grouped together for convenience.

Before this *Testimonial Chronology* was released, it was submitted by the Senate Select Committee to the White House for review by a Declassification Committee composed of representatives from the various executive departments. This is the same Declassification Committee which functioned throughout the Congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair. The Senate Select Committee expresses its gratitude to the members of the Declassification Committee, and in particular, to Brenda Reger of the NSC staff, for their diligent work in reviewing this *Testimonial Chronology* and helping the Senate Select Committee insure that all critical evidence was disclosed with due regard for considerations of national security and U.S. foreign relations.

This *Testimonial Chronology* is largely the work of Isabel McGinty, Esq., an Assistant Counsel on the Senate Select Committee staff. Ms. McGinty spent enormous hours—including long days, long nights and weekends—throughout the past year to compile this *Testimonial Chronology* and prepare it for publication. Although the task was extremely difficult and painstaking, Ms. McGinty saw it through to completion, long after the *Iran-Contra Report* had been issued and other staff members had departed for their homes. The Senate Select Committee expresses special gratitude to Isabel McGinty for her dedicated service in producing these volumes.

It is the Senate Select Committee's hope that this *Testimonial Chronology* will contribute to the public's understanding of the complex events which made up the Iran-Contra Affair.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/03/07-200 MARCH 7, 1986			CIA RAISES DOUBTS ABOUT IRANIAN INFLUENCE OVER HOSTAGE CAPTORS CIA MEMO: In a memo to the Chief of the Near East Division in the CIA Operations Directorate, his Deputy Chief (DC/NE) writes: "Ghorbanifar insisted on another meeting after which the Keesh Island matter will be set. . . . North is prepared to stonewall in Paris. There will be no more 'slices of salami' handed out. However, our other friend, NEER [sic], will also be present. We sense strongly [redacted] that he is unilaterally providing additional arms as an incentive to the Keesh Island. I have briefed Ed Juchniewicz on the above. I tried to get into McMahon, but he did not have time. I will be back Saturday PM and will give you a ring. What we may be facing is evidence that [the Second Iranian Official; see 86/01/11-180] does not have the authority in Tehran to make it work." (Iran-Contra Report, at 222 [citing DC/NE memo to Chief/NE Division, "[Redacted, with NSC handwritten above] Operation," 3/7/86 (Committee Document I 0613); substitution for bracketed redacted material in text of quote as provided in Iran-Contra Report].)
86/03/10-100 MARCH 10, 1986			McFARLANE'S MUSING ON NORTH'S FUTURE McFARLANE PROF: McFarlane PROF to North, proposing "a self-serving scenario": North joins McFarlane at CSIS after leaving the White House and the two

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"continue to work the Iran account as well as to begin to build other clandestine capabilities so much in demand here and there. Just a knee jerk musing." "Mr. SARBANES. . . .What was it you had mind? "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . .[A]s with really all good Marine officers, Ollie wanted to go to a command. ". . . . "[B]ut all you had to do to really stir Ollie up and get him quite mad was to suggest something that was other than command. . . .I was trying either by levity or comic [sic] or foolishness to pick him up out of the dumps or help him out with some bureaucratic problem here or there." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 208-10; JHICI Ex. 45-G.)
86/03/10-200 MARCH 10-11, 1986			PARIS MEETING: NORTH'S FRUSTRATION NORTH/McFARLANE PROFS: In a series of PROFs between North and McFarlane, North shows his frustration after the Paris meeting with Ghorbanifar: "Per request from yr old friend Gorba, met w/ him in Paris on Saturday. He started w/ a long speech re how we were trying to cut him out, how important he is to the process and how he cd deliver on the hostages if only we cd sweeten the pot w/ some little tid-bits -- like some arms, etc. After his speech I allowed as how he was not getting the message, but that I wd reiterate: "-The hostages are a serious impediment to serious govt-to-govt discussions and this must be

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			resolved before we can discuss any further transactions. -We remain ready to go to Kish or anywhere else to discuss issues of mutual concern as long as the hostages are going to be released during or before this meeting. . . ." In a late-night response, McFarlane offers his opinion on continuing with Ghorbanifar: ". . . Gorba is basically a self-serving mischief maker. Of course the trouble is that as far as we know, so is the entire lot of those we are dealing with. . . . But it is going to take some time to get a feel for just who the players are on the contemporary scene in Teheran. So the sooner we get started the better. . . ." North, in turn, responds: ". . . In re the Gorba prob: He is aware of the Kish mtg and is basically carrying our water on the mtg since he is still the only access we have to the Iranian political leadership. It wd be useful, I believe, for you to talk w/ George Cave, the Agency's Iran expert. He shares our concern that we may be dealing only w/ those who have an interest in arms sales and their own personal financial gain and believes the 'Russians are coming' approach is about the only way to broaden the perspective. . . ." (North PROF to McFarlane, "How's It Going?," 3/10/86 [Committee Documents N 12125-26]; McFarlane PROF to North, "How's It Going?," 3/10/86 [= JHICI Exx. OLN 179; 45-G; Committee Documents N 12126-27]; North PROF to McFarlane,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"How's It Going?," 3/11/86 [= JHICI Exx. OLN 179; 45-G; Committee Document N 12126]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 223.)
86/03/10-400 SOMETIME IN MARCH 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: LEDEEN'S VIEW LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "A. . . . [S]omeone in Washington told me that the McFarlane trip was going to happen. I don't remember who it was. "I went to McFarlane, probably in March, and said to him that it would be a terrible mistake for him to go on this trip because going on this trip would have the sole effect of strengthening the very people in Iran that we wished eventually to see removed. And I thought that the trip couldn't achieve anything other than that, whatever else people told him was going to happen, and that he must not lend himself to such a trip, that it was a mistake. "Q. How did he respond? "A. He thanked me for my advice. "Q. And went? "A. He went, yes. McFarlane -- a couple of things about McFarlane. "McFarlane was always rather closed mouth about things. It was sometimes difficult even for those of us who considered ourselves his friends to know what was on his mind. "Secondly, McFarlane, after 1985, is not the same person as the McFarlane prior to October of 1985. He had a very tough time in that period. . . ." (Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 127-29. See

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Ledeen, Senate Dep., 9/10/87, at 64-65 [Ledeen's view of McFarlane's Tehran trip].)
86/03/11-100 MARCH 11, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: POINDEXTER TELLS SHULTZ IT IS OFF DoS CHRONOLOGY: "POINDEXTER informs GPS that MCFARLANE objected to going ahead with the meeting and that the initiative is 'all off' again." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/04/21-600.)
86/03/13-100 MARCH 13-16, 1986		SECORD MEETING IN LONDON WITH KHALID RASHEED, THEN DAVID WALKER NAPIER ACCOUNT: Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, summarized her trip to London: "Accompanied Mr. Secord to attend a meeting with a Mr. Khalid Rasheed concerning a consulting agreement between the two. I was there to take notes and draft the agreement. No definite agreement was agreed upon, I never wrote up anything. Mr. Secord and Mr. Rasheed met together privately. . . . "Mr. Secord also met privately with David Walker." (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, Ex. 5 [Napier travel summary]. See Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 49-52.)	
86/03/15-100 MARCH 15,		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1:	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986		"Mr. Carome. I am going back to March. Would you please look at [C/CATF] Exhibit 21, a March 15, 1986 cable from the Central American Task Force to [redacted] and [redacted.] It refers to an ammunition re-supply for Southern Front leaders. "In paragraph 2, it says 'Suggest this drop be expedited by the FDN to speed up the development of NAC forces and addressees assist as appropriate.' "You were there directing your [redacted] to assist in a lethal drop to the Southern Front? "[C/CATF.] I was directing them to be -- to do what they could as appropriate to urge that that happen. "Mr. Carome. Later in March, I take it, you went with Colonel North and Elliott Abrams and others to [redacted] and [redacted.] "[C/CATF.] That is correct. It is very very important in the context of my previous answers [see 86/09/09-300] to go back and study the changes that took place with regard to authorizations in the Intelligence Authorization Act of fiscal year '86 and our actions in this cable were totally consistent with the interpretation of that act as at that time. And I want to make that very very clear, that this cable which we signed here, and which I signed, was according to our interpretation consistent with the authorizations of the agency in the laws governing our activities at that time. "Mr. Carome. Did you understand that your [redacted] could specifically assist in lethal	

flights?

"[C/CATF.] I understood that they could provide information, advice and guidance that related to the resupply of materiel -- not material -- materiel -- as long as it was not tantamount to specific or integral, I think is the word, to specific military operations in Nicaragua. It was generic, we could say you ought to do this or that, you ought to do the other thing, you could do this. We had a lot of discussion about this, and Chairman Hamilton will recall it.

"There was tremendous controversy as to whether or not the language of the Senate was -- the language of the bill was meant to be broader or narrower. The Senate Committee, Intelligence Committee, interpreted it as broader; the House as narrower. There was an exchange of letters with the then-Director and on our legal opinion, we went with the Senate Intelligence Committee interpretation, which was broader. That was the way we saw it, and there was a lot of discussion. I was involved in that discussion to make sure that we were within the bounds of propriety and law.

"I will also tell you, and this is important for the committees to understand, that by May or -- by January or February when those laws changed, I was in the agency, Clair[] George and I were letting the reins out. We were very very cautious politically in the first nine months under hard-core Boland. We were still exceedingly cautious during that intervening period when we were operating under the slight modification of Boland in the fiscal year '85 supplemental that authorized the $27 million program.

"When Boland went away and the fiscal year '86 Intelligence Aughorization Act came into play and we were allowed to provide intelligence, advice and communications equipment and advice on logistics operations as long as it was not integral to a very painful sort of construction, we let the reins out a little more.

"I want to make a point here that is critical, go back to the committee's first testimony of General Secord. You will recall him saying that there were times when we thought the agency, I think particularly in the February-March time[ ]frame, the agency was going to come into this thing, and then they drew back, and I went to complain to the Director. Well, he was exactly right. I started to lean into this thing in February and March, and along about March, after my meetings with Gadd, I said 'I am too far out, I don't like where I am going', and I started to pull back. I started to pull back, and that is when General Secord complained. I did it because I didn't like the feel of where I was."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 18-21; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 21.)

86/03/15-101
MARCH 15,
1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: C/CATF AWARENESS
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[C/CATF response continues from preceding entry:]

"[C/CATF.] I think you will begin to see in

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		this sometime in March and April a pulling back, trying to feather an engine and get out from where we were. By my own admission, if I got some place that is controversial, it was in February and March where I let the reins out, I got a little too rambunctious, like a colt that got out of the barn to play, and I pulled myself back in. I didn't do it all myself. My task force lawyer was whispering like Jiminy Cricket in my ear. I probably got us a little too far forward leaning at a point in time and then pulled us back. "Mr. Cohen. Could I clarify one point. You refer to the fact that General Secord complained as to your activities or lack of activities. You didn't know about it at the time? "[C/CATF.] No. "Mr. Cohen. So you were never told that you were pulling back too much by anybody? "[C/CATF.] No. We went over that in my deposition. I was kind of interested to see that, actually. "Mr. Cohen. I will pursue that a little more when I question. "Mr. Carome. On your March trip, you learned that [redacted] was passing information directly to the people who were running the [redacted] supply operation, is that correct? You testified to that fact in your deposition. "[C/CATF.] Can I refer to my deposition? "Mr. Carome. Page 114 of the first deposition . . . . 'Question: When did you become aware that there was a problem with [redacted] regarding his relationship with the private benefactors?	

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		"'Answer: March, '86, and with [redacted] when he discussed it in [redacted] is when we knew there was a problem.' "[C/CATF.] The discussions with [redacted] -- that is 28 May or the late May meetings in [redacted.] If I said March, I misspoke myself. Yes, I misspoke myself there. That should be May. I am sorry. [Redacted] was still in [redacted] at that point in time, and the meeting that took place took place in late May of '86. I am sorry for that. "My counsel reminds me that I just saw this deposition in its pristine form on Friday, and I had noticed a couple of things. For instance, Ambassador Duemling is not an Admiral, et cetera. I will have to make a correction. I didn't see that. "Mr. Carome. We have received substantial testimony and documentary evidence that in March of 1986 [redacted] was communicating using a KL-43 encryption device directly with Mr. North and directly with the [redacted] operators, you were not aware of that at the time? "[C/CATF.] I was not aware of that. I became aware that [redacted] had a KL-43 in October of '86." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 21-23.)	
86/03/17-100 MARCH 17, 1986		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: 3/17/86 REPORT OWEN MEMO, Part 1: Owen ("TC," "The Courier"), writes to North ("BG," "Blood and Guts"; see 85/08/25-100), in a memo titled "Overall Perspective":	

". . . .

"FDN/UNO POLITICAL SITUATION

"I put it as FDN/UNO because the FDN is now driving UNO, not the other way around. UNO is a creation of the USG to garner support from Congress. When it was founded a year ago, the hope was it would become a viable organization. In fact, almost anything it has accomplished is because the hand of the USG has been there directing and manipulating.

"No doubt the hope was Cruz and Robelo would turn into strong leaders to somewhat [illegible] bal[a]nce the strength of Calero and the FDN. Both Cruz and Robelo have been disappointments. Calero, on the other hand, has used his strength and will and the FDN to further consolidate his hold on the resistance and to gain control of UNO. Perhaps UNO is the correct acronym, for there is only one leader in the Democratic Resist[a]nce, Adolfo Calero.

"As long as the USG understands this to be true, then it can go forward with planning. But, if USG agencies actually believe that UNO is a strong and functioning body that tru[]ly represents all factions of the Democratic Resist[a]nce, they are fooling themselves into believing something that is not true. This is too dangerous for the USG and for the effort as a whole.

". . . .

"NHAO FUNDING

"NHAO is the worst possible vehicle which could have been devised to pay the bills. Because there is no verification it is impossible to ensure the integrity of the operation. . . .

"THE SEACORDS [sic] CONNECTION

"What you had hoped to remain quiet is now openly discussed on the street. For e[xample,] the following names have been used in connection with Seacord[']s operation:

"-Tom Klines [sic]
"-Larry Sterns
"-George Stockman
"-Patrice Gentry
"-Peter (aka Pablo) Duncan
"-[redacted]
"-One Lt. Col. Oliver North
"-Star Production
"-General Equipment and Leasing Corp. in Geneva
"-Stanford Technologies Trading Group and Transfer Ltd. in Arlington.

"The word is these people and companies have been involved in the procurement and tra[ns]portation of arms and aircraft for the FDN. Some people are complaining these people [are] making money on sweetheart deals and that the prices they are getting are not as goo[d] as they could be.

". . . .

"In all possibility, they are talking and bad mouthing Seacords [sic] because they want par[t] of the action. They are also blaming Seacords for whatever problem arises.

". . . ."

(JHICI Ex. RWO 13. Owen's memo continues in next

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		entry.)	
86/03/17-101 MARCH 17, 1986		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: 3/17/86 REPORT OWEN MEMO, Part 2: [Text continues from preceding entry:] "RWO and the FUTURE "I have been active in this cause since 1983 when I brought John Hull in to meet you. I have tried to give my all and to do my best. Hopefully I've contributed something. Perhaps the time has come for me to move on to other things. I am burned beyond bel[ief.] My name has now openly been linked to you in Congress. I am looked on as your boy by Calero and gang, and thus no[ ]longer trusted. Don't know what [redacted] and Company thi[nk] of me, but I don't think too much of the incompetence that has come out of the Agenc[y.] "In fact, I have probably never been more discouraged. UNO is a name only. There is more and more fluff being added, but there is no substance. I care and believe in th[e] boys and girls, men and women who are fighting, bleeding and dying. But the reality see it is [sic] there are few of the so called leaders of the movement who really care ab[out] the boys in the field. THIS WAR HAS BECOME A BUSINESS TO MANY OF THEM; THERE IS STILL A BELIEF THE MARINES ARE GOING TO HAVE TO INVADE, SO LET[']S GET SET SO WE WILL AUTOMATI[CALLY] BE THE ONES PUT INTO POWER. "If the $100 million is approved and things go on as they have these last five years, [it] will be like pouring money down a sink hole. The Agency has done a shitty job in the past, there is	

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		no evidence they are going to change, especially as they are going to have the same people running it as far as I know. State Department is no better. No one talks to each other, there is no coordination and there is little leadership. Without significant changes, things will not get better, they will get worse. The heavy hand of the gringo is needed. ". . . . "END OF STORY "I have valued these last few years. I've learned a great deal and had fun doing it. I just hope I have been helpful. "I will continue in whatever position you recommend. You have been my Godfather thro[ugh] this. I am here to serve my country, but I will not be involved if we are not seri[ous] and will not do what is necessary to make it work." (JHICI Ex. RWO 13 [emphasis in original].)	
86/03/24-100 MARCH 24, 1986		THE CONTRAS AND GUN-RUNNING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Mr. RODINO. On March 24, 1986, you were briefed by Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen on a criminal investigation conducted by the Miami Office of the U.S. Attorney regarding alleged gun-running to the contras. "Mr. POINDEXTER. What was the date on that? "Mr. RODINO. March 24, 1986. You got some information during that briefing, and I am wondering just what action you took regarding that information and whether or not you received a memo from Mr. Jensen during this briefing.	

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember the meeting, Mr. Rodino, and I don't remember the subject. If you have got an exhibit, maybe I can remember it, but at this point I have no idea what the meeting was about.

"Mr. RODINO. The memo is classified, and I could send it down to you. Anyhow, I wasn't going to discuss it. I merely wanted to ascertain whether or not you had received that memo. I will be glad to send it down.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I at this point have no idea.

"Mr. RODINO. Let me go on while you are considering that.

"Mr. BECKLER. We are going to have to consider it. Can we look at the memo? We just got a copy of it, Mr. Rodino. Not of the memo, of the schedule. Are you referring to this March 20, 1986--

"Mr. RODINO. March 24, 1986.

"Mr. BECKLER. That is the date of the memo?

"Mr. RODINO. No. That is the date of the briefing. And that is from Admiral Poindexter's appointment schedule, again.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall, Mr. Rodino, having seen this memorandum. I don't know whether I have seen it or not.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, let me ask you whether or not you recall asking Attorney General Meese or Lowell Jensen to slow down or in any way curtail the investigation that was going on.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall ever doing that. The only thing that I asked to be either slowed down or proceed ahead with great caution was the Southern Air Transport issue, and the fact that they were connected with the Iranian project.

"Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, I know this is already in the files. It is classified information, but I would like to make reference to that fact, that the indication is on the Deputy Attorney General's memo that the memo was sent, supposed to have been carried to Admiral Poindexter.

"It states on that memo, 'first floor, West Wing, carry and wait.'

"Mr. BECKLER. First of all, I would like to object. This is the 11th hour. We are being shown a memo that we have never seen before. We have made ourselves available since approximately February.

"Now, this routing and transmittal slip goes to one Mark Richard, who is an Associate Deputy Attorney General. I know him becuase I used to work at the Justice Department. It says 'Please get on top of this. DLJ is giving a heads-up to the NSC. He would like us to watch over it. Call Kellner. Know what is up.' I can't even--I can't read the whole thing, but I am looking for Admiral Poindexter's name on here.

"What is being left is an impression that this memo under it went to Admiral Poindexter and I don't see that on this cove[r] sheet. Furthermore, I would have like to get some of these exhibits earlier--it is 4:15 in the afternoon--and not at this 11th hour."

[Lengthy discussion followed among the

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		witness, his counsel, various Committee members, and the Chairman over the exhibit, Rep. Rodino's line of questioning, the time, and attorney-client conferences.] ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. I would like to set the record straight. I don't remember that Mr. Rodino [sic], Mr. Liman [in prior depositions], ever showed me that exhibit. ". . . . "Chairman HAMILTON. A question is pending. Mr. Rodino. "Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, let me finish my questioning by saying that if counsel thinks that I was trying to draw an inference, he is sadly mistaken. All that I sought to find out was whether or not the Admiral had in effect received such a memo. And then I asked him the other question as to whether or not there had been any attempted interference with that investigation. "I am satisfied that the Admiral could give me an answer to that question. I wouldn't want to suggest that I was drawing an inference. If the counsel wants to draw an inference, then so be it. Thank you very much." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 180-87.)	
86/03/26-005 MARCH 26, 1986	HAKIM'S $15,000 NAPIER ACCOUNT: Albert Hakim tells Shirley Napier, the staff assistant at STTGI, to type out two checks, one for $8,000 and the other for $7,000. Hakim asks her to go to different branches of his bank, the		

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	First American of Virginia, and cash them, then to bring him the money. Hakim is leaving for London or Geneva and Napier is concerned "because I was semi-aware of a law that if you cashed a check over $10,000 you were supposed to report it or fill out a form. And [Hakim] said that that didn't apply to this because each check was not over $10,000; I had nothing to worry about." Secord, Quintero, Tom Clines and Joan Corbin are also present at STTGI the day this occurs. (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 25-28, 31-32. See Napier Dep. Ex. 4 [Napier description of Hakim transaction].)		
86/03/26-010 DURING 1985 AND 1986		WIRE TRANSFERS TO STTGI NAPIER ACCOUNT: STTGI receives wire transfers from CSF and Credit Suisse in Switzerland. Shirley Napier testified, "[W]e had a $200,000 letter of credit with CSF, and we received $110,000 of that over, I believe, '85 and '86." The money is deposited in the STTGI account at the First American Bank. Another $70,000 comes by wire transfer from CSF in spring or late summer of 1986. At about the same time, $58,000 and $700 arrives at First American, referenced ADC (Arrow Development Corporation). In the fall of 1985 or 1986, $99,975 comes through CSF, referenced KITCO. Napier testified, "The only thing I was told about KITCO is that represented $50,000 consulting fee for '85 and $50,000 consulting fee for '86."	

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		Napier testified she thought she recalled a wire transfer from Lake Resources. Napier also testified she sent telexes to Willard Zucker and called him on Zucker's behalf at CSF. "Most of [the telexes] were in reference to collecting moneys or having something to do with money." (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 34-39.)	
86/03/26-050 MARCH 26, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: NOTICE TO McFARLANE See 86/02/27-300 through -302.	
86/03/26-100 SOMETIME IN LATE MARCH 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub travels to Costa Rica to persuade Eden Pastora to return to his command with the Nicaraguan opposition. Before he leaves, Singlaub meets with Elliott Abrams (who, in turn, according to Singlaub, "was meeting repeatedly with Oliver North"), with whom he reviews information about Nicaragua. Singlaub suggests that some of the past difficulties in controlling Eden Pastora "were related to personality conflicts or to amateurism on the part of the case officer." Abrams "expresse[s] some doubt" about Singlaub's plan, but "pose[s] no objection to that." Singlaub discusses his plan, as well, "with some staff members of a Senator . . . [and] some other members of the Department of State." Singlaub eventually travels to Central America and meets with Eden Pastora. They reach an agreement that Eden Pastora would go into	

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		Nicaragua and, in return, supplies, food, medicines and ammunition would be furnished to him by the Contra forces. On the day the agreement is signed, Singlaub takes it to the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs. Tambs, according to Singlaub, is pleased. Singlaub also speaks with Calero about furnishing ammunition and other supplies to Eden Pastora. "[L]ike Oliver North, he was not enthusiastic"; but they do reach an agreement on a "small quantity of ammunition." None of the equipment and supplies reaches Eden Pastora, however, for his operation on the southern front. "Mr. SINGLAUB. . . . I was informed that we had reneged -- 'we,' meaning collectively the people of the United States -- that he had gone inside with his troops, taken up position[,] had sent his aircraft to the rendezvous point to pick up the supplies[;] they never arrived. "Ultimately he had to surrender. . . . "Mr. BALLEN. When you say we had 'reneged,' who was 'we'? "Mr. SINGLAUB. Well, I was responsible for the agreement. I thought I had the support lined up with the necessary U.S. officials and the officials of the FDN, but -- "Mr. BALLEN. Did somebody in the U.S. Government renege on that -- "Mr. SINGLAUB. I learned later that it was someone in the CIA who gave instructions that the aircraft would not deliver the supplies as we had agreed."	

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		(Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 187, 240-45.)	
86/03/26-110 MARCH 26, 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT SINGLAUB ACCOUNT (cont'd): Singlaub on the agreement reached with Eden Pastora in March 1986: "Mr. COHEN. And you reached an agreement with Mr. Pastora about him re-entering Nicaragua "Mr. SINGLAUB. That is correct. ". . . . "Mr. COHEN. What intrigues me about this particular agreement is it says, 'the United States will do the following:'[.] Under what authority were you able to reach such an agreement and commit the resources of the United States? "Mr. SINGLAUB. I had no authority to represent the United States. I was trying to distinguish between Commandante Zero's forces and those of us in the Unites States that were anxious to help him and get him back in. It is an unfortunate choice of words. "The thing was written out by hand in a relatively short period of time. I just, at the moment, couldn't think of another way of representing my side because I didn't want to say it was me. I represented a large number of conservative groups. "Mr. COHEN. I think you also indicated you believed somebody in the CIA sabotaged that effort? "Mr. SINGLAUB. That is correct. "Mr. COHEN. Did you complain to Director	

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		Casey about it? "Mr. SINGLAUB. No, I did not. We did not discuss Nicaragua." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 234-36.)	
86/03/26-180 MARCH 26, 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs meets Singlaub in Costa Rica: "General Singlaub came to Costa Rica and called the embassy and asked for the courtesy of the mission. All right? "And consequently, as an old friend, we invited him over . . . . "Tomas Castillo and I sat down and gave him an unclassified briefing. We did not talk about the southern front in detail. We did not talk about Santa Elena, any of that stuff. And we told him some of the problems we saw in Costa Rica. ". . . . "We discussed Eden Pastora as we did the other forces down there." Tambs testified he did not notify the State Department before meeting with Singlaub. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 176-78.)	
86/03/26-190 MARCH 26, 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT TAMBS ACCOUNT (cont'd): Singlaub visits Tambs at the embassy in Costa Rica in the morning. He then meets with Eden Pastora and, that same afternoon, calls the embassy. Singlaub says, "My mission was always to find out what was going on and tell our fiends up here in Washington." So Tambs invites him for	

dinner.

Singlaub accepts. After he arrives, he gives Tambs a copy of an agreement he has entered into with Eden Pastora. The agreement states, "The United States will provide boots, food, ammunition, medicine, maps, military needs for Pastora's troops, including new men who join his army, training advisers."

"Mr. TAMBS. . . . And when I saw that, I said, I said, 'You cannot negotiate for the United States Government.' He said, 'That does not mean the United States Government.' He said, 'That means we private United Statesians.'

". . . .

"I said, I said, 'General,' I said, 'You cannot negotiate an agreement in the name of the United States Government.' He said, 'It does not mean the United States Government.'

"Mr. BELNICK. It only says United States." (JHICI Ex. LAT 1; Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 176-82.)

Singlaub sends the text of the agreement by cable to the State Department. The response is fast in coming:

"Mr. BELNICK. You received this cable in which . . . Deputy Assistant Secretary said, among other things, 'I was astounded by the report of the agreement, concluded between Singlaub and Eden Pastora[.] I fail to understand how you and the CIA representative could associate yourselves with an agreement which purports to commit the United States to provide military material and advisers in exchange for a series of undertakings on Pastora's behalf.'

"Now, sir, did you understand from the text of the agreement how the State Department might have concluded this was an agreement that purported to bind the United States of America?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, first of all, we did not associate ourselves with the agreement. We were reporting on an agreement between two private individuals.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. So you believed that the Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Assistant Secretary Abrams['] reaction to your cable, [your] sending the agreement, was not reasonable?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, whether it was reasonable or unreasonable, the fact is when we sent up a reporting cable, and reasonable men can have different views of something, so it was not unusual. [Sic.]

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you send up that reporting cable through a back channel?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes, indeed.

"Mr. BELNICK. The CIA channel?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . Why didn't you set it up through the normal diplomatic channel?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, because we did not, we work on a need-to-need basis; right? [Sic.]

"Mr. BELNICK. Even with agreements between purely private individuals?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, we had all sorts of

reporting which might go back channel, which was not really of great importance, so there was nothing unusual about that.

"Mr. BELNICK. It did not occur to you that despite disclaimers of United States involvement somebody might be able to use the text of that agreement to indicate that the United States Embassy had committed itself to supplying military needs of Eden Pastora? That was not your view?

"Mr. TAMBS. My view was that we should report to Washington what we had found out. And that is what we did."

(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 179-86; JHICI Exx. LAT 1 [cable from Tambs to the State Department, dated March 27, 1986], LAT 2 [cable to Tambs signed by Deputy Secretary Whitehead, dated March 29, 1986], LAT 3 [Tambs' reply, dated March 29, 1986: "We merely transmitted a copy of the private accord"], LAT 4 [Shultz cable to Tambs, dated April 4, 1986: "[T]he legal adivisor concludes that it is impossible to rule out the possibility that[,] your disclaimers of USG involvement notwithstanding[,] Pastora might attempt to use the Singlaub agreement to pressure or embarrass the USG."]. See Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 191 ["[D]istribution of messages through state channels can only be described as generous. And since we were operating on a need-to-know basis, we have believed it prudent to use the CIA channel."]; id., 5/28/87, at 199-202 [Tambs never notified Singlaub of State Department response to his agreement], id. 5/28/87, at 199-201, 203-05. See

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		also id., 5/28/87, at 251 [Tambs: "[T]he fact is that in many cases the State Department, sir, is a sieve. We had at least three cables . . . in Costa Rica . . . which were in the next morning newspapers, which gives one pause sometimes. So [the CIA] was a safer channel."].)	
86/03/26-250 LATE MARCH 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on the State Department reaction to the Singlaub-Pastora agreement: "Mr. BELNICK. When did you first learn of an agreement that General Singlaub had entered into with Eden Pastora? "Mr. BELNICK. Ambassador Tambs sent a back channel cable which gave the text of such an agreement. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. When you received that cable, that was the first you knew of the agreement? ". . . . "Mr. ABRAMS. That was the first I knew of this agreement between the United States and Eden Pastora. "Mr. BELNICK. Well, let me just take it one step further. It is also the first time that you knew of any agreement between General Singlaub and Eden Pastora? "Mr. ABRAMS. Of any agreement, yes. "Mr. BELNICK. The reason I am trying to be specific, sir, is because, as you know, General Singlaub has testified to the committees that he discussed his agreement with Pastora[] with you in	

a meeting before he went to Costa Rica.

"Mr. ABRAMS. We discussed at that April 24 meeting I think Eden Pastora. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . It is your testimony that you did not meet with General Singlaub before he went to see Pastora?

"Mr. ABRAMS. . . . Before he saw Pastora, yes[.] I think my first meeting with him was April 24.

". . . .

"Mr. ABRAMS. I had never met him before. I think that's right.

"Mr. BELNICK. So in your view, General Singlaub is mistaken in his testimony, A, he met with you before he went to see Pastora, and, B, advised you at that time about the agreement he intended to enter into with Pastora?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. I can only go by the documentary evidence and my memory. Both indicate that we did not discuss this prior to his trip to Central America.

"Mr. BELNICK. All right, sir. In any event, after you received Exhibit X, the back channel cable from Ambassador Tambs, you became angry at what you read, correct?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I sure did.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you reflected that in EA-Exhibit 1, the cable which was sent back to Ambassador Tambs and signed over Deputy Secretary Whitehead's name, correct?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. This was the toned-down version.

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"Mr. BELNICK. All right. And what was the source of your aggravation?

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, look at X, look at that exhibit. It is unbelievable. 'The United States will provide boots, food, ammunition, medicine, maps, encrypted' --first of all, military needs, first of all. Who is General Singlaub to negotiate on behalf of the United States? Secondly, and more incredibly, what is a U.S. ambassador saying this looks jim-dandy? Thirdly, talking about violations of the Boland Amendment, Jesus. This is a promise to send--I mean, it is unbelievable.

"Mr. BELNICK. All right.

"Mr. ABRAMS. It wasn't just my personal reaction. It was the reaction of others in the bureau, this was one of the more astonishing documents.

"Mr. BELNICK. Your cable really was the toned-down version?

"Mr. ABRAMS. That was not meant as a gratuitous remark.

"Mr. BELNICK. I understand.

"So you were also upset that, through meetings or being at the meeting with Singlaub, Ambassador Tambs seemed to associate the United States with this agreement Singlaub entered into, correct?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. If you look at this, no[]where does it say in here, of course, we told him that you know this was his own business. You can argue that even if he told Singlaub this is none of our business, that sending the cable was a form of facilitation."

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		(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 67-72; JHICI Ex. EA-X.)	
86/03/26-270 LATE MARCH THROUGH APRIL 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd): Abrams testified he met with Singlaub on April 23 or 24, 1986, and discussed the Singlaub-Pastora agreement. Abrams stated he did not express his Department's anger about the agreement. Abrams: "I didn't think that he had done anything wrong." Abrams explained further, "Singlaub is a private citizen. He could do what he wanted. . . . [H]e had made a mistake, but he is a private citizen and when a private citizen makes what I assumed to be an honest mistake of that sort, you say to him, 'Gee, you shouldn't do that.' The amazing, amazing action was that of the embassy." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 72, 80.)	
86/03/26-280 DURING 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Well, now, did you know that Ambassador Tambs was opening a Southern Front, assisting Colonel North in establishing an airstrip and engaged in the Singlaub-Pastora agreement? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I heard about the Singlaub agreement. That was reported. And that was totally out of line, and Ambassador Tambs--his report was that he wasn't involved in that, but he learned about it and he cabled us about it and we went back to him promptly and said you have to tell Mr. Pastora, this is without respect to the	

merits of the agreement, that the particular agreement was okay in its terms but that there was--that was not an agreement from the United States of America, it was a misrepresentation, and he should in no way think he has an agreement with the United States."
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 188.)

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THE PRIVATE DONORS: O'BOYLE
O'BOYLE ACCOUNT:

Jane McLaughlin calls William O'Boyle, says she has gotten O'Boyle's name through an old Texas friend, and asks if he "might be interested in coming down to the White House for a briefing on the political and military situation in Nicaragua." O'Boyle flies down on March 27, 1986, and is met at National Airport by McLaughlin and a limousine.

McLaughlin takes O'Boyle to the Hay-Adams Hotel where he meets representatives of IBC, as well as Carl Channell, some NEPL staff members, and several other possible NEPL contributors.

The group spends about a half hour at the Hay-Adams, then goes to a conference room at the OEOB. North addresses the group of 10 or 12 people on "the military and political situation in Nicaragua." He shows pictures of an airport recently built in Nicaragua, shows "how the harbors of Nicaragua were being enlarged," and describes "the refugee problem" to be anticipated. North explains to the group how "it is really the Russians managing the diplomacy of the Nicaraguans before the United Nations." North also "show[s] photographs which indicated that the Nicaraguan government officials were indicated [sic] in smuggling dope." North does not ask for contributions.

The group then goes back to a reception at the Hay-Adams, where Richard Miller of IBC joins them. O'Boyle, "concerned and upset" about what he has heard, asks Chris Littledale or Cliff Smith ("either an NEPL or IBC employee") if there is any way he can supply weapons, or military equipment to the Contras.

The discussion turns to cost of weapons: "For example, a blowpipe missile costs $20,000 . . . . " McLaughlin or Channell suggests that O'Boyle stay for the night; they have already made a hotel reservation for him.

After dinner, Channell joins O'Boyle to say he has heard O'Boyle is "willing to make an especially large contribution with the idea of possibly supplying weapons or military equipment of some kind to the contras. He said that there was a very small group of people in the United States that the President relied on to make that kind of contribution, that this was a cause that was very dear to the President's heart . . . ." Channell invites him to breakfast with North the next morning.

That night or before meeting North the next morning, Channell tells O'Boyle that for a $300,000 or greater contribution, he can have a 15-minute unrecorded off-the-record meeting with the President. (O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 18-27. See id., 5/21/87, at 63-68.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/03/27-420 1984-87		RICHARD MILLER'S FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES SUMMARY: For a description of Richard Miller's activities, and his connection with International Business Communications (IBC), see Iran-Contra Report, at 85-87. On private fund-raising for the Contras, see generally Iran-Contra Report, at 85-103. (See also 85/08/01-405 [Carl Channell].)	
86/03/28-100 MARCH 28, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: O'BOYLE O'BOYLE ACCOUNT: The morning after he arrives in Washington at Jane McLaughlin's invitation to a White House meeting, William O'Boyle has breakfast with North and Channell. Channell tells him that his background has been checked out overnight and that no record would be kept of his stay at the Hay-Adams. After North arrives, Channell introduces O'Boyle "as someone who was willing to provide money for weapons." (O'Boyle: "I don't recall his exact words.") North tells O'Boyle "he could not ask for money himself as a government employee, but that he could provide information and he did that. He began to explain the type of weapons which were needed." North refers to his small notebook as he talks about Blowpipe missiles at $20,000 apiece but sold in ten-packs, and about Maule aircraft at $65,000 each. North leaves, and Channell continues the discussion. O'Boyle says he will think it over	

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		and get back to Channell if he wants to contribute. A few days later, O'Boyle returns to Washington from New York and goes to NEPL headquarters. Jane McLaughlin takes him to the Hay-Adams, where Channell meets them. O'Boyle hands him a check for $130,000 and says, "[T]his is for two of the Maule aircraft." Channell goes out and calls North who then joins them. Channell shows him O'Boyle's check, and North acknowledges the contribution. They discuss weapons again, and North says the source of the Blowpipes "had decided not to sell to Colonel North's group for one reason or the other." North "review[s] the Eastern Bloc ammunition that was required." Channell adds that if O'Boyle donates around $300,000 or "commit[s] to becoming a fund raiser . . . that [O'Boyle] would meet the President." O'Boyle later sends Channell a mailgram that he does not wish to contribute further. (O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 27-35; JHICI Ex. WBO 1 [O'Boyle's check for $130,000, dated 3/31/86, made out to NEPL]. See O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 79-82; id., 5/21/87 at 83 [O'Boyle testifying on Channell's comment that for a $300,000 contribution, he could meet with the President: "Colonel North was present when that was discussed. And he didn't confirm it or deny it."]; id., 5/21/87, at 140 [O'Boyle accepts characterization that North and Channell worked "as a team"].)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/03/28-120 DURING 1985 AND 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: O'BOYLE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you sit down with these people [donors] together with Spitz Channell? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, on a number of occasions. I sat down with Mr. Channell and others. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you[,] after telling them what the contras' needs were, did you tell them that Mr. Channel would be the one who would have to ask them for a contribution? "Mr. NORTH. I don't remember ever saying those words to anybody. I want to make it very clear: I did tell people I could not and would not solicit, that I wasn't going to ask them for their money and I do not recall ever being in the presence of Mr. Channell at any time when he asked someone for money, at any time. Nor do I ever recall Mr. Channell offering someone a visit to the Oval Office with the President of the United States of America for a price. "I received several suggestions to that effect by several other people, and they were turned away. I never, ever heard that a certain contribution would result in a meeting with the President of the United States of America. "I do not recall ever being at such a meetings. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you arrange such meetings? "Did you arrange such meetings with the President? "Mr. NORTH. I do not believe that I personally arranged -- I may have sent forward	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		scheduled proposals. You will certainly have them because I would have had copies of them in my office. "I don't remember more than one or two occasions where I actually asked for meetings that I set up. "Now, others at the White House did indeed set those up and I was a party to that, knowing that these were contributors that had helped the resistance. "Mr. NIELDS. And -- "Mr. NORTH. Or these were people who might contribute to the resistance. Those meetings did happen at the White House, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Some of them were with people who had actually made contributions? "Mr. NORTH. Oh, yes. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And the contributions had been obtained in part through your efforts? "Mr. NORTH. People give me a lot of credit. If someone wants to say, 'It was a speech by Ollie North that made me want to give money to help the Nicaraguan resistance,' I appreciate that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 237-39. See id., 7/8/87, at 209 [North: "I have never to my recollection solicited funds . . . ."]. See also id., 7/10/87, at 86-87 [scheduling requests]; JHICI Ex. OLN 10 [North PROF to Poindexter, 5/16/86: "the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their support"].)	
86/03/28-130		THE PRIVATE DONORS: MUNITIONS LISTS AND	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
DURING 1985 AND 1986		ADVERTISING COSTS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you give munitions lists? "Mr. NORTH. I am sure that I did. I gave the cost of various munitions, the cost of various airports [sic], the cost of Blowpipe Missiles, as they were provided to me. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you give costs of advertising? "Mr. NORTH. I don't know that I did. I wasn't quite as familiar with advertising as I was with weapon systems. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever tell the President of the United States that the only thing that people were being asked to do was to contribute for advertising? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall ever telling the President that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 89-90.)	
86/03/28-135 BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: NORTH'S LETTERS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. FASCELL. Did you authorize Rich Miller, or anyone else for that matter, to draft letters for your signature which were sent to individuals who were helpful? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did. "Mr. FASCELL. And were those letters actually drafted by Rich Miller, and did you authorize him to sign it, or did you sign them? "Mr. NORTH. No. I believe I signed out several hundred letters to people who had supported the resistance."	

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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		(North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 81.)	
86/03/28-140 1984-86		THE PRIVATE DONORS: PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. FASCELL. . . . [Y]ou get the idea all these persons who are coming in, potential contributors, supporters or whatever, were going to be given the red carpet treatment, as you already testified; they would get the briefing, the North treatment and whoever else, and then . . . when it was possible, the President would drop in for five minutes and people would be motivated. "As a matter of fact, back in the bunker at NSC about that same period of time, North was sending out letters to these people, and I'm not saying anything was bad about this, I'm just saying this is what happened, and many of these people did contribute both for whatever, the contras or ads for the newspaper or television spots, et cetera. And they hired public relation experts out of this money and a lot of money was raised. "The question is, did you tell the President what this was all about, this whole operation? "Mr. REGAN. I think I probably would have given him about three or four minutes' briefing just prior to his going into this meeting. "Mr. FASCELL. So he would know what he was standing up for? "Mr. REGAN. Exactly." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 192-93.)	

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JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

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DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/03/28-500 MARCH 28, 1986			DIVERSION: ISRAELI REPLENISHMENT NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: Nir and North discuss how to divide up the profits from the sale of the HAWK spare parts. North's notebooks record a conversation with Nir on March 28, 1986: "Needs by Tues: "-Price data on 240 "-Timing for acquisition "-try to add costs of [blank] "-need to know residuals on "-Price per unit ($6068) "-Price in Aaron's place "-How much is left for use by Israelis "-. . . " "Aaron" was the code name for DoD official Noel Koch; "Aaron's place" was, presumably, the Pentagon. The conversation reflects the Israelis' desire to know how much of the residuals would be available to finance the Israelis' purchase of the 504 replacement TOWs. (North notebook entry, 3/28/86 [Committee Document Q 2075]; Iran-Contra Report, at 224. On North's codes, see JHICI Ex. DoD 13. See also above at 86/01/12-110.)
86/03/31-100 MARCH 31, 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD reports to GPS on SINGLAUB'S agreement with PASTORA, and AMBASSADOR TAMBS' involvement. WHITEHEAD says ABRAMS very concerned about TAMBS, noting 'it's all illegal	

apparently' and that there was 'no knowledge here until it over'. GPS tells staff 'we have to take this on.' Immediate cable rejecting arrangement." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology continues at 86/04/04-800. On the Singlaub-Pastora Agreement, see entries starting at 86/03/26-100.)

86/03/31-400
MARCH 31,
1986

OVERCHARGING THE CONTRAS
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

Rodriguez testifying on an invoice to Lake Resources, and on the amount designated therein for pilots' salaries:

"Mr. TRIBLE. Let me move to another area to make the same point about profiteering. To the best of your knowledge, what was the pay of the pilots?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, as I understand from them, it was $3000 a month. I never saw any paper . . . . Hasenfus testified when he was released and when he was down there that his salary and one of the other pilot[']s was $3000 a month.

"Mr. TRIBLE. Your understanding then was they were paid $3000 a month?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. $3000 a month, plus a bonus for every flight they make inside the country, inside Nicaragua.

"Mr. TRIBLE. And that was $700 a flight.

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. At the beginning it was $700 per pilot and $450 for the crews and . . . [later] they decided to pay equal to all of them.

"Mr. TRIBLE. All right, sir.

"Let me refer you to . . . Exhibit FIR-6,

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		which is a billing to Lake Resources. Do you have any indication why the billings to Lake Resources indicate a daily rate of $450, which adds up to about $13,500 a month? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir, I have no explanation . . . . "Mr. TRIBLE. This indicates, does it not, a substantial overcharging; that they were being charged far in excess to what the pilots received. "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. If Hasenfus was correct for $3,000, of course, a tremendous overcharge on that." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 33-34; JHICI Ex. FIR 6.)	
86/03/31-440 MARCH 31, 1986		OVERCHARGING THE CONTRAS: Sen. Rudman on JHICI Ex. FIR 6: "[The exhibit represents an invoice to Lake Resources, Incorporated from East, Incorporated. "Let the record show that East, Incorporated was a corporation formed by General Secord and his associate, Mr. Hakim, but nominally owned by Mr. Gadd. "And Lake Resources is a Secord-Hakim Company. ". . . . "So even though East theoretically was set up, General Secord and Mr. Hakim didn't put the prime assets in that corporation, they were put in Udall Incorporated, and money was funneled from Lake down to East to pay for the expenses of the planes owned by Udall, essentially all owned by Mr. Hakim and General Secord." (JHICI, 5/28/87, at 104, 107. See id., 5/28/87,	

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		at 123 [Sen. Sarbanes: "I note [the invoice] is dated March 31 of 1986."]. But see id., 5/28/87, at 110 [Sen. McClure: ". . . I am a little puzzled by the [Rudman] characterization of this last invoice, because I, too, can read the invoice, but I don't know what period of time it covers."].)	
86/03/31-500 MARCH 31, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEAKS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Next, I would like to have marked a PROF note dated 3/31/86. This one is from you, Admiral. ". . . . "Q. I would like you to explain to me what it's all about. "A. I remember this pretty well. "Q. Tell us what that's all about. "A. All right. In one of the last votes -- let's see, 3/31/86. That seems early. My recollection of the event -- and I thought it was the vote in the Senate. I don't think that took place that early. "[Redacted.] "Well, shortly after -- and then eventually we won the vote in the Senate. Still, the time frame of this bothers me a little bit. I don't think that quite matches up. "But, anyway, shortly after we agreed to do that, there was a story in the newspaper that was something to the effect that the administration would [redacted.] "My staff had informed me that they were	

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		almost certain that Mike Pillsbury, an employee of the Defense Department who worked in the covert action programs there, was responsible for leaking this information. I called Will Taft and told him that was my suspicion, and that I was so annoyed about it that until they conduct[ed] an investigation over there and questioned Pillsbury on it, we were not going to inform them of any more covert activities." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 205-06; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 20 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier, "Pillsbury," 3/31/86].)	
86/04/00-000 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1986		SECORD'S CENTRAL AMERICA TRIP SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord speaks personally with the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador during Secord's "brief trip to El Salvador in April of '86." The Ambassador gives "moral support." Secord testifies, "I know that he was sympathetic with our operation, and I know that he kept track of it." This trip, lasting less than a day ("I'm guessing . . . six hours") is Secord's only trip to Central America. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 147, 153-54. See 86/04/20-220 [Gadd testimony on a trip to El Salvador with North, Secord, and Quintero in late April 1986].)	
86/04/00-400 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1986		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen travels to Costa Rica and delivers a KL-43 from North to a senior CIA official. (Owen	

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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		Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 31. See id., at 32 [Owen testified he himself did not have a KL-43.] See also above at 84/01/25-300: Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 54, 56 [Castillo: "Although I understand Mr. Owen testified that he delivered it[,] I have no recollection of that."].)	
86/04/01-400 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD GARWOOD ACCOUNT: Ellen Garwood travels to Washington, D.C. for a meeting of contributors to NEPL and to see the President ("they [Channell's organization] had made an appointment with me to see the President"). Channell tells her prior to the visit that she will be asked for "a [ ] much larger donation than I had been asked for before for [NEPL]." She meets Channell and North after dinner at the Hay-Adams Hotel "in sort of [a] corner of a little room adjoining the cocktail room." Channell tells her the Contras face a crisis in Nicaragua; "then Colonel North appeared and described this crisis." Norths tells Garwood the Contras are out of food, clothes, medicine and other necessities, "and also out--practically out of weapons. . . . And then Mr. Channell and Colonel North spoke in low tones to each other and after they had finished, Mr. Channell pronounced [sic] a list of weapons that they needed." During the meeting, North never indicates to Garwood that any information she hears is classified. The list, which Garwood brings back to Texas with her (and which eventually disappears in its	

travels between her attorney and the manager of Garwood's trust account), was "a very small piece of paper." It included, however, "different categories of weapons, [ ] hand grenades, . . . bullets, cartridge belts, possibly surface-to-air missiles," as well as quantities needed and prices. "The approximate total amount was over a million, . . . probably a million and a half, something like that."

Channell asks Garwood to contribute only after North leaves: "Can you help provide for this and some of the other needs Colonel North had described?"

Garwood then returns to Texas and discusses the contribution with her trust manager and attorney. She send NEPL $1,633,506 in shares of stock and cash by wire transfer on April 15, 1986.

On May 19, 1986, she sends NEPL an additional $350,000. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 8-16, 43; JHICI Exx. ECG 1 through 3. See Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 57-59, 75-77.)

THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD
GARWOOD ACCOUNT (cont'd):

Garwood takes a tax deduction for her donations on her 1986 tax forms. Channell calls her later, in December 1986, and they discuss the tax question. He tells Garwood, "I have talked to Colonel North since this happened [apparently "after the Iran Contra affair had been aired"] and he told me that since you were able to supply . . . humanitarian needs . . . Colonel North told me that your money could go for that, and because you were relieving them of the need to get this amount other ways, they . . . wo[u]ld have that extra money for the weapons. So the weapons were handled in another way."

On April 13, 1987, Garwood's attorney calls Larry Bagdorf at the IRS in Washington who confirms that NEPL was tax exempt throughout 1986. "Based on that information," Garwood takes the deduction.

After Channell pleads guilty to federal charges related to his organization, Garwood amends her return and does not take the deduction. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 40-43. See id., 5/21/87, at 87 [When asked whether it appeared that North "actually went out of his way, especially being careful to not ask you to contribute," Garwood testified, "It did occur to me that he was doing that"].), 87-88 [Garwood's taxes], 140 [Garwood accepts characterization that North and Channell worked as a team.].)

86/04/01-430
APRIL 1986
AND AT OTHER
TIMES

THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on his meeting with Garwood and on his meetings with private contributors to the Contras in general:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [D]id you sit down with Ellen Garwood at the Hay-Adams Hotel and show her a list of munitions that the contras needed, together with Spitz Channell, giving an amount of money that needed to be contributed in order to purchase the weapons, and did they thereafter make the contribution?

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		"Mr. NORTH. I do not recall the specific event that you are talking about, but I met a number of times with Lady Ellen Garwood, I met a number of times with a lot of people. I am not denying that I did those things, and if she said I showed a munitions list, I showed a lot of munitions lists. "Mr. NIELDS. You showed a lot of different people munitions lists? "Mr. NORTH. Sure. People would ask me, 'What do these things cost[]?' I would take out a munitions list. I would say, 'There is the cost of one of those things, or many of those things. That is what they cost.' "Mr. NIELDS. Did you let them know how much the contras needed money for munitions? "Mr. NORTH. I let them know how much the contras needed everything. The Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters were at a point where they were dying in the field under Soviet Hind helicopters. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Did you sit down with these people together with Spitz Channell? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, on a number of occasions. I sat down with Mr. Channell and others. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you after telling them what the contras' needs were, did you tell them that Mr. Channel would be the one who would have to ask them for a contribution? "Mr. NORTH. I don't remember ever saying those words to anybody. I want to make it very clear: I did tell people I could not and would not solicit, that I wasn't going to ask them for	

their money and I do not recall ever being in the presence of Mr. Channell at any time when he asked someone for money, at any time. Nor do I ever recall Mr. Channell offering someone a visit to the Oval Office with the President of the United States of America for a price.

"I received several suggestions to that effect by several other people, and they were turned away. I never, ever heard that a certain contribution would result in a meeting with the President of the United States of America.

"I do not recall ever being at such a meetings.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you arrange such meetings?

"Did you arrange such meetings with the President?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not believe that I personally arranged -- I may have sent forward scheduled proposals. You will certainly have them because I would have had copies of them in my office.

"I don't remember more than one or two occasions where I actually asked for meetings that I set up.

"Now, others at the White House did indeed set those up and I was a party to that, knowing that these were contributors that had helped the resistance.

"Mr. NIELDS. And --

"Mr. NORTH. Or these were people who might contribute to the resistance. Those meetings did happen at the White House, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Some of them were with people who had actually made contributions?

"Mr. NORTH. Oh, yes. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the contributions had been obtained in part through your efforts?

"Mr. NORTH. People give me a lot of credit. If someone wants to say, 'It was a speech by Ollie North that made me want to give money to help the Nicaraguan resistance,' I appreciate that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 236-39. See id., 7/8/87, at 209 [North: "I have never to my recollection solicited funds . . . ."].)

86/04/03-100
APRIL 3, 1986

CAVE'S REPORT ON GHORBANIFAR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

CAVE MEMO:

Ghorbanifar meets in Washington with North, Cave, and the CIA Chief of the Near East Division. They discuss availability of HAWK spare parts and the timing of the release of hostages before any HAWK parts are delivered, and as soon as the U.S. delegation arrives in Tehran.

Cave writes about the discussions with Ghorbanifar:

". . . .

"4. we discussed the schedule in some detail. we proposed arriving about 7-8 days after the money is deposited. this would give us time to have the plane[] load of spaces positioned in europe. we then haggled for hours about what was included and what would be negotiated in tehran. we stuck to our position that once the release takes place we would order plane to launch and it should arrive in bandar abbas with 8 hours. it would then turn around and bring in the rest of the spares. we are tentavilye [sic] committed to dleiver [sic] the 3,000 volswagons [sic] [3,000 TOWs] about 10 days later. gorba pressed for new additions. . . . gorba kept[] insisting that we bring some of spares with us and we kept insisting that we wouldn't although a small sample is an option.

". . . .

"6. possibly the best indication that we might be getting somewhere is that towards the end, gorba began discussing his cut. goode [North] told him that he could add on whatever he thinks irght [sic] for his cut to the final price. he said that he had spent 300,000 dollars already to grease the skids etc. . . . it would appear that he now feels that the deal is entering its final stages.

". . . .

"8. gorba claims that the iranian side is devoting considerable time to this. the whole thing is being masterminded by rafsenjani [sic] behind the scenes. . . .

". . . ."

(Cave memo, "Meeting with Gorba 3 april," 4/3/86 [Committee Documents C 09509-09510]; Iran-Contra Report, at 224.)

86/04/03-150
APRIL 3-4,
1986

NORTH'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH GHORBANIFAR:
PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. The records that we have seen, Admiral Poindexter, show that Ghorbanifar met with North

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in Washington, D.C. on April 3 and April 4, 1986, to discuss arrangements for delivery of Hawk parts and hostages and the upcoming meeting. That is in the Tower Report [at B-85 to -86], as well.

"Do you have any recollection as you sit here today as to whether you briefed the President of the United States on the meetings that North was having with Ghorbanifar?

"MR. BECKLER: I have a continuing objection.

". . . .

"Approximately two weeks ago we had a discussion, which went on the record at the time of the deposition in which we stated our position that we have been requesting since December of 1986 the 0930 file and we finally found out late yesterday we could have some access to it today, which is unfortunately -- without access to that file we are not prepared to answer questions about discussions with the President.

". . . .

"Many of these events that you are talking about relate to events that have been testified to before.

"MR. LIMAN: There has been no testimony about whether he kept the President informed about Colonel North's negotiations with Ghorbanifar.

"Did you?

"MR. BECKLER: We are not going to answer questions about conversations with the President. We have already said that.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Do you have any recollection on this subject?

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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			"Bearing in mind that your recollection may be refreshed if you see a 0930 file, do you have any recollection? "A. Recollection of what? "Q. Of keeping the President informed about North's negotiations with Ghorbanifar. "MR. BECKLER: You can say you have a recollection. You do have a recollection. You can say that. "THE WITNESS: I have a recollection. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. And can you tell me generally whether you did keep the President informed of North's negotiations with Ghorbanifar? "MR. BECKLER: At what period of time? "MR. LIMAN: Let's take the period in the month or two leading up to the Tehran mission. "MR. BECKLER: Let's confer. Let's go outside here. "(Discussion off the record.) "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Is there an answer to the question? "MR. BECKLER: No. "MR. LIMAN: You are not letting him answer? "MR. BECKLER: That is correct." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 2-5 [followed at pp. 5-9 by discussion among the lawyers of Poindexter's prior access to his notes of 9:30 meetings with the President and his 5/2/87 deposition transcript, and the Independent Counsel's investigation].)
86/04/03-299	POINDEXTER'S CONTACT WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT,		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
APRIL 3, 1986 8:35 a.m., 11:40 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.	4/3/86 POINDEXTER SCHEDULE AND PHONE RECORDS: According to Poindexter's phone records, at 8:35 a.m. on April 3, 1986, he and the Vice President speak by phone. At 11:40 a.m., according to Poindexter's schedule, he meets with the Vice President until 12:20 p.m. at the Vice President's OEOB office. (Poindexter, Schedule, 4/3/86 [Committee Document N 52091]; Poindexter, Telephone log, 4/3/86 [Committee Document N 52550].)		
86/04/03-305 APRIL 3, 1986, 12:57 p.m.			THE TEHRAN TRIP: VICE PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS, AND TIMING THE TRIP TO ACCOMMODATE HIM POINDEXTER PROF: Poindexter tells North by PROF message: "If we can manage it, the VP would appreciate it if the Iran trip did not take place until he leaves Saudi Arabia. If that screws up planning too much, then he will understand that we can't do it." (JHICI Ex. 45-I [Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran," 4/3/86].)
86/04/04-010 APRIL 4, 1986 [?]		THE DIVERSION MEMO TEXT: See col. 3.	THE DIVERSION MEMO TEXT, Part 1: Around April 4, 1986, North prepares an extensive report for Poindexter, entitled "Release of American Hostages in Beirut." (See 86/00/04-100.) In the memo, North summarizes the Iran Initiative, beginning with a June 1985 meeting involving certain "private American and Israeli citizens."

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			Under the subheading "Current Situation" on page 2, North details the agreement reached at the most recent meeting on April 3-4, 1986 among Ghorbanifar and U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.: ". . . Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows: "--By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer $17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of $15 million. "--On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer $3.651 million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S. "--On Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring $3.651 million worth of HAWK missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to [a CIA storage facility]. This process is estimated to take seven working days. "--On Friday, April 18, a private U.S. aircraft (707B) will pick-up the HAWK missile parts at [redacted] and fly them to a covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the earlier delivery of the 1000 TOWs). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.

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			"--On Saturday, April 20, the following series of events will occur: "-U.S. party arrives Tehran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Iranian delegation. "-At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Beirut. "-At A+15 hours, the IDF aircraft with the HAWK missile parts aboard will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran." (JHICI Ex. OLN 1 [= JMP 38; FH 8]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 225 [substitution for bracketed redacted material as provided in Report].)
86/04/04-011 APRIL 4, 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO TEXT: See col. 3.	THE DIVERSION MEMO TEXT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] Under a second subheading, "Discussion," starting on page 3, North lists nine points to be discussed with the Iranian Government through Ghorbanifar. The ninth topic reads: "--The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows: "-$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original 508 sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks. "-$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance

inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to 'bridge' the period between now and when Congressionally-approved lethal assistance (beyond the $25 million in 'defensive' arms) can be delivered."

The text of the memo then concludes:

"The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

"Finally, we should recognize that the Iranians will undoubtedly want to discuss additional arms and commercial transactions as 'quids' for accommodating [redacted] Nicaragua, and Iraq. Our emphasis on the Soviet military and subversive threat, a useful mechanism in bringing them to agreement on the hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for means to protect themselves against/deter the Soviets.

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			"RECOMMENDATION "That the President approve the structure depicted above under 'Current Situation' and the Terms of Reference at Tab A. "Approve ______ Disapprove ______ "Attachment "Tab A - U.S.-Iranian Terms of Reference" (JHICI Ex. OLN 1 [= JMP 38; FH 8]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 225.)
86/04/04-100 APRIL 4, 1986 [?]		THE DIVERSION MEMO McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE DIVERSION MEMO McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Memorandum from North to Poindexter (titled "Terms of Reference U.S. - Iran Dialogue") states that of the residual funds from the Iranian arms transaction, "$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces." "Mr. COURTER. . . . But you did not see that memorandum; is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 55-56; JHICI Ex. 10 [= Ex. OLN 1; JMP 38]. See McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 88-89 [McFarlane has "no indications" that the President knew of the memo]. On diversion memos generally, see entries starting at 86/00/04-301.)
86/04/04-105 APRIL 1986 AND NOVEMBER 23-24, 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "THE WITNESS: This is a very strange document. "BY MR. LIMAN:	THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Q. Have you see this document [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16] before?

"A. Well, that is my handwriting on the cover sheet, but I don't think all these pages are related.

"Q. Well, this is the way it was given to us after being taken by the FBI. I believe, Admiral, that a copy of this was in your file.

"A. Well, as I said, that's my handwriting at the top, with instructions to my outer office.

"Let me finish looking at it.

"Q. Tell me what is strange about it. It reads from one -- pages 1 through page 5, and it refers --

"A. But you see --

"Q. -- to the terms of reference.

"A. But I think -- oh, okay. I see what it is.

"Q. It asks that the President approve the terms of reference and then the terms of reference follow.

"A. When I first started reading it, I thought it was an early draft of the chronology, but it isn't that.

"Q. No, it isn't.

"A. Okay. I see what it is.

"Q. Okay. Do you recall seeing this document?

"A. Yes. I recall seeing it, but the time that I recall seeing it is -- well, until I saw this --

"Q. This being your handwriting?

"A. My handwriting here.

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		"You see, I am not sure -- I think what this is, as I told you earlier, on Sunday, the 23rd of November, Colonel North called me -- maybe I didn't say this yet. Colonel North called me at home on Sunday the 23rd after he had finished meeting with the Attorney General most of the day; and I was getting ready to sit down and eat dinner. I think it was on a non-secure line. "Colonel North said, 'Admiral, I spent all day with the Attorney General, and his people turned up a memo on the contra connection to the Iranian project.' He said, 'I've explained everything to the Attorney General.' I can't remember my exact reaction, but at that point I was getting pretty tired. "But anyway, I said, 'Well, I'll see you in the office tomorrow.' "He came into the office on Monday, explained that the Attorney General's people had found a memo and -- in his safe which revealed the contra connection. I believe I probably said something to the effect at the time I was surprised there was anything in writing on it. I said, 'I don't remember the memo that you are referring to. Send me a copy of it.' "Later in the day, either -- well, it would have been Monday the 24th, I guess -- later that day, he apparently sent a copy over and the first time I recall seeing this together was the following morning on the 25th. After I had breakfast, after seeing the Attorney General early in the morning, and also talking to Don Regan, Commander Thompson came in. I said, 'Did Ollie	

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		ever send over that memo?' He brought what I believe -- this is a copy of what he brought in at that time. "I think the timing on this note on the top was sometime that last week in November. "Q. You mean the note that you wrote 'keep this together for me. Iran. J.P.' You believe you wrote that when you were given the copy in November? "A. That's right." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 176-78; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16 [= JHICI Exx. JMP 34, OLN 1, FH 8; the Diversion Memo].)	
86/04/04-106 APRIL 4, 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. But did you see this [sc. the Diversion Memo, Poindexter Dep. Ex 16] at or about the time it was written? "A. I may have. I did not recall it. I don't recall it now. "Q. When you look at it, there's a reference to 'the residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows.' It says, '$2 million to purchase the replacement TOWs,' and then says '$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces.' "A. Right. "Q. Does that refresh your recollection that you saw this memo at the time? "A. No, it doesn't.	THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		"Q. Were you given that information orally? "A. I think -- you know, I have tried to speculate and recall whether I had seen this before. My supposition is that this is probably the memorandum that Colonel North used to brief me on the Iranian project and that he had come up with a plan that would transfer funds to the contras. "Q. Let me ask you this, Admiral: When you briefed the President on a January 17th finding, you were talking about a sale by the CIA to Iran without any profit to the agent; that's what you were talking about, correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. Now you are being told by Colonel North that the transaction is going to end up generating as much as $12 million for the contras; correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. Did you not think that it was a matter of sufficient importance that the President of the United States should make the decision? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. You recognize that if this became public, the fact that the money was being funneled, it would cause enormous embarrassment to his administration; correct? "A. I think that's probably one thing that I underestimated. "Q. Well, did you not realize that it could at the very least cause problems with Congress in terms of funding? "A. I didn't think those were insurmountable. I knew it would cause problems. That is clearly	

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		why I decided not to tell him. "Q. But by not telling the President, you preempted a decision from him; is that correct? "A. I didn't view it that way, Mr. Liman. I viewed it as the important objective here was to keep the democratic forces, the contras, alive, until we got the legislation changed. "As I said earlier, we were very confident, including myself, that we could get the legislation in 1986. But it was going to take time. We simply -- they didn't have the funds to last that long." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/86, at 178-81.)	
86/04/04-107 DURING 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY; AND NHAO, GENERALLY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Who told you they [sc. the Contras] didn't have the funds to last that long? "A. Colonel North. That was also, I think, supported by the general view of the restricted IG [sc. the RIG] and the CIA that were keeping track of it from an intelligence point of view. "Q. Admiral, were you told that the NHAO organization couldn't even spend the money that had been appropriated for it? "A. No. I was not told. "Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Duemling? "A. Duemling. I met with Duemling very early on when the NHAO was established. Secretary Shultz, as I recall, had kind of a kick-off organizational meeting with all of the interagency	THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		players that were involved and I attended that, but didn't attend that level. He did not chair it again. So I didn't attend any more of those meetings. "I can't recall -- I could have had some telephone conversations with Duemling, but my staff dealt with him and I didn't. "Q. I marked as the next exhibit -- "A. I don't think, by the way -- excuse me. I don't think that -- if that is the case, I'd be very surprised; in fact, I thought just the opposite was the case, that NHAO was going to run out of money at the end of March. There would still be material in the piepline. "Q. You didn't know he had to make block grants in order to get rid of the money by the time that Congress had put the deadine on? "A. I don't recall being aware of that. "Q. Admiral, did you ever see any other versions of this memorandum, referring to the use of the proceeds of the arms sales for Iran? "A. I do not recall seeing any other versions of it. "Q. Any other writings referring to it? "A. Writings? "Q. Other than that PROF note on the 6 million [see 86/05/16-440]? "A. I simply don't recall. "Q. Did you ever -- "A. In fact, my operating assumption was that there wasn't anything in writing on it, because I told Colonel North repeatedly not to put anything in writing on the transfer of funds to the contras	

and not to talk to anybody about it.

"Q. Transfer of funds from whom?

"A. From the Iranian project to the democratic resistance, to the contras.

"Q. How many -- you said you told him repeatedly?

"A. I told him several times. I was surprised to learn -- and I forget exactly when I learned it -- that he said something to Mr. McFarlane on the way back from Tehran. I would have advised him or told him not to do that if I knew he was planning on it.

"Q. Why?

"A. Because, again, I didn't want anybody else responsible for it.

"Q. You were willing to take the rap yourself?

"A. I was willing to take the responsibility for my decision. I thought it was important to the President and I thought it was important to the long-term interests of the United States.

"MR. VAN CLEVE: Admiral, did it ever occur to you that because you didn't tell the President about the fact that the Iranians were about to be overcharged, you might prejudice the possibility of future relationships between the United states and Iran?

"THE WITNESS: That was not really part of my calculus, I guess. We thought -- I think, trying to reconstruct again my frame of mind at the time, by that point, when Colonel North raised this with me, we knew that the Iranians were being overcharged prior to U.S. involvement. The

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		Iranians were, in my assessment, were aware that they were having to pay premiums prices, and its long-term impact on U.S.-Iranian relations was pretty low on my concern." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 181-84.)	
86/04/04-110 AROUND APRIL 1986 AND NOVEMBER 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. The colonel has testified that he wrote this [Ex. JMP 38] at the beginning of April 1986. "Do you recall seeing this memorandum or a final version of it at or about that time? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not, Mr. Liman. "The first time that I recall seeing a memo like this was on Tuesday morning, the 25th of November 1986. "Mr. LIMAN. At the time you saw it, then, were you surprised to see a memorandum with a reference to the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I was. "Mr. LIMAN. Let me say for the record I am using the diversion as a shorthand and not for any legal characterization. "Mr. BECKLER. Thank you, Mr. Liman. I appreciate that. I want to make sure-- "Mr. LIMAN. I would like the record to reflect that it is the first expression of appreciation that I have drawn in these hearings in two months. "Mr. BECKLER. Somebody has to help you out. "Thank you, Mr. Liman." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 109.)	THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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86/04/04-115 APRIL - NOVEMBER, 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. So you remember that when you saw it in November finally that you were surprised to see this? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I was. "In fact, most of the--I would say in the October-November time frame, when it began to look like we were having some trouble here in keeping the secret nature of what we were doing secret, my recollection is that I was operating under the assumption there was very little, if anything, in writing on the plan to transfer the funds to the contras. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Ms. Hall testified publicly, as I am sure you are aware, that she recalled that she sent a draft of this memorandum to you and got it back with some corrections. "Does that refresh your recollection that you received this memorandum? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, it doesn't. I heard her testify to that. I don't recall seeing this until November of 1986." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 109-10; JHICI Ex. JMP 34 [diversion memo]. For testimony of North and others on diversion memos, see entries starting at 86/00/04-100.)	THE DIVERSION MEMO: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/04/04-118 DURING 1986		DIVERSION MEMOS: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Did you ever see a memo before November 24 [1986] that referred to the diversion?	DIVERSION MEMOS: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. I don't recall any.

"Q. Now have you watched Fawn Hall's testimony at all?

"A. I did.

"Q. Do you recall her testimony that this memorandum was sent to you and that her recollection was that it came back with any corrections?

"A. I heard her say that. [See 86/04/04-201.]

"Q. Does that in any way refresh your recollection that you received this memorandum?

"A. It does not.

"Q. If anyone were to say that you received as many as five to six memoranda that referred to the diversion, would that refresh your recollection in any way?

"A. No, it doesn't. I doubt that.

"Q. Do you deny that you received more than one memorandum from Oliver North referring to the diversion?

"MR. BECKLER: I'm going to object to this question. We have been over this ground. He answered it on May 2 as to what his recollection is about this memorandum. We're back at it again. If you have independent information about five or six or ten people telling him that he may have seen a deposition, fine. We will face it at some point.

"But we are not going to answer any repeat questions about this.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. Do you deny that you received more than one memorandum from Oliver North referring to the diversion?

"MR. BECKLER: We're not here to go over this.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. Do you deny that you received as many as five memoranda from Oliver North which referred to the diversion?

"(Witness conferring with counsel.)

"THE WITNESS: I won't deny that I didn't get that many, but I don't remember them. The only one I remember seeing is this version on that Tuesday morning, or a version like that.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. Now this one, which has been marked previously as [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 16, has on the page that is marked N-7519 the recommendation that the President approve the structure depicted above under 'current situation' and the terms of reference at Tab A; correct?

"A. Okay. What's the question?

"Q. You noted that before, that statement?

"A. I noted that since I have seen this document during preparations for the hearing, as I said earlier, I do not recall seeing the recommendation worded exactly that way on Tuesday the 24th, because my recollection was that it didn't indicate for whose approval.

"Q. Admiral, were the terms of reference that are attached to this memorandum in fact approved by the President?

"A. The terms of reference were approved by the President.

"Q. How were those terms of reference

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		communicated to the President of the United States? "A. Well, I don't remember that. "Q. Do you recall any covering memorandum other than the one I've just shown you that enclosed those terms of reference to the President of the United States? "A. I just don't remember that. "MR. LEON: . . . Assistant Attorney General Cooper testified that as to his recollection the diversion memo that his colleague Mr. Reynolds came upon on Saturday and which they reproduced for the Attorney General to view and to confront North had notations in it, and it was in draft form. And his recollection was that it had a number of notations handwritten on it. "And I'm looking at this Exhibit 16 and I note that the only handwritten change on it is the date, from the 14th to the 13th, and there is no other handwritten notation on it. Can you recall whether the one that you saw on the 25th had a number of notations in it which obviously indicated it was in draft form? "THE WITNESS: I don't recall that. I don't believe it did." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 437-40; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 34; Diversion Memo]. For Poindexter additional testimony on diversion memos, see Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 431-37.)	
86/04/04-119 DURING 1986		DIVERSION MEMOS: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2:	DIVERSION MEMOS: POINDEXTER'S FAMILIARITY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

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		[Continuing from preceding entry:] "[Q.] . . . I will ask you whether by any chance that is your '13' on the first page [of Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16A.] "A. That doesn't look like my handwriting. "MR. BECKLER: Wait a minute. Hold it. Are we saying, just to clarify the record here, are we saying that the document now, 16A, on N-582, has September 13 in a different writing than the one on N-7515? Because I'm not sure the postulate of that question is even correct. I think they are probably the same item. "MR. LIMAN: I am told that they are different. I'm not an expert examiner of documents by myself, but I am told that they are different. In any event, he said it's not his writing. They bear different Bates stamps and what I'm going to show him is essentially the ones, the different versions, we have and I will mark as 16B a version of the same memorandum that does not have the 14 struck out and replaced by 13. ". . . . "Q. Now I take it, Admiral, that looking at this document in four versions does not add to your recollection as you have given it now? "A. Are the only differences between 16B and 16C the 13 and 14? "Q. Yes. As you can see from the documents, it was[] typed originally with . . . September 14 and then the 14 was stricken. "MR. BECKLER: What ostensibly we have here is [Poindexter Dep. Ex.] 16, which is September 14,	See col. 2.

with the 14 crossed out and 13 written above it. We have Exhibit 16A, which appears to me to be the same document, except that it has an additional notation down in the corner indicating its source as well as -- and it also has the September 14 crossed out and the 13 put in. But I'm not so sure that that's a different document, and it's hard to say from the Xerox copy.

". . . .

"MR. BECKLER: Sixteen-B appears to be the same as 16 except the 14 is not crossed out and it also has redactions which do not appear in 16, and finally 16C appears to be the document.

"The witness has not had an opportunity to review any of these documents in any detail prior to sitting here today and it appears to be some of the same information, only on a different type face.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. You've now seen the evolution of that document. Is there anything more you have to testify about it?

"MR. BECKLER: Correction. I'm not sure if 'evolution' is the appropriate term. We have seen three, possibly four, different versions. I don't know if that can be classified as an evolution or not. There is no testimony to indicate any chronological evolution of these documents.

"MR. LIMAN: I'm not going to argue with you. You have one that was typed with September 14. It is stricken out to September 13. And the final version that appears on Fawn Hall's typewriter has the 13 typed in.

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		"MR. BECKLER: That's the whole point about evolution. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. I'm giving you what the facts are as we know it for whatever they're worth, and the question is does any of that refresh your recollection on whether you've seen this document before? "MR. BECKLER: I have to take exception to that, because there is nothing on the face of these documents that indicate any historical evolutionary process. For all I know, the one on Fawn Hall's station[e]ry may have been typed first. I have no idea. I don't know what the evolution is, nor does my client. "These documents are not dated. "MR. LIMAN: He can take it any order he wants. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. You've got four documents in front of you. Can you tell me whether they refresh your recollection at all as to whether you've seen any version of this document before? "A. I will stand on what I said before." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 440-45; Poindexter Dep. Exx. 16 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 34], 16A [= JHICI Ex. JMP 38], 16B [= JHICI Ex. JMP 36], 16C [= JHICI Ex. JMP 37].)	
86/04/04-125 APRIL 4, 1986 [?]		THE DIVERSION MEMO: RECOMMENDATIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE DIVERSION MEMO: RECOMMENDATIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. . . . I am referring now to Exhibit Number [JMP] 35 . . . . It is the

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			heretofore well-known smoking-gun memorandum. ". . . . "Mr. COURTER. . . . Once again all this seems to be consistent, clearly, with the fact that you and Lieutenant Colonel North and others in the Administration, including the President, were interested in really a strategic breakthrough. "It said on the first page, 'On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with the first direct U.S.[-]Iranian contact in over five years. At this meeting, the United States made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on the arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostages issue was a hurdle which must be crossed before improved relationships could occur.' "Then again, on the sixth page, and that is the page that has the recommendation boxes left blank, it says, 'The ultimate objective on the trip to Tehran is to commence the process--the process--of improving U.S. Iranian relations.' "Skipping down, 'These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the terms of reference with recognition that this is hopefully the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.' "Now it is a rhetorical question you have to answer once again in my mind that the paper record reveals that the President had the strategic

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			relationship in mind and not merely the hostages. While I am on this memorandum, I would like to read it perhaps differently than some others have, and I know you have no recollection of receiving it, so it is not a question to you, but I urge my other members of this panel to recognize that Oliver North, if he was a lot of things, he was not sloppy, and he was not imprecise. "The memorandum under 'Recommendation,' states: 'The President approve the structure depicted above under current situation and the terms of reference at Tab A.' "If you go to the entire document, it is broken into various parts. Number one is 'Background.' Number two is 'Current Situation.' Number three is 'Discussion,' and [N]umber 4 is the recommendation, and Number five is Tab A. So it seems to me that when Oliver North indicated that you review with the President the current situation and the terms of reference, he was referring to those two things. And then it seems to me even if this memorandum had been read by you, digested by you, and checked approved, it would not be a smoking gun. You would have precisely done exactly what Oliver North had recommended to you; that is go over those two things with the President and not the entire memorandum. "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct, Mr. Courter. That is the point I tried to make a couple of times so far." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 214-16; JHICI Ex. JMP 35 [Diversion Memo].)

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86/04/04-201 AROUND APRIL 4, 1986		THE DIVERSION MEMO HALL ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Would you turn in your exhibit book, please, Miss Hall, to the exhibit marked FH-8? "This is a memo titled 'Release of American hostages in Beirut,' and as the members of the committee know, it was this memo, discovered by one of the Attorney General's representatives on November 22, 1986, which led to the announcement of the so-called diversion at the Attorney General's press conference on November 25. "I've shown you this memo before. Do you recall, Miss Hall? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you type it? "Ms. HALL. Yes, I did, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. In the upper right-hand corner of this memo, which is otherwise undated, there is a handwritten notation, 'April.' Do you see that? "Ms. HALL. Yes, I do. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recognize that handwriting? "Ms. HALL. It is that of Colonel North. "Mr. BELNICK. Colonel North. "Do you recall who prepared this document originally, that is, who gave you the memo to take? "Ms. HALL. I believe Colonel North dictated it to me. "Mr. BELNICK. You recall North dictating it you and you typing it from his dictation?	THE DIVERSION MEMO HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did the memo go through more than one draft?

"Ms. HALL. My recollection is that it did, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Is it your recollection also that one of the drafts was sent out of the office to Admiral Poindexter?

"Ms. HALL. I believe that Admiral Poindexter made some changes to it, yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you typed those changes and prepared an additional draft?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall whether this memorandum was ever prepared and sent out in a final form?

"Ms. HALL. I don't recall, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you know if anyone else saw this memorandum in draft or final other than you, of course, Colonel North, and Admiral Poindexter?

"Ms. HALL. I don't recall. I don't know.

"Mr. BELNICK. You don't know.

"If you look at . . . Exhibit [FH] 8-A, which we have also reviewed before, during your interviews, you recognize that as another copy of the same memorandum without the handwritten 'April,' right?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. And the other change we identified is that in the second full paragraph, where it reads, 'On September 13,' September 13 is typed in whereas on the prior version we just looked at, Exhibit 8, 13 is written in by hand and

14 is crossed off?

"Ms. HALL. Correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. You prepared--that is, typed--both versions?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. I take it that looking at this other version does not affect your recollection as to whether a final was prepared and sent out?

"Ms. HALL. No, it doesn't. I just have to assume that it was typed for a reason, that it went somewhere. I don't know where it went."
(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 218-22; JHICI Exx. FH 8, FH 8-A [copies of an undated memo, "Release of American Hostages in Beirut"]. See Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/9/87, at 2, 5, 32-33 [Hall testimony on Poindexter's having made revisions to the diversion memo].)

86/04/04-400
APRIL 4, 1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS, AND BLOWPIPES

McFARLANE PROF:

McFarlane PROF to North, titled "Odds and Ends":

"I've been thinking about the blowpipe problem and the Contras.

"How are you coming on the loose ends for the material transfer? Anything I can do? If[,] for any reason, you need some mortars or other artillery--which I doubt--please let me know."
(JHICI Ex. 45-I. See 86/02/27-300 [North PROF to McFarlane, 3/26/86, on Blowpipes].)

86/04/04-450

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: POINDEXTER'S HELP

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
DURING 1986		WITH BLOWPIPES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it true that you knew that Colonel North was trying to get blowpipe missiles for the contras and that you gave him some assistance in that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. Yes, I did." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 189.)	
86/04/04-800 APRIL 4 AND 11, 1986		SINGLAUB-PASTORA AGREEMENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS tells POINDEXTER that PASTORA will be told that he does not have an agreement with U.S. (On April 11 GPS instructs ABRAMS to tell PASTORA.)" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/04/21-100. On the Singlaub-Pastora Agreement, see entries starting at 86/03/26-100.)	
86/04/07-200 APRIL 7, 1986		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OWEN MEMO: Memorandum from Owen (TC) to North (William), Subject: Recent Trip: The memo discusses an investigation in Central America by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman from Florida, a special agent from Panama, and two agents from Miami. ". . . . "According to [Casillo,] Feldman looks to be wanting to build a career on this case. He even showed [Castillo] and the Ambassador a diagram	

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		with your name at the top, mine underneath and John [Hull's] underneath mine, then a line connecting the various resistance groups in C.R. "Feldman stated they were looking at the 'big picture' and not only looking at a possible violation of the neutrality act, but at possible unauthorized use of government funds. "Attached . . . is a notarized statement by one Steven Carr, who has done most of the talking. In it he states Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan told him what to say. These two 'reporters' are nothing more than disinformation experts, and they are after me and you. ". . . ." The memo concludes: "Am good at where I am for another 45 days or so. Have thought about resigning from there because of all the heat, but will stick it out if you think it appropriate. I do not want to do anything that will end up causing you problems, but that time has probably already come and gone, and as some would say 'We's in too deep now to turn back.' "No question, I am a hot property, as even people on the Hill are asking questions about me. I want to see this through, but not at the cost of jeoperdizing [sic] it, as I am the only one out on a limb without a genuine safety net or fall back position. "WHERE TO NEXT?" (JHICI Ex. TC 15 [= Ex. RWO 15].)	
86/04/07-201		OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
APRIL 7, 1986		CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testified on the memo: "Mr. Rudman. . . . Now you have testified that you did not say anything whatsoever to Mr. Owen. "Mr. Castillo. That is correct, sir. "Mr. Rudman. That is not what this says. "Mr. Castillo. . . . I stand by what I said, to the word. I don't know where he [sc. Owen] got this from. . . . "I do not recall ever seeing a diagram." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 192.)	
86/04/07-210 SPRING 1986		MIAMI U.S. ATTORNEY'S INVESTIGATION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . In March of 1986 there has been some testimony at the hearings about this investigation which was being conducted by the U.S. Attorney's office in Miami on Costa Rica. There has been testimony from Bob Owen, I think Lou Tambs and [redacted] testified about a trip that was taken down to Central America, down to Costa Rica by people from the U.S. Attorney's office. "Are you familiar with any of that testimony that has come out during the course of the hearings? "A. I remember parts of it. "Q. Were[ ]you briefed in March or so, in the spring of 1986, about that investigation? "A. I don't recall it. "Q. Do you recall whether you ever discussed it with Lowell Jensen, who was then with the	

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		Department of Justice? "A. As I said, I don't recall it. I talked to Lowell several times. "Q. I asked the follow-up question to see whether that would refresh your recollection. "A. No, it doesn't." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 124-25.)	
86/04/07-215 SPRING 1986		MIAMI U.S. ATTORNEY'S INVESTIGATION: DRUGS AND GUN-RUNNING C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Rodino. . . . [O]n March 31, 1986, two FBI agents and Assistant U.S. Attorney went to Costa Rica to investigate allegations of gun running to the contras by John Hull, Rob Owen, Oliver North, Tom Posey and others. Were you aware of this investigation? "[C/CATF.] Yes, I guess generally I was but I don't recall it specifically. But generally I must have been. "Mr. Rodino. Do you recall when you became aware? "[C/CATF.] I would have to check the record, but I was -- it was roughly sometime in the spring of '86, when people were looking at the lawsuit surrounding the possibility of drugs and money and John Hull and such. But I don't remember -- some time in the spring of '86, but I don't remember when exactly without checking records. "Mr. Rodino. Can you recall who called this to your attention or did you learn it yourself? "[C/CATF]. In the course of my normal duties, I think it was partially through reporting from	

[redacted] and then I think that it came up because a complaint was filed if I recall correctly with the U.S. District Attorney in Miami, Florida at some point in time during that year, and I read the complaint.

"Mr. Rodino. When you say [redacted] whom are you referring to?

"[Answer redacted.]

"Mr. Rodino. Did he then report to you regarding this investigation?

"[C/CATF.] He reported to us regarding the allegations that were being done and information about the fact that an investigation was going and a suit or a possible suit was going to be filed, and I don't recall all the details of that.

"Mr. Rodino. Are you aware of any cables or other traffic concerning this?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, there were cables concerning it, but not about that. [Redacted] --

"(Counsel conferring with witness.)

"[C/CATF.] And there were, as my attorney points out, a number of questions that we prepared in response to congressional investigations on this issue. So generally there was a lot of exchange on that. I don't remember the details of it, but it was no secret and I knew about it.

"Mr. Rodino. But the cables did reflect and report on the investigation?

"[C/CATF.] On the FBI investigation.

"Mr. Rodino. Yes.

"[C/CATF.] No, [redacted.] I don't recall specifically cables on the FBI investigation per se. There may have been some, but I don't recall

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		them. "Mr. Rodino. Was Oliver North to your knowledge aware of this investigation? "[C/CATF.] In general terms he must have been, yes, because it was public knowledge and -- "Mr. Rodino. Did he talk to you about it? "[C/CATF.] Not that I can recall specifically, but it is possible in the context of one of the meetings he might have mentioned it, but I don't recall. I don't recall specific conversations about it. It is probably I guess as I think about it that he would have discussed it with me. "Mr. Rodino. Do you know what if anything was done about the investigation? "[C/CATF.] Not that I can talk to firsthand. It may be that I knew more details about it at one point in time than I can remember right now. As I recall the initial case was thrown out of the District Court for some reason, and had to be refiled and I think the investigation may have been stopped because of that or it may have gone forward. I just don't know the details of it." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 175-78. See id. at 245 [C/CATF testimony on the allegations of Jesus Garcia].)	
86/04/07-220 JULY 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986		MIAMI U.S. ATTORNEY'S INVESTIGATION SUMMARY: For a description of the Miami investigation of possible Neutrality Act violations, the Avirgan-Honey lawsuit, the allegations of Jesus Garcia, and NSC staff involvement, see Iran-Contra	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Report, at 106-09.	
86/04/07-230 1985-86	NSC STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN INVESTIGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SUMMARY: On involvement of the NSC staff in investigations by the U.S. Customs Service and Department of Justice, see Iran-Contra Report, at 105-16.	NSC STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN INVESTIGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SUMMARY: See col. 1.	NSC STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN INVESTIGATIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SUMMARY: See col. 1.
86/04/07-250 1985-87		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: OWEN AND DRUGS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. HATCH. What about drug smuggling? There have been a lot of allegations thrown around that the contra resupply operation was involved in cocaine trafficking. A news program over the weekend suggested that Rob Owen, who testified earlier, was involved in drug smuggling. "Now, is there any truth to that? Can you shed some light for us on the subject? "Mr. NORTH. Absolutely false. Mr. Owen is the last person, perhaps right beside me, that would ever be engaged in those kinds of activities. When Mr. Owen found any information pertaining to the possibility of involvement in drugs, he told me, and I would tell the appropriate Federal authorities, and there were several such instances. "Absolutely false, Senator." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 83. On the Contras and drugs, see entries starting at 86/05/15-108; also 86/05/16-461.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/04/07-255 1984-86		THE CONTRAS AND DRUGS NORTH ACCOUNT: "We found absolutely no evidence during my tenure at the NSC that any of the resistance leaders were themselves or their subordinates involved in drug running. The only one case that we actually had some information on I reported in the executive session [7/9/87] as to who those people were, and that was not in any of the main resistance organizations." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 190.)	
86/04/07-259 1984-86		THE CONTRAS AND DRUGS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Liman. I think the next subject I am going to go into may not be a -- one that required this classification, but I don't know whether it is accusations or -- well-founded or not since we have not had a private session with you. I want to put them to you. "Your notebooks indicate entries such as this: '$14 million to finance Supermarket came from drugs.' I think you alluded to this when you said that you had given instructions that people ought not to deal with the Supermarket because of the source of it -- or suspected source of the funds? "Mr. North. That was a suspected source. Again, I want to go back to what Director Casey--his guidance to me was that until the agency could determine -- and I do not know to this day if they ever did -- could determine where the money came from to finance the Martin[-]McCoy	

Supermarket [redacted] that we should discourage any dealing with him whatsoever, and we were concerned on two accounts; that it was drug money; that perhaps there were [redacted] engaged in it; or that they had actually diverted U.S. ESF [sic (CSF?)] monies -- monies fungible -- from an ESF fund [redacted.]

"We encountered that problem consistently [redacted.]

"Mr. Liman. Were you ever given any conclusion on that?

"Mr. North. No.

"Mr. Liman. Then there is another reference which is a call from AC.

"Mr. North. Calero.

"Mr. Liman. Calero?

"Mr. North. It could be Cruz.

"Mr. Liman. It says on this one 'Pastora revealed his drug dealing.' What is that all about? Is it just an accusation?

"Mr. North. It probably is an accusation. We had significant indication that not Pastora, himself, but the people below him immediately [redacted.] That is one of the reasons why we withdraw [sic] from direct support for Pastora.

"Mr. Liman. There is another entry, August 1985, '[redacted] DC-6 which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into the United States.'

"Mr. North. And I turned that over to the DEA, sir. It was -- when I say [redacted]' in that, it was registered in [redacted] and it was not [redacted] military or government airplane.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		It was a DC-6 registered in [redacted] and someone had told me -- in fact it was probably Rob Owen who told me that. I turned it over to the DEA immediately. "Mr. Liman. To your knowledge was any of the funding for the contras derived from drug money? "Mr. North. No. I think that -- if this committee could do one thing, it would be most helpful to put that story to rest. It has appeared consistently. It was in the media. It was in the media repeatedly that I was dealing with drugs, that the contras were dealing with drugs. I personally looked into this. "The CIA looked into it. The DEA looked into it. The FBI in this country looked into it. To my knowledge, aside from the accusations and never proof that I saw, the only contras who were in any way potentially implicated in the movement of drugs of any kinds, in or out of the United States or elsewhere, was [sic] [redacted] and [redacted,] both of whom worked initiallly for Pastora." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 31-33. See 85/04/25-232 [further North testimony on the Martin-McCoy operation, and Casey's restrictions on whom to use as a source of arms]. See also 85/04/11-220 [Calero testimony on Martin and McCoy].)	
86/04/07-290 APRIL 7, 1986			DIVERSION: ISRAELI REPLENISHMENT NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: North writes: "-Nir very upset that Israel might be be [sic] 'cut out' of the Iran trip

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			"-very bad blood if cut out "-If this deal falls thru Israel will sell HAWK parts to finance [half line illegible under smear]" (North notebook entry, 4/7/86 [Committee Document Q 2096]; Iran-Contra Report, at 224 [Report notes that "Israel remained concerned about how the replenishment of the 504 TOWs would be financed"].)
86/04/07-300 APRIL 7, 1986		DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF NORTH PROF: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF NORTH PROF: North transmits a PROF message on April 7, 1986 to McFarlane stating that North has prepared the memorandum at Poindexter's request for "our boss." The PROF reads, in full: "Met last week w/ Gorba to finalize arrangements for a mtg in Iran and release of hostages on or about 19 Apr. This was based on word that he had to deposit not less than $15M in appropriate acct. by close of banking tomorrow. [Redacted.] Have talked at length w/ Nir who is handling him on thie [sic] bank xfer and Nir believes that Gorba may be having trouble closing the final arrangements back home. Per request of JMP have prepared a paper for our boss which lays out arrangements. Gorba indicated that yr counterpart in the T. mtg wd be Rafsanjani. If all this comes to pass it shd be one hell of a show. [Redacted.] Bottom line: believe you shd avail yrself of this paper [at] yr earliest convenience. Wd like to see you anyway. Am going home -- if I remember the way.[ ]Warm regards,

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			North BI "What's going on?" (JHICI Ex. OLN 2 [= Ex. JMP 39; North PROF to McFarlane, "What's going on?," 4/7/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 226.)
86/04/07-301 APRIL 7, 1986		DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Would you turn to Exhibit 2. . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. And it is dated the 7th of April, 1986. "Mr. NORTH. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. And that's three days after the date of the terms of reference on Exhibit 1. You can check if you wish or you can take my word for it. It is dated April 4. "Mr. NORTH. Will you take my word? ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. This PROF message makes reference to Mr. Ghorbanifar in the first line? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, it does. "Mr. NIELDS. It makes reference to the $15 million in line 3. "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And then in line 6, it reads: 'Per request of J.M.P., have prepared a paper for our boss, which lays out arrangements.' "Mr. NORTH. That is what it says. "Mr. NIELDS. And my question to you, sir, is doesn't that mean that you were telling Mr. McFarlane that Admiral Poindexter -- that is

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			J.M.P., isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, it is. "Mr. NIELDS. Had asked that you prepare a paper for the President? "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. That is 'our boss,' isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. He is indeed. "Mr. NIELDS. Laying out the arrangements, and that refers, does it not, to the description of the transaction which is in Exhibit No. 1? "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. So, far from telling you to stop sending memoranda up for the President's approval, Admiral Poindexter was specifically asking you to send memoranda up for the President's approval. "Mr. NORTH. Well, again, in this particular case, that is true, Mr. Nields, and I don't believe that I have said that Admiral Poindexter told me to stop. Did I? "Mr. NIELDS. Where are these memoranda? "Mr. NORTH. Which memoranda? "Mr. NIELDS. The memoranda that you sent up to Admiral Poindexter seeking the President's approval. "Mr. NORTH. Well, they are probably in these books to my left I haven't even looked through yet. If I try to guess, I'm going to be wrong, but I think I shredded most of that. Did I get them all? I'm not trying to be flippant. "Mr. NIELDS. That was going to be my very next question, Colonel North. Isn't it true that you shredded them? "Mr. NORTH. I believe I did.

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			"Mr. NIELDS. And that would include the copies with a check mark where the line says 'approve'? "Mr. NORTH. That would have included all copies. I tried, as I was departing the NSC, a process which began as early as October, to destroy all references to these covert operations. I willingly admit that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 33-36; JHICI Exx. OLN 1, 2.)
86/04/07-308 APRIL 7, 1986		DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Now I show you [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 17, which we viewed once before, which is a PROF note from Oliver North. It was dated 4/7/85, and I called your attention previously to the words . . . 'per request of JMP have prepared a paper for our boss which lays out arrangements'. "I will ask you whether you are aware of any document other than the so-called diversion memorandum which Oliver North prepared on or about April 7, 1986, relating to the arrangements for the Tehran visit. "A. There were papers associated with that. I don't recall seeing this PROFS note. "Q. This was not addressed to you, Admiral, but are you aware of any paper other than the so-called diversion memorandum which he prepared on or around April 7, 1986? "MR. BECKLER: Are you saying this diversion memo was prepared on or around April 7? "MR. LIMAN: We can date it to between the 4th

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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			and 7th. "MR. BECKLER: These, one of these versions, one of Exhibit 16s? [See 86/04/04-119.] "MR. LIMAN: That's right. It's all the same except for the date. Those were prepared between the 4th and the 7th of April, and I can also tell you that having looked through the documents that remain at the NSC, after whatever shredding was done, we find no other document prepared at or around that time relating to arrangements other than this one, and I'm asking the Admiral if he knows of any. "MR. SMALL: He's previously testified he may have seen a different type of document than this one on the 25th. "MR. BECKLER: He's already answered that. "MR. LIMAN: Then I want him to describe it. "MR. SMALL: He's already described it. "MR. LIMAN: No, he hasn't. "MR. BECKLER: He has described the document that he saw around the 25th, which he does not recall as having the same recommendation. "MR. LIMAN: On the 25th -- "MR. BECKLER: Of November, right. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. What did you do with the one you received on the 25th of November? "A. Of 1986? "Q. Yes, sir. "A. After reading it I put it in my out basket. "Q. Do you know how the document that I have shown you, which was this first diversion

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			memorandu[m], ended up in your files when the FBI came to inspect them after you left office? "A. I don't know that. That is why I earlier I said I would not deny that he had sent that to me. I just simply don't recall it. "Q. The question is whether you recall -- and the document that you did see on the 25th did relate to, did have a paragraph relating to the diversion? "A. That is correct. "Q. So do you know of any document that Oliver North prepared on or around April 7, 1986, referring to the arrangements for the Tehran mission that did not refer to the diversion? "A. I simply don't know. There may have been some, but we're talking about a long time ago." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 445-48; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 17 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 39; "Our Boss" PROF]. See 86/11/24-170 [Poindexter testimony on North's sending him a copy of a memo on diversion on 11/24/86].)
86/04/07-309 APRIL 7, 1986		THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. If you look at [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 17, . . . it's a PROF note to you about the same time as Exhibit 16 [the Diversion Memo], would you examine it and if you examine it, you will notice it says, 'Per request of J.M.P., have prepared a paper for our boss which lays out arrangements.' "Can you tell me, sir, whether that refers to the paper about the use of the proceeds of the arms sales for the contras?	THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. I don't know.

"Q. Did you ever ask Colonel North to prepare a paper for the President in which you -- in which he described the amount of money that was going to be available to the contras from the arms sale?

"A. No. I did not.

"Q. Did you ever destroy any papers reflecting the use of any of the proceeds of the arms sale for the contras?

"A. As I said, Mr. Liman, earlier, you know, I did not recall seeing this memo. To my knowledge, there wasn't anything in writing on this.

"Q. Did you destroy any paper reflecting the use of proceeds for the contras?

"A. I did not. Not knowingly.

"Q. Do you recall any piece of paper other than the ones we have talked about, the $6 million one [see 86/05/16-440] and this memorandum that refer[s] to that subject?

"A. Sometime in October of 1986, it was after the aircraft with Hasenfus aboard was shot down, I recall having a couple of conversations that may or may not be pertinent. One was with Colonel North in which he came into my office to report on the details of the shoot-down of the aircraft. He reported to me there had been a lot of identifying information aboard the aircraft. I told him I was very displeased with that. . . ."
(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 188-89; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 17 [= JHICI Exx. JMP 39, OLN 2; "Our Boss" PROF]. For Poindexter testimony continuing from this excerpt, see 86/10/05-305.

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		See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 116 ["To my knowledge, until Sunday, Sunday night, the 23rd, I didn't think there was anything in writing any place on the transfer of funds to the contras. . . . I did not remember that [diversion] memo."].)	
86/04/07-310 APRIL 7, 1986		DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: THE "OUR BOSS" PROF POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Colonel North testified that [the paper mentioned in the 'our boss' PROF] referred to this [diversion] memorandum [Ex. JMP 38] and that it was at your request that he prepared this paper, and that 'the boss' referred to the President. Does that refresh your recollection, sir, as to questioning this memorandum from Colonel North? "[Witness conferring with counsel.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I have obviously given this a lot of thought since you and I discussed this issue in earlier closed session. And what I would like to do now is to give you--and this is speculation on my part because I really don't have a memory of seeing this before--but putting together all the pieces, what I would speculate happened was that we were getting ready to send Mr. McFarlane off to Tehran; the Iranians had agreed for a meeting in Tehran, and I probably asked Colonel North to prepare a paper that I could use to discuss this with the President and get his approval, final approval, although we had discussed it informally up to that point, but to get his final approval on the trip

and to get his approval on the terms of reference.

"Now, one of the things that has always surprised me about this particular exhibit, on the morning of the 25th of November, when I first saw something similar to this, my recollection was that the terms of reference was not attached, and there was nothing in terms of a date on the document that would put it in the proper--put it in a time frame.

"I also don't recall in the approve/disapprove area of the memo that there be any reference to the President. That memo that I saw on the 25th of November, I would have put in my 'out' basket in my office and my secretary would have taken it and put it in a pile that I established the previous Friday on the various Iranian papers that I had on my desk. But what I speculate happened was that Colonel North probably prepared this memo at that time in response to my request. It probably came over to me.

"I realized that I didn't want to discuss the transfer of funds issue with the President for the reasons I gave this morning, and I probably destroyed that memo at the time or at least disposed of it some way, pulled the terms of reference off and discussed the terms of reference with the President, the Secretary of State and other people on the NSC staff that were involved in drafting the terms of reference, because Colonel North was not the only one that was working on the strategic aspect of the Iranian initiative.

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, I think I have told you

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			this before, but I will represent it to you now, that the memorandum which we have just shown you was given to us as a copy of the memorandum in this form that the FBI found in that folder of papers that you had given to your secretary, which included materials that you were collecting in the end of November. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand that, Mr. Liman, and I can't explain it, but I'm just giving you my recollection as to the thoughts I had when I first saw the memo, to my recollection, on the 25th. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you have-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me, if I may, I must say that I didn't spend very long on the morning of the 25th studying the memo. I had other things to think about at the time. That was after I had met with the Attorney General." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 111-13. See JHICI Ex. JMP 39 ["our boss" PROF].)
86/04/08-100 APRIL 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: FIRST DROP TO SOUTHERN FRONT SECORD MESSAGE: In a KL-43 message to Quintero, Secord writes: "CIA and Goode [North's code name] report Blackys [a Southern front military commandante] troops in south in desperate fix. Therefore, [CIA's Chief of Station in a Central American country] is supposed to arrange for a load to come from [the FDN base] to [the Airbase] via L100 tomorrow afternoon. . . . Notify Steele we intend to drop tomorrow nite or more like Thurs nite.	

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		. . . Meanwhile, contact [Castillo] via this machine and get latest on DZ [drop zone] coordinates and the other data I gave you the format for. . . . CIA wants the aircraft to enter the DZ area from the Atlantic. . . ." (Iran-Contra Report, at 66 [quoting Secord KL-43, 4/8/86 (Committee Document T 891); with bracketed explanatory material and substitutions for redactions as provided in Iran-Contra Report, at 66]. See 86/04/10-095 [North KL-43 setting up a lethal drop].)	
86/04/10-095 EARLY APRIL, PRIOR TO APRIL 8, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH MESSAGE: North, in a KL-43 to Secord, sets up essential elements of resupply drops to the Southern Front: "The unit to which we wanted to drop in the southern quadrant of Nicaragua is in desperate need of ordnance resupply. . . . Have therefore developed an alternative plan which [Chief of the CIA's CATF] has been briefed on and in which he concurs. The L-100 which flies from MSY to [an FDN base] on Wednesday should terminate it[]s NHAO mission on arrival at [the FDN base]. At that point it should load the supplies at [the Airbase] which--theoretically [the CIA's Chief of Station in a Central American country] is assembling today at [the FDN base]--and take them to [the Airbase]. These items should then be transloaded to the C-123 . . . . On any night between Wednesday, Apr 9, and Friday, Apr 11 these supplies should be dropped by the C-123 in the vicinity of [drop zone	

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		inside Nicaragua]. The A/C shd penetrate Nicaragua across the Atlantic Coast . . . . If we are ever going to take the pressure off the northern front we have got to get this drop in--quickly. Please make sure that this is retransmitted via this channel to [Castillo], Ralph, Sat and Steele. Owen already briefed and prepared to go w/ the L-100 out of MSY if this will help. Please advise soonest." (JHICI Ex. OLN 88 [with substitutions of bracketed redacted material as provided in Iran-Contra Report, at 66].)	
86/04/10-100 AROUND APRIL 10, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH MESSAGE: North (Goode) sends a message by KL-43 and asks that his message be "retransmitted via this channel to [Castillo], Ralph, Sat and Steele." The message refers to a proposed alternate resupply flight involving an L-100 which would fly between two (redacted) locations. At the L-100's destination, a C-123 would be loaded and flown to southern front commanders sometime between April 9 and 11, 1986. The message states that the Chief of the Central American Task Force has been briefed on, and concurs with, the plan. The message concludes, "Owen already briefed and prepared to go w[ith] the L-100 out of [redacted] if this will help. Please advise soonest." (JHICI Ex. TC 6.)	
86/04/10-101		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROP	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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AROUND APRIL 10, 1986		CASTILLO ACCOUNT: "Mr. Barbadoro. Do you know whether this proposed plan was ever put into effect? "Mr. Castillo. I know that an L-100 aircraft delivered 20,000 pounds of lethal material to the southern front commanders on or about April -- "Mr. Barbadoro. Tenth? "Mr. Castillo. Tenth. "Mr. Barbadoro. And you reported on that drop to CIA headquarters in the normal intelligence reports that you file, didn't you? "Mr. Castillo. Yes, sir. When the equipment was delivered--was picked up by the commanders and inventoried." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 57-61; JHICI Ex. TC 6 [= OLN 88; KL-43 from North ("Goode") proposing a lethal drop].)	
86/04/10-110 AROUND APRIL 10, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LETHAL DROP NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on Ex. OLN 88: "Mr. NIELDS. Again I take it this message was sent by you and I take it this was not atypical of other messages that you sent dealing with the same kinds of issues? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 160. See JHICI Ex. OLN 88 [= Ex. TC 6; KL-43 from North ("Goode") proposing the drop].)	
86/04/10-112 APRIL 9 AND 11, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LETHAL DROP GADD ACCOUNT: Secord (perhaps at North's request) asks Gadd	

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		to arrange for a Southern Air Transport L-100 to get supplies and munitions to the southern Contra forces. Gadd arranges the mission with Southern Air for $25,000. The first mission, on April 9, 1986, fails; the supplies can't be dropped. On the second try two nights later the mission succeeds. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 33-35.)	
86/04/10-115 FROM 1984		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SUPPLYING THE CONTRAS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you know that he [sc. North] was engaged in making efforts to find out where and how air drops could be made to contras within Nicaragua? "A. I was aware that he had a role in that. I'm not sure that he was the one that was making the decisions, and I'm still not sure of that point. "Q. Well, I didn't quite say that he was making the decisions. Did you know that he was engaged in coordinating that effort? "A. As I testified on the second of May, my view of his role was as a switching point in the whole process of supporting the democratic resistance during the period of the Boland Amendment. [See 84/10/03-160.] "Q. Did you believe that the contras could have survived without someone playing the role that North was playing? "A. I don't believe they could have. "Q. Did you ever tell that to the President? "A. That is a possibility, but I don't have a	

specific recollection of it.

"Q. You know, you used a different word here. Usually you say you don't have a recollection. This time you said that's a possibility.

"MR. BECKLER: You finally got a rise out of him.

"MR. LIMAN: There's something in the back of this man's mind and I want to know it.

"THE WITNESS: I was very proud and pleased to have an opportunity to work with Colonel North and I felt very strongly about the statement I made that I didn't think that the contras would have survived if it hadn't been for Colonel North, and I very likely would have passed that on to the President. But I don't recall a specific incident of doing it."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 330-31. On Poindexter's knowledge of North's Contra activities, see below at 86/00/09-195, -196.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROP, AND CIA AWARENESS

C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. Carome. I take it that you were aware of an early April flight of lethal materials to the Southern Front, is that correct?

"[C/CATF.] We went over that in some detail in my deposition. It would apprear from the traffic that came in and out that I would have been aware that flight took place because there were cables going back and forth. At the time it was brought to my attention in the deposition I didn't remember it, but having read those at the time, I must have been aware of it when it was happening.

"Mr. Carome. Those cables are [C/CATF] Exhibit 25, consisting of [redacted] requesting intelligence for this lethal drop. Do you know whether or not you provided the intelligence requested there?

"[C/CATF.] If he requested it, in probability we did.

"Mr. Carome. Please turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 26. Exhibit 26 is a KL-43 message from Oliver North apparently to Mr. Secord. It refers to the lethal flight we just discussed. It says about five or six lines down, in describing the plan for the flight, have therefore developed an alternative plan which [redacted] has been briefed on and in which he concurs. [Redacted] is your code name, is that correct?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, it is.

"Mr. Carome. Did you receive a briefing on this planned lethal flight, and did you concur in it with Oliver North?

"[C/CATF.] I have no recollection of having received that briefing or of having concurred in it. I certainly wouldn't have approved it, because I thought it was the folly of first order for American pilots to fly into Nicaragua an AL-100 -- I would have known that AL-100 had to be a SAT L-100 or an airplane leased from them, and I would have said that is a dumb idea.

"Mr. Carome. Why would Oliver North say you concurred in a plan --

"[C/CATF.] I don't know why he said that.

The most I can tell you, and this is really hard-core speculation, is we might have had a conversation about the problem in general and he might have said something about, 'Hey, what if this or this happened', and I said, 'Gee, Ollie, it sounds okay to me.' That is the most it would have been, and I don't recall having done that.

"Mr. Carome. [C/CATF] Exhibit 28 is a cable from [redacted] which he reports on the lethal flight immediately after it occurred. At the bottom of paragraph 3, it says 'Arrangements made in strict secrecy to avoid past experience of leaks due to inevitable contacts between UNO/FARN and UNO/FDN.'

"Didn't this cable indicate to you that [redacted] was right there at the center of the operations for this lethal drop?

"[C/CATF.] Let me explain to you that I, [redacted] and in [redacted] were right in the middle of all, right in the middle of it. It was going on around us. We saw parts and glimpses of it, and as I testified before, we were right in the middle of the nut cracker, and we knew we were there, and we knew we were in an awkward position, and I thought each one of my [redacted] and two out of three were politically sophisticated, smart enough, and had ready enough judgment that they were not going to get in the middle of it.

"I want to make a point -- go back to the Tayacan manual. I came into the task force at the time of the Tayacan manual, and I sat through the IG investigation, and I saw the devastating impact of five letters of reprimand going to the task

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		force chief, [redacted] who was then a task force officer, [redacted] GS-13 who was his deputy, a staff writer, a contract writer who was just trying to do what was right and two other people. When I came into the task force, I told Clair[] George, we discussed it at some length, I want to structure the task force so that all the liability, the political heat, falls on me. I don't want anybody else to get in the way of this thing so that when the time comes to stand up some place, I am accountable, me, and I don't want anybody else to have to take the heat, and I meant in that also my Division Chief, to the degree possible, and also Clair[] George." (C/CATF response continues in next entry. C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 23-26; JHICI Exx. C/CATF 25, 26, 28.)	
86/04/10-121 EARLY APRIL 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROP, AND CIA AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2: [C/CATF response continues from preceding entry:] "[C/CATF.] I had two people that got out in front of me for reasons that I still don't entirely understand. One was [redacted] and one was our [redacted] and those are the two things, along with one other thing I think we will discuss, that troubled me the most about what happened that should not have happened. "The only person that should be sitting in front of this committee answering questions should be me. I told the Tower Commission, and as I told	

the grand jury, and as I think I told Mr. Barbadoro in the deposition, I knew in November, '84 that I was going to be held in front of some board accountable for what I did and what happened, and I wanted only one person to have to take the heat for it, me.

"I had my [redacted] get out ahead of me and do things under his own volition that I did not know of, and I think the record is very clear, and he was purposefully circumventing the chain of command to get around me. Frankly, I thought he was smart enough to do them in a way that was within the bounds of the law.

"I said 'Stay inside the law, support the administration.' There was a way he could have done it. If you want me to, I will tell you how he could have done it. He should have done it as it was done in [redacted] he should have buffered himself with the resistance forces.[]

"He should have said to whoever was [redacted] look, you deal with that man over there, just go and he could have introduced them and put that buffer in between him just like happened in the North and then he could have provided his intelligence, his advice and his guidance within the scope of the law to that individual, and that individual could have passed it on to whatever contractor or private benefactor he wanted to, and then it becomes legal.

"It doesn't become technically within the broad consensus someplace, no, but it is legal and it supports the Administration and stays within the confines of the law. It is exactly what we

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		did in [redacted] throughout all of this period, actually even a little bit before this. You come to the KL-43, in preparation for this testimony, we sat[] absolutely almost speechless when it just dawned on us why didn't he give the KL-43 to his communicator in the resistance. His problem goes away. I don't have an answer for that. He made his decisions. As I said earlier I won't criticize those decisions." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 26-27.)	
86/04/10-122 EARLY APRIL 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROP, AND CIA AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Carome. You think it would have been proper to give a U.S. provided encryption device -- "[C/CATF.] I wouldn't have given it to them. I don't know what I would have done there, but I don't think it was proper to have taken it and I think if he was concerned about it he could have gotten out from under the load of having it done. We were giving at that time and had authorization to give to the resistance U.S. encryption devices. [Redacted] as authorized by Congress as discussed intensively in the days leading up and during the conference, the committee conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act in November and December of '85. And that is what we did and that is how he could have solved that problem and kept himself out of the middle of it, I think. "And hindsight is always 20-20 and all those	

cliches, that is how I would have solved it. It is how I thought he was doing it, how I thought he should have done it. I was astounded at the May meeting and I have been astounded subsequently to see what happened and frankly, I am upset by it. It should not have happened.

"Mr. Carome. [Redacted] has testified that shortly after the April lethal drop he told your superior, [redacted] of what he was doing precisely making contacts with the team at [redacted] that he was using a KL-43 to do so.

"Did you know that [redacted] had been so informed in April?

"[C/CATF.] I didn't know at the time that [redacted] had been so informed in April. [Redacted] did not discuss that with me. He certainly didn't tell me that he had a KL-43 or an encryption device and I don't recall discussing in any detail the contacts directly with the private benefactors at [redacted.] I don't know wha[t] [redacted] told [redacted] at the meeting. That is for the committee to talk to [redacted] and [redacted] about and you will have to compare those testimonies.

"The fact is that the KL-43 I am certain was never told to me as to the best of my recollection we didn't discuss the direct contacts with the private benefactors. At that time I was far more concerned about my [redacted] and a [redacted] there who is in a word obstreperous, far senior to me, a difficult personality to deal with and we were having a little trouble holding him in and keeping that setup the way we wanted it.

"Mr. Carome. By May of '86 you knew that [redacted] was dealing directly with the [redacted] operators, is that right?

"[C/CATF.] By late May of '86 at the meeting in -- actually it was in [redacted] I was a little surprised in what I heard but I would have known there that [redacted] felt that he was dealing directly with them or was much closer to them than anybody else. The meeting went like this.

"First of all, [redacted] took control of the meeting. It surprised me. I was taken aback by it for two reasons, first the force with which he came on and secondly, that he did that because I was used to sort of being the preeminent person and here he was playing a much different role and the dynamics threw me and I was trying to adjust to it.

"I didn't say a lot at the meeting to the best of my recollection. The points were we have to stay away from the private benefactors, that is trouble in the making, we don't want to be anyplace around it, so don't stop it but don't get involved with it.

"Mr. Carome. Don't stop it?

"[C/CATF.] Don't try to put a pencil in the spoke, just don't get involved with it."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI 8/5/87, at 27-30.)

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EARLY APRIL
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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROP, AND CIA AWARENESS

C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. Carome. But you knew he [antecedent name

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		redacted] was involved. Were you telling him to change what he was doing? "[C/CATF.] Don't stop the private benefactors is what I meant from doing their thing, but don't get involved with it. That was our instruction. [Redacted] do you have a problem, no. [Redacted] not the one there in March, [redacted] do you have any problem. No. It was perfectly clear to me I don't want anyplace near this. My problem was in my political dynamic in [redacted.] I don't want to get sideways with the firms, Rodriguez has a good relationship with these people and I don't want him as my enemy. Meet with Felix and say I am your friend, but I am not going to be involved and back off of it. "That was done. [Redacted] said I have a problem, I have an information flow problem here and I need a way to fix this and the way to fix it is to put a communicator at [redacted] and if I can put a UNO South communicator at [redacted] then my problem goes away. "The decision that came out of the meeting was, [redacted] go back and see if you can train, give equipment to and cause to be stations [sic] in [redacted] a UNO South communicator, and that is where we left it. "Mr. Carome. It turns out that that communicator was not set up, is that right? "[C/CATF.] It was never set up." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 30-31. On the communicator, see 86/07/12-100.)	
86/04/10-200		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LETHAL DROPS	

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BETWEEN APRIL 10 AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1986		CASTILLO ACCOUNT: Castillo testified he recalled nine successful flights of lethal supplies to Southern Front forces: the first in April, two between May and July, and six in September 1986. Many other flights were attempted but failed "[m]ainly because of decrepit aircraft, unskilled pilots, no equipment for radar or navigational equipment." (Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 64-65.)	
86/04/10-230 DURING 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: CALERO'S KNOWLEDGE CALERO ACCOUNT: "Mr. BARBADORO. When did you learn that Colonel North and General Secord were operating this airlift operation in Central America? "Mr. CALERO. Well, I never learned for sure that it was, this gentleman [sic] running the operation. The [Miami] meeting was in July [1985; see 85/07/00-010], so they say, and I remember that this airlift operation began almost a year later in April of 1986. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you know in April of 1986 when the airlift operation was underway that General Secord was connected with it? "Mr. CALERO. I could have suspected, but no, I never knew anything for sure on that. I knew, I had been told by Colonel North that there was going to be this private effort to help us, to aid us in that. I don't know when I was told about it, but I knew that Colonel North knew about a private airlift operation. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North consult with you about how the airlift operation should be	

structured and what it should do?

"Mr. CALERO. No.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever share with you the par[ti]culars of how the airlift operation was going to be run?

"Mr. CALERO. No. I remember telling Colonel North it was lousy.

"Mr. BARBADORO. You were upset with the services that were being provided by the operation, correct?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes, I expected it to be a lot more efficient.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What did they do for the FDN?

"Mr. CALERO. Well, they--I checked at one point but I am not sure now--that they gave us 200 hours of flying time, mostly to deliver goods from a neighboring place, and--but not very many. I don't remember how many trips into Nicaragua, which is what really counted.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did the airlift operation supply you with any donated arms?

"Mr. CALERO. No. They didn't give us any. We had enough arms. We had enough ammunition.

"Mr. BARBADORO. So it is fair to say that what the airlift operation did for the FDN was simply transport the FDN's weapons from one location to another?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes.

"Mr. BARBADORO. They would take weapons from an FDN warehouse that you had already purchased and deliver them to your troops, is that right?

"Mr. CALERO. Yes sir, that is my understanding.

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		"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you also know that the airlift operation was being used to support the southern front troops? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, yes, I knew that. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you know about the existence of the airfield in Costa Rica? "Mr. CALERO. I heard about it at some point, but I don't remember when. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North ever tell you that he had played a role in building that airstrip? "Mr. CALERO. I remember talking with him about it but---- "Mr. BARBADORO. What did he tell you about it? "Mr. CALERO. Well, there was this airfield that was built in Costa Rica and that it was built real quick. I heard something, as I say, but I had nothing to do with the south and I hadn't even been to that country you mentioned for over two years, I guess. "Mr. BARBADORO. Mr. Calero, is it fair to characterize your knowledge of the airlift operation as kind of sketchy? "Mr. CALERO. Yes, I would say so. "Mr. BARBADORO. Colonel North told you about it but he didn't tell you too much about the details and he didn't consult with you about how it should be run, is that right? "Mr. CALERO. I never met any of the gentlemen, pilots, involved in this operation." (Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 40-42.)	

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86/04/11-150 AROUND APRIL 11, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD SUMMARY: Ellen Garwood meets with North and Channell at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C. (See 86/04/01-400 [Garwood's meetings with North and Channell]. See generally Iran-Contra Report, at 95-96 [Ellen Garwood and her contributions to the Contras].)	
86/04/12-100 APRIL 12, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: FIRST SUCCESSFUL DROP TO SOUTHERN FRONT CASTILLO MESSAGE: By KL-43, Castillo writes to North: ". . . Per UNO South Force, drop successfully completed in 15 minutes. . . . Our plans during next 2-3 weeks include[] air drop [redacted] maritime deliveries NHAO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UNO South, but w/certified air worthy aircraft, lethal drop to UNO South, [redacted] visit to UNO South Force with photogs, UNO newspapers, caps and shirts, and transfer of 80 UNO/FARN recruits [redacted] carrying all remaining cached lethal materiel to join UNO South force. My objective is creation of 2,500 man force which can strike northwest and link-up with quiche to form solid southern force. Likewise, envisage formidable opposition on Atlantic Coast resupplied at or by sea. Realize this may be overly ambitious planning but with your help, believe we can pull it off." (JHICI Ex. TC 6. See Iran-Contra Report, at 66-67.)	

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86/04/14-100 APRIL 14, 1986	RAID ON LIBYA: U.S. bombing raid on Libya.		
86/04/14-200 DURING 1986	LEAKS FROM CONGRESS: THE LIBYAN RAID AND THE ACHILLE LAURO NORTH ACCOUNT: "There were revelations immediately after the Achille Lauro capture of the terrorists that very seriously compromised our intelligence activities which allowed us to conduct the activity itself. The operation could not have been done without the availability of certain intelligence, and the statements made by a number of Members of Congress thereafter seriously jeopardized that effort and compromised those intelligence-gathering means. And I don't think we need to speak in further detail about that, but that is precisely the kind of thing we are talking about. "In the case of the Libya raid, there was a detailed briefing provided at the White House in the Old Executive Office Building which was hosted by the President, members of the Cabinet were there that were part of the National Security Council and National Security Planning Group. The President several times in the course of that briefing on what we were planning to do that evening noted the sensitivity and the fact that the lives of Americans were at risk. Nonetheless, when the briefing concluded at about 5:00 or 5:30, two Members of Congress proceeded immediately to waiting microphones and noted that the President		

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	was going to make a heretofore unannounced address to the nation on Libya. "I would tell you that the volume of fire over the Libyan capital was immense that evening. Two American airmen died as a consequence of that antiaircraft fire, as best we can determine. And I will also tell you that in my military experience, nobody keeps that volume of ammunition sitting around in their guns. They need a half hour, an hour to break it out and get it ready, and any one of the magazine photgraphs that you looked at shows, or the gun camera films show an enormous volume of fire that would indicate that while we may have had tactical surprise, strategic surprise was probably sacrificed by the comments made about the fact that the President was going to address the nation that evening on the issue of Libya. "If I were Mu'ammar Qadhafi hearing those words, and there is no doubt he did--this very session is being broadcast all over the world. The words that I am saying are instantly available in Moscow. The same thing happens on all of our network news. Those kinds of things alert our adversaries." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 8-11. See North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 78-82 [North on leaks from Congress]. On the Achille Lauro incident and leaks thereafter, see entries starting at 85/10/07-050.)		
86/04/14-205 APRIL 14,	CONGRESSIONAL LEAKS AND THE BOMBING OF LIBYA INOUYE RESPONSE TO NORTH ACCOUNT:		

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1986	Sen. Inouye, responding to North's testimony about a Congressional leak of the bombing raid: "I'd like to . . . clarify the record. . . . "In response to a question of two of my fellow panel members relating to the bombing of Libya, you said, for example, today, 'When the briefing conducted by the President concluded at about 5:00 or 5:30, two Members of Congress'--and you meant two Members of the Senate--'proceeded immediately to waiting microphones and noted that the President was going to make a heretofore unannounced address to the nation on Libya. "'I would tell you that the volume of fire over the Libyan capital was immense that evening. Two American airmen died as a consequence of that antiaircraft fire, as best we can determine. They alerted our adversaries.' "When the response was first made a few days ago, I checked with the senior officials of the Senate and looked into the record. "First, these two Members did not stop at the bank of microphones near the White House. They immediately left and returned to the Senate. There they were confronted by members of the press. One leader responded, 'No comment.' The other said, 'You should ask the President the question. He might have something to say tonight at 9:00.' "The 18 U.S. F-11s left Britain on Monday, April 14 at 12:13 p.m. The briefing began at 4:00 and the bombs fell at 7:00. However, a week before the bombing, CBS Evening News had this to say: 'Top U.S. officials acknowledge that		

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	detailed military contingency plans for retaliation already exist. Said one source, "They involve five targets in Libya."' "On the same day, the Wall Street Journal . . . . "Then the next day, Tuesday, April 8, the Wall Street Journal, again . . . . "On the same day, the CBS Evening News . . . . "On Wednesday, April 9, CBS Evening News . . . . "That same evening, ABC World News Tonight . . . . "Thursday, April 10th, we are getting closer to the day, NBC Today Show . . . . "On the same day, the New York Times . . . . "On Friday, April 11, NBC Today Show . . . . "Saturday, April 12, New York Times . . . . "Associated Press . . . . "Another AP . . . . "The same evening, NBC Nightly News . . . . "Washington Post . . . . "And the day before the bombing, NBC Nightly News: 'Administration officials say the President [is] moving towards a decision about whether to make a retaliatory strike against Libya, and White House officials confirm the President will have a special national security meeting tomorrow to evaluate the situation. Today, the President conferred with Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz, both of whom are believed to favor a military strike. Notably absent from the Camp David meeting was Defense Secretary Weinberger, who is believed to oppose such		

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	action.' "I think it is grossly unfair to suggest that two American lives were lost because one leader said, 'No comment,' and the other said, 'I believe you should ask the President. He may have something to say tonight at 9.'" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 176-81 [Sen. Inouye to North].)		
86/04/14-208 UNTIL PRESENT			LEAKS FROM CONGRESS, GENERALLY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. I think the question that you are likely to hear, and I think it is a question to ask you now, is to what extent was concern about leaks from Congress an influencing factor in the President's decision to not tell Congress in November of '86 about the Finding? "A. Well, it was a very strong factor. "Q. Was it discussed openly among the members at the meetings? "A. I can clearly recall the President discussing it. "Q. And had there been an history prior to that time frame, the November '85 time frame, had there been an history of congressional leaks, leaks from Congress, that you were aware of and could cite as examples? "A. There probably were. No specific incidents come to mind. I can remember something specific after that. "Q. Do you recall tasking someone on the NSC staff while you were Deputy to prepare a memorandum outlining leaks that had taken place in

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			the past from Congress or for that matter, leaks from the Executive Branch with regard to sensitive national security matters? "A. Yes. I can recall tasking Mr. DeGraffenreid to prepare one as I recall." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 112-13.)
86/04/15-150 APRIL 15, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD SUMMARY: Ellen Garwood transfers a contribution to NEPL. (See 86/04/01-400. See also 86/04/11-150.)	
86/04/16-090 APRIL 16, 1986			OBJECTIVE TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES POINDEXTER PROF: In a PROF to North written shortly before a meeting in Frankfurt among North, Cave, Nir, Ghorbanifar, and the Second Iranian Official (see 86/01/11-180), Poindexter issues specific instructions to North: "You may go ahead and go [to the meeting in Frankfurt], but I want several points made clear to them. There are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free in accordance with the plan that you layed [sic] out for me before. None of this half shipment before any are released crap. It is either all or nothing. Also you may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their continual stalling. He will not agree to any more changes in the plan. Either they agree finally on the arrangements that have been discussed or we are going to permanently cut off all contact. If they really want to save their asses from the Soviets, they should get on

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			board. I am beginning to suspect that [the Second Iranian Official] doesn't have such authority." (JHICI Ex. JMP 40 [= OLN 276; Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 4/16/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 227 [substitution for bracketed redaction as provided in Report]. See also 86/04/22-200 [similar message in Poindexter PROF to McFarlane].)
86/04/16-100 APRIL 16, 1986			OBJECTIVE TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you receive instructions from Admiral Poindexter before the Teheran trip that there would be no delivery of arms unless all the hostages were released? "Mr. NORTH. I recall that being the specific objective, and I think that was our specific objective in each of these transactions, that we would seek to limit any further transfers unless we got them all home immediately. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Who was calling the shots on these negotiations for the United States? "Mr. NORTH. On the trip that I went with Mr. McFarlane, clearly he was the chief negotiator. "Mr. LIMAN. And on the instructions that preceded the trip, the authorization as to how far you could go, who called the shots on that? "Mr. NORTH. Well, certainly Admiral Poindexter gave the guidance. "Mr. LIMAN. [T]his is Exhibit [OLN] 276 . . . Admiral Poindexter sent you a PROF note saying, 'You may go ahead and go, but I want several

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			points made clear to them'--meaning the Iranians. 'There are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free in accordance with the plan that you laid out for me before. None of this half shipment before any are released crap. It is either all or nothing. Also you may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their continual stalling.' . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 8/10/87, at 29-31; JHICI Ex. OLN 276 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 4/16/86; see 86/04/16-090 for text].)
86/04/16-110 APRIL 16 AND 22, 1986			OBJECTIVE TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: I will mark as the next exhibit two notes from Admiral Poindexter, one dated April 16, 1986, the other dated April 22, 1986. The first [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 41; see 86/04/16-090] is to Oliver North, the second [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 42; see 86/04/22-200] is to McFarlane. ". . . . "Q. Admiral, if you look at 41, this is a PROF note that is from you to Oliver North, and it states, among other things, that 'there are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free in accordance with the plan that you laid out for me before.' "It goes on to say, 'Also, you may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their continual stalling.' "Now, first, do you recall telling Colonel North at or about this date that the hostages had

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			to be freed before there would be any parts delivered? "A. Yes, I recall that. "Q. And was it a fact also that the President was becoming annoyed at the stalling? "A. To the best of my knowledge. "Q. And the memorandum, rather, the PROF note, Admiral, from you, Admiral Poindexter, to Mr. McFarlane dated April 22, 1986 also has a reference to the fact that the sequence has to be meeting, release of hostages, delivery of Hawk parts, the President is getting quite discouraged by this effort. "Is that an accurate reflection of the President's attitude at that time? "A. In my opinion. "Q. Was that based upon your conversations with the President? "A. That is correct. (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 14-15; Poindexter Dep. Exx. 41 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 40; Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 4/16/86], 42 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 41; Poindexter PROF to McFarlane, "Update for Bud on Iran," 4/22/86]. See also entries starting at 86/04/22-100 [Poindexter's 4/22/86 PROF to McFarlane].)
86/04/16-120 APRIL 16, 1986			REASSESSED OBJECTIVES OF THE IRAN INITIATIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . This is a PROF note from you, Admiral, to Colonel North. I'll read it verbatim. 'You may go ahead and go, but I want several points made clear to them. There are not

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			to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free in accordance with the plan that you laid out for me before. None of this half shipment before any release crap. It is either all or nothing. Also, you may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their continual stalling. He will not agree to any more changes in the plan. Either they agree finally on the arrangements that have been discussed or we are going to permanently cut off all contact. If they really want to save their asses from the Soviets, they should get on board. I am beginning to suspect that blank' --the name has been deleted, or the word has been deleted-- 'doesn't have such authority.' "Do you recall that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. Obviously it is a very frank message. "Mr. DEWINE. All right. This is why I--I was trying to set the stage. I wasn't trying to put out anything that shouldn't be put out. I was trying to set the stage on that date, April 16, 1986. "Now after this note was sent, Bud McFarlane went to Tehran. There were more--frankly, more disappointments. What kept this initiative alive? The President was frustrated. You were frustrated. McFarlane was frustrated. What kept it going at that date? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I think I've testified on this point before, but let me see if I can rephrase it. ". . . .

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. The problem is when you start any project, whether it's a project in foreign policy or involves the national security of the country, you start off with a plan and you lay out objectives, milestones that you want to reach. Seldom does an actual project follow the plan. You've got to adjust for it. I was in this note trying to be very emphatic and thus my choice of a few of those words to Colonel North that I wanted him and the others that were representing Bill Casey to be as tough as possible and that was our objective, as laid out in that note. "Now when we weren't able to reach that objective, we had to reassess. The President was unwilling to give up. He thought that there were still possibilities and his message was always try harder; and we kept trying. And that is why we continued. "Mr. DEWINE. Was there anything else that kept the thing going? Pretty much you are saying it is the desire just to keep moving? And the desire to-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't--I don't know of anything else that kept it going from my standpoint or the President's standpoint." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 88-90; JHICI Ex. JMP 40 [= Ex. OLN 276; Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 4/16/86: "There are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free . . . ." For text, see 86/04/16-090.].)
86/04/16-200		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF	

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APRIL 16, 1986		THE CONTRAS" TEXT: "Schedule Proposal" from Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, to Debbie Hutton of the Vice President's scheduling office: "REQUEST: "VP Meeting with Felix Rodriguez, a counterinsurgency expert visting from El Salvador. "PURPOSE: "To brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El Sal[]vador and resupply of the Contras. "BACKGROUND: "The Vice President has met previously with Mr. Rodriguez during his visits to Washington and will be interested in the current information he will be able to provide. ". . . ." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 4 [= Byrne Dep. Ex. 1]. See below at 86/05/01-205.)	
86/04/16-210 APRIL 16, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF THE CONTRAS" GREGG ACCOUNT: Gregg testified on the source of the phrase "resupply of the Contras," written on the Vice President's Schedule Proposal: "A. . . . The thing that we cannot establish is where the phrase 'resupply of the contras' came from. "Q. Next to purpose of the meeting, just for the record, it reads: Purpose: To brief the Vice	

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		President on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the contras. Right? "A. Right. ". . . . "Q. Did you ask [Phyllis Byrne] . . . where she recalls getting that phrase? "A. She believes she got that phrase from Colonel Watson. "Q. Have you asked Colonel Watson? "A. I have, and he says he did not say that to her. "Q. Is there any place else she could have gotten it? "A. No, I just can't account for it and I don't want to speculate about it. "Q. You didn't give it to her? "A. I did not. "Q. She didn't come up with it on her own. "A. She says she did not. "Q. And Colonel Watson says he didn't give it to her. "A. That's right." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 54-55. See Gregg Dep. Ex. 4 [schedule proposal, 4/16/86].)	
86/04/16-213 APRIL 16, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: WATSON TELLS BYRNE THE PURPOSE BYRNE ACCOUNT: Donald Gregg was aware his secretary, Phyllis Byrne was preparing the schedule proposal, but he did not read it before it was sent out, according to Byrne. Since he was not in the office at the time she completed the proposal, Byrne added	

Gregg's initials to speed along the request, as she did regularly with other requests.

"Q. How do you know whether it's authorized or not?

"A. Because I usually have discussions with Mr. Gregg prior to my preparing it.

"Q. Did you discuss Byrne Exhibit 1 with Mr. Gregg prior to preparing it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you tell him what it contained?

"A. Well, at the [time] we were talking about it I had not prepared the schedule proposal, so I didn't really know the exact language that would appear in it, that I would put in it, at the time I told him about it.

". . . .

"Q. Where did you get the information that appears in this schedule proposal?

"A. Well, the information that I got came in several ways. It came in a telephone call from Felix Rodriguez from El Salvador.

"Q. You say in several ways. How else?

"A. Well, he told me when he was coming and that he would like to see the Vice President for a short time. Those are his exact words. I checked my notes.

". . . .

"Q. What else did he tell you?

"A. He didn't tell me anything else except that he left phone numbers where he could be reached at different times in El Salvador.

"Q. Did he tell you what he wanted to speak to the Vice President about?

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		"A. No. "Q. What did you do after Mr. Rodriguez called? "A. I told Mr. Gregg that he was coming in, and he said go ahead and put in a schedule proposal to effect scheduling of the meeting, and this is the result of that. "Q. Did Mr. Gregg tell you what to put in on that part of the form that describes the purpose of the meeting? "A. No, he did not. ". . . . "Q. Where did you get the other information from that appears on Byrne Exhibit 1? [Sic.] "A. The purpose of the meeting was given to me by Colonel Watson. "Q. And how did Colonel Watson become involved in this schedule proposal? "A. My desk is located right outside of Colonel Watson's door and my word processor is there, too. I turned to him when I was preparing this and asked him to give me a phrase. "Q. And he gave you the following phrase: 'To brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the contras'? "A. I don't believe that he gave me those precise words, but he did tell me--the resupply of the contras was the phrase that he provided to me. "Q. He did tell you that. When you say he didn't give you those precise words? "A. Well, he didn't give me the complete sentence as it appears here. "Q. But he gave you the substance?	

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		"A. That's right, and I just structured what he gave me into a sentence." (Byrne, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 9-14, 17; Byrne Dep. Ex. 1 [Schedule Proposal for the Vice President, 4/16/87].)	
86/04/16-214 APRIL 16, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: WATSON TELLS BYRNE THE PURPOSE BYRNE ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [A]s busy as you are and all the things you are doing, how i[s] i[t] you can recall that it was Watson that gave you the passage? "A. He was the only person there. He was the only person in the office who would have been able to provide it, and it was a word that I didn't even know. It was language that I would not have known. "Q. But I just want to be sure of one thing. Is it that you remember him saying it to you or is it that there was no one else who could have said it to you? "A. I recall his telling me. It's my recollection that he told me." (Byrne, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 25; Byrne Dep. Ex. 1.)	
86/04/16-220 APRIL 16, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF THE CONTRAS" WATSON ACCOUNT: "A. . . . To anticipate your question, I don't know whether Felix wrote, called, or what to set this meeting up. "Q. . . . [H]ave you supplied information for	

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schedule proposals from time to time?

"A. From time to time.

"Q. Do you know how this schedule proposal was prepared?

"A. No, I don't.

"Q. Do you recall telling Phyllis Byrne or providing Phyllis Byrne with the information that appears next to the word 'purpose' on the April 16, 1986, schedule proposal?

"A. No, I don't. What I do recall--and my memory is very fuzzy because, as I said, we sometimes--so many of these things are coming and going, and we are always asking for meetings.

"I don't recall whether it was in preparation for the April 16th schedule proposal or in preparation of briefing memo, I remember--

"Q. The April 30, 1986?

"A. Yes, I'm sorry.

"I recall at one time Phyllis turning from her desk, because her desk is as close as you and I are, three or four feet apart, and she is outside the door of my office, and she said: How do we describe Felix? And we settled on the words 'a counterinsurgency expert visiting from El Salvador.'

"Q. Do you recall telling Phyllis Byrne that a purpose of the meeting requested by Rodriguez was to discuss resupply of the contras?

"A. No, I do not.

"Q. Would it affect you recollection if I told you that Phyllis Byrne recalls that it was you who gave her the essence and substance of what appears as the purpose of the meeting on the schedule proposal, namely to brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the contras?

"If I tell you again that Ms. Byrne recalls that it was you who told her that what I just read in effect was the purpose of the meeting, would that change your recollection in any way?

"A. That would not change my recollection.

"Q. Your view is that Phyllis is wrong?

"A. I can't say she's wrong. I can't say she's wrong. I can't say she's right.

"Q. She recalls that it was you who told her.

"A. Well, she can, but I do not recall giving those words.

"Q. Let me tell you where we are with this, Colonel Watson. Mr. Gregg says he didn't write it. [See 86/04/16-210.] You say you didn't give it to Phyllis Byrne. She recalls that you did give it to Phyllis Byrne, that you did give it to her. [See 86/04/16-213.]

"Do you have any explanation for where this language came from?

"A. The only explanation is that the Congress and the President and everybody was in the midst of a request for a vote, a request for an appropriation of funds, and the whole subject of continued or resumed military assistance for the United Nicaraguan Opposition was something that was being much discussed.

"There were meetings going on constantly during that spring involving different members of the Administration to advocate the President's policy of supplying, providing supplies to the

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		Nicaraguans that were seeking freedom. And it was not an unusual issue. "The specific words 'resupply of the contras' could have devolved or evolved from that general atmospheric. But as for the specific, no, I still do not know where that came from." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 27a-29. See Watson Dep. Ex. 3 [4/30/86 Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President for 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; 4/28/86 meeting approval memo for the Vice President's 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; and 4/16/86 Schedule Proposal for the Vice President's meeting with Rodriguez].)	
86/04/16-221 APRIL 16, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF THE CONTRAS" WATSON ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Q. . . . But when you said before that the general atmosphere at the time was one in which there was attention being paid to the contras and to the prospect of getting renewed assistance from the Congress and so forth, I am trying to understand how that testimony relates to my question of where Ms. Byrne would have gotten the information from as to the purpose of this meeting[.] "A. I can't tell you where she got it. "Q. Were you suggesting that she made it up based on the general atmosphere in Washington at the time? "A. I wouldn't want to suggest that maybe she did anything. I can't read her motives or her intentions or her role in preparing this schedule.	

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		I can't do that. But what I can tell you is that I am fairly certain that I did not provide those words. "Q. Because if you didn't provide it and if Mr. Gregg didn't provide it, and if she didn't come up with it on her own, and if Felix Rodriguez didn't provide it, then this was ghostwritten literally, because there's nobody who provided it. "Would you think that there would have been something wrong with discussing resupply of the contras with the Vice President in May of 1986? "A. I would not have phrased it 'resupply of the contras.' I would have phrased it--I would have phrased it 'the need for legislative effort' or 'to discuss the situation to provide background for support of the President's budget request for military aid to the Congress [sic (Contras?)].' "Q. What does 'resupply of the contras' mean? "A. To me, 'resupply' is a very specific technical thing, which means kicking bundles out of airplanes. "Q. And you came to learn as of some point, I guess as of August 1986, that Felix Rodriguez was involved in resupply of the contras, right? "A. That's correct. Well, that he had something to do with access to the airplanes on the ground and refueling them and that sort of thing. "Q. Facilitating? "A. I don't know if he was the person who got on the airplane and did that. "Q. I understand. But that he was involved in facilitating?	

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		"A. Facilitating. That's a good word. "Q. And that you came to understand in August 1986, right? "A. That's correct--now wait a minute. August 1986, we didn't learn that he was involved in it. We learned that he had a lot of information about the people that were doing it--Secord, Clines, and those folks--not that he himself was involved. "Q. When did you learn that he himself was involved, 'he' being Felix Rodriguez? "A. Well, the first allegation was when Eugene Hasenfus was shot down in October, or his airplane was, and the Sandinistas paraded Hasenfus out. It was the first allegation. "Then at some time later, maybe October, November, December, as the information began to roll out which you are investigating, Felix Rodriguez's role became more known. And I understand he came to Don and confessed that he had been much more heavily involved. "Q. When? "A. I think it was December '86. I was not a party to it and Don has only told me that later." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 32-34. See Watson Dep. Ex. 3 [4/30/86 Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President for 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; 4/28/86 Meeting approval memo for the Vice President's 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; and 4/16/86 Schedule Proposal for the Vice President's meeting with Rodriguez].)	
86/04/16-222		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY	

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APRIL 16, 1986		OF THE CONTRAS" WATSON ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Q. . . . Let me go back one more time, then, to Watson Exhibit 3. It is your testimony that you are not the source of the language that resupply of the contras was a purpose of the meeting between Felix and the Vice President, correct? "A. That is my testimony, to the extent that all humans are both fallible and wish they were infallible. ". . . . "Q. You have probed your recollection, correct? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. And you are not the source of the information that appears as the purpose of the meeting between Mr. Rodriguez and the Vice President set for May 1, 1986; that's correct? "A. No, no. When I said earlier-- "Q. Tell me what it is[.] "A. At some point, and I believe it was either the schedule proposal or the briefing memo, Phyllis said: How do we describe Felix Rodriguez? "Q. And you said counterinsurgency? "A. Counterinsurgency expert visiting from El Salvador. "The question I think you're asking is where did the phrase resupply of the contras come from. That I testified that I do not know. "Q. What about the phrase 'briefing on the status of the war in El Salvador'? Where did that come from?	

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		"A. I don't know, but that would be a normal thing you would expect with a meeting with Felix. "Q. But you don't know where that came from, any more than you know where the resupply of the contras purpose came from? "A. That's correct. "Q. Have you discussed these documents, the briefing memo and/or the scheduling proposal, with Mr. Gregg before today? "A. We discussed it briefly when we discovered the document in our files back in, whenever it was, December or January, whenever. I think it was in response to the Congressman Hamilton request in January. "Q. Of 1987? "A. Of 1987. "We looked at it, and Don's question was: Where did 'resupply of the contras' come from? "Q. And what did you say? "A. I said 'beats me' or words to that effect. "Q. And what did he say? "A. He said 'Oh' or words to that effect, 'beats me,' I don't know. "Q. That was the substance of the discussion? "A. I think so. I don't think we had an extended discussion on it. "Q. Have you learned from that day to this where the words 'resupply of the contras' came from in these documents, this document that went to the Vice President? "A. No, I have not." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 34-36. See id.,	

6/16/87, at 36-40. See also Watson Dep. Ex. 3 [4/30/86 Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President for 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; 4/28/86 Meeting approval memo for the Vice President's 5/1/86 meeting with Rodriguez; and 4/16/86 Schedule Proposal for the Vice President's meeting with Rodriguez].)

86/04/20-200
APRIL 10,
1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: THE CONTRAS' EQUIPMENT
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

North and Secord fly to Central America for a meeting with Enrique Bermudez ("they came on a . . . private jet, on a November 1012 Bravo, if I [sc. Rodriguez] remember correctly").

Bermudez complains about the quality of the aircraft. As Rodriguez testified, "Colonel North told him [sc. Bermudez] that those were a donation, that he didn't control that." Rodriguez added, "[T]hat is probably where I got my idea that if it were a donation, it does belong to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters."

North also mentions training FDN pilots to operate the aircraft.

Two or three weeks earlier, Rafael Quintero had asked Rodriguez to acquire local end-user certificates in the name of Lake Resources for Blowpipes. Rodriguez asks North at the meeting "if it was all right to go ahead and produce this end-use certificate." North says yes, "so I [sc. Rodriguez] gave the end-use certificate to General Secord."

A month or two later, Rodriguez asks "what happened to the deal and I [sc. Rodriguez] was told that the deal was dead. They couldn't get any agreement with the South American country who had the unit, and knowing the importance of something like this, . . . I requested very strongly that it should be returned to the country several times." The end-user certificates, however, are never returned. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 248-52. See id., 5/28/87, at 41-43 [4/20/86 meeting].)

86/04/20-220
SOMETIME IN
LATE APRIL
1986

NORTH, SECORD AND GADD IN EL SALVADOR,
AND THE CONTRAS' EQUIPMENT

GADD ACCOUNT:

Gadd travels with North, Secord and Quintero to an airfield in El Salvador. They stay 4 or 5 hours. North and Secord, minus Gadd, meet in "a closed-door session in the office of General B[u]stillo, Commander of the El Salvador[]an Air Force." After the meeting, North and Secord fly back with Gadd. (Where they go is unspecified, but they arrive on a Jet Star.)

Ian Crawford, a crew member on the April 9-11 lethal drop inside Nicaragua, briefs North on that mission during the return flight.

Gadd also overhears from North and Secord on the plane that Bustillo attended the meeting along with Col. Steele, the U.S. military group commander in El Salvador. The meeting discussions, however, "were directed at the FDN principal"--Enrique Bermudez.

"Q. During that conversation, did they say that B[u]stillo and others from the FDN indicated the planes belonged to the FDN . . . ?

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		"A. Yes. "Q. Did North and Secord report that they explained that their opinion was the planes belonged to a private group? "A. Correct. A contractor. "Q. . . . [W]hat else did they say on that subject? "A. Basically the FDN principals explained about the type of support they were receiving. "Q. What did they say? "A. Essentially that they were the wrong type of aircraft and that they wanted C-130 equivalent -- C-130 or equivalent aircraft as a better choice. "Q. How did General S[e]cord and Oliver North explain their response to that? "A. General Secord stated in this conversation that he tried to explain to Enrique Bermudez and the others in the group that a C-130 or equivalent aircraft was out of the question, that those aircraft were, in fact, most suitable for this type of air support activity, and that they would work extremely hard in improving the type of air support they would be receiving. "Q. Do you know whether General Secord and Colonel North were able to resolve the issue of who owned these aircraft with . . . B[u]stillo and the Contra leaders? "A. No." (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 36-39, 44-46. See 86/04/00-000 [Secord testimony on his only trip to Central America: a "brief trip to El Salvador in April of '86"].)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/04/21-100 APRIL 21, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: $27 MILLION SPENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Report at ARA regional that $27 million humanitarian assistance largely spent; NDR on reduced rations." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/05/16-350.)	
86/04/21-200 APRIL 21, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS North PROF to McFarlane: ". . . . ". . . Went to CentAm to try and reassure our friends--both govts. and resistance that we WOULD get funding thru the Congress. In the four years I have been working this effort, it was the most depressing session to date. There is great dispair [sic] that we may fail in this effort and the resistance support acct is darned near broke. Any thoughts where we can put our hands on a quick $3-5M? Gaston [sc. Sigur] is going back to his friends who have given $2M so far in hopes that we can bridge things again, but time is running out along w/ the money. So far we have seven a/c working, have delivered over $37M in supplies and ordnance but the pot is almost empty. Have told Dick [Secord] to prepare to sell the ship first and then the a/c as a means of sustaining the effort. Where we go after that is a very big question. How about Ross? As you know I have never asked him for help in this regard, believing that he wd be inclined	

to talk about it. It may now be time to take that risk. Any thoughts? . . . "
(JHICI Ex. 46 [= Exx. OLN 4, GJS 2; North PROF to McFarlane, "Any guesses?," 4/21/86; emphasis in original]; see McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 105-10.)

86/04/21-201
APRIL 21,
1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS

McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

[McFarlane testimony continues from 86/02/27-302:]

"Mr. NIELDS. Would you turn, then, to Exhibit 46. Do you have that in front of you.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. The first paragraph--this is also, I take it, a PROF message in April, now, 1986, from North to you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. The first paragraph I am going to skip. That deals with another subject.

"The second paragraph reads as follows: 'Also not a good weekend. Went to CENTAM,' --that is Central America-- 'to try and reassure our friends, both governmental and resistance, that we would get funding through the Congress. In the four years I have been working this effort, it was the most depressing session to date. There is great despair that we may fail in this effort, and the resistance support account is darn near broke.'

"What was he talking about there, the 'resistance account'?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I suppose the aggregate amount of funds that he had for supporting them. I don't know if he is distinguishing here between the humanitarian support and whatever support may have been collected otherwise.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it goes on: 'Any thoughts where we can put our hands on a quick three to five million dollars? Gaston is going back to his friends who have given $2 million so far in hopes that we can bridge things again, but time is running out along with the money.'

"Gaston is who?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Probably Gaston Sigur, who at the time was the head of the Asian branch of the NSC.

"Mr. NIELDS. And his friends, without identifying any particular one?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I could guess that they were Asian friends, obviously. I do recall, as well, that I had heard--and I am trying to recall whether it was orally or in writing--after the fact of one of, I think, Mr. Sigur having made a contact with an Asian government seeking support and after having been turned down and my learning of it--and I made it very emphatic--we could have nothing to do either with seeking nor with making the arrangements for any third country donations and that if any third country had an interest, it had to be for them, handled by them with the contras directly.

"Mr. NIELDS. But I take it from this PROF message North is telling you that Mr. Sigur went to one of his friends, the third country, and got

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		$2 million, and he is suggesting that he should go back again. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Then the message goes on, 'So far we have seven aircraft working, have delivered over $37 million in supplies and ord[]nance, but the pot is almost empty.' "'Ord[]nance' means weapons, does it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. 'Have told Dick' --you knew who Dick was? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. That is Mr. Secord? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Probably, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. '--to prepare to sell the ship first and then the aircraft as a means of sustaining the effort.' "What was 'the ship'? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know. It sounds to me like he is writing this on the assumption that I did know what ship he was talking about. I didn't. I don't know today, for that matter. "Mr. NIELDS. You didn't have any conversations with him that are not on PROFs? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, we did. I don't think he ever told me about a ship." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 105-08; JHICI Ex. 46 [North PROF to McFarlane, "Any guesses?," 4/21/86].)	
86/04/21-202 APRIL 21, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: McFARLANE'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:	

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		[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Then he says, 'Where we go after that is a very big question. How about Ross?' Do you know who[m] that refers to? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is very likely Mr. Ross Perot. "Mr. NIELDS. Then it goes on, ['A]s you know, []I have never asked him to help in this regard, believing that he would be inclined to talk about it.['] Now I take it from that that you would conclude that Mr. North had made a--approached some other people for money who would not be inclined to talk about it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, Mr. Nields, it is inferential. "I have to say I think your conclusions are justified entirely by a reasonable person reading these things, and I think it does little good for me to say repeatedly that this kind of, oh, Rabelaisean cast to the messages and to the creation of romantic kinds of activities are--I don't dismiss them at all. [Sic.] "But because I view them through four or five years experience of reading things which I knew to be not compatible with the realities of things I wouldn't necessarily have gotten upset. I was someone out of government unable to either get access to the truth or to confirm or deny the precise validity of what I was reading here. "Mr. NIELDS. But North, I take it, continued to talk to you even after you had left government and communicate to you through these PROF messages?	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is obviously true. I think perhaps in the year's time there may have been a dozen messages or once a month or so. "Mr. NIELDS. And he was quite open with you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. About what he was doing with respect to the Contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 108-10; JHICI Ex. 46 [North PROF to McFarlane, "Any guesses?," 4/21/86].)	
86/04/21-300 APRIL 21, 1986		SIGUR AND COUNTRY 3 SIGUR RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF: PROF note from North: "Gaston is going back to his friends, who have given $2 million so far, in hopes that we can bridge things again . . . ." Sigur testified he did not approach Country 3 again for Contra money after the fall of 1985. (JHICI Ex. GJS 2 [see 86/04/21-200]; Sigur Testim., JHICI, 5/14/87, at 121-23.)	
86/04/21-350 APRIL 21, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTRA FUNDING NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that at the time that you were involved in the Iran initiative and the Tehran visit that the contras were running out of money? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Exhibit [OLN] 3 was a KL-43 message on April 21, 1986 to you from Secord indicating that they were running out of money.	

'Current obligations over next few weeks nearly wipe us out except for CD.'

"Mr. NORTH. Right.

"Mr. LIMAN. Incidentally, did you know what the CD was for?

"Mr. NORTH. It was a, as I understood it, a $2 million allocation set aside for insurance of aircraft that were not ours, that were the property of another government.

"Mr. LIMAN. Who told you that?

"Mr. NORTH. I am quite confident it was General Secord. It could also mean . . . I had frequently told General Secord to set aside monies for other activities . . . .

"I also . . . tasked General Secord frequently to provide on short notice other support for other operations.

" . . . .

Mr. LIMAN. If you look at Exhibit [OLN] 4, which is an April 21, 1986 memorandum, it is a PROF note actually to McFarlane, and . . . the second paragraph . . . says, 'There is great despair that we may fail in this effort --' referring to the contra support -- 'and that the resistance account is darn near broke. Any thoughts where we can put our hands on a quick $3 to $5 million? Gaston is willing to go back to his friends who have given $2 million so far, in the hopes that we can bridge things again.'

"As you understood it, the resistance account was darn near broke at that point?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct[.]

"Mr. LIMAN. And when you indicated that

Gaston was willing to go back to his friends, that is Gaston Sigur?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Does that refresh you as to whether you knew who those friends were at that point?

"Mr. NORTH. Those were the friends that I had already met with.

"Mr. LIMAN. And does it refresh you that you knew they had already given $2 million?

"Mr. NORTH. Certainly.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, on Exhibit [OLN] 5, which was a note from you, again a PROF note, . . . you say that the weekend's trip to Central America was the most depressing venture in four years of working the Central American issue, and you describe your anxiety that Congress won't act in time.

"That really did reflect your point of view at that time?

"Mr. NORTH. It certainly did.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . . [D]id that not only reflect your point of view, but that state of anxiety that existed in the White House at that time?

"Mr. NORTH. I think it was not only in the White House, it reflected the sense of the Central American leaders with whom I visited, it reflected the sense of the Nicaraguan resistance. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 74-77; JHICI Exx. OLN 3 [KL-43 from Secord to North, dated 4/21/86], 4 [PROF from North to McFarlane, dated 4/21/86], 5 [PROF from North to Wilma Hall to

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		relay to Don [Fortier], dated 4/21/86].)	
86/04/21-360 APRIL 21, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: ENTERPRISE ACCOUNTS NORTH TESTIMONY: North's PROF note to Poindexter summarizes the then-current state of Contra funding. The note concludes, "The picture is, in short, very dismal unless a new source of 'bridge' funding can be identified. While we should not raise specific sources with blank, et al. we need to explore this problem urgently or there won't be a force to help when the Congress finally acts. Warm regards, North." North was questioned on the PROF: "Mr. TRIBLE. Colonel North, on the very day you wrote that note of despair there was over $4.8 million in the account controlled by Mr. Hakim and Mr. Secord. You couldn't have known that, could you? "Mr. NORTH. I did not. But as I testified earlier, Senator, I do not know to this day whether or not those funds were set aside for the other activities that I briefed this committee on." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 65-68; JHICI Ex. CLN 5 [North PROF to Poindexter dated 4/21/86].)	
86/04/21-600 APRIL 21, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT SHULTZ KNEW DoS CHRONOLOGY: "POINDEXTER tells GPS that the Iranians have complained, and the PRESIDENT said they could 'take it or leave it.' GPS asks if this means

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			that PRESIDENT is prepared to 'leave it,' and POINDEXTER says, 'I think so.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/05/03-100.)
86/04/22-200 APRIL 22, 1986			NO ARMS DELIVERIES BEFORE HOSTAGES RELEASED POINDEXTER PROF: In a PROF to McFarlane, titled "Update for Bud on Iran," Poindexter sets out the sequence for the Tehran trip: "Here is the update we discussed on Saturday. [The Iranian official] wants all of the Hawk parts delivered before the hostages are released. I have told Ollie that we can not do that. The sequence has to be 1) meeting; 2) release of hostages; 3) delivery of Hawk parts. The President is getting quite discouraged by this effort. "This will be our last attempt to make a deal with the Iranians. Next step is a Frankfurt meeting with Gorba, [redacted,] North and Cave. Sorry for the uncertainty." McFarlane responds by PROF: "Roger John. Your firmness against the recurrent attempts to up the ante is correct. Wait them out; they will come around. I will be flexible." (JHICI Ex. 46-A [= JMP 41; Poindexter PROF to McFarlane, "Update for Bud on Iran," 4/22/86 (Committee Document N 12502)]; McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Update for Bud on Iran," 4/22/86

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			[Committee Document N 17754]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 227, 238 [substitution for bracketed redacted material as provided in Report]. See also McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 155-56.)
86/04/22-250 APRIL 22, 1986			NO ARMS DELIVERIES BEFORE HOSTAGES RELEASED NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. [Ex. OLN] 279. "It says, 'Here is the update we discussed on Saturday'--referring to Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter. It says--and a name is deleted for the Iranian official--'wants all of the Hawk parts delivered before the hostages are released. I have told Ollie that we cannot do that. The sequence has to be: one, meeting; two, release of hostages; three, delivery of Hawk parts. The President is getting quite discouraged by this effort. This will be our last attempt to make a deal with the Iranians.' "And then it says the next step is a Frankfurt meeting with Ghorbanifar, North, Cave and the Iranian whose name is blanked out. "Do you remember that those were your instructions? "Mr. NORTH. That's correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it also a fact that when you were in Teheran the Iranians suggested that they might be able to get two hostages released if you were prepared to proceed on that basis? "Mr. NORTH. I recall that, but I also recall testifying to this committee that when we arrived in Teheran, it was evident that Ghorbanifar had

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			lied to both sides, and there were expectations on the part of the Iranians that we were unwilling to meet, and my sense is that they made an effort to compromise based on what they had told Ghorbanifar before we arrived, and Ghorbanifar had not related it to us. "And the fact is the Iranians took several steps, as best we were able to determine, to make those compromises, given their rather difficult political situation. "Mr. LIMAN. The compromise was two hostages for the arms? "Mr. NORTH. For the parts. "Mr. LIMAN. For the parts. "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. The parts were parts for missiles, right? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. Technical parts, not warheads or anything like that. "Mr. LIMAN. But they were parts that were necessary for those missiles and warheads to go and hit their targets, right? "Mr. NORTH. Absolutely. ". . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 31-32; JHICI Ex. OLN 279 [Poindexter PROF to McFarlane]. See 86/04/16-110 [Poindexter testimony on the PROF].)
86/04/25-100 APRIL 25, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ABRAMS' AWARENESS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on a note in his notebooks dated April 25, 1986 and stating "meeting with Elliott":	

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		"Mr. NORTH. It says -- I don't even know what the first note means at this point. Supplies for Southern Front is the second item, air base open and blank, aircraft for blank, and 100 Blowpipes -- BP's -- that's not the gas station. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you discuss those subjects with Mr. Abrams at that meeting to the best of your recollection? "Mr. NORTH. I don't have a recollection of that meeting but do not deny that I discussed those at various points in time with Mr. Abrams and others." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 170; JHICI Ex. OLN 94.)	
86/04/28-010 LATE APRIL 1986 [APRIL 29, 1986]	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM ROBINETTE ACCOUNT: Secord mentions to Glenn Robinette that North has been receiving threats to his family and is interested in a security system for his home. Either at this time or later, Robinette hears that North has been threatended by Abu Nidal. Secord does not mention method of payment for the security system. Secord then calls Mrs. North to tell her Robinette will be calling her. Robinette later sets up a visit to the North house on April 30. Robinette visits the house and starts the arrangements for the security system. He then goes with Secord to meet North at the OEOB on May 5, 1986 at about 7:30 p.m. They discuss the system at that meeting and again on Saturday, May 10, at the STTGI offices.		

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	Robinette details the system to North and estimates the price at $8,000 to $8,500. North says, "Please try to keep it along those lines. Remember, I am a poor lieutenant colonel." That is the only reference to payment at the meeting. A few days later, one of Robinette's suppliers estimates the system will cost about $12,000, not including the cost of a gate. Secord pays Robinette $16,000 to cover the cost of the full system, including Robinette's expenses. (Robinette Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 10-29.)		
86/04/28-100 APRIL 28 - MAY 5, 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM NORTH ACCOUNT: THE ABU NIDAL THREAT, Part 1 "Mr. NIELDS. There had been testimony that several thousand dollars was spent on a fence, a security system, that was put in at your residence and that the moneys to pay for it came from General Secord . . . . " . . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Were you aware that that security system was paid for by General Secord? "Mr. NORTH. I am going to waffle an answer. I am going to say yes and no, and if you would indulge me, I will give you another one of my very straightforward, but rather lengthy, answers. "The issue of the security system was first broached immediately after a threat on my life by Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal is, as I am sure you on the Intelligence Committees know, the principal, foremost assassin in the world today. He is a brutal murderer. When I was first alerted to that		

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	thtreat by the Federal Bureau of Investigations in late April, I was simply told that there was a threat that had been promulgated by Abu Bakar, who is the press spokesman for Fatah Revolutionary Council, which is the name of the Abu Nidal group. He targeted me for assassination. "We then made an effort to have the story killed--not me, but the story--killed and not run on the U.S. media. Nonetheless, it ran, and I believe the date was the 28th of April. The initial assessment was that this was a response to the attack of Libya, which we had run a preemptive counter-terrorist raid on Libya on the 14th of April, in which I had a small role to play. CBS chose to run the film anyway. "The FBI was then contacted again and asked what protection can be offered. The FBI correctly said[,] 'We don't offer protection.['] I then sought other types of protection. I went to my superiors and said, 'What can be done?' Contrary to what was said some days ago, this Lieutenant Colonel was not offered at that time any protection by the government of the United States, Senator Rudman. I asked for, and I was told that the only thing that I could do is to immediately PCS, permanent change of station--you and I, as Marines, know well what that means--and jerked out of our home and sent to Camp Lej[e]une in that I was preparing at the time to go to Tehran and we didn't want to tell the whole world that that was deemed not to be the appropriate thing to do. "The next thing we tried to do was to find a secure telephone to put in my home to justify the		

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	installation of a U.S. Government security system. That too was impossible or not feasible or couldn't be done. "The next thing I did was to ask for a list of who installs these things for the U.S. Government, maybe I can get a better price by calling them. I believe it was someone in the Secret Service gave me a list of three or four of these companies that do that kind of installation. "I called two or three of them. It is now late April, early May, it is within days of this threat, and I called and I asked can you come out and do a survey and give me an estimate, and in each case, I think it was two or three of them, and I was at that point relatively busy, I was told, 'It would be several weeks before we can come out and do an estimate and a survey, and it will be several more weeks or months before we can complete the installation because, after all, summertime is our busy time.'" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 89-92.)		
86/04/28-110 APRIL 28 - MAY 5, 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM NORTH ACCOUNT: THE ABU NIDAL THREAT, Part 2 North continued his narrative of his search for a security system in late April and early May 1986: "At some point along in there, either General Secord raised with me or I raised with him this threat, and I told him I couldn't get U.S. Government protection; I couldn't find a contractor to come out and do it myself; and he said, 'Don't worry about that, I have got a good		

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	friend, or an associate'--I don't remember the words--'who is an expert. This guy has a company that does these things.' "And he, shortly thereafter, I believe it was around the 5th of May, introduced me to Mr. Glenn Robinette. He was introduced to me as a man who, one, had been a former CIA, or perhaps I understood at the time FBI, I don't remember, technical expert; a man who owned a security company and a man who could immediately go out and do a survey and an estimate. "He did. Over the course of the next few days, he went out to my home, I called my wife or told my wife, whatever, that he would be out and went through the situation. He came up with an estimate of $8500 max, as I recall it was $8,000 to $8,500, and he could furthermore immediately install the system. "Now, I want you to know that I would be more than willing--and if anybody else is watching overseas, and I am sure they are--I will be glad to meet Abu Nidal on equal terms anywhere in the world. Okay? There is an even deal for him. "But I am not willing to have my wife and my four children meet Abu Nidal or his organization on his terms. I want you to know what was going through my mind. I was about to leave for Tehran. I had already been told by Director Casey that I should be prepared to take my own life. "I had already been told that the Government of the United States[,] on an earlier proposal for a trip, might even disavow that I had gone on the trip		

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	"So, having . . . asked for some type of U.S. Government protection for my wife and children, and having been denied that, and perhaps for fully legitimate reasons and if there is a law that prevents the protection of American Government employees and their families from people like Abu Nidal, then gentlemen, please fix it, because this kid won't be around much longer, as I am sure you know, but there will be others, if they take active steps to address the problem of terrorism, who will be threatened." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 92-94.)		
86/04/28-200 AFTER APRIL 28, 1986	THE ABU NIDAL THREAT NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): North testified he notified Poindexter of his need for protection, and Poindexter then referred him to Rod McDaniel (at the NSC). North continued, "[I]t was then suggested that there [are] only two things that can be done, . . . we can find a secure telephone and put it in your home, and use that to justify the installation of then security system. "Well, for whatever reason, no secure telephone could be found. . . . "I was also told that the other alternative was immediate PCS [permanent change of station] to Camp Lejeune or another military installation, which did not seem entirely practical, given that I was getting ready to go to Teheran. Thus, there were no answers. "Mr. NIELDS. That was Admiral Poindexter or Mr. McDaniel that told you that you could be		

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	transferred to Camp Lejeune? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall whether--which one it was. I know that that issue came up and was dismissed." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 101-02.)		
86/04/28-225 DURING 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM, AND THREATS AGAINST NORTH POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did Colonel North tell you [th]at he felt he was being harassed at his home by opponents of the contras? "A. I, yes, recall -- I am not sure t[h]at his home [was] harassed. "Q. Did he ever ask you to seek protection for him? "A. I can't recall that. You know, that is something that probably would not have come to me. It would have come to the administrative people on the staff. "Q. You just don't recall? "A. I just don't recall. The one incident I do recall, and I am not sure Colonel North told me or somebody else, but I was aware that somebody had done some damage to one of his automobiles or something. I can't remember exactly what it was, but he was clearly in a vulnerable position. "Q. Were there mechanisms for providing protection for people in vulnerable positions? "A. For senior people the government does have provisions. "Q. Did he ever ask your permission to have General Secord provide a security system for him?		

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	"A. I don't recall that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 38.)		
86/04/28-250 AFTER APRIL 28, 1986	THE ABU NIDAL THREAT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Colonel North has testified about the threats to his life, and I think everyone was very moved by that. Are you the person who turned down his request for a security system? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well-- "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Liman, we have been accused of all kinds of things. Is there a more delicate way you could phrase that? "Mr. LIMAN. Yes. I can phrase it: Did Colonel North request a security system? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall his requesting one, but I am certain that he did. The one request [sic (regret?)] I have, after hearing Colonel North's testimony about that, is that I didn't follow up on it personally. "I was aware of the Abu Nidal threat against Colonel North. I have a vague recollection that he came to me and indicated his concern; and my recollection is I asked him to speak to one of my assistants. It was probably Rod McDaniel, the executive secretary, or possibly Commander Thompson, my military assistant. And [I] asked Ollie to talk to them about the problem and see what could be worked out. "I don't recall following up on it. As I say, I regret that, and I suspect Colonel North thought at the time that I wasn't concerned enough about		

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	the security of him and his family. I should have been. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he take it up with you personally . . . after it got lost in the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He may have. I don't recall it." (Poindexter Testim., 7/16/87, at 50-52.)		
86/04/28-255 BEFORE APRIL 28, 1986	THE ABU NIDAL THREAT AND NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I believe it is your testimony that Colonel North did come to you with notification of a threat of some kind. We are aware of what that was. "You turned it over to one of your staff, did not follow it up. After that, you expressed your regret and said if you could do it over, you would; is that a fair characterization? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is a fair characterization. "Mr. RUDMAN. When Colonel North was before us, he was somewhat agitated about that and made a statement to the committee that he thought the law ought to be changed. "I just, for the record, Mr. Chairman, am not going to read it. I want to put in the record a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Webb, dated 9 July, at my request and the chairman's request, a letter addressed to us from the Commandant of the Marine Corps by his legal counsel setting forth that--as I am sure the admiral recognizes, as we stated earlier in these hearings--that any United States Government		

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	employee, military or otherwise, who has a legitimate threat against himself or his family, has available to him adequate resources for protection, and the colonel had reason to think that he didn't, but I just want to put that in the record. "Counsel, your counsel, will have copies of these, of course. I would ask consent these be placed in the record. "Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 144-46.)		
86/04/29-140 APRIL 29-30, 1986		MIAMI MEETING NAPIER ACCOUNT: Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, summarized a meeting in Miami about locating radios: ". . . Present at this meeting was [sic] Mr. Secord, Mr. Olmstead and myself. Mr. Secord asked me to listen carefully but not take notes and write it up after the meeting. I was in this meeting for approximately 20-25 minutes. Two men arrived (earlier I was told they would be coming [and] that they were with Motorola) and Mr. Secord asked me to leave and return to Washington." (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, Ex. 5 [Napier summary]. See Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 52-53.)	
86/04/29-300 APRIL 29, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: O'BOYLE O'BOYLE ACCOUNT: O'Boyle's second meeting with North and	

Channell:

O'Boyle receives a call from NEPL inviting him to lunch. He later has lunch in New York with Channell and his associate, Mr. Conrad. (O'Boyle: "I think he was his second in command at the NEPL.") Channell tells O'Boyle he has contributed "so quickly that they hadn't had the chance to give me all of the sort of courtesies and show me all the presentations."

They invite O'Boyle to Washington for another meeting with North. O'Boyle accepts, and on April 29, 1986, meets with North for 30 to 45 minutes at the OEOB. Channell stays for the beginning of the meeting but then leaves. North, alone with O'Boyle, tells him about the Administration's strategy in Nicaragua and shows him a map of Nicaragua.

After the meeting with North, O'Boyle again speaks with Channell. O'Boyle says he will contact Channell if he wants to donate more. (O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 35-39, 120. See id., 5/21/87, at 44 [O'Boyle, asked whether North ever indicated at this meeting "that he was sharing any classified information with you," replies, "Yes, he did."], 104-05 [O'Boyle: "I should say Colonel North didn't characterize it exactly as this is classified information which I am now giving you. The way he put it was this is very secret. You can't tell anybody about this. I took that to mean classified."], 118-23 ["I am not sure whether it is correct to describe it as a classified briefing. . . . He said that this was very, very secret information . . . ."], 135

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		[O'Boyle does not know whether the information North gave him was classified or not.], 143-44 [O'Boyle saw a 3-by-5 foot wall map of Nicaragua], 145.)	
86/04/29-304 1983-86		CONRAD'S FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES SUMMARY: For a description of Daniel Conrad's activities, see Iran-Contra Report, at 86-88. On private fund-raising for the Contras, see generally Iran-Contra Report, at 85-103. (See also 85/08/01-405 [Carl Channell].)	
86/04/29-305 APRIL 29, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: NORTH'S SECRET CONTRA PLAN O'BOYLE ACCOUNT: O'Boyle testified further on the "very, very secret information" he received from North: "Mr. STOKES. . . . Mr. O'Boyle, you had made the inquiry yourself of Mr. North as to what was the plan for Nicaragua; is that correct? "Mr. O'BOYLE. That is correct. "Mr. STOKES. And then in response to that, he then said to you something to the effect that he would share it with you, but it was really a secret; is that correct? "Mr. O'BOYLE. Yes. "Mr. STOKES. After that, what did he then say? "Mr. O'BOYLE. Are you requiring me to answer that? "Mr. STOKES. Yes, sir. "Mr. O'BOYLE. He then said that there were two--or there was one plan that had two	

different--there were two plans in one, so to speak.

"One would be implemented if Congress approved the money last year for the contras. One would be implemented if Congress did not approve the money.

"They involved the Nicaraguan contras seizing a part of Nicaragua, establishing a provisional capital, a provisional government, and the U.S. Navy going down, blockading the country, preventing the supplies coming in from Cuba to support the Sandinistas, and at that point, supposedly, the Sandinistas would fall and the contra government would come into power and then Nicaragua would be restored to democracy.

"And if the Congress did approve the money, this would happen on a slower time scale, giving the contras more time to consolidate their position. If they did not approve the money, it would happen on a shorter time scale which would be something of a desperation move, but kind of a last ditch effort, you might say, on the part of the contras. That was the plan.

"Mr. STOKES. Did he say anything in terms of the plan of any involvement by the United States or its forces?

"Mr. O'BOYLE. Yes. He indicated that part of the plan would involve having our Navy go down and blockade the country.

". . . .

"Mr. STOKES. So that in essence was it?

"Mr. O'BOYLE. Yes."

(O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 137-39. See id., 5/21/87, at 122 ["very, very secret

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		information"], 123-25 [Sen. Nunn: "I assume your attorney is the only person you told that you know of that did not have a clearance?" Mr. O'Boyle: "Yes, that is right. And the grand jury for the special prosecutor."].)	
86/04/29-310 APRIL 29, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: NORTH'S SECRET CONTRA PLAN NORTH RESPONSE TO O'BOYLE: "Mr. JENKINS. . . . Mr. O'Boyle has testified that in the course of a meeting with you following a fund-raising solicitation with Mr. Channell, not with you, but with Mr. Channell, you indicated a plan for U.S. involvement in Nicaragua that was extremely, in his words, very, very secret and that you indicated that should not be revealed to anyone else. Did that conversation ever take place? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall the specific concversation with Mr. O'Boyle, or conversations, because it appears that I met more than once with Mr. O'Boyle by my recollection. I cannot imagine that I used the word 'secret.' I probably used the word 'sensitive.' It was probably in response--and that question was asked by others. And the question would generally be asked, 'Look, is there any end to this? How can this possibly come to a conclusion? I hear on the one hand that there is no way for the Nicaraguan Resistance to ever militarily win a victory over the Sandinistas, given the preponderance of numbers and force on their side.['] "And I described to hima plan which had been discussed with the Nicaraguan Resistance. It was	

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		not summarily dismissed, as others may have indicated, and in fact was designed to preclude U.S. military combat operations. I want this committee or these committees to be abundantly clear that I personally, in every policy paper I wrote for the President and for my superiors and for coordination with the other departments and agencies with whom we were in contact at the NSC, vociferously advocated solving the problem of democracy in Nicaragua without the use of U.S. military force, and that is very very important. "Mr. JENKINS. I understand that. "Mr. NORTH. Congressman, I think people have left the wrong impression. This man saw too many Americans die to in any way advocate using U.S. military force in Central America unless it was the last resort. "Mr. JENKINS. There is no disagreement on that issue. The point I am asking was, did you discuss any, in his words, very very secret involvement? "Mr. NORTH. Look, this is a sensitive issue. "Mr. JENKINS. It is not classified. Is that right? "Mr. NORTH. It is not classified. "Mr. JENKINS. That is all I want to know. "Mr. NORTH. It was discussed with the Resistance." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 188-89.)	
86/04/29-314 SOMETIME AFTER JULY		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE ALAMO PROPOSAL ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Probably at a RIG meeting, North proposes the	

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1985		seizure by the Contras of a certain Atlantic coast territory in Nicaragua. North predicts two possible outcomes (according to Abrams' later testimony): "Either seeing these freedom fighters killed day by day, we would rescue them or seeing them fighting to the last man in Alamo-style fight, the public perception of their bravery would change. That was the basic idea, though he hoped, of course, that we would intervene. "Mr. BELNICK. What was your response to that proposal? "Mr. ABRAMS. Interesting proposal. I did not have any idea whether it was militarily feasible. I generally got ideas about what was militarily feasible from Colonel North and from the CIA and from DOD, of course. "As I recall, maybe it was a RIG meeting because I think we did get from DOD and CIA . . . that it is the craziest idea we ever heard, they couldn't do that, it is not going to happen and it disappeared relatively fast. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you ever make a report, that idea? "Mr. ABRAMS. No. It disappeared. ". . . . "Mr. ABRAMS. To have done it would have been a major policy decision which would have required not the Secretary, but the President. "Mr. BELNICK. You think the Congress would have had to have been involved in that, too? "Mr. ABRAMS. I am no expert on the War Powers Act. It seems to me I would leave that to the lawyers."	

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		(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 88-90.)	
86/04/30-100 APRIL 30, 1986		WATSON-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, notes a meeting between Col. Samuel Watson, Gregg's Deputy, and Felix Rodriguez: "On April 30, 1986, Colonel Watson and Mr. Rodriguez met to discuss progress of the insurgency and the need for helicopter parts." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [see 86/01/19-100 for preceding entry in Gregg chronology; chronology continues at 86/05/01-250].)	
86/04/30-300 SOMETIME IN APRIL 1986		ABRAMS-MELTON-SINGLAUB MEETING MELTON ACCOUNT: Richard Melton, Office Director of the Office of Central American Panamaian Affairs within the Bureau of Inter American Affairs at the DoS, testified that in May 1986 he had one or two face-to-face meetings with Gen. John Singlaub. He also spoke with Singlaub by phone several times during that month. Elliott Abrams, then an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Inter American Affairs, attended two meetings with Melton and Singlaub. Melton testified he had met Singlaub prior to May, and described a meeting in April 1986 at Elliott Abrams' office where the discussion topic was the Singlaub-Pastora agreement: "Q. And who all was present? "A. As I recall, I was there, of course,	

Elliott Abrams, General Singlaub. I am not positive, but Deputy Assistant Secretary William Walker may have been in that meeting as well or in part of that meeting. I am not positive of that.

"Q. All right. Tell us your best recollection of what was discussed at that meeting.

"A. The earlier meeting?

"Q. Yes, this first meeting.

"A. I have no recollection of that specifically. The context in which that took place was the agreement which General Singlaub had worked out himself with Eden Pastora. The concerns that we had that Assistant Secretary Abrams expressed were that there was some confusion as a result of the content of that agreement, and the wording of that agreement that could have made it appear that the United States Government was a party to that agreement between General Singlaub and Eden Pastora. Assistant Secretary Abrams' concern was to dispel that, to make sure that both General Singlaub and Eden Pastora knew with absolutely no doubt that the United States Government was not a party to that agreement. That was the context of and the thrust of that meeting as I recall it.

"Q. . . . Was anything discussed at that meeting concerning any intentions of General Singlaub to solicit foreign countries for aid for the Contras?

"A. No, not at all.

"Q. So the purpose of that meeting was simply to make clear to General Singlaub the position of the United States with regard to that agreement he had worked out and the fact that the United States was not a party or involved in any way with any such agreements or understandings he would reach with Eden Pastora; is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

". . . .

"Q. During that discussion, do you recall whether or not General Singlaub indicated that he had discussed these matters with the ambassador to that particular country where he had worked out this agreement with Mr. Pastora?

"A. No.

"Q. Do you recall anything in that discussion about the involvement . . . of our ambassador to that country in connection with this agreement?

"A. Not in that discussion. And I, as I say, I do not have records here to indicate the timing of these things. So the specifics I may get wrong, but I am confident of the thrust of the meeting. Recounting that episode without being sure of the specific sequence of events, as I mentioned, there was a concern about a possible misunderstanding. The content of that agreement was cabled by the embassy to Washington and from the content of the agreement, from the cable, we were concerned, I know I was concerned and I know other people in the bureau were concerned that this so-called agreement could be misinterpreted as an agreement between the U.S. Government and Eden Pastora. As a result of that, we communicated with the embassy the specific instructions that this was not the case, that Eden

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		Pastora should be so informed, and we undertook to insure that General Singlaub knew the same thing. So that was the context in which this took place." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 5-11. For Melton's testimony on other contact with Singlaub, see 86/05/08-500 and -501; 86/05/12-101 through -103; 86/05/14-101 through -103; 86/05/15-103; 86/05/22-200 through -202; 86/05/28-050; 86/05/29-500 and -501.)	
86/05/00-000 SOMETIME IN MAY 1986		CASEY ON THIRD-COUNTRY FUNDING SECORD ACCOUNT: One day while Secord is in North's office, DCI Casey calls from his office on the same floor to meet with the two. They discuss the growing shortage of funds available to the Contras. Casey discusses who can approach a foreign government for $10 million. Secord declines, saying he is not an official of the U.S. Government. Casey suggests George Shultz. "That was the last time I [sc. Secord] ever met with the director." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 198-201; see also id., at 193-95, 197 [earlier meetings between Secord and Casey in Dec. 1985 and Feb. 1986].)	
86/05/00-400 SOMETIME IN MAY 1986		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ABORTED SOLICITATIONS OF COUNTRIES 3 AND 5 SINGLAUB ACCOUNT: Singlaub travels again to Countries 3 and 5 to follow up on his prior efforts in December 1984 and January 1985 to get money for the Contras. Singlaub at the time has had no indication whether his earlier efforts had worked.	

Before Singlaub leaves, he meets with Elliott Abrams and briefs him on his prior trip. Singlaub explains he wants, this time, to work out in advance "how the U.S. would send a signal." Abrams says "that he would be the one that would give the signal" and "concur[s] in the solicitation of Country Three and Country Five."

Singlaub then travels to Country 3 and makes an appointment to see the head of state. After his appointment is confirmed, Elliott Abrams calls him to tell him not to carry through with the plan. Singlaub asks why, but Abrams says he cannot tell the reason, "but when you [sc. Singlaub] get back I will explain why you are not to make that solicitation."

Singlaub eventually returns to the U.S. without having solicited either Countries 3 or 5. He then speaks with Elliott Abrams who "indicate[s] that the reason I was not to make the solicitation is it was going to be handled by someone at the highest level, which I [sc. Singlaub] assumed to be someone in the White House." Abrams mentions no one by name, however. (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 235-37. See id., 5/21/87, at 166 [Abrams' deputy, Bill Walker, may have been present during a conversation with Abrams], 175-76 [generally on Abrams], 190-91, 206-07, 214-15 [either Bill Walker or Rich Melton present at meetings with Abrams before and after Singlaub's second trip to Countries 3 and 5: "I had had quite a few meetings . . . . I can't think of an occasion when there was not another one of his assistants there."].)

"Mr. SINGLAUB. [Abrams] indicated that the solicitation was going to be made at the highest level, which . . . I assumed was someone in the White House. If it was true.

"Mr. FOLEY. When you are speaking with an Assistant Secretary of State and he refers to the highest level, that would be normally something you would assume to be from the White House?

"Mr. [SINGLAUB]. Above George Shultz, yes.

"Mr. [FOLEY]. How many people are above George Shultz in the U.S. Government?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Not many."

(Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 207.)

"Mr. MITCHELL. And he [sc. Elliott Abrams] used the phrase, according to your testimony, that the solicitation was to be at the highest level?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. That's correct, yes.

"Mr. MITCHELL. And did you inquire as to what he meant by that?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. No. That was fairly clear to me, that it was going to be somebody from the White House o[r] the NSC that was going to do this or had it done.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you testified earlier it would be someone higher than Secretary of State Shultz?

"Mr. SINGLAUB. Yes. I felt, he would have said someone higher in the department or made some reference to the Secretary, but he indicated in words which I'm not positive were the highest level but at a higher level or something similar

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		to that, indicating to me that that would be outside of the department and probably in the White House. That's the impression that he was trying to give me, I'm confident." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 215.)	
86/05/00-450 PRIOR TO MAY 1986		SINGLAUB'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: ABORTED SOLICITATIONS OF COUNTRIES 3 AND 5 ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on his contact with Singlaub on April 24, 1986, prior to Singlaub's trip to Countries 3 and 5: "[I]t has been my experience in this program that whenever I reached out, I paid a price for it . . . . I recall that when General Singlaub asked to see me in April and I remember saying to myself, I have no reason to see General Singlaub, I don't have any business with General Singlaub. Maybe I will get in trouble if I go see--rather if I say to General Singlaub come see me. But I have been a great admirer of General Singlaub, still am. "I thought, he wants to see me, fine. I thought I am going to get accused of facilitation if I see General Singlaub, even if I don't do anything for General Singlaub. Sure enough, I didn't do anything for General Singlaub, and I have been accused of facilitation." (Abrams Testimony, JHICI, 6/2/87, at 31.)	
86/05/00-550 DURING 1986			STALLS IN THE IRAN INITIATIVE, AND WHY IT CONTINUED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. HYDE. Admiral, weren't you inclined to shut down this Iran operation during the spring and summer of 1986 when the February arms shipment failed to get a hostage released and it looked like we were being strung along?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, we were. And we did go through a period of time there where we were essentially standing down.

"Mr. HYDE. Who kept reviving the operation? Did Colonel North get Director Casey to help relight the fire?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, at the time I would have [s]aid that Bill Casey was anxious to continue. I did, as I recall--got [sic] a memo from him that recommended that we push ahead.

"Mr. HYDE. Was it the Israelis? Did they have an interest in keeping this thing going and did they come back with new information and additional spins on this to give encouragement to continue?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes.

"The Israelis were anxious to continue. They felt that the long-term gains were significant enough that they wanted us to continue participating.

"And I frankly was torn. We were discouraged after the February shipment, and the fact that we didn't get the hostages back, and I sensed bad faith. But on the other hand, we had so few other options in terms of gaining a decent channel into Iran, and getting the hostages back.

"Mr. HYDE. In for a penny, in for a pound.

"You started down the slippery slope and--

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I said earlier today, I believe you don't always have good options. You have to make do with what you have. "Mr. HYDE. The conventional wisdom is that the Iran overture was a policy disaster. Is that not too precipitous a judgment? Shouldn't the jury still be out on that? Because if we do lack good intelligence, we don't really know whether we were getting somewhere or not on the hostage issue or the strategic opening. "Is that a fair statement? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that is a very fair statement. I think it is possible if the present people working this problem in government go about it properly, I think it is still possible. One of the interesting things is that we maintained contact with the second channel right up until the day I left the White House and we were alerting the channel as to what we were getting ready to do so that the President's speech, so that his press conference didn't surprise them. "We got the Iranian Government to have their ambassador at the U.N. make a statement which referred to the United States in terms that are more favorable than ever had been made public by this particular Iranian Government, because I truly believe that with the second channel that we had established, we were in contact with some people that really wanted to bring about some changes in the Iranian Government that would be much to the benefit of the United States. "I am not talking about returning to a situation in Iran that was the same as when the

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			Shah was there, but turning the government around to a direction where we could indeed have a constructive relationship with them. "I think it is still possible that that may come about. "Mr. HYDE. It is a little disheartening, isn't it, that since November when the succession struggle is being waged in full force and we need the access and influence most we seem to have lost it, and that is-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think--you know, there is another problem here. I think it is a misconception, and there are probably people on this committee that will disagree with this point. "But I do not agree that we caused great damage to the foreign policy of the United States in that area of the world. I personally spoke to two very senior representatives of governments in that area of the world, and once I explained what we were doing, why we were doing it, there was no big problem. "Mr. HYDE. You would think those countries would have a great interest in a more moderate Iran rather than a revolutionary Moslem fundamentalist expansive state? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "At this point, I want to take a bit of a shot at the State Department because one of the problems after this became public was that we got a lot of harping and criticisms from officials in the State Department, primarily in my view because they didn't understand what we were trying to do, they were overreacting to press reports because

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			they weren't aware of what was happening; and I think that that contributed to what I consider to be an overreaction to the whole affair." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 208-11.)
86/05/00-590 DURING 1986		NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WHETHER THE CABINET JUST DIDN'T WANT TO KNOW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Was there really a point of view that you had that you should not share the information about what the NSC was doing to keep the contras going with the other cabinet officers? That's correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. Did you notice on their part a point of view that they shouldn't ask too many questions? "A. That's exactly right. "Q. Was it ever said in those words, did anyone say 'we just don't want to know'? "A. It's possible. I don't recall a specific incident where somebody said that. "What I was going to add is that not only do I think that by and large that was the view of the cabinet officers and a lot of other people in Government, but I also think that was the view of many people in Congress. "Q. What do you base that on? "A. Well, I base that on the fact that in August or sometime in late '86, a resolution was introduced on the floor of the House to require the President to provide documentation on the NSC activities, and it was referred to three of the committees of the House, and the House Armed	THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHETHER SHULTZ WANTED TO KNOW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "A. . . . My attorneys have reminded me of -- that Secretary Shultz did take that kind of view and expressed it to me of really not wanting to know the details on the Iranian project. "Q. Saying to you what and when? "A. Well, it would have been sometime in the -- probably the spring of '86. Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger and Director Casey and I periodically had what we called a family group lunch and there ought to be in my files a folder -- I thought there was a folder in which there may be some notes from those family group lunches; but I used at least one of those occasions to give them an update on the Iranian project and it was either during the lunch or after the lunch, by my recollection, that Secretary Shultz said, 'Look, you know my feeling on this. I don't think we ought to be doing it. Just don't bother me with details,' or something like that, 'on stuff I don't need to know.'" (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 173-75.) See col. 2.

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		Services Committee voted it out with a negative report. "By that time, it was relatively common knowledge that -- there was a lot of speculation that Colonel North was involved, but you know all of that put together told me that people didn't want to know. "My attorneys have reminded me of -- that Secretary Shultz did take that kind of view and expressed it to me of really not wanting to know the details on the Iranian project. "Q. Saying to you what and when? "A. Well, it would have been sometime in the -- probably the spring of '86. Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger and Director Casey and I periodically had what we called a family group lunch and there ought to be in my files a folder -- I thought there was a folder in which there may be some notes from those family group lunches; but I used at least one of those occasions to give them an update on the Iranian project and it was either during the lunch or after the lunch, by my recollection, that Secretary Shultz said, 'Look, you know my feeling on this. I don't think we ought to be doing it. Just don't bother me with details,' or something like that, 'on stuff I don't need to know.'" (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 173-75.)	
86/05/00-595 AROUND MAY 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT POINDEXTER TOLD SHULTZ POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you ever tell Secretary of State

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			Shultz in or around May of 1986, before the Tehran mission, that the Iranian initiative was over? "A. I don't recall the time frame at all. At various points we did consider it over. I can't remember the time frame, though. "Q. At any of the points that you considered it over, did you consider notifying Congress? "A. It was never considered that over. "Q. When you told Secretary -- "A. By the way, I think Secretary Shultz knew about the Tehran mission. "Q. When you told Secretary Shultz that it was over, did you tell him it wasn't that over? "A. I don't remember that. "Q. What does the term 'stand down' mean? "A. A temporary cessation of some activity. "Q. Did you tell him that you were standing down or that the initiative was standing down? "A. I don't remember the precise words, but I talked to Secretary Shultz several times over the period of the year about the Iran initiative, specifically talked to him about those terms of reference. Those are the same terms of reference that he later recalled that we gave to [redacted] at his suggestion. "Q. Do you remember whether you told him about the terms of reference before you told him it was over? "A. I can't remember the time frame. "Q. You said you think he knew about the Tehran mission. "A. Yes. "Q. Did you tell him?

"A. I'm sure I did.

"Q. Do you remember that?

"A. No, not precisely. Because he knew Mr. McFarlane was going to go.

"Q. How do you know that?

"A. Because I probably told him that.

"Q. You say you probably told him that. Did you or didn't you?

"MR. BECKLER: He has given an answer. He said he probably said it. Let's read back the record.

"MR. LIMAN: Probably isn't the same as recalling that you did. That is what I want to know.

"MR. BECKLER: Let's go back and have the answer read to the initial question you asked him. He gave an answer. He did not say probably. He said, I believe I told him, or something to that effect.

"MR. LIMAN: He used words like 'I believe.'

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. I ask whether you recall telling him?

"A. I do not recall the specific conversation.

"MR. BECKLER: That is the answer he gave two answers ago.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Do you recall telling him even if you don't recall the specific conversation?

"A. I remember discussing with him the terms of reference and that the President planned to send Bud. I can't remember the specific conversation or the exact time frame."

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			(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 67-69.)
86/05/00-600 SOMETIME IN EARLY MAY 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT POINDEXTER TOLD SHULTZ POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Can you tell me whether you recall that during the Tokyo Summit in early May, Secretary of State Shultz came to you and told you that he had heard from the American Ambassador to Great Britain and that we were still engaged in the Iran initiative? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe he got to me while we were in Tokyo. I recall having a discussion with him on Air Force One on the way back. "Mr. LIMAN. That is good enough. "Mr. POINDEXTER. He and Don Regan and I discussed it. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you that he had heard stories that we were still dealing with the Iranians and that he was concerned? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall the discussion very well, but he no doubt did. That was his position all along. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Secretary that you had directed your subordinates involved in this to stand down? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe that is when I told him that. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell him that at some point?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. At some point, and, in fact, we did stand down at one point, and I am a little fuzzy on the exact sequence, but George Shultz and Cap Weinberger and Bill Casey and I tried to have lunch together once a week and it appears in my schedule as FGL, family group lunch, and it was called that because we had it in the old family dining room of the residence in the White House. "We also had a rule that we wouldn't have the lunch unless everybody could be there and with all the travel that many of us did, it was sometimes many weeks between meetings. I believe in at least two of those family group lunches, I provided an update on the Iran project. "I recall at one of those, and it was at one point in the process, and I don't recall exactly when it was, we were standing down. "Mr. LIMAN. Let me put it to you this way--because of the beliefs in secrecy that you have expressed, did you ever tell the Secretary of State that the Iranian initiative had been halted or suspended at a time when it was still going forward? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Not intentionally, and I don't believe I did. Now, standing down, you understand, doesn't mean we stopped. It just means that there is a pause while we sort things out. [But see 86/05/00-608.] And at--and I believe it was--it was some time after the February shipment and before the second hostage was released, there was a point in time there where we thought it was falling apart."

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			(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 177-79.)
86/05/00-601 DURING 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT POINDEXTER TOLD SHULTZ POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Did you get an inquiry from the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Ambassador Price? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. Charley called me on a secure line while I was in Tokyo. "Mr. LIMAN. And he said he had heard about an initiative in which the U.S. was participating? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Right. He had a report from a--I believe British, I am not certain of the nationality--businessman. "Mr. LIMAN. Tiny Rowland. Does that refresh your recollection? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I am just not sure of his nationality. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you deflect his inquiry? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. As I recall I told him there were shreds of truth in the story that he had been told, which indeed was accurate. The whole story that Mr. Rowland had was inaccurate, and as I recall I asked Colonel--I sent Colonel North a message reporting the call from Price and wondered what in the world Mr. Nir was doing. "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, did you tell him it was not a U.S. operation, as you recall it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I told him that the operation, as it had been described to him, was not a U.S. operation. And I thought that that

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			was, indeed, true. Because the operation that he described was much more extensive than anything that I knew about. "I also told him that if he had further concerns about it, that we could get together when we were both in Washington." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 179-80. On Tiny Rowland, see below at 86/05/03-100, 86/05/04-100.)
86/05/00-602 SOMETIME IN EARLY MAY 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT POINDEXTER TOLD SHULTZ POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. But, as I understand your testimony, you would deny any assertion by the Secretary of State that you told him in May of 1986 that this operation was over? "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that counsel ask the question of what he did, not denying the assertions of somebody else. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Secretary of State in May of 1986 that the operation was over? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not recall making it that definitive. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever tell the Secretary of State that the United States had actually shipped arms to Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, I think that the Secretary of State knew that. I think that was covered in at least one family group lunch. "Mr. LIMAN. So your recollection is you did, in fact, tell him?

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think I did. In fact, I am almost certain of that. "Mr. LIMAN. Did the Secretary of State ever ask you not to keep him informed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Not in those precise words. He, in at least one or more conversations, told me that--that I understood that he was opposed to the plan, that he also understood that the President wanted to go ahead with it, not that he liked that, he accepted it, and he indicated that he didn't particularly want to know the details. "He said just, in effect, tell me what I need to know." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 180-81.)
86/05/00-604 DURING 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHETHER SHULTZ WANTED TO KNOW POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . [I]t's been consistent with everybody else's testimony, that the Secretary of State was opposed to the Iran arms deal; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He was. That is correct. "Mr. DEWINE. Now this arms deal was a major foreign policy initiative of this Administration; there is no doubt about that, is there? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I would characterize it as the Iranian project was a major foreign policy initiative. "Mr. DEWINE. But it was major? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was major. "Mr. DEWINE. And everybody-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me. It was major

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			because of the strategic importance of Iran to the United States and the free world. "Mr. DEWINE. And everybody understood that? They understood the sensitivity of it, the importance of it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. DEWINE. Yet the Secretary, Secretary Shultz, told you he disagreed with it? And told you, further, that he didn't want to know the details of the operation; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. To be--and I want to be fair to George Shultz, he disagreed with the arms aspect of the initiative. He didn't think that was appropriate. He saw that as creating problems. In trying to maintain Operation Staunch, many of our allies were anxious to transfer arms to Iran; and he was afraid that if it became known that we were involved with that, that that would open the flood gates. And I think, you know, it was a legitimate concern and was certainly factored into my thinking and the President's thinking. He wasn't opposed to the strategic objectives. "Mr. DEWINE. I understand. He also told you, did he not, though, that he didn't really want to know the details? "Mr. POINDEXTER. At one point he did tell me that. "Mr. DEWINE. Admiral, wouldn't you agree that on an issue as--this important, having--very, very important to the Administration, that that required the Secretary of State to give the President his best advice and then if the

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			President went the other way--which he did--to give him his full support? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think-- "Mr. DEWINE. Not just to back away from it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that's important. "Mr. DEWINE. The fact is, the sad fact is the Secretary of State chose to protect his own position, did he not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. You could draw that conclusion." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 90-92.)
86/05/00-605 DURING 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHETHER SHULTZ WANTED TO KNOW SHULTZ RESPONSE TO POINDEXTER: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . In particular, Admiral Poindexter testified that he did not withhold anything from you that you did not want withheld from you. With this in mind, Mr. Secretary, this testimony in mind, let me ask you, first, whether you ever told Admiral Poindexter or any other member of the administration that you did not want to be kept informed of the Iran Initiative? "Secretary SHULTZ. I never made such a statement. What I did say to Admiral Poindexter was that I wanted to be informed of the things I needed to know to do my job as Secretary of State. "But he didn't need to keep me posted on the details, the operational details of what he was doing. That is what I told him. "Now, the reason for that was--I'm not--this is the gist of what I told him. I don't remember the exact words, but that was about it. The

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			reason for that was that there had been a great amount of discussion of leaks in the Administration, justifiably so. "I think it is a terrible thing that goes on in Washington, leaks from everywhere, constantly, and we are all very concerned about it. And there had been, in connection with what to do about it, discussion of the idea of giving very large numbers of people who were--who had access to classified information, lie detector tests on a regular, random basis, which I opposed. "While I was on a trip abroad in the latter part of 1985, a directive encompassing that idea was signed. So I didn't comment on it when I was abroad, but when I got back here I did comment on it, registered my opposition, talked to the President about it, and it got changed. "Now that, I recognized, put me at odds with the intelligence and national security community, to put it mildly. "So I--what exactly would be done--and I am sure we will go into this after the January meeting--remained to be seen. But in terms of particulars, like who is going to go someplace to meet somebody and so forth, all of this kind of operational thing, it seemed to me, in the light of the suspicion cast on me as a result--and the hostility--that I would not know that. So I felt it would probably leak, and then it wouldn't be my leak. "So that was the background of this. It had to do with the problem of leaks. "But that doesn't mean that I just bowed out

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			insofar as major things having to do with our foreign policy are concerned. "And your previous question, the things that were being talked about, to consider that that statement would mean that I shouldn't be informed of things like that is ridiculous. "Mr. BELNICK. The main events you wanted to be kept informed of? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. And that was true not only with respect to Iran, but with respect to all areas of foreign relations activity, including activities engaged in by the NSC staff in Central America? "Secretary SHULTZ. Not only did I want to be informed, but when I found out things, sometimes by chance, I did my best to act on those things." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 12-15.)
86/05/00-606 DURING 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHETHER SHULTZ WANTED TO KNOW SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, you testified earlier when we began this line of questioning that you had told Admiral Poindexter that while you didn't need to be informed of what you called operational details, you did want and need to be kept informed of those facts which you needed in order to do your job, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. So in order to do your job as the nation's chief diplomat and as a statutory member of the National Security Council at a time when, through Operation Staunch, you were in

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			charge of attempting to persuade our allies and other nations throughout the world not to sell arms to Iran, did you need to know that the United States itself was selling arms to Iran, that the President had signed covert action findings authorizing those sales and that the President's former National Security Adviser was in Teheran on a diplomatic mission, bringing with him the first installment on a delivery of U.S. Hawk parts? "Did you need to know those facts? "Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly. "One of the many arguments that I used, and Secretary Weinberger used, in opposing having an arms sale dimension to the Iran initiative--one of the arguments was that we felt that one way of getting the Iran-Iraq war to come to an end was to do everything we could to deny weapons to the country that was refusing to come to an end, and so we had a rather vigorous program called Operation Staunch. "Ambassador Fairbanks was in charge of it for a while and when he left Ed Derwinski, now Undersecretary of State, was put in charge of it, and we made a very considerable effort to convince people, and with some success. "Mr. BELNICK. Were there any facts, Mr. Secretary, concerning the Iran initiative that you chose not to know and wanted not to know? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I chose not to know the operational details of how they were arranging meetings and so on, and I think Admiral Poindexter, if he understood that he didn't need to tell me about that, was perfectly proper.

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			"On the other hand, when you go beyond that into these more substantive matters, that's a different matter altogether." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 29-30.)
86/05/00-607 EARLY MAY 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: SHULTZ' AND REGAN'S CONCERNS OVER ITS CONTINUING SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Did there come a time, Mr. Secretary, in May 1986, when you were advised by the United States Ambassador to Great Britain of an approach to a British entrepreneur, [by?] a Mr. Nir, about getting involved in an arms deal to Iran which had White House approval, which supposedly had White House approval, which had John Poindexter as the point man and which included participants such as Mr. Adnan Khashoggi and Mr. Ghorbanifar? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. I was in Tokyo for the economic summit taking place there in early May, and I received a cable from the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Armacost, who had been called by Ambassador Price, Ambassador Price reporting a conversation that had been volunteered to an officer in the embassy in London. "The officer, obviously, having reported it to Ambassador Price in a cable, detailed more or less what you said. I received it there in Tokyo. "Mr. BELNICK. And if you look in your exhibit book, please, Mr. Secretary, at Exhibit GPS No. 20, is that a copy of the cable that you received? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. We understand from prior

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			testimony that you have given that once you received this information, you spoke to Don Regan, the President's Chief of Staff and Admiral Poindexter; am I correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. I understand that in those conversations you objected strongly to any such deal, to the United States being involved, insisted that if there was such an operation, it be called off and warned that the President was seriously exposed and at risk if this information you had received was true. "Is that a fair summary? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, that is a fair summary. You can imagine how I felt when I read this cable. And so I--in the way we are staying, we were in the Okura Hotel and I was in one area of the hotel and the President and his immediate staff, including Mr. Regan and Mr. Poindexter, were in another part. "So I just walked over to the President's part of the hotel to whoever was available; we were getting ready for the next meeting of the summit meetings, and I found first Mr. Regan and then Admiral Poindexter. I wasn't able to reach the President. And I went through this and I said, 'Well, that is what you said.' "Don Regan seemed to me to be very upset about it, said he would take it up with the President when he saw him at his own staff time, later told me that the President was upset and this was not anything he knew about, and Admiral Poindexter told me, I think his words were something like 'We

are not dealing with these people. This is not our deal.'

"He told Ambassador Price, who called him, that there was, I think his words were 'only a smidgen of truth in it,' something like that.

"Mr. BELNICK. So was it your impression from what Admiral Poindexter told you that there was no truth to the information you received, that we were not involved in that kind of transaction?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I couldn't know whether or not the people mentioned were involved in some kind of transaction, obviously, but from what Admiral Poindexter told me, I concluded that, as he said, this is not our deal, it may be going on, but it is nothing we have to do with. So the representations this is something that has been explicitly endorsed by the U.S. Government were wrong.

"Mr. BELNICK. Well, when Admiral Poindexter told you that this was not our deal in that conversation, which I understand from the chronology was on May 4, 1986, did he inform you that our deal involved an upcoming mission which by then had been rescheduled which would be led by Bud McFarlane which would include a shipment of Hawk spare parts to Iran?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No."
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 20-24; JHICI Ex. GPS 20 [Cable from Armacost to Shultz, re Price's report, 5/3/86]. See Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 220-22 [Shultz' conversation with Poindexter in Tokyo].)

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86/05/00-608 LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT SHULTZ HEARD SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. By the way, the stand down discussion was in late May or early June 1986, am I right? "Secretary SHULTZ. That's my recollection. I don't have a note in my records about it, but that is my, what is in my head. "Mr. BELNICK. But you understood when Admiral Poindexter told you that the people involved had been told to stand down that it was over? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. Now Admiral Poindexter has testified that in parlance, the term 'stand down' means that there's only a temporary hiatus, it is an intermission. [See 86/05/00-595, -600.] But that's not how you understood it. "Secretary SHULTZ. That's not how I understood it, but I'm not, I'm a Marine, I'm not a Navy man. So I may be wrong about that. "Somebody looked it up in the dictionary, though. "Mr. BELNICK. What did they find? "Secretary SHULTZ. Stand down means it's done. According to the dictionary. That's not necessarily a naval dictionary. I accede to Admiral Poindexter on that. What I understood that to mean was that this has been conducted and worked at and they went all the way to Tehran, and it fizzled. "Mr. BELNICK. Whether Army, Navy or Marines,

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			the Admiral did not say to you we expect this to be rejuvenated within the next several weeks or any particular point in time? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. Although the initiative or effort that I mentioned a moment ago I think was something that he suggested, and I thought it was a good suggestion. I worked on it and a few of the key people who knew a lot about Iran in the State Department worked on it, and so it wasn't as though things were dead, as I said. "Mr. BELNICK. But to be clear, as I understand your testimony, and please correct me if I'm wrong, this other initiative did not include or envision arms shipments to Iran? "Secretary SHULTZ. No." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 27-28.)
86/05/00-609 LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE 1986			STANDING DOWN ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE: WHAT SHULTZ HEARD DoS CHRONOLOGY: "After GPS returns from trip to Philippines, he is told by both POINDEXTER and CASEY that the Iran-hostage operation has ended and the people associated with it have been told to 'stand down.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/06/12-100.)
86/05/00-610 FEBRUARY - MAY 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: SHULTZ' AND REGAN'S CONCERNS OVER ITS CONTINUING REGAN ACCOUNT: In February 1986, after the 1,000 TOWs are

shipped to Tehran and no hostages are released in Lebanon, Regan tells the President "to break it off, that we have been snookered again, how many times do we put up with this rug merchant type of stuff--or words to that effect." Regan assumes the President shares his view, but Regan then "sort of los[es] track of what was going on."

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, it popped back up during the Tokyo summit in May of 1986 when Secretary Shultz came to you and was very concerned about something.

"Do you recall that?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And what do you recall him telling you at that time?

"Mr. REGAN. Has the man's name been mentioned in your hearing? It has?

"He told me that Ambassador Price had called him to alert him to the fact that Tiny Rowland, a British business person, was inquiring about whether or not we were engaged in shipping arms to Iran, that he was being offered a--I suppose you'd say a share in the underwriting of this, and wanted to know was this indeed U.S. policy.

"And when I heard the name Rowland involved in this, I was really concerned.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. You knew of Mr. Rowland?

"Mr. REGAN. By reputation.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. What was your concern at that time?

"Mr. REGAN. Well, you know, what kind of a deal is this? Here we are going to outsiders, to a British merchant banker, quote, unquote, or

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entrepreneur, as part of the Iranian arms sales? I couldn't follow what was going on.

"So I told him, I said you better get hold of Poindexter and find out what is going on there. So he said he would. So that's the last I heard of that one.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, Secretary Shultz has testified that it was his recollection that when he gave you this information in Tokyo, first of all that you were alarmed.

"Would it be fair to say you were alarmed at this information?

"Mr. REGAN. Concerned, yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. It was Secretary Shultz' recollection that you stated to him that you would attempt to bring it to the President's attention.

"Mr. REGAN. I don't recall that. I'm not sure that I thought that of sufficient importance to involve the President.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, if you were alarmed and you felt that this matter was possibly now in the hands of some people that you didn't particularly trust, why didn't you feel that this was something that--particularly given the fact that after the February shipment, when no hostages were released, you felt that this matter ought to be terminated?

"Why didn't you bring it to the President's attention at that point?

"Mr. REGAN. Well, having--knowing that the Secretary of State was aware of this information, having made my concerns known to the Secretary of State, and he in turn reflecting those views to the National Security Adviser, I felt that those were two very competent people who could handle the situation and would.

"There was no need for me to be going either around them or bringing something directly to the President that was really in their purview. I was trying to keep channels, if you will, or keep these things in channels.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you ever talk to the President about this matter? I mean around that time frame.

"Mr. REGAN. Around that time, no.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you check back with Secretary Shultz at any point to see whether he had been satisfied by Admiral Poindexter's--

"Mr. REGAN. No. Again, you have to remember we were at an economic summit. I was concerned that the President was being briefed, had enough information, going over with him some of the fine points of what the heads of government were discussing. So I put this sort of thing out of my mind."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 47-50.)

86/05/00-615
SOMETIME IN
MAY 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: TINY ROWLAND'S CONNECTION
REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. COHEN. When you were in Tokyo and Secretary Shultz came to talk to you and ask about Tiny Rowland, you indicated your reaction to that. Tiny Rowland--is his name synonymous with syndication?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. COHEN. Would you explain?

"Mr. REGAN. I won't say synonymous, but it could be associated with it.

"Mr. COHEN. What does that mean?

"Mr. REGAN. That he would take shares of an enterprise--a group of people get together, share the risk.

"Mr. COHEN. If he was one sharing the risk, there were others sharing the risk?

"Mr. REGAN. That's what it would seem to me. Why are they bringing in a British citizen here?

"Mr. COHEN. Didn't any alarm bells go off within the administration saying, 'If Tiny Rowland is involved, who else is involved?'

"Mr. REGAN. That is what I told George Shultz, he ought to find out from Poindexter what is going on.

"Mr. COHEN. George Shultz goes to Admiral Poindexter, and he says there is nothing to it?

"Mr. REGAN. I don't know what their conversation was."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87 at 125-26.)

86/05/00-620
UNTIL
NOVEMBER 25,
1986

POINDEXTER ON WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM
CONGRESS, THE CABINET, GENERALLY,
AND SHULTZ

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"I don't think it is fair to say that I have misinformed Congress or other Cabinet officers. I haven't testified to that.

"I testified that I have withheld information from Congress, and with regard to Cabinet officers, I didn't withhold anything from them that they didn't want withheld from them.

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	"The only question I think that has come up is what Secretary Shultz said to me, and he was not aware of all the details but that was by his choice." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 47.)		
86/05/01-200 MAY 1, 1986	DUTTON BACKGROUND DUTTON ACCOUNT: Colonel Robert Dutton retires from the USAF. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 3.)	RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Two days after his meeting in Central America with North and Secord on April 20, 1986, Rodriquez decides to leave the resupply operation. "Well," Rodriguez testified, "[I]t was a very personal reason. I don't know if I got a sixth feeling or something, but after I saw the people in there, I didn't feel comfortable with it and I thought we had better leave." Rodriguez makes an appointment to meet with Vice President Bush. He arrives at the White House early and goes to see North first. He tells North he is leaving the operation but does not specify any reason: "I told him, look, Colonel, I'm tired." North tells Rodriguez to take two weeks vacation, but Rodriguez insists he is quitting. Rodriguez then goes to Donald Gregg's office, and together they go to see the Vice President. For 15 to 25 minutes, Rodriguez briefs the Vice President and shows him a photo album of his helicopter operation. Nick Brady and Sam Watson are also present. They discuss only the helicopter operation. Rodriquez testified, "I want to make clear that at no point in any of this conversation did I ever mention doing anything	

that was remotely connected to Nicaragua and the contras." Rodriguez does not mention the resupply effort or North's involvement: "I didn't see a reason why . . . [;] it wasn't important."

As the meeting progresses, Rodriguez is about to tell the Vice President of his decision to leave. But an aide interrupts the meeting to say an ambassador from that area (whom Rodriguez had told earlier of his decision to quit) wants to talk briefly with the Vice President. The Vice President turns him down; the aide is insistent.

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. . . . So at that point I and the Vice President agreed, and the ambassador to the country where I was came in with Colonel North. Colonel North stayed in the background and the ambassador came in and shook hands with all of us.

"He told the Vice President that I had done a magnificent job in his area and that he wanted that, as long as he was ambassador there, I would stay. I am sure the Vice President didn't know what he was talking about, because I had not made my pitch that I was leaving yet.

"Mr. BARBADORO. So at that point you decided to say?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. It was kind of hard. . . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. So, out of embassassment about telling the Vice President you were going to leave, you decided to stay, and you returned to Central America.

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Right. I didn't mention anything from there on."
(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 256-61.

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		See id., 5/27/87, at 261-62 [Brief meeting with Bush during Cuban Independence Day celebration in Miami, 5/20/86; no discussion of the resupply effort. Rodriguez: "That is all the meetings we ever had."]; id., 5/28/87, at 19 [Rodriguez repeats he never discussed with the Vice President the Contra resupply operation]; id., 5/28/87, at 51-52, 58, 60 [meeting with Vice President].)	
86/05/01-205 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF THE CONTRAS" GREGG BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: "Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President," dated April 30, 1986, from Don Gregg: "I. PURPOSE "Feliz [sic] Rodriguez, a counterinsurgency expert who is visiting from El Salvador, will provide a briefing on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the Contras. "III [sic]. PARTICIPANTS "The Vice President "Craig Fuller "Don Gregg "Sam Watson "Felix Rodriguez" (Gregg Dep. Ex. 4 [= Byrne Dep. Ex. 3].)	
86/05/01-210 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL: "RESUPPLY OF THE CONTRAS" GREGG ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [Gregg Dep. Ex. 4] is a briefing memorandum? "A. That's right.	

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		"Q. For the Vice President. "A. Which would go in his daily notebook and would be, if he were to flip through to see who am I seeing tomorrow and why, this would be what he would see about any specific meeting. ". . . . "Q. And under Purpose it says 'Felix Rodriguez, a counterinsurgency expert, who is visiting from El Salvador, will provide a briefing on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the contras.' "A. That's what it says. "Q. What have you learned about who wrote that? "A. Again, that would have been Phyllis Byrne, and the language would have just been picked up from the schedule proposal. "Q. Is that what she's told you, that she just picked it up? "A. That's right. "Q. Didn't discuss this again with Colonel Watson? "A. No. "Q. And you don't recall reviewing this document before it went into the briefing book? "A. No, I did not. "Q. Do you typically review those documents? "A. No. I mean, if they are sensitive meetings with a head of state, I do. In this case, Felix had said he was in town and his morale was rather low. He had some pictures to show the Vice President of his operations and it was nothing that I would have reviewed.	

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		"But these documents jumped out at me in December of 1986. We at that point were putting together Exhibit 1, the [Gregg] chronology [see 83/11/03-100], and in doing so we made quite a full review of the documentation and we came across these documents. As soon as we did, it jumped out at us that there was an anomaly, an error -- i.e., resupply of the contras. So I thought, well, take the bull by the horns, raise it. We raised it in our office and in the testimony or in the interview that I gave to the House Select Committee with Mike O'Neill and a couple others present [where] I said we have these documents. I cannot account for what they say. "But, as I state here, there was no intention to discuss contra resupply, nor was contra resupply discussed in the 1 May meeting. "Q. At all? "A. At all." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 57-59. See Gregg Dep. Ex. 4 [Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President, 4/30/86].)	
86/05/01-217 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL BYRNE ACCOUNT: Phyllis Byrne, secretary to Donald Gregg, prepares the Vice President's Briefing Memorandum for his meeting with Felix Rodriguez by repeating its language from the April 16 Schedule Request. Since Gregg is out at the time the memo is prepared, Byrne signs Gregg's initials on it and sends it along without showing it to anybody. (Byrne, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 18-21; Byrne Dep.	

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		Ex. 3 [Briefing Memorandum].)	
86/05/01-250 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes a meeting of the Vice President and Felix Rodriguez: "On May 1, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez met with the Vice President for approximately ten minutes. Mr. Gregg and Colonel Watson attended. Mr. Rodriguez showed pictures taken during the counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador. Former Senator Nicholas Brady also sat in on the meeting. At the end of the brief session Ambassador Ed Corr, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, joined the group in the Vice President's office. At that time, Ambassador Corr strongly praised Mr. Rodriguez' performance in El Salvador." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [see 86/04/30-100 for preceding entry in Gregg chronology; chronology continues at 86/05/20-900].)	
86/05/01-300 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING PROPOSAL GREGG RESPONSE: Letter from Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, addressed "To Whom It May Concern": "The schedule proposal of April 16, 1986 and the briefing memorandum of April 30, 1986, both relate to a 15-minute meeting held on May 1, 1986 with the Vice President. Four points should be made about these documents:	

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		"1. I had nothing to do with their preparation and did not see them until a document search was initiated in December, 1986. "2. I cannot account for the fact that the purpose of this meeting, according to these documents, was to discuss resupply of the Contras in addition to the war in El Salvador. "3. The subject of resupply of the Contras was not, repeat not, mentioned at all by anyone in the meeting with the Vice President on May 1, nor had there been any intention to discuss that subject. "4. Since I realized these documents were anomalous, I highlighted their existence in an interview with the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held on December 17, 1986. Mike O'Neill was one of the staffers present." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 4.)	
86/05/01-325 MAY 1, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH MEETING WATSON ACCOUNT: "Q. Let's turn to May 1, 1986. 11:00 a.m. meeting in office room 298. Whose office is 298? "A. Room 298 in the Old Executive Office Building is the office of the National Security Adviser for the Vice President, to wit, Don Gregg and myself and others. "Q. Is that still your office? "A. Still is. "Q. You and Felix were at the meeting and am I right from this question mark that you're not sure whether Gregg was at this meeting?	

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		"A. I'm not sure whether he was. "Q. And this was a meeting that preceded, immediately preceded, a meeting with the Vice President, correct? "A. That's right. "Q. What do you recall having transpired at this pre-meeting before the Vice President's meeting? "A. Felix arrived early for the 11:30 meeting. For someone like Felix, we would usually have them stop by our office to say hello and then walk down to the Vice President's office or, in this case, over. "Felix stopped in earlier than expected and we sat there and talked. "Q. About what? "A. We talked about how things were going, how his need for parts was going, what he was going to raise with the Vice President. And he told me he was going to describe for him what had been accomplished since the last time he had met with the Vice President. I think it was January '85. How he had succeeded in getting a number of helicopters, his concept of operations, his need for supply parts, his need for more helicopters, that sort of thing. "Q. All right. And then there was a meeting that followed with the Vice President in Mr. Bush's West Wing office? "A. That's correct. "Q. And the Vice President was there, you were there, Felix, Don Gregg? "A. Also, not listed here, former Senator	

Brady, Nicholas Brady, Republican from New Jersey. At the end of the meeting, Ollie North and Ed Corr knocked on the door, poked their head[s] in, and said: We hear that Felix was in the building seeing you, so we would like to say hello also.

"Q. Okay. What was discussed at the May 1 meeting with the Vice President?

"A. I think it was a 10 or 20 minute meeting scheduled. It went over. Felix had a briefcase and in his briefcase he had a photo album [redacted.]

"He showed the Vice President the picture album. He described to him what was going on in El Salvador, showed him pictures of the helicopters, bullet holes in the helicopters.

"It was a discussion of counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador.

"Q. Now, was there any discussion at that meeting of the situation with respect to the contras?

"A. None whatsoever.

"Q. No discussion of Nicaragua at all?

"A. I don't recall any, other than there may have been discussion--I am only speculating--of Nicaragua as the source of the insurgency. But I don't recall any.

"Q. Any discussion of how the contras were doing?

"A. I don't recall any.

"Q. Any discussion of--

"A. In fact, I think I can be more emphatic than that. I'm almost positive there was none. Felix was very wrapped up in this meeting in the

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		helicopter operations and showing the Vice President that he was really down there with his helicopters, really fighting in El Salvador. "Q. And nobody asked how the fight in El Salvador was affecting the fight in Nicaragua or vice versa? "A. I don't recall it. "Q. Aren't those two subjects that are related? "A. I just don't recall whether there was or not. But I don't think there was. Felix was leading this discussion very heavily with his picture album. You may have seen it. "Q. But the Vice President I assume asked questions during this? "A. I don't remember whether the Vice President asked questions. On something like this, usually the VP's mode is to listen to what someone has to tell him. "Q. Is it your testimony that at this meeting on May 1 there was no discussion about the contras? "A. To the best of my recollection." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 22-24.)	
86/05/02-000 SOMETIME IN MAY 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: DUTTON ROLE SECORD ACCOUNT: Gen. Secord brings in Col. Robert Dutton, USAF ret., "to try to get some operational capability generated in th[e] airlift company," Udall Corp. "And ultimately he did. He did a very good job. . . . So by . . . late summer they were functioning . . . very well." (Secord Testim.,	

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		JHICI, 5/5/87, at 177.)	
86/05/02-050 MAY 2, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: DUTTON ROLE DUTTON ACCOUNT: Col. Dutton begins work managing operations at Stanford Technology Trading Group International on a resupply effort for the Contras: "When I made the decision to retire from the U.S. Air Force, I informed General Secord that I was going to get out in the summer of '86 and we were on a trip to Colorado with the Secords and he made an offer to me to come and work with him at Stanford Technology Trading Group International. "At that time he mentioned that he was in the process of conducting a special operation that he could sure use my help at." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 3-4, 10-11; see id., 5/27/87, at 132-34.)	
86/05/02-080 MAY 2, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: DUTTON ROLE RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Rodriquez testifying on the reasons he had heard for Dutton's retirement: "Mr. COHEN. Let's talk about the Honey-Avirg[a]n case. In your deposition, you indicated back in the spring fo 1986 that a decision had been made as a result of that law suit here in Washington to have Colonel Dutton retire and take over the management of the operation. "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. COHEN. . . . From whom did you hear	

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		this, that he was asked to retire, Colonel Dutton? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I heard mention that down there from, I think, Quintero, one of the pilots they were bringing him aboard [sic] and asking him to retire. It was just a comment. I didn't pay much attention to it. "Mr. COHEN. When they said they are asking him to retire, who[m] did you think that meant? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. [General] Secord. ". . . . "Mr. COHEN. Did you ever during the course of your activity in Central America ever cooperate with either Honey or Avirg[a]n? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. . . ." (Rodriquez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 72-73.)	
86/05/02-400 MAY 2, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LEGAL CONCERNS DUTTON ACCOUNT: Secord provides Dutton with "a copy of a legal opinion that he had had written that drew out the rules of engagement, that said, in fact, if we did not deliver people into the combat area, if we delivered only goods, even if it was arms, that we were legal as far as the Neutrality Act [required]." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 21.)	
86/05/02-450 AFTER MAY 2, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LEGAL CONCERNS RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Rodriguez testifying on Dutton's advice to the crew on staying within U.S. laws: "Mr. TRIBLE . . . [W]hat did Colonel Dutton tell his associates about U.S. neutrality laws[?]	

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, the first time I actually did not -- he arrived down there, he was carrying the Neutrality Act in his hand. He did mention the fact . . . for them to be legal, first of all, they could not, like he said here, drive anybody from the aircraft, but they had to compromise American officials in it to be legal, to be receiving information from the military.

"He wanted to get Steele more involved in it, and the ambassador if possible. That way it would be legal in the operation.

"Mr. TRIBLE. Colonel Dutton, contrary to his testimony yesterday, told his associates that they should try to compromise U.S. officials and get them more involved in these activities; is that right?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He mentioned that at the base, sir.

"Mr. TRIBLE. Did Dutton tell you what his long-term goal was in terms of this operation? Did you also hear about that from the pilots?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He believed that after the approval by Congress of aid to the contras, he believed the operation will continue and they will get participation and support in the south front. I believe it was on a rented basis with the agency.

"Mr. TRIBLE. In fact, you told Colonel Gregg, did you not, he had constructed a paper organization to sell the CIA?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. . . .
(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 39-40.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: LEGAL CONCERNS
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT (cont'd):

Rodriguez testifying further on Dutton's instructions to the crew on staying within U.S. law:

"Mr. DEWINE. . . . You testified . . . that Mr. Dutton was going to compromise U.S. officials to get further protection under the neutrality act.

". . . .

"Mr. DEWINE. But the term 'compromise,' how are you using that term?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, I would say he was told for him to be legal, he had to receive in every operation the approval of a U.S. Government official. The civilians were working for a government project, it would be legal. I didn't feel that--he probably felt North alone didn't make this operation legal.

"He needed people like Colonel Steele, the ambassador and other officials to support the operation, to feel comfortable and legal in it." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 80-81.)

86/05/02-500
MAY 1-2, 1986

CONTRA AID: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF
UNILATERAL ACTION
POINDEXTER PROF:

Poindexter PROF to Fortier, "Subject: Contra Project":

"When Shultz, Regan and I discussed it yesterd[]ay on AF-1, we were a bit confused as to whether the expedited procedures in the legislation would apply to this proposal. What pressure would exist on Tip to take action on it? Please talk to Will Ball. What about the idea that Jim Miller and Dennis had about submitting an urgent-urgent supplemental containing among other things the Irish aid package?

"Next, yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with 'I am really serious.' 'If we can't move the Contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action uni-laterally to provide assistance.' In other words he does not buy the concept of taking actions or talking about pulling out as described in the package. He has been reading Natanyahu's (sp?) book on terrorism and he was taken with the examples of Presidential actions in the past without Congressional approval. He also read an op-ed piece on the same subject. I believe that was the one by Dick Pipes' son. The President is recalling the 506A action we took on Honduras. I told him that I didn't think that it would apply here, since we are not dealing with a government. But the fact remains that the President is ready to confront the Congress on the Co[]nstitutional question of who controls foreign policy. We need to get Abe Sofaer and other stalwart lawyers thinking in these terms to see if there is some way we could do this, if all else fails.

"With our answers to the first question, we will discuss the package on the return trip and be ready to proceed on return. I have George's proxy on the package. George agrees with the President

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		that we have to win some way and we will not pull out." (JHICI Ex. JMP 45.)	
86/05/02-503 MAY 2, 1986		CONTRA AID: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: Would you mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 43] a PROF note from the Admiral to Mr. Fortier. It is dated May 2, 1986. ". . . . "Q. Admiral, if you will look at this PROF note, I will direct your attention to the second paragraph where it says 'Next, yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with "I am really serious. If we can't move the contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance."' "Do you see that? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. Do you remember that conversation? "A. Vaguely. "Q. If you put it down in this PROF note to Mr. Fortier, did it happen? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you remember what unilateral action the President of the United States was considering taking? "A. I don't recall that he specified any, but he was not willing to drop the support of his objective of establishing a democracy. That was	

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		clear -- the position on that was clear from sometime in 1981 until I left the White House. "Q. Had he ever before said that he wanted to take action unilaterally? "A. I can't say that I can recall his using that exact formulation before. "Q. The word 'unilaterally', does that mean taking action without congressional approval? Is that what you were conveying? "A. That is what I was conveying. "Q. And that the President would be exercising his constitutional prerogatives? "A. That is correct. "Q. And do you remember that Colonel North got hold of this and suggested the way to take action unilaterally was to seize a part of Nicaragua and recognize it? "A. I remember that Colonel North replied to this -- I believe I sent him a copy of it, yes, I did. "Q. In any event, you never approved [redacted.] "A. That was never approved. "Q. Was it ever elevated to the President? "A. I can't recall that. "Q. Is it fair to say only if you regarded something as a serious, feasible proposal that you would elevate it to the President? "A. That is correct. "MR. LEON: Before you switch subjects -- "THE WITNESS: I am not saying that it wasn't serious. "MR. LIMAN: I said 'feasible' also.	

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		"MR. LEON: On this one point when the President suggested he might act unilaterally, did he give you the impression in any way, shape or form by suggesting that he intended to act outside of the law in any way? "THE WITNESS: None whatsoever. All with -- the point, as I recall, is that he wanted us to think about ways he would under the Constitution lawfully act unilaterally." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 28-30; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 43 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 45; Poindexter PROF to Fortier, "Contra Project," 5/2/86].)	
86/05/02-506 MAY 1-2, 1986		CONTRA AID: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. You testified that you have had many many conversations with the President of the United States. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And you knew him to be a person of good humor? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Was there ever a moment when you were tempted to tell him about the fact that the Ayatollah, instead of supporting the Sandinistas, was giving money for the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, Mr. Liman, there was. There was one point that I was very sorely tempted to tell him, but I didn't. And, as I recall, we were aboard Air Force I on the way back from the Economic Summit in Tokyo, and in fact I think you	

have an exhibit that was prepared about that time that is pertinent here. And the President had just finished reading a book by a man named Netanyahu, who is presently the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. . . . Ambassador Netanyahu has written a book on combatting terrorism, and the President had been reading that book during the trip over to the Economic Summit, and he finished it on the way back, and he had a discussion with me on the airplane--this would have been in May, the middle of May, 1986--and we had received via facsimile from the White House Office a paper that laid out the status of our legislative plans for getting the 100 million, and one of the options in the paper was that if we were unable to get the 100 million, to pull out, drop our support of the contras.

"And I had discussed that with the President, and he had been very adamant at the time. He says, look, I don't want to pull out our support for the contras for any reason. This would be an unacceptable option, isn't there something that I could do unilaterally?

"And by that, I took it to mean he could do on his own that didn't require congressional approval. And I was sorely tempted at that point to tell him what we had working, but I thought better of it and did not.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that was because you realized this would be so controversial?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 128-30. See JHICI Ex. JMP 45 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier,

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		"Contra Project," 5/2/86, quoted in preceding entry].)	
86/05/02-508 MAY 6-8, 1986		CONTRA AID: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION NORTH RESPONSE TO POINDEXTER PROF: In response to Poindexter's PROF (Ex. JMP 45; see 86/05/02-500) relating the President's unilateral action proposal, North suggests that the Contras should capture some territory inside Nicaragua and set up a provisional government. The President would respond by recognizing the Contras as the true government and provide support. Asked by Poindexter whether he has talked with Casey about his plan, North replies in a PROF, on May 8, 1986, "Yes, in general terms. He is supportive, as is Elliott [Abrams]. It is, to say the least, a high risk option--but it may be the only way we can ever get this thing to work." (Iran-Contra Report, at 69; JHICI Exx. OLN 286, 287 [North PROFs to Poindexter, 5/6 and 5/8/86]. See Committee Documents N 1246-47, N 17770, N 18738 [JHICI Exx. 286, 287].)	
86/05/02-510 DURING 1986		DIVERSION: POINDEXTER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . I think you have already testified to this, that over the 5-1/2 years that you worked for this President, that you came to know him and what he wanted and what his policies were?	DIVERSION: POINDEXTER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And when the issue of what has been referred to as the diversion was brought to you, I think you testified that based on your 5-1/2 years, you knew how he would want that decision to be made? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And you felt, therefore, that you could make the decision yourself without bringing it to him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. And, more importantly, I think--well, as importantly, I thought I had the authority to do that. "Mr. NIELDS. Because this was an implementation you felt of a policy that you--of his that you already knew about? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is right. "Mr. NIELDS. But, Admiral, didn't the diversion proposal raise really two issues: One of them was what did the President favor? And that I think you have already testified you believe he would favor the diversion and, therefore--and that you felt confident you knew that? But didn't it raise a second issue? And that is--are you still with me? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I am listening. "Mr. NIELDS. That is the question of whether he would want to be told or whether he would want to be shielded from responsibility for a politically embarrassing decision? Didn't it present that second issue, too? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I suppose it did. "Mr. NIELDS. And my question to you is this:	

Based on your 5-1/2 years of experience with him, what led you to believe that he would want deniability as opposed to responsibility for an embarrasssing political decision?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was a personal judgment on my part.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you believe it was what he would want?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The situation I think was very clear in my mind. As I have testified, I felt confident that he would want to do this. He was very secure in his belief that it was the only way that we could bring about a democratic change to the government in Nicaragua; that it was the only way that we could keep from at some point in the future having to use U.S. soldiers on the ground in Central America.

"He felt confident that unless we brought about a change to this government, at some future point, some future President would have to make the decision to send U.S. troops down to Central America.

"He wanted to avoid that. He was willing, by my assessment, to take unilateral action.

"In other words, the President exercising his constitutional authority without necessarily getting the agreement from Congress. Later on, I had a specific discussion with him on that subject, which I referenced briefly the other day and you have it as one of the exhibits in your book."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 58-60. See JHICI Ex. 45 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier,

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		Unilateral Support for the Contras, 5/2/86].)	
86/05/02-511 DURING 1986		DIVERSION: POINDEXTER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Exhibit [JMP] 45. And if I might, I would like to read this. It is PROFS note from me, and I was aboard Air Force I at the time, and it was back to my staff in Washington. It reads: 'Next, yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with "I am really serious."['] "And the rest--this is also a quote, '"If we can't move the contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance." In other words he does not buy the concept of taking actions or talking about pulling out as described in the package. . . .' "Mr. NIELDS. He is talking there about special powers that may or may not exist, but he is talking about special powers of the President of the United States? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Not powers of the National Security Advisor who has never been elected by anybody? Isn't that true? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Obviously--say that again. "Mr. NIELDS. I think that is just a yes or no question. You can expand if you wish. He was not talking about powers of the National Security	DIVERSION: POINDEXTER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		Advisor? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He was talking about his powers. "Mr. NIELDS. Now my question to you is: What was it that made you believe that he wanted those special powers exercised by you with deniability rather than responsibility on his part? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was a judgment call on my part based on a long time in government and a long time working with the President. "Mr. NIELDS. Are you saying that there is something that you learned from working with this President that led you to believe that he did not want responsibility for an embarrassing political decision, he wanted deniability? "Mr. BECKLER. Objection, Mr. Chairman. The witness did not say that. . . . "Chairman HAMILTON. Counsel, let the witness answer in his own way. "Mr. POINDEXTER. The President never indicated in any way to me that he did not want to be responsible for his decision or that I should provide deniability to him, if that is what you are getting at. This was an integration of a lot of experience that I had that made me conclude that this was the way we should go. "Mr. NIELDS. The same issue was raised--and I will ask you the same question--about the destruction of the finding. What was it, if anything, that made you believe that your President would want you to destroy a Presidential document in order to avoid embarrassment to him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't analyze, when I saw	

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		that finding on the 21st of November, what the President would want, one way or the other. "Mr. NIELDS. The same issue was presented, and I will ask you the same question, about sending Oliver North to brief the Congress and at the same time withholding information. What, if anything, led you to believe that your President would want--our President would want Colonel North to go to the members of the House Intelligence Committee, who were asking him questions about his support of the contras, and withhold information? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was a personal decision on my part, as I have testified. The President didn't enter into that matter. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 61-64; JHICI Ex. JMP 45 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier, Unilateral Support for the Contras, 5/2/86].)	
86/05/02-515 DURING 1986		DIVERSION, GENERALLY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION FOR THE CONTRAS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. HATCH. . . . Now, your testimony has unequivocally confirmed what the President has been saying for eight months now, that he never knew and did not know what you didn't tell him. And that is of the diversion of funds. ". . . . "I believe you, Admiral, and I do believe the President of the United States. I have been around him enough both before this happened and since it happened that I believe what he said. He	U.S. POLICY ON IRAN, AND DIVERSION, GENERALLY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		is one of the few people I have met in government life who really does stand up and say I did it and I take the consequences or I didn't do it, and I think he has done that throughout his whole political career. "Now, others have picked up on a new thing. They are screaming about how shocking it is that you should keep such an important matter away from the President to begin with. "Well, they are saying that no elected official was making these high foreign policy decisions that affected out country. Now, with respect to that line of thinking, I would like to ask you just a few questions. "Who was it, Admiral Poindexter, that made the decision to go ahead with the operation to try to develop a long-term relationship with the people in Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The President of the United States. "Mr. HATCH. By gosh, it was, wasn't it? "Well, before the President made that decision, did he seek the advice of his top advisors? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He did. "Mr. HATCH. He did, didn't he? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Extensively. "Mr. HATCH. My goodness. And once the decision was made, was there any question in your mind who made that decision? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely none. "Mr. HATCH. Okay. Once the decision was made, I take it that you saw it as your job to	

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		carry out that decision; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. To the best of my ability. "Mr. HATCH. And that is what you have expressed here. Much has been said about the President's managerial style or management style. Let me ask you this: would you say that the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, is a decisive person? "Mr. POINDEXTER. On some issues, he is. If he is confident and has a strong feeling about something, he can be very decisive. "Mr. HATCH. If he has studied it, listened? "Mr. POINDEXTER. If he has studied it, listened. He is not one to be a hip-shooter. He wants to understand the issue, and once he understands it, he makes decisions very readily and is very secure in those decisions. "Mr. HATCH. Is he willing to make the tough decisions himself? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely. "Mr. HATCH. All right. Now, as to the contras, who made the decision to support the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The President did. "Mr. HATCH. Was that a knee-jerk reaction on the part of the President or did he seriously study the serious problems down there in Central America and what the Sandinistas were meaning to that area? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We spent most of the first year of the Administration studying the issue, trying to figure out what we could do; and in the end, the President decided that the only solution	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		we had was to support an indigenous organization in the country to keep military pressure on the Sandinista government to bring about change to democracy there." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 162-64.)	
86/05/02-516 DURING 1986		DIVERSION, GENERALLY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF UNILATERAL ACTION FOR THE CONTRAS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. HATCH. I thought Exhibit [JMP] 45 was interesting. In that note you were describing a conversation you had with the President and you say, 'yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with "I am really serious. If we can't move the contra package before June 9th . . ." --', and I take it he meant move it through Congress? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. HATCH. And you described how the leader of the House of Representatives--I should say the Speaker of the House[--]prevented that for four solid months [see 86/10/18-140, -145]? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. HATCH. He could have brought it up like that in the interests of this country one way or the other? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. "Mr. HATCH. But he didn't and you knew it was foot-dragging, in your opinion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. In my opinion, it was. "Mr. HATCH. He said, 'I am really serious. If we can't move the contra package before June	

9th, I want to find out a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance.'

"You went on to say, 'The President is ready to confront the Congress on the constitutional question of who controls foreign policy. We need to get Abe Sofaer . . .'--that is counsel for the State Department; right?--'and other stalwart lawyers thinking in these terms to see if there is some way we can do this if all else fails.'

"That is what you wrote at the time; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. HATCH. I take it, Admiral, nothing you said in that note indicates that the President was attempting to do anything unlawful; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not. It was just a desire on his part to exercise what he saw as his authority and responsibility as prescribed in the Constitution.

"Mr. HATCH. In fact, the President was trying to do everything he lawfully could consistent with his constitutional authority to accomplish his foreign policy objectives in Central America; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, sir, it is." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 164-66; JHICI Ex. JMP 45 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier, "Contra Project," 5/2/86, quoted in 86/05/02-500].)

86/05/02-530
MAY 2-16,

CONTRA FUNDING: ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

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1986		"Mr. McCOLLUM. . . . Exhibit Number [JMP] 50 . . . is the National Security Planning Group meeting report to the President, the one of May 16, 1986. It has been referred to quite a bit for other reasons. You may recall that on May 2nd, Exhibit [JMP] 45 is a May 2nd PROF note that you entered and discussed about the trip back with the President on the plane in which he asked you if there was anything he could do unilaterally to help the contras, and you have discussed that at some length. "Just about less than two weeks later, the National Security Planning Group had this meeting to discuss that very point. Was that meeting a product of that discussion with the President on the plane? "Mr. POINDEXTER. In effect, it was; but the progenitor of both the meeting on the airplane and the NSPG meeting later was a staff paper that had been prepared, and I believe it was probably an inter-agency paper on the various options that the President had with regard to going forward with the legislation. "Mr. McCOLLUM. Also part of this was to keep the contras alive in the interim if Congress did not in fact continue or come forward with appropriations. "On page three of Exhibit 50, well, actually pages 2 and 3, the bottom of that, there are three or four alternatives given to the President about keeping the contras alive. Reprogramming $15 million of money from other sources; a second one was a Presidential appeal for private donations by	

U.S. citizens; and the third was a direct and very private Presidential overture to certain heads of state who are financially and politically capable of bridging the resistance.

"We have had some discussion about a number of these. But number two, a Presidential appeal for private donations by U.S. citizens, was this proposal, this memo taken by you to the President and this option presented to him to directly appeal for private donations to U.S. citizens?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it was.

"Mr. McCOLLUM. Did he reject that? How did it come that this did not get accepted as a proposal?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I frankly don't recall. I believe in preparation for these hearings, I did read through the classified notes of that meeting. I don't recall it being mentioned that we discussed that particular issue.

"Mr. McCOLLUM. Would you have supported that option? That is, a confrontation-type option?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I would have supported that, and probably did. I just think the problem is that there always is a limited amount of time in these NSPG meetings, and we probably didn't simply get to that issue. Spent too much time on other parts."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 29-30; JHICI Exx. JMP 45 [Poindexter PROF to Fortier, "Contra Project," 5/2/86], JMP 50 [Poindexter memo dated 5/15/86, "Meeting with the National Security Planning Group," for meeting scheduled 5/16/86].)

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86/05/02-700 MAY 2, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "[C/CATF.] Mr. Chairman, there is one exhibit [C/CATF Ex. 43-26] . . . I would like to talk to because it bothers me. It is May 2 -- ". . . . "[C/CATF.] It is a phone call. It says, 'call from [redacted'] and it lays out there something about Clines, [redacted] and so on and so forth. "And I have reflected back on this and in all probability this is a phone call I made to Ollie North when I saw a cable coming out of Europe that talked about Tom Clines buying arms from [redacted] et cetera, and the conversation went something like, 'Ollie, are any of your people dealing with Tom Clines? If so, he's bad news, stay away from him.' That is really probably the watershed when I really started to get and see, because I know [redacted] about Tom Clines, Wilson, and Terpil, and I knew it was big-time bad and I told Ollie that and tried to give him a wave off. I wanted to put that on the record now rather than just let that one se[e]p out. "Mr. Carome. Did you notify your superiors of that? "[C/CATF.] I don't recall. I don't think so." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 64-65; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 43-26.)	
86/05/03-100			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: TINY ROWLAND'S CONNECTION

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MAY 3, 1986			DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ARMACOST cables GPS in Tokyo that Ambassador PRICE in London has learned from a staff member that TINY ROWLANDS was approached by NIR to take part in arms transactions with Iran which had White House approval and which involved GHORBANIFAR and KHASHOGGI. POINDEXTER was allegedly the point man and the State Department was cut out." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/05/04-100. See 86/05/00-615 [Regan on Tiny Rowland].)
86/05/04-100 MAY 4, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: TINY ROWLAND'S CONNECTION AND POINDEXTER'S REACTION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS advises DONALD REGAN of PRICE/ROWLANDS contact. He expresses his opposition to dealing with persons mentioned in ARMACOST cable, and argues that if a low level official such as the Embassy staffer knows about this it will become public and leave the PRESIDENT exposed. GPS says REGAN must go to PRESIDENT and get him to 'cut your losses and call if off.' REGAN expresses alarm and agrees to talk to the PRESIDENT. "GPS alerts POINDEXTER to the PRICE/ROWLANDS contact and makes the same points as with REGAN. POINDEXTER states that he told PRICE there was only a 'smidgen of reality' to the allegations and tells GPS 'we are not dealing with these people.' GPS voices his strong objections to any such proposed transaction. POINDEXTER says he does not

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			share GPS' view. GPS argues that the PRESIDENT is very exposed." (JHICI Ex. GPS-8. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/05/28-900.)
86/05/05-200 MAY 5, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM SHULTZ SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Now, the conversation again between you and Admiral Poindexter about the information from the London Embassy was on May 4, 1986. With that in mind, sir, would you please turn to Exhibit 21, GPS-21 in your book. That exhibit, Mr. Secretary, is a PROF note from Admiral Poindexter to Oliver North sent one day after you informed him of the information that you had learned from the London Embassy and after he told you that there was no truth to it or that it was not our deal. . . . ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. . . . In that note from Poindexter to North on May 5, 1986, he instructed North to bypass the London Embassy during the trip to London, and he said, quote, 'Do not let anybody know that you are in London or that you are going there, do not have any contact with the embassy.' That as I said was one day after you informed Admiral Poindexter that the London Embassy had informed you of the approach to the British entrepreneur. I take it that Admiral Poindexter did not tell you that he had immediately instructed Colonel North to bypass the London

Embassy.

"Secretary SHULTZ. No, he didn't."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 24-25; JHICI Ex. GPS 21 [Poindexter PROF to North, 5/5/86].)

86/05/05-400
MAY 5, 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: ALLEN'S DOUBTS
ALLEN MEMO:

In a formal memo to Casey, Charles Allen details his interpretation of events in Iran:

"1. [Most recent information] suggests that the White House initiative to secure release of American hostages in Lebanon remains dead in the water. We surmise . . . that [the Second Iranian Official; 86/01/11-180] is unable to provide the assurances and to make the arrangements demanded by our side. Ghorbanifar has not deposited the funds necessary to move the spare parts.

"2. We believe that the Iranian Government has not been able to convince the holders of the hostages to release them to Iranian custody. This belief is fortified by the experience of [another government]. Ghorbanifar's failure to deposit the necessary funds indicates that he has doubts about [the Second Iranian Official's] ability to obtain the release of the hostages. Ghorbanifar is in a bind and he knows that once he deposits the money he cannot get it back. He also is aware that we have insisted that the spare parts will [be] delivered eight hours after the release of the hostages and ONLY after the release of the hostages.

". . . ."

(Allen memo to DCI/DDCI, "Comments on the

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			Ghorbanifar Operation," 5/5/86 [Committee Document C 09422]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 228 [substitutions for bracketed redactions as provided in Report].)
86/05/06-300 MAY 6, 1986			LONDON MEETING SUMMARY: On May 6, 1986, North, Nir, Cave, and Ghorbanifar meet at the Churchill Hotel in London. The meeting focuses on the pricing of the spare parts shipment. In discussing the upcoming meetings in Tehran, Ghorbanifar names Iranian Government representatives whom an Iranian official (the Second Iranian; see 86/01/11-180) has said would meet with the U.S. delegation: Prime Minister Musavi, Speaker Rafsanjani, and President Khameni, with a possible visit by the Imam's son, Ahmed Khomeini. (Iran-Contra Report, at 229-30 [citing Cave, and noting his denial he participated in discussions about pricing]. See Tower, at B-94.)
86/05/08-100 MAY 8, 1986		SECORD'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: LEGAL CONCERNS SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord testified that he sought a legal opinion on the applicability of the Neutrality Act to the airlift operation prior to becoming involved in it. Secord was working on that operation by November 1985. The Patton, Boggs & Blow opinion is dated August 22, 1985, but is stamped "RECEIVED MAY 08 1986." Secord also testified, "And the opinion is addressed to me and	

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		it is dated the 8th of May 1986." He was not questioned directly on the precise date when he sought or received the opinion. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 143; id., 5/7/87, at 209; JHICI Ex. 23.)	
86/05/08-210 MAY 8, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TAMBS ACCOUNT: Oscar Arias Sanchez is inaugurated as President of Costa Rica. Tambs testified, "[T]he new administration had certain reservations about the airfield at Santa Elena. . . ." "One-eyed Jack" Olmstead arrives in Costa Rica at this time and negotiates an agreement. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 156.)	
86/05/08-500 MAY 8, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON MEETING: TOPICS DISCUSSED MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 1: Following a meeting among Singlaub, Abrams and Melton held in April 1986 to discuss the Singlaub-Pastora agreement (see 86/04/30-300), Melton meets again with Singlaub on May 8, 1986. Melton testified on that meeting: "Q. Now, certain matters were discussed there. First let me ask you about the discussion concerning this question of aid for Mr. Pastora. "A. Yes. "Q. . . . [Y]ou set forth in your memo to Assistant Secretary Abrams the fact that Mr. Pastora was looking for a certain token amount of military equipment which he would like to get from	

the UNO stocks; is that correct.

"A. Well, as I understood it, this was something that had been worked out between General Singlaub and Eden Pastora. I don't know whether the initiative came from Eden Pastora or from General Singlaub. I am not sure of that.

"Q. Okay. Now, the last sentence of that particular part of the memo states: 'Singlaub wants you to try to turn this around.'

"Do you recall that that was General Singlaub's wish?

"A. Yes, I do. He very much wanted this to happen.

"Q. Now, there is a marginal note up at the top which Mr. Abrams wrote to R.M.: That is you, is that correct, R.M.?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. And in it he indicates that, if I can just summarize it, that he appears to be in favor of this idea because it does involve such a minimal amount of equipment. Do you recall that that was Assistant Secretary Abrams' position?

"A. His position, I think that is what was -- the note was on the memo. That didn't imply a decision or a formal position on his part or on my part.

"Q. I understand that. But is it fair to say that the two of you together thought that there might be some merit to the request of General Singlaub?

"A. My view at the time was that there was a role in the resistance for Eden Pastora. He was the individual with the greatest name recognition

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		among any of the resistance leaders. At that time he was talking about pulling out of the resistance and my view, and I believe it is fair to say it was Elliott Abrams' view as well, although he will speak for himself, that there was a role for Eden Pastora and we were interested in ways to encourage him to stay. (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 12-14; JHICI Ex. EA 2 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Singlaub Asks for Help," 5/8/86; Committee Documents S 4035-36].)	
86/05/08-501 MAY 8, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON MEETING: TOPICS DISCUSSED MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 2: Melton's testimony continued on his May 8, 1986 meeting with Singlaub, as Melton described the discussion of the approaches Singlaub planned to make to countries 3 and 5 for aid to the Contras: "Q. Now, turning to another topic at that meeting, General Singlaub advised you that he was departing for certain foreign countries with the plan to seek funds from those countries to sustain the Nicaraguan resistance; is that correct? "A. That is correct. "Q. Now, he named two particular countries which we will refer to as country 3 and country 5. Do you know the countries I am referring to? "A. Yes, I do. "Q. Okay. "Q. Looking at the memo that you wrote, it appears fairly clear that you seemed to be generally in favor of the idea of sending of signal or indicating in some way our approval of	

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		his solicitation; is that correct? "A. I wouldn't characterize it that way. "Q. What would you say? "A. Let me read the memo. "My interpretation of that and my view generally was that I knew that solicitations were -- by the State Department were legal. As to who would carry out a solicitation was a matter for someone to decide other than me. And my role in this, in this meeting, was to pass along the information and the request from General Singlaub. As to how it would be done, how it would be considered, that was really a matter for others to determine. "Q. I understand that. Let me put it this way: This wasn't a decision for you to make, but you were certainly not opposed to the idea. I mean, it did not appear to be in any way an illegal request or asking you or State Department to do something that you couldn't officially do; isn't that correct? "A. That is right. Solicitations were legal for humanitarian purposes. "Q. Did General Singlaub in these initial discussions with you, did he tell you that he had previously made any solicitations to these particular countries in the past? "A. He did not. "Q. Did he -- was he asked about that, in other words, did he specifically deny that he had ever solicited funds from countries 3 or 5 or did that subject just never come up? "A. It never came up. Basically I was	

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		listening. "Q. Okay. You then sent this memo to Secretary Abrams to inform him of your discussion and then to determine what should be done thereafter; is that correct? "A. That is correct. ". . . . "Q. . . . In the last paragraph of that memo, you state: 'The simplest way to handle this would be over the secure phone. NSC approval will be needed.' Why did you feel that NSC approval would be needed for this if this was an authorized activity by State Department? "A. Well, any kind of policy decision would have required some interagency consultation. And a matter like this, I assumed that it would be the subject of interagency consultation. These were policy decisions that were being raised and so they would be treated in an interagency forum. "Q. Did you also believe that the regional secretary, assistant secretary for that particular area would also need to be consulted in connection with this, if it were to take place? "A. I would think that the Secretary of State would be consulted. "Q. All right. What about specifically the regional bureau? "A. I would think that -- well, this is speculation, but, sure, I would think that certainly the regional assistant secretary would be consulted as well. "Q. Did you bring this subject up with the -- with anybody in the regional bureau for the part	

of the globe affected by this?

"A. I beg your pardon.

"Q. Did you consult with anybody in the regional bureau that was responsible for countries 3 and 5 to discuss this matter?

"A. I took no further action other than writing the memo."

(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 14-18; JHICI Ex. EA 2 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Singlaub Asks for Help," 5/8/86; Committee Documents S 4035-36.] See Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 18-19 [Melton testimony on his memo dated 5/10/86 to Deputy Ass't Sec'y William Walker on the 5/8/86 meeting]. For further Melton testimony on his contact with Singlaub, see 86/04/30-300; 86/05/12-101 through -103; 86/05/14-101 through -103; 86/05/15-103; 86/05/22-200 through -202; 86/05/28-050; 86/05/29-500 and -501.)

86/05/08-800
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CONTRAS:

ISRAELI PROPOSAL OF CONTRA TRAINERS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

See 86/09/15-505.

86/05/08-900
MAY 8, 1986

IRAN:

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: ALL HOSTAGES TO BE RELEASED
NORTH PROF:

North informs Poindexter by PROF that he has achieved what Poindexter required -- all hostages are to be released before delivery of the HAWK parts:

". . . I believe we have succeeded. Deposit being made tomorrow (today is a bank holiday in Switzerland). Release of hostages set for week of 19 May in sequence you have specified. Specific

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			date to be determined by how quickly we can assemble requisite parts. Thank God--He answers prayers. V/R, North." (North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 5/8/86 [Committee Document N 17770]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 231. For Poindexter PROF setting out his requirement of release of all hostages before delivery of HAWK parts, see 86/04/16-090.)
86/05/10-100 MAY 5, 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM ROBINETTE ACCOUNT: North meets with Secord and Robinette at the OEOB to discuss the security system Robinette is arranging for North's house. They meet again at the STTGI offices on May 10. (Robinette Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 10-29. See above at 86/04/28-010.)		
86/05/10-120 MAY 10, 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on the price estimate he received from Robinette for the security system, "He came up with an estimate of $8500 max, as I recall it was $8,000 to $8,500, and he could furthermore immediately install the system." North testified further, "[W]hen Mr. Robinette told me that on or about the 10th of May that he could immediately install a security system, I said please try to keep it to the 8,000 to 8,500. I am, after all, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, I live on my salary; and he installed that system." (North Tetim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 93, 95.)		

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86/05/12-101 MAY 12, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON MEETING: ABRAMS INFORMED MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 1: Richard Melton testified on his contact with Elliott Abrams following Melton's meeting with Singlaub on May 8, 1986 (see 86/05/08-500, -501), where they had discussed aid to Eden Pastora and Singlaub's proposed approaches to Countries 3 and 5 for aid to the Contras: "Q. Your memo of May 12, do you have that in front of you? "A. I do. "Q. In the first paragraph of it, the second sentence, you state that you had told General Singlaub that you had spoken with Secretary Abrams on May 10 about the subjects concerning the aid to Pastora and vouching for Singlaub. Do you recall that particular meeting with Secretary Abrams? "A. Only in general terms. Not in any greater detail than is in the memo. "Q. Well, is there anything you can add or subtract from the matters you set forth to him in your May 8 memo? In other words, can you think of anything in particular that you discussed that went beyond what is set forth in those memos? "A. No. It was to inform him basically that there were -- that no decisions were reached on these things on either, on any of the topics that he had raised. "Q. So Mr. Abrams did not make a specific decision as to whether or not to vouch for General Singlaub's efforts with these countries or for his request to help out in connection with some	

additional aid to Pastora; is that correct?

"A. That is right. He made no decision to do either of those things.

"Q. Did he tell you he was going to discuss those matters with somebody else to help him arrive at a decision?

"A. I believe the way it went is that he said he would be back in touch on those topics. And I was sort of in a holding position, pending further conversation with him. It was the kind of environment as it is in the bureau where you don't always get a chance to talk through issues entirely. You alert -- I alerted him about this issue. He, in our conversation, he indicated that he understood what it was and he said he would get back in touch kind of thing.

"Q. So Mr. Abrams had not to your knowledge made a specific decision to in fact send the signal to the foreign countries that General Singlaub had requested; is that correct?

"A. No, not at all.

"Q. Is the contrary true also, that he had not made a specific decision to decline to send such a signal?

"A. Not exactly in that categorical way. It was more that he would talk about it some more.

"Q. But he hadn't specifically ruled out the possibility, had he?

"A. He didn't say that I should convey a decision to that [e]ffect.

"Q. And he didn't tell you that he had ruled that out as a complete possibility, had he?

"A. He didn't say it one way or another. But

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		he didn't authorize me to convey a decision that we would do that. "Q. I understand. I just want to make sure that you are also clear about the fact that he hadn't come to a decision at that point to refuse to go forward, as General Singlaub had requested. "A. I don't know whether he had or not, but he didn't convey to me a decision. "Q. All right. Thank you. "Now, you set forth in your memo of May 12 the fact that General Singlaub called that particular day; is that correct? "A. Yes. "Q. And he called from, I believe, country 3? "A. I don't recall. That's not in my memo. "Q. I see. You have just, you are looking at the redacted version? "A. That is correct. "Q. Okay. At any rate, you recall he called from one of these two foreign countries that he said he was traveling to? "A. Right." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 20-23; JHICI Ex. EA 4 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Followup on General Singlaub's Proposals," 5/12/86; Committee Document S 4033].)	
86/05/12-102 MAY 12, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON MEETING: ABRAMS INFORMED MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Okay. And I would like you to try to go beyond what is just set forth in your memo and try to recall what General Singlaub actually told you	

during that conversation.

"A. Basically had any decisions been reached and that was it. And I told him basically what is in the memo, that no decisions had been reached.

"Q. Do you recall whether or not General Singlaub indicated --

"A. Yes.

"Q. -- at that time that he was in fact on the verge of successfully making a solicitation and what he needed at that very moment was some type of a signal from the U.S. Government?

"A. Going back to the beginning of this sequence, as I recall it, he was making these trips, he had other business that was taking him to these areas. So as I recall it, he was making these trips, he would have made the trips if there had been no issue of a solicitation.

"Q. . . . [W]hat do you mean if there had been no issue of a solicitation?

"A. As I recall it, he was traveling to these countries and he wanted to make a solicitation. But he presumably had other business in those countries as well which he did not discuss with me. So even without a decision, he made the trips, so his other business took him to these countries.

"Q. . . . [D]o you recall that when he made this particular telephone call to you, he was at that very time engaged in this process of soliciting funds and needed -- and that was why he called you, because he needed a decision as soon as possible.

"A. Well, not to my knowledge. He was in the country. He had said in the first meeting that he sought some official indication that he was making these requests and that we were aware of it. So he was looking for that to make his request. And that was never forthcoming.

"Q. Your memo states that you told General Singlaub that you wanted to be helpful, that Secretary Abrams wanted to be helpful on both issues, but that the appropriate White House officials had been unavailable. What do you recall about that particular matter?

"A. That was in the nature, as I recall it, of a general kind of response to General Singlaub. General Singlaub was a man who was held in high regard and regardless of these specific issues, there was no desire on anyone's part to gratuitously offend him. So that in my conversations with him, I was conveying that sense or I sought to convey that sense. That's certainly my recollection, that is, that Assistant Secretary Abrams wanted to convey that as well.

"Q. Okay. Well, what appropriate White House officials were you referring to in your memo?

"A. Specific White House officials?

"Q. Yes.

"A. In a generic sense, appropriate officials could have been -- White House could have been left out very easily. I had no specific officials in mind.

"Q. But you specifically told General Singlaub that the appropriate White House officials were unavailable, but what you are telling me is that you in fact had no specific officials in mind.

"A. That's right.

"Q. So you hadn't been attempting to reach specific White House officials who were in fact unavailable; is that correct?

"A. Not at all.

"Q. Would it be fair to say that . . . you were basically putting him off, because no specific decision had been made and you just didn't want to bluntly tell him that nobody had been consulted? Is that a fair statement?

"A. That is it. This was a temporizing response. That is exactly what it was.
(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 23-26; JHICI Ex. EA 4 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Followup on General Singlaub's Proposals," 5/12/86; Committee Document S 4033].)

86/05/12-103
MAY 12, 1986

SINGLAUB-MELTON MEETING: ABRAMS INFORMED
MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. . . . Now, then you set forwards in your memo the fact that decisions need to be made, A, about the limited amounts of equipment for Pastora, and, B, whether to inform the authorities in these countries, foreign countries, that the U.S. Government approves of his solicitation efforts.

"Did you, after writing this memo, sit down with Assistant Secretary Abrams in which he came to a specific decision?

"A. Not at all. The 'decisions needed' part is basically there is no new information there.

It is basically a recapitulation of the original -- there is no new information there. It is basically a recapitulation of the original requests that were put by General Singlaub. And they were stated just as a reminder to Assistant Secretary Abrams, but they don't represent any new thoughts on the subject or really any new information. It is basically a recapitulation of the points raised in the original meeting.

"Q. Now, your memo indicates that a RIG meeting was scheduled for May 12 and that perhaps consultations with the agency could be handled at that particular RIG meeting. Do you recall making that particular recommendation to Mr. Abrams?

"A. I remember writing it in the memo, but I didn't make it other than that.

"Q. Did you attend a RIG meeting on May 12?

"A. No, I didn't.

"Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Abrams prior to the RIG meeting what if anything should be discussed at this meeting concerning this matter?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. Do you know whether or not the matter was brought up by Mr. Abrams at the RIG meeting?

"A. No, I don't.

"Q. He didn't tell you afterwards whether he had done so or not?

"A. No.

"Q. Okay.

"Now, why did you feel that you say both decisions will require consultations with the agency. First of all, by 'the agency,' are you referring to the CIA?

"A. Yes, I am.

"Q. Now, with regard to the decision number one, concerning aid to Pastora, I think I can understand what you were referring to there. But with regard to the second matter, involving vouching for General Singlaub's efforts, why did you feel that the agency was a participant in this decision?

"A. On all decisions of policy, an interagency consultation process, it seemed to me, would be appropriate.

"Q. Okay.

"Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone with the agency?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. Specifically, the chief of the Central American Task Force at that time? Did you ever discuss it with him?

"A. Not with anyone from the agency." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 26-29; JHICI Ex. EA 4 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Followup on General Singlaub's Proposals," 5/12/86; Committee Document S 4033].)

86/05/14-101
MAY 14, 1986

SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: SINGLAUB'S ABORTED SOLICITATION

MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 1:

Richard Melton testified on his memo of May 14, 1986:

"Q. . . . You state in there that you passed the decisions on the matters of aid to Pastora and solicitations by General Singlaub to General Singlaub that afternoon. First of all, I assume this was by a telephone conversation?

"A. That is right.

"Q. Do you recall whether or not you called General Singlaub or General Singlaub called you?

"A. I do not.

"Q. All right. Let me tell you why I would like you to think about that and get your absolute best recollection of it. General Singlaub has testified that he was in the process of making his solicitation efforts in one of these particular countries when he received a call from either you or Secretary Abrams basically telling him stop, stop whatever you are doing, we have -- we can't go forward with this matter. And that he said as a result of that phone call to him, he stopped, he stopped engaging in his efforts at that time. [See 86/05/00-400.]

"I believe Assistant Secretary Abrams' best recollection is that this was a decision that was passed on to him after he called inquiring to find out, well, have you all made a decision yet.

"So, you know, I am trying to see . . . if either of those jog[s] your memory and if you could tell us whether or not you recall who placed the call and under what circumstances?

"A. My recollection is that throughout this process that the person making the queries about whether a decision had been reached, whether we were going to do what he wanted, that the initiative was with General Singlaub.

"Q. Okay. In other words, you specifically can state that to your best recollection . . . you did not have to call General Singlaub to change a prior message that had been given to him concerning his efforts; is that correct?

"A. That is correct. In fact, I would not have known how to get in touch with General Singlaub.

"Q. . . . [I]n there you first of all told General Singlaub about the decision concerning Mr. Pastora. It was about this time, wasn't it, that Mr. Pastora had publicly announced he was withdrawing from the fight?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. And basically your memo sets forth your decisions and your reasons for the decisions. Do you have anything to add to it, do you recall anything else that entered into that particular decision?

"A. Yes. I would add one factor and that is that reaching his decision, that is, Eden Pastora reaching his decision -- he was making statements to the press critical of entities of the U.S. Government and of course these statements were not helpful to our concerns in the area. And we had an interest in trying to discourage him from making these statements. So I would add that to what is in the memo."

(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 29-32; JHICI Ex. EA 5 [Melton memo to Abrams, "General Singlaub Has the Word," 5/14/86; Committee Document S 4032].)

86/05/14-102
MAY 14, 1986

SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: SINGLAUB'S ABORTED SOLICITATION
MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 2:
[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. . . . Now, moving on to the next topic are the solicitation matters, your memo states, 'I told Singlaub that I had been instructed to pass the following message to him,' and then you have a colon and then you have an indented paragraph. It looks, from looking at this memo, as though you were very specifically setting forth word for word a message that you had been told to pass to General Singlaub. Is that in fact the case?

"A. That is very close to being correct. I wouldn't vouch for every word in that indent, but it is the substance, it is close to the substance of what I passed to him; that is correct.

"Q. Okay. It starts off by saying, 'the earlier decision to pass the message he had requested had been reconsidered.' What did you mean by that?

"A. I would say that is loose language. I may have said something approximating that, but loose language in the sense that there had not been any earlier decision to do this.

"Q. Do you recall --

"A. I have looked at the memos and if you go to the previous memo, the one dated the 12th. [See 86/05/12-101.]

"Q. Yes.

"A. The first sentence in that, 'he called that morning to see if decisions had been reached.' I think that is further indication that decisions had not been reached. So it would be certainly imprecise to say 'earliest decisions,' because there had been no decisions.

"Q. All right. In other words, between the date of May 12, when General Singlaub called, and May 14, when you discussed this matter with him again, there had been no intervening telephone calls?

"A. Correct.

"Q. So to your best recollection, there had not been, he had not been told that an earlier decision had been made to pass the message he had requested?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Then you go on to say 'the judgment here was that the timing was not right. To move now might complicate other priority matters of importance of which he was aware.' That is a very intriguing sentence. What did you mean by that?

"A. As I recall, I think that is more or less what I said. And that language and that message, as I recall I got that from Assistant Secretary Abrams.

"Q. In other words, Assistant Secretary Abrams told you to tell him about complicating other priority matters of importance of which he was aware?

"A. That is right.

"Q. Did you know what Secretary Abrams was referring to?

"A. I did not. I took it to mean that it was more of the temporizing kind of response that had been characteristic of the entire process.

"Q. Okay. But --

"A. I didn't assume that this had any specific content to it.

"Q. But you are telling this to General

Singlaub and certainly if it had no content to it, wouldn't you be concerned that General Singlaub's response would be, what are you talking about? What priority matters of importance? I mean, this wasn't just simply put-off language.

"A. If I were acting, in effect, under instructions, passing a message, then it wouldn't be required that I would have to explain what the message was. And I think that that is the way General Singlaub took it.

"Q. In other words, when you were given this message to pass, by the way, you were given specific language by Mr. Abrams; is that correct?

"A. He gave me generally not only what I should say to him and that is -- but I don't have it word for word. I wouldn't say that what I have in the memo is specifically what Assistant Secretary Abrams said. He didn't give it to me in writing and I didn't write it down immediately. It is more or less what the message was.

"Q. But he told you something concerning priority matters of importance of which General Singlaub was aware, right; you didn't make that up?

"A. That is right.

"Q. All right.

"A. More or less that. I would say a word here, a word there, but the substance of the message is correct and it is a faithful reflection of what I told him.

"Q. And you did not ask Secretary Abrams and he did not tell you in any way what he was referring to by these 'other matters of importance' of which Singlaub was aware?

"A. No."

(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 32-35; JHICI Ex. EA 5 [Melton memo to Abrams, "General Singlaub Has the Word," 5/14/86; Committee Document S 4032].)

86/05/14-103
MAY 14, 1986

SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: SINGLAUB'S ABORTED SOLICITATION

MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. And when you read this message to General Singlaub, did he ask you right then and there what you were referring to?

"A. No, he didn't. He was disappointed, but he took the message more or less as a military man would.

"Q. Did he ask you questions?

"A. He realized throughout that what my -- what I was doing in this and so he took, he didn't take it that he would try to change things by debating an issue with me such as this.

"Q. In other words, during the series of conversations you were relaying messages between General Singlaub and Secretary Abrams and not acting in your own capacity as a participant in any decisionmaking; is that correct?

"A. Well, that is not entirely true. The decisions, I certainly did not make decisions in these instances, and in the first instance the contact was initiated by General Singlaub with the requests that were in the first memo, and my role after that was to convey what he had said and generally convey back to him a series of

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		temporizing responses which culminated in edification of the decisions in both cases. "Q. And when you use the word 'temporizing,' what you mean is, in other words, putting him off without -- "A. That's right. "Q. -- specifically rejecting it, rejecting the idea abruptly? "A. That is right. I think that would be the appropriate way, that we would have, that we did deal with him and for the reasons that I have stated earlier, that everyone had great respect for General Singlaub and no one, certainly I did not have any interest in treating him less than with the respect that I considered that he merited. "Q. But up to this phone conversation on May 14, you were not aware that these series of messages were simply temporizing. In other words, it was still possible up to this date that as far as you were concerned a decision might be made to go along with what General Singlaub was requesting; isn't that correct? "A. I didn't discuss it in any great length. I think that is reflected in certain of my comments in these memos, that there was no conversation, no deliberation of which I am aware in the bureau on these topics. "In the one case the -- I am not aware of what consultations may or may not have gone on about the solicitation issue. The other issue, the one of materiel for Eden Pastora, that ended up that it was overtaken by events when Eden Pastora	

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withdrew from the resistance.

"Q. I realize you did not participate in any decisions -- conferences which led to any decisions concerning this solicitation. But going back to my question, isn't it true that up to the passage of this message to General Singlaub on May 14, the possibility, as far as you were concerned, had not been ruled out that such a message might be able to be passed from the U.S. Government?

"A. That is true.

"Q. I mean, you had said in your previous memo --

"A. He didn't communicate that to me.

"Q. Okay. You had stated in your previous memo that if it was going to be done, the agency might have to be consulted with. You had mentioned the possibility of getting NSC approval, so these are all indications that as far as you were concerned, a decision had to be made one way or the other, but had not been made up until the time you passed this, were told to pass this message on May 14. Is that a fair statement?

"A. I think that is true.

"Q. Okay.

"A. And in outlining these things in sort of the comment, I was sort of outlining the interagency process of consultation that, in my judgment anyway, would be appropriate in these circumstances."
(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 36-39; JHICI Ex. EA 5 [Melton memo to Abrams, "General Singlaub Has the Word," 5/14/86; Committee Document S 4032].)

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86/05/14-300 MAY 14, 1986	THE ERRIA: NORTH'S OPERATIONAL ROLE CANNISTRARO MEMO: In a memo to Poindexter, Vince Cannistraro describes the items on the agenda for a meeting between Poindexter and Casey: ". . . . "-- Status of Ollie's Ship. Ollie has offered the use of a Danish vessel for [redacted.] He first offered CIA a six month lease. CIA told me that they thought it was too expensive, and the cost and time involved in refitting the vessel for a [redacted] mission made the alternative option of outfitting a CIA owned vessel more attractive. Ollie then offered to take [redacted] from his vessel, using his own resources. [Redacted] has told me that because of the alleged involvement of one Tom Clines (who was involved in Wilson and Terpil era), CIA will have nothing to do with the ship. Frankly, I can't tell whether this is just a convenient reason not to do what CIA was opposed to doing in the first place, or whether the concern about Cline[s] is legitimate. In any event, Casey has a briefing paper on this which he will use if the subject is raised. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 190 [Cannistraro memo to Poindexter, "Agenda for Your Weekly Meeting with the DCI, Thursday, May 15, 1986," 5/14/86]. See entries starting at 86/05/15-385 [the Erria].)		
86/05/15-100 MAY 8-15,		ABRAMS-PASTORA CONTACT ABRAMS ACCOUNT:	

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1986		Abrams meets again with Singlaub on May 8, 1986, and again the Singlaub-Pastora agreement comes up. At that point, Abrams testified, he "probably told Singlaub that there just wasn't anything we could do for Pastora in the military area. We could promise him--and at a certain point we did promise him--if he stayed on board, we would try to give him resources out of the $100 million. But there wasn't much we could do." Abrams continued, "And I guess he told us that what he planned to do was to go talk to Mr. Calero" about seeking military assistance for Pastora from UNO. But Singlaub wanted Abrams to call Calero to say, "[I]f you want my opinion, you should do it." Abrams summarized, "[W]hat it amounts to is he wanted me to pressure Calero to do it." Abrams testified, "I have no memory of [having called Calero]. It is not inconceivable, but I do not recall that I ever did that. I don't think I did." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 72-75.)	
86/05/15-102 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1986		ABRAMS-PASTORA CONTACT ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd): In the first half of 1986, Abrams speaks two or three times with Pastora, and once Abrams takes Pastora to see Shultz. They apparently do not discuss the Singlaub-Pastora agreement. Instead, "we were kind of cajoling Pastora. . . . We explained to him he needed to clean up his outfit . . .; he needed to be willing to work with the other elements of the resistance and, if he were doing	

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		all this, then when the great day came and we had 100 million, he could share in it." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 75-76.)	
86/05/15-103 MAY 15, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: SINGLAUB'S ABORTED SOLICITATION MELTON ACCOUNT: Following his testimony on his contact with Singlaub about Singlaub's approach to Countries 3 and 5 for aid to the Contras (see 86/05/08-500 and -501; 86/05/12-101 through -103; 86/05/14-101 through -103), Richard Melton testified on his May 15, 1986 memo of a call from Singlaub: "Q. Let's go to the next memo. May 15, 1986. . . . ". . . . "Q. Okay. This indicates that General Singlaub called again on that day, raising the topic one more time. Do you recall that conversation? "A. I recall it from being refreshed reading the memo, yes. "Q. Now, this specifically does indicate that it was General Singlaub calling you, rather than vice versa. Do you recall that that was the case? "A. Yes. I recall all the calls were initiated by General Singlaub for the reasons I stated, that basically he was in travel status, I wouldn't have known how to get in touch with him in any case. "Q. Okay. Now, going to the second paragraph of your memo, . . . you state that General Singlaub was puzzled by your comment concerning	

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		the timing of his planned fund raising initiative and it states, 'I responded that important events and decisions were in the offing and that approaches by him at this time might complicate our efforts.' "Now, in your previous memo you had, you have told us you were simply passing on a message that you were told to pass along. In this memo it indicates that you had to respond directly to General Singlaub on his question. What information did you have in mind when you told him that important events and decisions were in the offing? "A. I had nothing in mind. That is basically a restatement of what the message was in another form. But I had no new information to pass to him. I basically restated the message I had given him earlier. "Q. Okay. Well, at about -- "A. You will have to, you will have to talk about it when you get back. I really don't have anything more for you on it. "Q. You mean that is what you told General Singlaub? "A. Yes. I think I said -- I stated it a little bit more elegantly than that. That is basically what I said. "Q. Okay. At about this same time, May 15, May 16, that time period of 1986, an NSPG meeting . . . discussed certain matters concerning solicitation. [See entries starting at 86/05/16-300.] Were you aware of the fact that this was a topic which was being discussed at	

higher levels?

"A. No, I was not.

"Q. On or about that particular time, a specific decision was made to go forward, pursuant to some legislation which specifically authorized State Department to make such solicitations, a decision was made to go forward with such efforts. Were you aware that such a decision had been made at or about that time?

"A. No, I was not.

"Q. Okay. So when you refer to 'important events and decisions are in the offing,' you were not aware that that day or the next day such a meeting was going to be held?

"A. No, I was not.

"Q. Do you know whether or not your words in the offing were words that were suggested to you by Secretary Abrams?

"A. They -- it may have reflected the earlier decision, the earlier guidance that he had given me as to what I should say to General Singlaub.

"Q. Okay.

"A. But I wouldn't say that is word for word what the guidance was.

"Q. All right. Your last sentences, 'I said that I was unable to be more specific over the phone but suggested that he talk to you on his return to the United States.'

"First of all, the, your phone conversation with General Singlaub was over an unsecured telephone line; is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. But you had nothing particular in mind

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		when you told him this, that was of any particular sensitive nature that you couldn't discuss with him on the telephone; is that also correct? "A. That is correct. I had nothing more really that I could convey to him. "Q. Whether it was secure or unsecure? "A. Correct." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 39-42; JHICI Ex. EA 6 [Melton memo to Abrams, "More from General Singlaub," 5/15/86; Committee Document S 4031].)	
86/05/15-104 MAY 15, 1986		RICHARD MELTON MEMO ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on a memo written by Richard Melton (Director of the Office of Central American Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs), dated May 15, 1986 (Ex. EA 6), which mentions the proposed Singlaub-Pastora-Calero agreement and a message to Singlaub "that we were engaged in a damage-limiting operation with Pastora, with outcome uncertain": "Mr. ABRAMS. . . . Pastora was constantly attacking UNO. The damage we were trying to limit, I think, was really his constant and repeated attack on CIA and on UNO and on our whole policy. And the trouble was . . . we didn't have anything to give him. We had no resources. . . . "The 100 million was nowhere to be seen. All we had for Pastora was promises. We had no resources to give him. What we had to give him were words and promises, to try to limit the damage and keep him on board. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you not see any problem in	

associating yourself with this damage-limiting operation and attempt to come up with an agreement among Singlaub, Pastora, and Calero?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I don't believe--as I say, I have no memory of ever engaging in such activity. What I was doing was a different thing, which was doing what I could do, which was getting him to come up to Washington--actually introduced him to the Secretary of State in the hope that these kinds of--if you will pardon the expression--kinds of honors being shown to him would keep him on board.

"Mr. BELNICK. You didn't think this was associating the United States Government in any way with an agreement that would end up providing military assistance to Pastora?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I don't recall ever talking to Calero about this subject.

"Mr. BELNICK. Even the conversations with Singlaub and the meetings between Melton and Singlaub about this proposed agreement and assistance, in your view[,] . . . did not contain the risk of associating the United States Government with an agreement that aimed at furnishing military assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters?

"Mr. ABRAMS. First of all, the resistance question was not furnishing military assistance to the freedom fighters. It was to have one group in the possession of military goods, give it to another group of freedom fighters who did not have military goods.

"But the answer is, as best I can recall it, I

did not do that. What I did was use what few resources I had, which constituted really the trappings of office."
(Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 76-79.)

86/05/15-108
1985-86

C/CATF's VIEW OF EDEN PASTORA
C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Cohen. We know that Secord complained to Mr. Casey about you. Did you ever complain to Casey about General Secord and the other 'unsavory characters' that started to surface durin[g] the course of this? Why didn't you complain to Casey about what was going on?

"[C/CATF.] I did complain about Singlaub and what he was doing.

"Mr. Cohen. As far as Pastora was concerned?

"[C/CATF.] Just his activities. He was very pushy. And I complained about what he was doing. I just did not bring these things up to Director Casey. He didn't discuss them with me nor I with him.

"Mr. Cohen. Were you aware of any relationship between Director Casey and Oliver North?

"[C/CATF.] I knew they were close and talked a lot. I knew the depth of that from some time in December-'84 in a particular incident I can go into with the committees. I knew they were close and that they talked a lot. But I did not know the substance of their conversations.

"Mr. Cohen. I would like to come back to that. I think it is hard to imagine a team of you, Elliott Abrams and Oliver North, almost like the Three Musketeers who were carrying on this operation, not talking to each other about the contra operation but I would say the evidence that I have looked at contradicts that, that the fact is you didn't talk much amongst yourselves, if I look at some of the documentation. Even though that strikes me as being not credible on the surface, in looking at the documents I find some considerable evidence to support your position. Eden Pastora is one that comes to mind because I looked through your deposition [redacted] who[m] you believe bid about his troops. You also believe [redacted] that everyone around him was involved in cocaine, and you wanted to 'marginalize him' and I find it almost totally inconsistent.

"We have had Abrams testify that he tried to get him back in.

"[C/CATF.] We fought a lot about that.

"Mr. Cohen. That lends credibility to what you have been saying as far as not coordinating some of your activities.

"[C/CATF.] Let me point out the hearings of Senator Kerry's subcommittee and Senator [sic] Rangel's committee and what you have heard from [redacted] subsequently bore out the fact that there would [sic] a lot of rot around Pastora and it was right not to deal with him."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 149-51.)

DATE	CONTRAS
86/05/15-109 1985-86	PASTORA, THE CONTRAS, AND DRUGS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Heflin. According to the accounts that

we have -- they may not be fully complete, but they would reflect that moneys from foreign countries, moneys from the Miller-Channell operation, all moneys either went into the Hakim-Secord accounts or into Calero's accounts as far as we know from donations from third parties or from countries.

"Do you know of any other fund that could have come from other sources that would have been of aid to the contras during the year of 1986?

"[C/CATF.] No, sir. As I testified, I didn't know where any of the moneys came from until this revelations [sic] growing out of the proceedings after January, and I don't know of any others or how that money was handled.

"Mr. Heflin. Did you see any evidence that would raise a suspicion that it would come from sources other than what I've enumerated? That is the foreign government's contributions, the Miller-Channell types, what Calero raised on his own and went through [h]is bank accounts.

"[C/CATF.] Yes, let me be specific, not with Calero or the FDN or people in the North, but with the remnants of ARDE, of Pastora we developed information that they were receiving money from cocaine trafficking.

"Mr. Heflin. But not in the north --

"[C/CATF.] No, we have looked at that as closely as I can. We see no indication that anybody in the north or anybody currently active in the resistance has been involved in drug trafficking. We see considerable evidence, I think much of it has been talked about now in

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		public, that people in and around Eden Pastora were in fact involved in cocaine running to the United States to raise revenue for their cause." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 221-23.)	
86/05/15-110 1985-86		PASTORA, THE CONTRAS, AND DRUGS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. McCollum. . . . Is my understanding correct the only indication of any drug relations with the contras or with any of our personnel at all was the question of a couple of people with Eden Pastora's group? "[C/CATF.] With regard to the resistance forces; that is correct. It is not a couple people. It is a lot of people. And it is around Eden Pastora's group. I testified, at our request we went down to the intelligence committees and gave them a full briefing on that. We first reported it in November of 1984 to Justice Department and subsequently periodically thereafter and the body of intelligence is fairly complete on it. "Mr. McCollum. That is a primary reason we served [sec (severed?)] our connection with Pastora or one of the factors? "[C/CATF.] One of about three or four. "Mr. McCollum. I want to make sure you would concur with the findings of our investigation or on this particular matter. In a memo to Chairman Hamilton dated July 23 of this year, Robert B[e]rmingham said in his findings for us, 'our investigation has not developed any corroboration of media-exploited allegations that U.S.	

Government condoned drug trafficking by contra leaders or contra organizations or that contra leaders or organizations did, in fact, take part in such activity.'

"Now, there is a distinction, I suppose, between our involvement and the involvement of contra leaders and the involvement of contras. Now, is that statement that Mr. B[e]rmingham made to us, his findings, comply with yours?

"[C/CATF.] No, it is not. Would you read the last paragraph again?

"Mr. McCollum. It says 'Our investigation has not developed any corroboration of media exploited allegations that U.S. Government condoned drug trafficking by contra leaders or contra organizations or that contra leaders or organizations did in fact take part in such activity.'

"[C/CATF.] That's accurate. CIA officers, U.S. Government officials, to the best of my knowledge, which I think is probably pretty complete, were at no time a party to, directly or indirectly, knowingly narcotics activities; Resistances forces with whom we are currently dealing are not known in any way to have been involved with them. We investigated those who were, one had to leave the movement. [Redacted.] I do not have all of the details because [redacted], but there was a lot of cocaine trafficking around Eden Pastora.

"Mr. McCollum. Not around the FDN?

"[C/CATF.] None around FDN, none around UNO, it was all [redacted] based.

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		"Mr. McCollum. I would like, Mr. Chairman, for the record, since I could only read a part of this, [to] put this memorandum by our investigator into the record. "Chairman Hamilton. Without objection, so ordered." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 241-44. On the Contras and drugs, see entries starting at 86/04/07-250; and 86/05/16-461.)	
86/05/15-385 MAY 15, 1986	NORTH'S OPERATIONAL ROLE POINDEXTER PROF: In a PROF to North, titled "Be Cautious," Poindexter writes: "In a memo from Ken [de Graffenreid] to me today he talks about your off[]ering a Danish ship under your control to CIA for broadcasting into [redacted.] I am afraid you are letting your operational role become too public. From now on I don't want you to talk to anybody else, including Casey, except me about any of your oper[]ational roles. In fact you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have insisted that you stop." North responds by PROF, "Done." (JHICI Ex. OLN 191 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Be Cautious," 5/15/86; North PROF to Poindexter, "Be Cautious," date obscured].)		
86/05/15-390 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . When we ended up needing a ship to perform a certain task, there was nowhere to get one on short notice, and so this		

organization produced it practically overnight.

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. That was because the Director said, 'We can't find one anywhere else, get a ship,' and we got a ship.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Was there a provision in that Presidential finding signed by Ronald Reagan for the purpose of this ship?

"Mr. NORTH. No. But there was nothing that prohibited the purchase of the ship by the private commercial companies that were supporting that activity.

"Mr. LIMAN. And--

"Mr. NORTH. And the ship was there to serve the foreign policy goals of the United States. The fact that the whole operation was terminated before it could do so is unfortunate, in my humble opinion.

"Mr. LIMAN. Was the President of the United States told about the fact that that ship had been purchased?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not know.

"Mr. LIMAN. The Congress wasn't told, correct?

"Mr. NORTH. They certainly know now.

"Mr. LIMAN. But they weren't told at the time.

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe they were, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. So that as far as your own personal knowledge was concerned, the people who approved the purchase of this ship for this covert operation were you, the Director of Central

Intelligence and Admiral Poindexter?

"Mr. NORTH. And Richard Secord, who was managing the private commercial operation.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did Richard Secord do it at the request of you?

"Mr. NORTH. He did.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you feel that you needed the approval of Admiral Poindexter to do it?

"Mr. NORTH. I believe I sought that approval.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you seek that approval with a memo that went up the line in the same form as the ones we have been talking about?

"Mr. NORTH. What do you mean by the 'same form'? We have seen several different forms here this morning.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did the forms say 'recommend that you brief the President'?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know that it did or not.

"Mr. LIMAN. You also got the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence?

"Mr. NORTH. I got the request from the Director of Central Intelligence. The idea did not originate with me.

"We found ourselves without the capability, unbelievable though that may seem, to put a radio broadcast ship out at sea off a hostile nation and we couldn't find a ship in the entire CIA inventory or the U.S. Navy that was able to do it. The Director of Central Intelligence came to me and within I think 72 hours, we had a ship.

"Mr. LIMAN. Don't you think that is a decision that the President of the United States should make?

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	"Mr. NORTH. If the Director of Central Intelligence asked me to produce a ship and I did so, I think that is good and sufficient." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 94-99. See id., 7/13/87, at 47-48 [the Erria]. See also Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 75-80 [Secord on the Erria, and on Olmstead's (Haskell's) role in its purchase].)		
86/05/15-392 1985-86	THE ERRIA SUMMARY: For a narrative description of the Erria, and how it was acquired and used, see Iran-Contra Report, at 367-69.		
86/05/15-400 MAY 15, 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on a PROF note sent to him by Poindexter concerning the ship, the Erria: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember Admiral Poindexter sending you this PROF note? "Mr. NORTH. Now that you show it to me, I do. "Mr. LIMAN. Let's read it. It is dated 5-15-86, in a memo from Ken--who is Ken? "Mr. NORTH. Mr. DeGraffenreid, who was the Director of the Intelligence Directorate, Special Assistant to the President. "Mr. LIMAN. 'In a memo from Ken to me today, he talks about your offering a Danish ship under your control to CIA for broadcasting into' --then it is blanked out. That is a hostile country, right? "Mr. NORTH. Yes.		

"Mr. LIMAN. And then Admiral Poindexter says to you, 'I am afraid you are letting your operational role become too public. From now on, I don't want you to talk to anybody else, including Casey, except me about any of [y]our operational roles. In fact, you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have insisted that you stop.'

"Do you remember that?

"Mr. NORTH. I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. So he wanted you to continue, but to have a cover story that you 'stopped'?

"Mr. NORTH. And the last line is, 'Be cautious.'

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . You talked about the fact that Director Casey described the Iran initiative with the residuals being generated as the--these are your words--'the ultimate covert operation.'

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Would you agree that this here is the ultimate covert operation[,] even one that you are not to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence about?

"Mr. NORTH. The problem that generated this note was that Director Casey had told someone on his staff that they could go to me for the ship. When I was out of town or out of the office, a call was placed to Mr. DeGraffenreid's office instead of mine because he was the normal point of contact for the CIA.

"That is what generated this note. It was not my indiscretion. In that case, it was Director

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	Casey's, unfortunately. "Mr. LIMAN. So this business of covert operations reached the point where not only Congress was regarded as too indiscreet to be told, but that even the Director of Central Intelligence made that list. "I have no further questions this morning." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 99-101; JHICI Ex. OLN 191 [Poindexter PROF to North, dated 5/16/86, "Subject: Be Cautious"].)		
86/05/15-405 DURING 1986	THE ERRIA; AND CASEY'S VIEW OF SECORD POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Admiral, do you have any recollection of being told by Colonel North about the purchases by the Secord organization of the ship Erria, E-r-r-i-a? Did he tell you they had bought a ship? "A. I think I knew that they either had bought or had -- I am not sure if 'bought' is the right word. I thought they just had control, either charter or contract." [3 sets of questions and answers redacted in full; 1 set redacted except for this remainder of the answer:] "[A.] . . . I must say that Colonel North's view, I think, probably -- in fact, I did talk to Director Casey about this at one point. Colonel North had the view that the Agency was not treating Dick Secord fairly. "Q. Did he tell you that they felt he had been associated with Clines and Wilson? "A. That's correct.	SECORD'S IRAN-CONTRA ROLE: CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SECORD'S IRAN-CONTRA ROLE: CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

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	"Q. And that as a result of that, they were keeping an arms-length relationship with him? "A. That's correct. "Q. And that he wanted you to tell the Agency that he had performed a service to his country in connection with Iran and the contras? "A. I don't recall the contras, but, in fact, I did have a conversation with Bill Casey and I can't recall whether it was that specific -- connected with that, but I did have a conversation with him that I thought that he had people at the Agency that wanted to keep an arms-length relationship to Dick Secord and that Dick was providing a great service to the United States and that the Wilson Terpil thing had been investigated and gone to court and the charges had been unsubstantiated by the judge. "As I recall, Director Casey said, 'I agree with you; Dick Secord is a great patriot,' or something like that. "Q. You were aware yourself of Secord's background? "A. Yes. Well, to a general degree. I realize there was this charge and that judge -- some judge had ruled, dismissed the charges. The issue, as far as I was concerned, was resolved in Dick's favor." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 211-13.)		
86/05/15-410 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, do you recall, sir, the matter of what came to be called in some of these		DIVERSION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: On use of the Iran arms money to purchase the Erria ("Ollie's ship"), see col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	exhibits Ollie's ship? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm sorry, sir. I wasn't listening to the first part of your question. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever refer to or did others at the NSC refer to the Erria as Ollie's ship? "Let me try it differently. Did you know that out of the funds of the Iranian venture a ship had been purchased? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think you have an exhibit on this subject. It is a PROF note from me to Colonel North, in which I expressed some surprise that he is talking about this ship with other people. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. It is Exhibit [JMP] 46. "Admiral, this is a PROF note from you to the Colonel. Its subject is 'Be cautious.' It reads: 'In a memo from Ken to me today' --who is Ken? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is Mr. DeGraffenreid, Special Assistant to the President for Intelligence Affairs. "Mr. LIMAN. '. . . he talks about your offering a Danish ship under your control to CIA [for] broadcasting into [rest of sentence redacted in Ex. JMP 46] an unfriendly country. I'm afraid you are letting your operational role become too public. From now on, I don't want you to talk to ✓anyone else, including Casey, except me about any of your operational roles. In fact, you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have insisted that you stop. Be cautious.' "Now, first, that is a memo you sent, correct?		

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	"Mr. POINDEXTER. It is. "Mr. LIMAN. Second, did you know that the ship had been paid for out of what has been called the enterprise or funds from the Iranian arms sales? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Let me tell you my assumption when I heard about the ship. I assumed it was a ship that General Secord had obtained in connection with the arms shipments that he was overseeing to the contras. I did not, to the best of my recollection, recall or know at the time that this was a ship that was procured specifically for this purpose. "I think it is important to point out here, and I don't think it has come out clear in the hearings, there was a separate Presidential finding which I can't swear to, but I'm confident was briefed to the appropriate congressional committees. The question was in carrying out, as Colonel North had stated. The Defense Department was unable to come up with a platform for various reasons that we could get into in closed session, and so I thought this was a situation where Colonel North was, say, offering to divert--divert a ship that was involved in the logistics support of the contras to this other objective." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 149-51; JHICI Ex. JMP 46 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Be Cautious," 5/15/86].)		
86/05/15-411 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:]		DIVERSION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

"Mr. LIMAN. When you said [in Ex. JMP 46] 'under your control,' you understood this was a ship that even if it was paid for by Secord, was under North's control?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not mean it that way.

"Mr. LIMAN. Just a poor choice of words?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Just a poor choice of words. In other words, as I have testified in closed session already, I viewed Colonel North as the switching point in the process of supporting the contras.

"Now, Colonel North is very capable, I can assure you, but he obviously couldn't do everything by himself, and I knew that General Secord had a larger logistics operation. And so when I say 'your,' it is a combination of Colonel North, General Secord. I really--I guess I did not believe that Colonel North was actually providing sailing schedules for ships.

"Mr. LIMAN. Let me just then see if we can sum this up.

"As I understand your testimony, you did not think of this ship as having been paid for by the Iranian arms sales money?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I didn't say that, Mr. Liman. I think I probably thought that. I thought it was procured for a purpose other than support of the contras.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever discuss with the President of the United States that Colonel North had under his control a ship that had been paid for out of the proceeds of the Iranian arms sale?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not."

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	(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 151-53; JHICI Ex. JMP 46 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Be Cautious, 5/15/86].)		
86/05/15-412 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. When you said here that Colonel North shouldn't even discuss his operational role with Director Casey, that wasn't because you thought that Casey was loose-tongued, was it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, same reason that I gave before. "Mr. LIMAN. Because you might have to go before Congress? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And so that the only two people who should know about this ship and [sic (in?)] the government would be you and Colonel North? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, the thing that I wanted to protect was detailed knowledge about Colonel North's role in supporting the contras. You see, I think it's important here to understand, I mean there were at least two reasons why I was concerned about that, and none of them are [sic] connected with the Boland Amendment applying or not applying. One is that I didn't want to get more restrictive legislation. I felt that with the present legislation that we were not covered, that if it had been intended to cover the NSC, it would have said that, or if we were going to cut off all support to the contras, it would have said it. It didn't say that.		DIVERSION: THE ERRIA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

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	"Now, it was very likely if it became obvious what we were doing that Members of Congress would have maybe tightened it up. I didn't want that to happen. "Also, I wanted to return to a more covert activity. Originally the Nicaraguan program started off as a covert activity, we had a lot of leaks for a lot of different reasons. It came out in the open. It gave us immense problems in the area because many of the surrounding countries down there aren't strong enough, and they didn't like the idea of public exposure, and it created all sorts of difficulties. Managing the $27 million humanitarian aid was very difficult because it was so open. "And, again, my philosophy was the way you keep a secret is you don't tell anybody. These things, though, again I would like to emphasize, are consistent with the policy. We weren't making new policy. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever discuss with the President that you wanted to keep North's role secret and what he was doing to support the contras in order to avoid more restrictive legislation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think I ever said that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 153-55; JHICI Ex. JMP 46.)		
86/05/15-420 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Cohen. . . . [D]id you have dealings with		

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	Mr. Secord or Mr. Hakim in terms of the use of a ship that was owned purportedly by Mr. Hakim? "Mr. Clarridge. The only think I know about a ship was that at some point in time after the Libyan raid, they [redacted] they were searching around for some sort of other vehicle, and I believe it was that Colonel North suggested that a ship that he had some control over in the Mediterranean might be used for this purpose. "Mr. Cohen. That is the only contact you know about that? "Mr. Clarridge. That is all I know." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI 8/4/87, at 147-49.)		
86/05/15-421 DURING 1986	THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Boren. I think again Senator Cohen asked you about this Hakim-owned ship that has been talked about, you mentioned the possible use of the ship [redacted.] But we have heard in other testimony that perhaps this same ship, the Hakim-owned ship, was used to wait off Lebanon for the possible release of hostages and later to take equipment to Iran and possibly pick up some tanks. "Mr. Clarridge. Yes. The only other thing, I never heard about it lying off the shore related to hostages, but I do remember a discussion or something about the possibility of a ship. I didn't know that Hakim owned it, that a ship some place in the Mediterranean was going to go to Bandar Abbas, I believe, and pick up a T-72. "Mr. Boren. Do you know whether this ship was ever used for any other NSC or CIA-sponsored		THE FULL-SERVICE COVERT OPERATION: THE ERRIA CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

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	missions? "Mr. Clarridge. No, I don't." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 159-60.)		
86/05/15-450 DURING 1986	THE ERRIA GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. Similarly you were familiar that earlier in time, Colonel North had been the one that offered to rent to the CIA the vessel the Erria, isn't that correct? "Mr. George. Colonel North met with a very -- that is not fair -- mid-level officer. Well, there was a series of meetings. I thought they were in '85, and thanks to you I had a chance to check; it was in '86, a series of meetings [redacted.] "Oliver North arrives on the scene -- you have dates -- and just hus[t]les out of me and a couple of guys in the Situation Room that he can get me a ship. I'm not speaking against Colonel North. I do not want any equipment that Colonel North has. "Mr. Kerr. One of the reasons that you didn't want this particular piece of equipment -- "Mr. George. Although it only cost $200,000, I got to rent it for a million and a half a month, so it was not the best deal I ever worked for the taxpayers. "Mr. Kerr. On October 14, 1986, when Mr. Abrams is making these statements, you may not know who actually has title to these pieces of equipment -- "Mr. George. Colonel North, I knew long before that, even without the evidence, Counsel,	NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CIA AWARENESS GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. George. . . . I don't know about [redacted] testimony, but it became evident to [redacted] and to me, and back to what I said, when John McMahon and I picked [redacted] it became evident in the fall of '84 that we were going to get into deep, deep water and that someone somewhere in the National Security Council was going to certainly support the contras and they were going to seek private funding. "We assumed Ollie knew about it. Ollie would say in a telephone conversation, 'Oh, my God, I got to get out of the Central American thing.' And I am neither a coward saying 'don't you ever say that to me again,' or a fool and say, 'oh, tell me what you're doing,' and he never did. [Sic.] "I assume, thanks to this committee and all that has gone on, we now know a lot about it." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 35-37.) See col. 1.	

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	that you're bringing correctly, yes. I don't know about [redacted] testimony, but it became evident to [redacted] and to me, and back to what I said, when John McMahon and I picked [redacted] it became evident in the fall of '84 that we were going to get into deep, deep water and that someone somewhere in the National Security Council was going to certainly support the contras and they were going to seek private funding. "We assumed Ollie knew about it. Ollie would say in a telephone conversation, 'Oh, my God, I got to get out of the Central American thing.' And I am neither a coward saying 'don't you ever say that to me again,' or a fool and say, 'oh, tell me what you're doing,' and he never did. [Sic.] "I assume, thanks to this committee and all that has gone on, we now know a lot about it." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 35-37.)		
86/05/16-290 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. . . . I'll mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 32] on May 15, 1986, memorandum by you for a meeting with the NSPG. ". . . . "[Q.] Would you look at this and tell me whether or not you wrote this document? "(Pause.) "MR. BECKLER: Just to clarify the record, I think you said it was a memo from Poindexter, but we ought to note it was prepared by -- "MR. LIMAN: It says it was prepared by --	

"MR. BECKLER: Prepared by North and Burghardt.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. This is a memorandum you sent to the President; am I correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And when you sent something to the President others on your staff may prepare it, correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. But you're not shy about making any changes if it's appropriate?

"A. That's correct. It's my memo, but I didn't prepare the draft.

"Q. On that subject, you found that Oliver North was a good draftsman?

"A. Very good.

"Q. Now in this memorandum, right at the beginning, you describe the resistance itself as increasingly desperate as available supplies are depleted.

"A. Um-hum.

"Q. Is that a fair description of what you understood the circumstances of the resistance were by May of 1986?

"A. It is a fair description.

"Q. And apart from this written communication to the President had you briefed him on the fact of your concerns that the resistance was running out of supplies?

"A. I may have, but I simply don't recall it.

"Q. Would it have been your practice, sir, given the condition in which you found the

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		resistance to have brought that to the attention of the President? "A. Yes. And, you know, I very likely did. But again I don't have a recollection of a specific, and I want to be very careful here, you know. There's a lot at stake. "Q. You do not want to attribute -- when you say there's a lot at stake, you do not want to attribute knowledge to the President unless you are certain of it? "A. That is correct. "MR. BECKLER: Just to clarify for the record, I'm sorry -- how do we know this memo went to the President? I mean, I'm just not familiar with the format here. It's a memo for the National Security Planning Group, the NSPG. Now do we assume that the President was there or saw this? "MR. LIMAN: I'm going to show him the minutes." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 303-05; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 32 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 50; Memo from Poindexter, "Meeting with the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)" on 5/16/86; memo dated 5/15/86 and marked prepared by North and Burghardt].)	
86/05/16-291 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. You remember that the President was at this meeting and took a lively role, do you not, Admiral? "A. I have a vague recollection of the	

meeting.

"MR. LEON: Do you know if the President ever got the memo?

"THE WITNESS: I would be surprised if he didn't.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. Let's clarify some things about the President. I mean, the Tower report portrayed him as if he only read comic books, and that's not your observation of this President, is it?

"A. Oh, not at all. The President would read everything that we provided him. In fact, we had to be careful. I felt that we had to be careful not to overburden him with large documents because he would try to read the whole thing.

"Q. Now as I look at this memorandum prepared by North and sent to the President you presented various options for trying to provide some relief to the resistance, if you look at page two, right?

"A. Right.

"Q. And you described it as, given the urgency of the situation; correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And one was a reprogramming which would require Congressional approval, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. Another was a Presidential appeal for private donations

"A. Correct.

"Q. And then a third was for the President himself to make an overture to certain heads of state to provide bridge financing, correct?

"A. Correct.

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		"Q. And there you discussed in the memorandum the liabilities of the last step, right? "A. That's correct. "Q. And they were that the public exposure would exacerbate the current partisan atmosphere; correct? "A. Correct. "Q. And what did you mean by that? "A. Just what I have said before, that our opponents on the Hill would not like it and that they would try to take some steps to preclude it from happening. "Q. And the second was that the foreign contributors would ultimately expect that their largess would result in some kind of U.S. Government concession in their favor, and that you've discussed before, that when you ask people for money they may expect that when they come around to ask for something that you'll have to reciprocate, right? "A. That's generally true. "Q. You talked about [redacted.] "A. That's right. But Israel falls in a different category than [redacted] cooperation with us on this project [redacted] falls in an entirely different category. "Q. In that [redacted] "A. They don't need the money. "Q. They don't need money and they don't need weapons and they don't need U.S. Government support? "A. No. The difference is that they don't need U.S. financial assistance, whereas the	

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		Israelis do, and it was my assessment that the reasons [sic] that [redacted] helped was an entirely different reason. ". . . ." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 305-08. See id., at 308-10 [Poindexter on McFarlane's reluctance to reapproach Country 2 when it turned out that North's estimate of $25 million was too small to allow the Contras to carry on].)	
86/05/16-292 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing, after a break, from preceding entry:] "Q. You recall this meeting, I take it? "A. I have a vague recollection of it. "Q. And even if you don't remember the words of Director Casey where he says that the ammunition will soon run out and so on, you do remember the tone of desperation in terms of the contras; am I correct? "A. Yes. As I've testified before, my impression was at that time in 1986 we knew the contras were going to be in difficulty before we were going to be able to get the $100 million. "Q. And then you and the others reviewed the various options for bridge financing; am I correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. And if you look at the bottom of page nine, it is Secretary Shultz who, in reference to reprogramming, says that 'the suggestion is to go to the Committees and persuade them to reprogram	

some money from defense for non-military aid to the contras. Personally, I think it's breathtaking in improbability. It would be better to go to other countries.'

"Do you remember him in substance saying that you were not going to get reprogramming?

"A. I don't remember hearing him say that, but that is consistent with my understanding of what his view was.

"Q. And in the end, if you look at your summary, you say that 'George will prepare for the President a list of countries which could be approached.' That's the sentence I'm focusing on.

"A. Right.

"Q. Now was such a list approached?

"A. I don't recall. My recollection, which I think I covered on the second of May, was that I have a vague recollection of Secretary Shultz discussing verbally with the President the question of third country support in one of his weekly meetings, which would be the three of us -- the President, Secretary Shultz and me.

"Q. In the end you testified that you considered a group of countries that you mentioned at the last session and that ultimately Brunei was selected; correct?

"A. Yes. Brunei was -- I can't recall that that was a Presidential decision.

"Q. Well, that's the question I was going to put. Was it a Presidential decision?

"A. I don't believe so. That would have been, you know, a tactical matter that really was in Secretary Shultz' bailiwick to decide at that point, and I agreed with Brunei. So once a decision was made to go ahead to third countries I would only have reraised it with the President if I had disagreed with it.

"Q. Was the President ever told while you were National Security Advisor that Brunei had been approached and had agreed to contribute?

"A. I don't recall that.

"Q. When you say you don't recall that, does that mean you don't recall whether he was told or that, to the best of your recollection, he was not told?

"A. I was aware that Secretary Shultz was going to approach Brunei and I thought it was going to happen on his trip to Southeast Asia, which was the original plan. I don't recall ever knowing myself that Brunei had agreed and had contributed, so I'm almost certain the President -- that I did not tell him, because I don't recall being aware of that, and possibly not even until after I left the White House."
(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 311-13. For testimony of the C/CATF of Shultz' comment -- "breathtaking in improbability" -- see 86/06/00-166.)

86/05/16-300
MAY 16, 1986

NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA
ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Attending: the President and Vice President, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Casey, Abrams, North, and "[m]any others."

Topic: the situation in Central America, the options available to try to get the Sandinistas to negotiate, and the need to get funds to the Contras after the House failed to provide a $100 million aid package when the $27 million ran out on March 30, 1986.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall--and it is reflected on page 5 of those notes [Ex. EA 23] that it was Secretary Shultz who first said at the meeting that although there was a great deal of discussion about negotiations, the real problem is that if we don't get money to the freedom fighters, they are going to be out of business, period, and that Secretary Shultz said that it was his feeling that in addition to proposals of going to Congress, that it would be better to go to third countries and get assistance for the contras f[rom] these foreign countries?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I take it this is correct. I may have to say that I wouldn't have remembered it.

"Mr. BELNICK. All right.

"But you do recall the Secretary discussing going to foreign countries for assistance to the Contras?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I don't recall he raised it, but I certainly recall he was one of those engaging in a discussion of it.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall also that as the discussion continued at the NSPG meeting . . . there was a question from Director Casey about whether we--meaning the United States Government--had approached other countries, to which the Secretary of State responded affirmatively, but said there hadn't been any success[?]

"Mr. ABRAMS. Correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall also that there was a proposal at this meeting that perhaps at this stage, the President himself ought to get involved in soliciting funds from foreign countries on behalf of the freedom fighters?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Again, I wouldn't have recalled it. I see it here.

"Mr. BELNICK. All right, sir.

"What was your belief as to the policy that had been decided when this NSPG meeting concluded?

"Mr. ABRAMS. That we were going to give it a try.

"Mr. BELNICK. Give what a try?

"Mr. ABRAMS. The solicitation of funds for humanitarian assistance or the solicitation of humanitarian assistance, but presumably funds for the resistance from a foreign government, and it was my view that the Department had been assigned that responsibility, which was in accordance with [w]hat Congress had said.

"Mr. BELNICK. In fact, Congress had passed legislation stating affirmatively as of 1986 that the State Department could permissibly solicit for humanitarian aid?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Congress in the fiscal year 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act passed in December of 1985 said that flat out.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall at or about the time of the NSPG meeting, shortly thereafter, discussions at the State Department concerning which countries to approach for assistance for the

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		freedom fighters? "Mr. ABRAMS. My memory is that after the meeting, I said to the Secretary essentially, well, how do we proceed. . . . [T]he Secretary gave two general guidelines. First, that we did not want to solicit money from a right-wing dictatorship. It would be just the kind of association with the resistance we did not want should it ever leak. "Secondly, that we did not want to solicit money from any government which was dependent upon the United States." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 103-10.) Abrams testified that Shultz told him "he would not countenance a solicitation from a right-wing dictatorship because he didn't want that association. You can image how he would have felt about Iran." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 271.)	
86/05/16-301 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT: According to minutes of the meeting, the President states at an NSPG meeting to discuss Contra policy: "What about the private groups who pay for ads for the contras? Have they been contacted? Could they do more than ads?" (Burghardt memo for McDaniel, "Minutes of the May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group Meeting," 6/4/86 [Committee Documents N 10288 through 10299, at N 10298.])	

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86/05/16-304 AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1984		THIRD-COUNTRY SOLICITATIONS AND ARMS PURCHASES: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Was the President aware . . . at the time that money solicited from other countries permitted for humanitarian purposes was in fact used for arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That was after I left government, sir. I don't know about that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 259.)	
86/05/16-350 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA DoS CHRONOLOGY: "NSPG meeting. Discussion of bridge funding for the NDR and possible Third Country solicitation for humanitarian assistance. GPS supports, noting State's discussions with Country 8. GPS tasked to draw up list of possible donors. CASEY mentions that Countries 1, 2, 3, and 5 all have some interest. (No mention of prior solicitations)" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/06/16-090.)	
86/05/16-351 MAY 16, 1986		NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . Now, at that [5/16/86] meeting, as I read the [meeting] notes, you were a forceful proponent of soliciting third country assistance for the contras, each as a more desirable alternative for the temporary period,	

for the bridge period than trying to rely on getting reprogrammed funds from Congress.

"And my question, if that is a fair characterization of your position, is why your views had so changed in the two years between June 1984 [see entries starting at 84/06/25-100] and now, May 1986?

"Secretary SHULTZ. The whole atmosphere had changed. Congressional attitudes had changed and the law had changed. And so I thought under those circumstances, it was perfectly proper to do it, in fact, perhaps even desirable if we could do it in the right way.

"Mr. BELNICK. And the change in the law to which you refer was the change which expressly provided that the State Department could solicit humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan opposition, subject only to the strictures of the Pell amendment; am I correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. The May 1986 NSPG meeting ended with you being asked to prepare a list of countries which could be approached to make donations or contributions to the contras; is that correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. When you were asked to undertake that assignment, did anyone inform you then of the prior solicitation of countries No. 2, 3, 4 or any others?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No.

"Mr. BELNICK. But subsequently, . . . you heard from Mr. McFarlane on June 16 of 1986, a month after the NSPG meeting when you were asked to come up with a list, that Country No. 2 had given $31 million; correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. [See 86/06/16-090.]

"Mr. BELNICK. I take it that at that time when Mr. McFarlane so informed you, you were unaware of an exchange of messages between Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter on June 10 [Ex. GPS 28; see entries starting at 86/06/10-030]. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. The second page of the exhibit, [GPS] 28, is a PROF note from Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter dated June 10, 1986, and near the end . . . he says, 'I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the'--and Country No. 2 is one of the countries' named there which has been blacked out--'of the Country No. 2 aid that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Did RCM'--that is McFarlane--'ever tell Shultz?'

"If you will look, sir, at the first page of the exhibit, that is Admiral Poindexter's response to Colonel North's PROF note, the same day. And he says, . . . 'To my knowledge, Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way.'

"You obviously were unaware of those messages and of the fact that subsequent to sending this message, Admiral Poindexter talked, as he has testified here, to Bud McFarlane who then called you in June of 1986.

"You were unaware of those events?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I was unaware of that. But--I was mystified as to what was the reason this call out of the clear blue sky from Mr. McFarlane, so this seems to explain it. But I didn't know that at the time.

"Mr. BELNICK. And Mr. McFarlane gave you no context for the sudden information about a $31 million contribution?

"Secretary SHULTZ. No."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 43-46.)

86/05/16-400
MAY 16, 1986

NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that there was an NSPG meeting that was going to take place on May 16, 1986?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't specifically recall.

"Mr. LIMAN. If you look at Exhibit [OLN] 8, is that a memorandum that you prepared for Admiral Poindexter for this meeting?

"Mr. NORTH. As I see in this memorandum, it was prepared by myself and another staff officer.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall, sir, that the subject of this meeting was the dire condition that the contras were facing in terms of funding?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you actually attended the meeting; am I correct?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not remember whether I actually attended that meeting or not. I guess I did, since my name is on the attendance list.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that the meeting ended with a suggestion that a list of countries who might be approached would be prepared and submitted to the President?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not remember that. I am not saying it didn't happen at the meeting."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 78-80; JHICI Ex. OLN 8 [North memo to Poindexter dated 5/15/86, re 5/16/86 NSPG Meeting].)

86/05/16-440
MAY 16, 1986

CONTRA FUNDING: $6 MILLION AVAILABLE
NORTH PROF:

North PROF to Poindexter, titled "Iran and Terrorism" and dated May 16, 1986:

". . . You should be aware that the resistance support organization now has more than $6M available for immediate disbursement. This reduces the need to go to third countries for help. It does not, however, reduce the urgent need to get CIA back into the management of this program. We can only do this by going forward with the reprogramming proposal and getting the requisite authorities [sic] for CIA involvement. Unless we do this, we will run increasing risks of trying to manage this program from here with the attendant physical and political liabilities. I am not complaining, and you know that I love the work, but we have to lift some of this onto the CIA so that I can get more than 2-3 hrs of sleep at night. The more money there is (and we will have a considerable amount in a few more days) the more visible the program becomes (airplanes,

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		pilots, weapons, deliveries, etc.) and the more inquisitive will become people like Kerry, Barnes, Harkins, et al. While I care not a whit what they say about me, it could well become a political embarassment [sic] for the President and you. Much of this risk can be avoided simply by covering it with an authorized CIA program undertaken with the $15M. This is what I was about to say in the meeting today and a point that I believe Shultz does not understand in his advocacy of Third country solicitation. I have no idea what Don Regan does or does not know re my private U.S. operations but the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their 'support for Democracy' in CentAm. In short, we need to proceed with the $15M. Shall I work this up?. . . ." (JHICI Ex. 11. For President Reagan's response, see below at 87/03/19-103.)	
86/05/16-441 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: WHAT REGAN KNEW REGAN RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF: "I have read in the paper that there was a PROF note from Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter about how much Don Regan knew of this, and John Poindexter's answer to North was: 'He knows very little, and it's best you keep it that way.' I have only to realize I believe that what he was referring to there was if I knew about it, I would blow the whistle. There is no way I would put up with diversion of funds. I have worked with money too much too long to know you just don't do that	

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		sort of thing." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 98. See JHICI Ex. DTR 29 [= Exx. 11, OLN 10; North PROF to Poindexter, 5/16/86].)	
86/05/16-443 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF: In response to North's May 16, 1986 PROF on Contra funding (see 86/05/16-440), Poindexter writes: "Go ahead and work up the paper needed for the $15M reprogramming. . . . I understand your concern and agree. I just didn't want you to bring it up at NSPG. I guessed at what you were going to say. Don Regan knows very little of your operation and that is just as well." (JHICI Ex. OLN 11 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran and Terrorism," date obscured].)	
86/05/16-444 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING AND NSPG MEETING ON NICARAGUA POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Is it a fact that you understood that the $6 million that Oliver North referred to there [in Ex. JMP 51] was money coming out of the Iranian arms sale? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I probably thought that at the time I read it. "Mr. LIMAN. On this very day, May 16, 1986, do you recall that you had a meeting of the NSPG? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. " . . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that one of the purposes of the meeting was to discuss third	DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Is it a fact that you understood that the $6 million that Oliver North referred to there [in Ex. JMP 51] was money coming out of the Iranian arms sale? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I probably thought that at the time I read it." See col. 2.

country support?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall indeed that the whole purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to raise money, bridge funding for the contras until Congress appropriated more money?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I recall that was one of the objectives.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that the Secretary of State at that meeting said that he thought that you could not get reprogramming from Congress and that you would have to look to third countries for support?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, and my memory of course has been refreshed on this by going over the minutes of the meeting.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall having refreshed your recollection that the meeting ended with the Secretary of State being asked by you to prepare a list of countries that could possibly help, to be presented to the President of the United States?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I recall that was one of the outcomes of the meeting.

"Mr. LIMAN. On that very day after the meeting, Oliver North then sent you this PROF note saying that $6 million was available and that this reduced the need to go to third countries for help.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. My recollection having looked at all this material fairly recently, as I believe what happened is Colonel North was in that NSPG meeting and he during the discussion started to say something. [Sic.]

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		"At this particular time, my deputy, Don Fortier, was in the hospital with terminal cancer, and so I was up to my eyebrows in work and I hadn't had a chance to talk to Colonel North before the meeting. He started to say something during the meeting and I thought he was going to talk about some of the contra support activity and Colonel North was not aware of at all times as to who knew what. "My guidance to him was not to talk to anybody and that way I had control over who knew what. "I cautioned him not to say anything in the meeting and I believe this PROF note is probably as a result of that and he is telling me here what he was getting ready to say. "Mr. LIMAN. Since the meeting had ended with the Secretary of State being asked to prepare a list of countries for the President, did you tell the President that you had found $6 million from a third country? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. I take it that the reason that you did not tell him was for the same reason that you didn't tell him originally, that you wanted to preserve deniability? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is exactly right." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 165-68; JHICI Ex. JMP 51 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran and Terrorism," 5/16/86].)	
86/05/16-446 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: THE $6 MILLION AVAILABLE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . We talked about the $6 million PROF	CONTRA FUNDING: MONEY FROM THE IRAN ARMS SALES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		note. "Please mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18] a PROF note from Oliver North dated May 16, 1986. ". . . . "Q. Have you seen that before? "A. Well, the last time I saw this was in the Tower Commission Report [at B-96]. "Q. When was the first time you saw it? "A. I suppose -- I probably saw it in that May time frame. But I frankly can't recall it. "You know, I would receive hundreds of PROF notes every day. "Q. Did you try to read them? "A. Tried to. At least glance at them. "Q. Where it says 'You should be aware the resistance supporting organization now has more than 6 million available for immediate disbursement,' did I understand your prior testimony to mean that you assumed that that came out of the Iranian arms sales? "A. Yes. "Q. It goes on to say, and this was also in the Tower Report, at the very bottom, 'I have no idea what Don Regan does or does not know re my private U.S. operation, but the President obviously knows why he's meeting with several select people to thank them for their support for democracy in Central America.' "What did you interpret that to mean? "A. Well, the history of this issue probably needs to be laid out to kind of put this in perspective.	

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		"As I said earlier, in 1986, well, the latter part, and probably it started in about May, I wanted -- I was -- by that point, I guess we had gotten the vote in the House and either we had it in the Senate but we really weren't ever too worried about the Senate. [Redacted.] "I wanted to -- in order to lower Colonel North's visibility and because he was being overworked -- but he was a very capable person -- I wanted to move him out of the Central America account. So, on the one hand, Colonel North agreed that the CIA had to get back into it, and I think that's the significance of the one paragraph in his memo about saying that we really did need to get the CIA back into the program. "But, on the other hand, I think he was kind of torn. He did enjoy his work and sort of prided himself in, frankly, keeping the contras alive during the period of time that the CIA was restricted from doing anything. So my plan was to phase him out. "As it turns out -- and I can't recall exactly when it started -- but I was at some point after that heavily criticized in the press by our conservative supporters who thought that I was trying to fire Colonel North. Of course, that was not my intent, but the intent was to lower his visibility and get our opponents on the off of his back. [Sic.] "So that's what he is referring to there." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 199-202; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18 [= JHICI Exx. 11, JMP 51, OLN 10; North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran and	

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		Terrorism," 5/16/86].)	
86/05/16-447 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PRIVATE DONORS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. What's [North] referring to [in Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18] when he talks about the President? "A. You know, again -- no, I understand. I wanted to explain that background. "I think it's just -- you know, he means exactly what he says. He assumes that the President understands why he's meeting with several select people; and I agree with that. You know, in the White House during this period of time that we were encouraging private support, we really didn't distinguish between how the money was going to be spent. We didn't make any distinction between -- at least in my mind -- between using the money in the United States to encourage public support or providing it directly to the contras. "I don't recall having any specific conversations with the President about these meetings. The meetings would be set up by Colonel North. I believe this is the way they were set up, by Colonel North going to the schedulers and getting the schedulers to put these supporters on the President's list to see during administrative time. I did not attend any of them that I can recall. "[Redacted] came in to see the President, I	

did attend that meeting, at which the President thanked him for his help [redacted.] But these -- the private U.S. citizen supporters were handled as a routine matter that I didn't get directly involved with.

"I knew they were happening. I assume[d] the President understood why he was meeting with them.

"Q. There was no doubt in your mind that the President understood he was meeting with them to thank them for contributing to the contras?

"A. There wasn't any question in my mind.

"Q. I think you have told us before that your view was that this was not illegal or inappropriate activity?

"A. No.

"Q. And that was the President's view?

"A. That's correct. Once in a while he would -- if he had a meeting the day before and if the person had something interesting to report, he would often provide a little debrief about what so-and-so said or something like that. So I -- you know, I am confident that he was aware that these people were making contributions to support the contras."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 202-03; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18 [= JHICI Exx. 11, JMP 51, OLN 10].)

86/05/16-448
MAY 16, 1986

CONTRA FUNDING: DISCUSSION OF THIRD-COUNTRY BRIDGE FUNDING

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. At the last session we reviewed minutes of the NSPG on May 16, 1986, at which there was a discussion of third country funding, a suggestion by the Secretary of State that that was the only practical means of getting bridge funding and a conclusion at the meeting that a list of potential third country donors would be prepared. Do you remember that?

"A. I remember that.

"Q. Now, that meeting of the NSPG was on May 16.

"I want to show you a document that has been marked previously as [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 18, which was written . . . the very same day, by Oliver North to you.

". . . .

"Q. What I am going to direct your attention to, Admiral, is Colonel North's statement 'you should be aware that the resistance support organization now has more than $6 million available for immediate disbursement. This reduces the need to go to third countries for help.' [See 86/05/16-440.]

"Remember, we went over this PROF note before.

"A. Yes.

"MR. BECKLER: Let's take a look at it, unless it is going to be just a low-ball question.

"MR. LIMAN: It is going to be a very low-ball question.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Did you discuss with anyone other than Colonel North the fact that the need for bridge funding from third countries was now going to be less than what was discussed earlier in the afternoon at the NSPG meeting?

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		"A. I did not, to the best of my knowledge. "Q. Did you report to the President of the money that you had been talking about in bridge funding that Colonel North had indicated that six million was already available? "MR. BECKLER: Arthur, I have a continuing objection to his reports to the President based on my previous objection. [See 86/04/03-150.] "I am going to direct him not to answer that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 22-24; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18 [= JHICI Ex. JMP-51; North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran and Terrorism," 5/16/86].)	
86/05/16-450 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: $6 MILLION AVAILABLE NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 1: North testified on his PROF message to Poindexter, written after the May 16, 1986 NSPG meeting on Nicaragua and Contra funding: "Mr. LIMAN. [I]t reads, 'You should be aware that the resistance support organization' --that is Lake-- " . . . . "Mr. NORTH. I see it, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. 'You should be aware that the resistance support organization now has more than $6 million available for immediate disbursement.' "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And in fact that was $6 million that was generated from the deposits from the arms sales; that is correct, isn't it? "Mr. NORTH. I believe it is, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And then it says, 'This reduces	DIVERSION: $6 MILLION AVAILABLE NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

the need to go to third countries for help.'

"Mr. NORTH. That's what it says.

"Mr. LIMAN. Does that refresh your recollection that earlier that day there was a discussion with the President at the NSPG meeting that you participated in, about going to third countries for help?

"Mr. NORTH. Again my recollection of the meeting is--with the President is not altogether clear. Very obviously I wrote this note and it does refer back to that reference that you have made.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you ever discuss with Admiral Poindexter the subject of this note, namely, that the need . . . for the Secretary of State and the President to get involved in third country solicitation had been relieved to a little extent by the $6 million that you now had available?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I think the issue is not so much the need; the issue was--and certainly it was my understanding--you needed a lot more than 6 or even 10 million dollars from Brunei, you needed a lot of money.

"Mr. LIMAN. But this was good news, wasn't it?

"Mr. NORTH. I would guess so, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. That is what you were conveying?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever discuss with Admiral Poindexter that this was good news that ought to be brought to the attention of the President of the United States or the Secretary of State?

"Mr. NORTH. I did not. I saw no need to. I still believed that we ought to have gone to others and go back to others that had already given, because the need was much greater than $6 million.

"Mr. LIMAN. Didn't you say it 'reduces the need'? Those are your words?

"Mr. NORTH. Perhaps the immediacy of the need.

"I am not going to back away from the words that I wrote at the time. The point I want to make, just like the one I tried to make yesterday when we were talking about Boland, is there was always a need to get more money, to get the CIA back involved, and this note says that. I didn't want to be out there doing these things, counsel. What I was trying to do was to get a full program re-established by the Government of the United States, and we were trying to bridge it until that happened.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, what occasioned you to write to Admiral Poindexter saying that this reduces the need?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I think probably that it was important he understand that Secretary Shultz didn't need to go out that afternoon and go ask for additional help. But as we all know, Secretary Shultz eventually did.

"Mr. LIMAN. Let's go on here, because you do in this note--and you have already testified to it--you plead for the legislation to get the CIA back into it.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

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		". . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 81-83; JHICI Ex. OLN 10 [North PROF to Poindexter, 5/16/86].)	
86/05/16-451 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: $6 MILLION AVAILABLE NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 2: North's testimony continued on his PROF message to Poindexter, written after the May 16, 1986 NSPG meeting on Nicaragua and Contra funding: "Mr. LIMAN. And then it says, 'I am not complaining, and you know that I love the work, but we have to lift some of this onto the CIA so that I can get more than 2-3 hours of sleep at night. The more money there is (and we will have a considerable amount in a few more days)' --and let's stop there. "That was also going to be more money from the Iranian deposits? "Mr. NORTH. I believe so, if the time is right. "Mr. LIMAN. 'The more money there is (and we will have a considerable amount in a few more days) the more visible the program becomes (airplanes, pilots, weapons, deliveries, etc.) and the more inquisitive will become people like Kerry, Barnes, Hawkins, et al.' "Those are members of Congress? "Mr. NORTH. They are. "Mr. LIMAN. 'While I care not a whit what they may say about me,[] it could well become a political embarrassment for the President and you.['] "Mr. NORTH. I think that has been borne out.	

"Mr. LIMAN. And what was the political embarrassment that you were focusing on, then?

"Mr. NORTH. We have it before us, counsel.

"Mr. LIMAN. That it would come out that you were generating the funds for the contras and doing what you have described to assist the support operation?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you then come with the proposal, much of this risk can be avoided simply by covering it with an authorized CIA program undertaken with the $15 million. You say that Shultz doesn't seem to understand that, right?

"Mr. NORTH. That is what I said.

"Mr. LIMAN. And then you say, 'I have no idea what Don Regan does or does not know of my private U.S. operation, but the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people, to thank them for their support--' right?

"Mr. NORTH. That is what it says."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 84-86; JHICI Ex. OLN 10 [North PROF to Poindexter, 5/16/86].)

86/05/16-460
MAY 16, 1986

CONTRA FUNDING: SOURCES
NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. HEFLIN. . . . [I]s it fair and accurate to state that after the humanitarian aid of $27 million ran out, that the contras were in dire circumstances as to the need for food, clothing, medical supplies, arms, ammunitions and all other necessities to carry on a resistance movement?

"Mr. NORTH. That is the--the facts in there [Ex. OLN 8] are those facts as I knew them, as

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		supported by intelligence that we were receiving and as reviewed by my colleagues. ". . . . "Mr. HEFLIN. . . . Mr. Abrams testified about the contra needs at this time for bridge money totaling $100 million until military and humanitarian aid could be authorized. He mentioned that it would take something like 3 million a month. "Now, you mentioned in this Exhibit [OLN] 8 . . . that $5 million a month--well, do you agree that from 3 to 5 million dollars a month was needed for humanitarian assistance? . . . "Mr. NORTH. Yes. And furthermore, the war had been prosecuted at the rate of about 1.25 to 1.5 million a month in the intervening years. . . . "And so the estimate was you would need between 3 and 5 million a month to allow the resistance to continue to grow at its natural rate, to train them, field them, equip them and send them back into combat. "Mr. HEFLIN. How much would it take to keep them as they were, at the status quo? "Mr. NORTH. I guess you could live with about one to one and a half million a month. ". . . . "Mr. HEFLIN. . . . [F]rom about April 1 until after you left in November, which would have been close to eight months that you really had a situation there of dire consequences, and there was a great need for some type of financial assistance to help them in their movement.	

"Mr. NORTH. Yes. The completion of the expenditures of the principal overseas backers, which was well running out by this point in time, was a serious concern.

"Mr. HEFLIN. If they needed then, say, 5 million times eight months, that is 40 million, or 3 million times eight months, 24 million or say we get down to 1 million they would have been in need. The basic thing of at least 8 million during that period of time.

"Mr. NORTH. That is right.

". . . .

"Mr. HEFLIN. . . . So, now, on May the 16th, . . . you make a note on the second page [of Ex. OLN 10,] a PROF note from, I believe, you to Admiral Poindexter, 'You should be made aware that the resistance support organization now has more than $6 million available for immediate disbursement', and some other things there.

". . . .

"Mr. HEFLIN. . . . [T]hat 6 million, . . . was that to come from Hakim-Secord Enterprises, Lake or where?

"Mr. NORTH. I believe, and I am trying to recall without a whole lot to remind me here, but I believe this would reflect the transaction that came to be known as the Hawk parts shipment, in which there was monies placed in what has come to be called the Lake Resources account, and therefore available at that point in time.

"Now, as I have also testified, I was accused frequently by General Secord, and I did not talk to Mr. Hakim about these issues, but I certainly

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		did talk to General Secord[,] of being overly ambitious in my procrastinations of how much was available for certain activities. "But I believe the reason that I put this in this particular note is I had just been informed that the deposit had been made. "Mr. HEFLIN. Well, according to the financial records of the Secord-Hakim, various groups and organizations, that is true, just about that time was when that deposit--as of that date, there was something like over an $11 million balance in it. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . [M]y sense is, if I can recall the time frame right, is that 6 million would have been derived as part of the Ayatollah's money that had been placed in the account to pay for the parts that we were due to ship in May. "This is just prior to the trip to Tehran by Mr. McFarlane." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 181-87; JHICI Exx. OLN 8 [North memo to Poindexter, dated 5/16/86, re NSPG meeting], 10 [North PROF to Poindexter, dated 5/16/86, discussing Contra funding].)	
86/05/16-461 MAY 16, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: SOURCES NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. HEFLIN. Well, now, we have run from . . . April 10 til after you leave, the records of the Hakim-Secord companies, their records, orders have gone through from that period forward; and we can find no expenditure for humanitarian aid	

whatsoever coming from the Hakim-Secord group.

"There was $632,000 for arms, and the rest of their expenditures, and they expended something like 3 million, 3.5 million, I reckon, altogether, are in relationship with transportation-related expenses.

"In other words, there was no humanitarian aid, no military aid for arms or ammunition from the 1st of April on, and that their expenditures were in connection with aircraft transportation-related expenditures.

". . . Were you led to believe that they were supplying humanitarian and military aid in addition to transportation-related aid to the contra movement at that time?

"Mr. NORTH. I am not quite sure I understand the question. I understood, and I believe it to be accurate, that not only was Lake Resources but the other offshore accounts, the ones that have been identified as Mr. Miller's[,] were indeed sending monies, that General Secord's organization was providing boots, clothing, uniform items, packages, parachutes, and the aircraft support to deliver that, and that they were also flying ammunition and the military supplies necessary to support them.

"Mr. HEFLIN. Well, at the same time, the auditors['] review . . . of the Calero accounts, from April til the period you left the government, would reflect that he received very little money, and very little America influence donated money [sic], in particular after July of 1985, I believe there was a meeting in Miami about that time, but

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		that the records of the Calero accounts from April 1 to after you left would reflect that the donations that he received during this time would have amounted to approximately $1 million, including the donations from Channell and Miller and their comapnies. "Now, according to those accounts, it would have indicated that from Hakim and Secord, for humanitarian and military ammunition, there would have been a total during this period of around $1.632 million. There was 632[,000] that was paid for arms. "Now, granted that they could have made money on exchange rates and they could have had some credit for buying arms on credit or some humanitarian aid needs on credit, but it would appear that during this time that from either Calero, Hakim and Secord, Miller and Channell, that there was inadequate money for the contras to have existed on. "That gets down to this: Do you know whether or not there could have been another source of money which could have been used to support the contras from April 1 until the time that you left the government? "Mr. NORTH. There are none that I know of positively, Senator. We did have reports of other countries having been approached directly by the resistance leadership and other foreign donors, as well as perhaps other Americans who donated directly and simply gave it to Mr. Calero or one of the other resistance leaders or made deposits directly to their accounts.	

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		"But again, I am not familiar with the facts on that, but we certainly had some indication that they were receiving other reports. Some of those reports caused us to look very carefully into the possibility of drug running. "We found absolutely no evidence during my tenure at the NSC that any of the resistance leaders were themselves or their subordinates involved in drug running. The only one case that we actually had some information on I reported in the executive session as to who those people were, and that was not in any of the main resistance organizations." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 187-90. See JHICI Exx. OLN 8 [North memo to Poindexter, 5/16/86, re NSPG meeting], 10 [North PROF to Poindexter, 5/16/86, mentioning $6 million available to Contras]. On the Contras and drugs, see entries starting at 86/04/07-250, and 86/05/15-108.)	
86/05/16-470 1985-86		CONTRA FUNDING: NORTH'S ROLE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. FOLEY. . . . Colonel North testified that in the summer of 1985, rather than route money directly to the contras, he participated in the establishment of a secret Swiss bank account under his control. "When you approved the diversion of funds from the sale of arms to Iran, did you also approve the use of the Swiss bank acccunts, the secret Swiss bank account? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Foley, I don't think it	CONTRA FUNDING THROUGH DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

is accurate to say that Colonel North established a Swiss bank account under his control.

"Mr. FOLEY. I said participated.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I misunderstood you then. I was aware that Colonel North was concerned about the logistics operation, the way it was going, and I was aware that he was going to Miami to talk to the contra leadership about this and I was aware that he was going to talk to General Secord about setting up a more professional logistics support operation as a private operation.

"With regard to details of bank accounts that General Secord may or may not have had, I simply didn't get involved in that.

"Mr. FOLEY. Did you know about it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I suppose at some point I probably did, only from the standpoint of it being mentioned probably in passing, in talking about the amount of money that was available to the contra leadership.

"But with regard to how many accounts and what their names were--

"Mr. FOLEY. Were you told how much money was available to the contra leadership from these accounts?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The only figure that I can recall is the one that you have got in one of the exhibits where Colonel North indicated to me that there was $6 million available.

"Earlier on, when support was coming from what we have referred to as Country Two, I was generally aware of the amount of money that was available then.

"Mr. FOLEY. Were you led to believe by Colonel North that $6 million from the sale of arms to Iran was going to be available to the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is the reference I was just making.

"Mr. FOLEY. Were you satisfied later that that $6 million was actually distributed to the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I--again, that is a detail that I did not get into. I don't know that.

"Mr. FOLEY. You don't have any knowledge at a later time that you can recall--you had no knowledge of how much actually went to the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I do not know.

"Mr. FOLEY. Do you know if the main force of the contras, the FDN was ever provided with any of the funds from the diversion?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I have no basis on which to answer that question.

"Mr. FOLEY. You don't actually know who got the money or--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know that.

"Mr. FOLEY. Well, there has been a lot of testimony here about keeping the body and soul of the contras alive during 1986 with the sale of arms to Iran.

"Are you testifying that you don't of your own knowledge know if they got a dollar of it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No--

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, the testimony,

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		the words say what they say. The witness has made it clear, he has testified now, this is his eighth day of testimony. ". . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 18-21.)	
86/05/16-471 1985-86		CONTRA FUNDING: NORTH'S ROLE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry after debate over the objection of Adm. Poindexter's counsel:] ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. Let me suggest something to you and ask for your response. I would suggest to you that Mr. Calero has testified that in 1986, the main force of the contra resistance in northern Nicaragua--this force is generally put to be about 12,000 to 15,000 men--did not receive any funds from the accounts of General Secord or Mr. Hakim. "Do you have any response to that? Do you know whether that is true or do you have any comment on it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard Adolfo Calero's testimony and I am sure that it was truthful. If it were not for these hearings and the special prosecutor, I think that all of the parties involved, General Secord, Mr. Hakim, Mr. Calero and Colonel North could sit down and sort this out very accurately. "But as things stand now, there is no opportunity for that sort of consultation and I don't know what the correct answer is. "Mr. FOLEY. Let me ask you to respond to this if you will. That the only funds that were	CONTRA FUNDING THROUGH DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		distributed from the accounts of Mr. Hakim and General Secord that resulted from the diversion of funds were applied to the so-called southern front, most of them for the purpose of aircraft and the payment of salaries and that about $600,000 or so was the amount of the supplies that were provided to the southern front. "Do you have any reaction to that statement? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't. "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. FOLEY. You do not yourself--is it your testimony that you do not yourself know how the funds were distributed from the sale of arms to Iran or whether any of those funds reached the northern front and all of them if any reached the southern front that were distributed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have great trust and confidence in Colonel North and General Secord and I was confident that they would make the right judgments and do the best they could under a very difficult set of circumstances of keeping the contras alive as a fighting force and I still believe they did the best they could under very difficult circumstances. "Mr. FOLEY. Where was the main force of the contra resistance, in northern Nicaragua or in the southern front? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The main fighting force in the country was, of course, in the north. One of our objectives in order to keep pressure on the Sandinista Government was to make the force in the south a better force. "Mr. FOLEY. Can you tell me--	

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We also worked very hard in getting political coordination between the leaders in the south and the leaders in the north.

"Mr. FOLEY. What I am trying to understand, Admiral Poindexter, is how it can be said again and again in these hearings that the diversion of funds, which you authorized in February 1986 from the sale of arms to Iran, kept the contras alive during a critical period, when you yourself do not quarrel with the testimony that the main force of the contra resistance by far, the northern front, did not receive any of those funds?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I haven't testified to that. I said I don't know.

"Mr. FOLEY. Well, if you don't know, how can you testify that the contra force was kept alive by the diversion of funds, if you don't know whether they got any of the money or not?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe that I have attributed keeping the contras alive only to the transfer of residual funds. It was the whole effort of private support, third-country support, getting political--developing political cohesiveness amongst the contra leadership, helping them focus on what their objectives were, those things taken in toto I believe kept the contras alive as a fighting force.

"Mr. FOLEY. So you are not willing to say here that it was the diversion of funds that purchased vital supplies to keep the main force of the contras alive--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe I have ever testified to that."

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		(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 21-25.)	
86/05/16-600 MAY 16, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WHO KNEW WHAT NORTH PROF: North PROF to Poindexter states: "I have no idea what Don Regan does or does not know re my private U.S. operation, but the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their 'support for democracy' in Central America." (JHICI Ex. OLN 10.)	
86/05/16-601 MAY 16, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: WHO KNEW WHAT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on the PROF: "Mr NIELDS. Was the President aware of your U.S. operation to raise funds for the contras from private contributors? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I think that that PROFs note right there indicates that I believed he was. But I didn't ever walk in and by the way say to him, 'Mr. President, this is what I --[.]' I know I have been accused of those kinds of things, but I didn't do that. "The fact is that I assumed, and I think that is a fairly clear indication I am sending my boss what I thought was going to be a very private not[e] that would never see the light of day anywhere else, and I said to him what I felt. And I was asking him for guidance. "Mr. NIELDS. And he certainly didn't tell you to stop? "Mr. NORTH. Why would he? We were conducting	

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		a covert operation to support the Nicaraguan resistance, to carry out the President of the United States' stated, publicly-articulated foreign policy. "Why should he tell me to stop? We weren't breaking any laws. We were simply trying to keep an operation covert." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 240-42; JHICI Ex. OLN 10.)	
86/05/16-700 SOMETIME IN MAY OR JUNE 1986	NORTH'S ACTIVITIES: CONCERN WITHIN THE NSC STAFF POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. McCOLLUM. Did Commander Thompson ever come to you at some time in May or June of 1986 and say that concerns have been expressed by another member of the NSC staff about the legality of some of Colonel North's activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall that. He may have. But I don't recall it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 26.)		
86/05/17-040 MAY 17 AND 19, 1986			KEEPING SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER INFORMED ABOUT THE IRAN INITIATIVE NORTH AND POINDEXTER PROFS: North writes in a PROF to Poindexter, titled "Iran and Terrorism," on May 17, 1986: "Also, strongly urge that we have a quiet mtg w/ RCM and RR on Weds or Thurs (preferable) prior to departure. We shd probably not have any paper on this mtg. You may also want to include Shultz, Wienberger [sic] and Casey. Warm regards, North[.]" Poindexter responds in a PROF to North two

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			days later, "I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz and Weinberger." (JHICI Exx. GPS 24, GPS 25 [= Ex. OLN 193].)
86/05/17-045 UNTIL NOVEMBER 25, 1986	KEEPING SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER INFORMED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Admiral, you indicated that if the President had made a decision on a policy issue that Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger would accept it and faithfully go about carrying out that policy to the best of their ability. And the question arose in my mind that as to whether you meant that if either gentleman were called to testify before the Intelligence or Foreign Relations Committee, you would expect them to withhold information in the same fashion that the information was withheld from Congressman Hamilton and others? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We never had a discussion that would allow me to answer your question. There was never any intent to put Secretary Shultz or Secretary Weinberger in a position where they would be vulnerable to being asked about that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 63-64.)		
86/05/17-050 MAY 17, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: SECRECY SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . .[Ex. GPS 24] is a PROF note dated May 17, 1986, a few weeks after your conversation in Tokyo. It is a PROF note from Oliver North to Admiral Poindexter about the McFarlane [trip] to Tehran which was then being planned and about to lift off and you will notice

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			near the end of that PROF note Colonel North suggests to Admiral Poindexter that there be a quiet meeting with Bud McFarlane and the President prior to the departure of the mission, and he queries whether the participants in that suggested meeting ought to include you and Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Do you see that? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I see that. "Mr. BELNICK. If you turn please to the next exhibit GPS-25, you will see Admiral Poindexter's reply to that suggestion in the last sentence of the PROF message that he sends back, and I quote, 'I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz and Weinberger.' I take it you were unaware of this exchange as well? "Secretary SHULTZ. Obviously. "Mr. BELNICK. And again, sir, when you spoke to Don Regan and Admiral Poindexter at the Summit in May of 1986, about this information, nobody told you that a few weeks later the former National Security Adviser was heading to Iran with U.S. arms? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, they did not." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 25-26; JHICI Exx. GPS 24 [North PROF to Poindexter, 5/17/86], GPS 25 [Poindexter PROF to North, 5/19/86].)
86/05/19-100 MAY 19-23, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: DUTTON ROLE AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton travels to Central America to see the air resupply operation. He "determine[s] that, in fact, there wasn't an organization."	

The operation at that time has four airplanes ("one C-123, two C-7's and one Maule"), plus an airstrip "up on the northwest coast of one of the neighboring countries." The warehouse at the main operating base has "parachute rigging, uniforms and an assortment of munitions . . . light machine guns, some rifles, ammunition for each[,] . . . mortars, grenades, some C-4, which is plastic explosive."

Dutton meets 3 non-U.S. crew members (2 pilots and a load master) hired through David Walker, a Briton, to fly inside Nicaragua so Americans would not be involved. "[W]e thought we were hiring highly experienced airlift pilots, and it turned out the one with the most flying time was a helicopter pilot, and the other one did not have the experience that we required, and they just . . . were asked to leave."

In June, North authorizes that the missions inside Nicaragua be operated by U.S. crews. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 23-30.)

86/05/19-180
MAY 19, 1986

NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES: REGAN'S UNAWARENESS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"[Q.] Mark as the next exhibit [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 21] another PROF note from you. I think it is dated May 19, 1986.

". . . .

"[A.] This is in response to that earlier exhibit you showed me. [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 18; see 86/05/16-440.]

"Q. The one . . . about 'I don't know what Don Regan knows about my activities, but the

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		President knows why he's thanking everyone'? "A. Right. "Q. You responded by saying, [']Don Regan knows very little of your operation and that is just as well.['] "A. Right. "Q. Can you tell me what operation you were referring to and why it was just as well that Don Regan didn't know about it? "A. Well -- "Q. This is still in executive session. "A. Well, the operation we are talking about is support of the contras. What I said was accurate. I don't recall talking to Don Regan directly about it. I am pretty sure that he, as well as most everybody else in the White House, knew that Colonel North was the NSC staff officer with primary responsibility for Central America and that he was involved in some way in supporting the democratic resistance. "But again, based on my feeling that if we were going to keep this up and avoid more restrictive legislation, that we simply had to limit the knowledge of the details to those that had absolutely the need to know. I simply didn't think that he had an absolute need to know. "Q. He was the Chief of Staff. Was there more to it? "A. Well -- "MR. BECKLER: Lay it all out. "THE WITNESS: He talked to the press too much. I was afraid he'd make a slip." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 206-08;	

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		Poindexter Dep. Ex. 21 [= Ex. DTR 30; Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran and Terrorism," 5/19/86].)	
86/05/19-185 MAY 19, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SECRECY, AND REGAN'S UNAWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, would you look at Exhibit [JMP] 47 on the same subject of secrecy. That's a memorandum from you, and it says, and I'm going to read the last line, 'Don Regan knows very little of your operation, and that is just as well,' referring to North. "What was the reason that it was just as well that Don Regan, the Chief of Staff, know as little of North's operation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, as you know, Mr. Liman, I have testified on this point before, and if you insist, I will cover it again. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it because of your concern that when people have jobs where they have to deal with the press, they may unwittingly say something? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. And the-- "Mr. LIMAN. I'm phrasing it as diplomatically as I can. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I appreciate that, Mr. Liman. "The point here is that there's a difference between, and I may be drawing too fine a line, but in my opinion there are secrets and there are secrets. Clearly, items that have great importance in terms of our national security,	

sources and methods in foreign countries, for example, there isn't as much tendency to leak that kind of information, either wittingly or unwittingly, because you automatically recognize that is something that ought to remain very secret, whereas the contra support activity is something that doesn't really fall in that same category. It, by and large, is a politically controversial issue, and I was concerned that people would be less careful with that kind of information. And the one way I had of keeping things secret was not to tell people.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you see, Admiral, that in the desire to preserve secrecy, you could so compartmentalize things that you wouldn't get different points of view and dissenting points of view?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, as I've said before, the policy issue here was very clear and not necessarily all of the people involved recommended the kind of policy that the President stated.

"He got dissenting views there sometimes. But the policy with regard to support of the contras was well understood. That was not a neutral policy. The question of how you implement it within the various constraints that existed was an issue that was something that I had to worry about.

"Mr. LIMAN. But can you reach the point where your concern with secrecy becomes so great and your aversion to the potential for leaks so acute that even the President of the United States doesn't get briefed? Can it go that far?

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		"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't think so. ". . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 197-99; JHICI Ex. JMP 47 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran and Terrorism," 5/19/86].)	
86/05/19-400 MAY 19, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NOTICE TO THE CABINET NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Do you recall that you suggested, before the Teheran mission, to Admiral Poindexter that there be a meeting with Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger and that he rejected that? [See 86/05/17-050.] "Mr. NORTH. I recall suggesting those kinds of things on occasion. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall your suggestions being rejected? "Mr. NORTH. On occasion. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that they were cut out? "Mr. NORTH. I don't know. It was not my responsibility to walk up to Secretaries of State, of Defense, and apprise them of things. It was my responsibility to carry out the lawful orders of my superiors and, as I have indicated for the last three and a half days, I tried to do so, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 135; JHICI Ex. OLN 193 [Poindexter PROF dated 5/19/86, "Subject: Iran and Terrorism"].)
86/05/19-405 MAY 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NOTICE TO THE CABINET WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. In late May of 1986, Mr.

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			McFarlane, with others, made a trip to Tehran. In advance of the trip, did you know that he was going? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I did not. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Were you advised after the trip that he had gone? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I still started picking up a considerable amount of my information about this from sources other than the United States. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall when you first learned from a United States official that he had gone? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I think probably sometime after he returned. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Were you briefed on his trip? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, not specifically. We would from time to time during this period get requests from the NSC to have evacuation teams ready, debriefing teams, medical teams on the theory that some hostages were about to come out, and we would arrange to have this ready, but for the most part this never happened. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Were you aware that Mr. McFarlane had taken Hawk missile spare parts with him on the plane? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I didn't have any knowledge of that until later when the various aspects of this started to come out." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 123-24.)
86/05/19-407 FROM MAY 19,			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NOTICE TO THE CABINET WEINBERGER ACCOUNT:

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1986			"Mr. SARBANES. Are you familiar with the PROF notes between North and Poindexter that appear in the Tower Report? When North suggested to Poindexter before departing for Tehran with McFarlane that he and Poindexter have a quiet meeting with the President and McFarlane without papers and that Poindexter might want to include the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, Poindexter responded negatively, 'I don't want a meeting with Ronald Reagan, Shultz and Weinberger.' "Secretary WEINBERGER. I became aware of it when I read it in that report. "Mr. SARBANES. What is your perception of what was occurring? You are the Secretary of Defense, a statutory member of the National Security Council. You are charged with major responsibility and, in fact, in the command and control function in the case of conflict, have a very unique and special responsibility that has been entrusted to you and yet here we are with you obtaining information about what your own Government is doing from foreign sources. "The National Security Adviser in effect is saying no, we don't want the Secretaries of State and Defense to consult with the President. What is your perception of what was taking place in our Government? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, what was taking place, I believe, is what I described earlier and which I strongly disapprove of, that people with their own agenda who thought that this opening was a good thing, who knew that I opposed

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			it and that George Shultz opposed it, did not want the President to hear these arguments after the decision had been made or perhaps indeed even to the extent that they were made before, I don't know. "But I think that that was basically the problem, and I think that people with their own agenda as I have said in the Security Council were doing everything I [sic] can and maybe the motives were good, I don't know, but were doing everything they could to put this agenda into effect and one of the ways they were doing that was to keep away from the President views that they suspected, correctly most of the time, differ with theirs. "I think it was a bad procedure. I think it has been completely corrected now because we have totally different kinds of people who have a totally different approach. "I am not trying to lay blame, I am trying candidly to express to you how I think the situation came about. "Mr. SARBANES. Leaving aside whether the intentions were well meaning or not, is it not in your view that it is an excusable [sic], deplorable way to conduct the policy-making process of the Government? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 221-23; JHICI Exx. CWW 24 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran and Terrorism," 5/19/86], CWW 25 [Poindexter response PROF to North, 5/19/86].)
86/05/19-900		THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
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LONG-FORM VERSION

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MAY 19, 1986		SUMMARY: Ellen Garwood makes another wire transfer to NEPL. (See 86/04/01-400; 86/04/11-150; 86/04/15-150.)	
86/05/20-000 MAY 20, 1986	THE BUTTON ACCOUNT HAKIM TESTIMONY: "Mr. NIELDS. Now the last account is the Button account, it has $200,000 in it, and your records reflect that that was put into the Button account May 20, 1986. Is Button short for something? "Mr. HAKIM. In this case, no. The name, Button, actually came as a result of a joke between Mr. Zucker and myself at a time that we were having a discussion. Actually, the complete name is Bellybutton, and this was a name that I decided to use at the time because we laughed about the joke, and I simply took the name and used it for this set-aside. "Mr. NIELDS. Does it refer to a person? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, it does. "Mr. NIELDS. Who? "Mr. HAKIM. Lieutenant Colonel North. "Mr. NIELDS. Can you explain the circumstances surrounding the setting up of an account for Lieutenant Colonel North? "Mr. HAKIM. I must start by saying that when I established this account, Lieutenant Colonel North had absolutely no idea about this. This occurred during the time that the so-called McFarlane Tehran trip was about to take place. "Mr. NIELDS. That took place approximately	RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez meets briefly with Vice President Bush during a Cuban Independence Day celebration in Miami. "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. . . . I was in a room with about 40 different people, and he came in and shook hands with us, and I asked him if he would take a picture with my friend's wife and with him, which he did gladly and introduced us to his son, Jeff, and that was about the extent of it. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you say anything at this meeting with the Vice President about what you were doing? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. In connection with the resupply effort? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Not at all. "Mr. BARBADORO. Have you ever had any other meetings with the Vice President? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. That is all the meetings we ever had. If you can consider this a meeting. It was very, very short." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 161-62. See id., 5/27/87, at 256-61 [Previous meeting with Bush on 5/1/86. Rodriguez: "I want to make clear that at no point is any of this conversation did I ever mention doing anything that was remotely	

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	the 24th, 25th of May, 1986, and this account was set up on May 20th? "Mr. HAKIM. I am talking about the time when the concept and idea came to my mind. We knew that such a trip was going to take place, and by this time I had become extremely fond of Lieutenant Colonel North. To me, he is an amazing person. I know it is something in this man that--he has got two loves. One is his country, and to a point that he is, in my mind, the biggest satisfaction that can be given to him is if he would enter into an environment that he could get killed for his country. I sensed that so many times. "The other love that he has is his family, and he especially during the time of the second channel, I witnessed him being torn apart between these two loves. "But coming back to how this thing came about, I came up with the idea that Ollie had to be assured, and it started out with putting this money aside as a death benefit for him, and I had also learned through scattered discussions--it was not that there was one dicussion that this issue was analyzed--I had heard through various remarks that Ollie was not spending time at home, and he was not attending to his family, to his kids' education and so forth, and I had become emotionally very attached to Ollie, still am, and I really love this man. "I talked to Richard, General Secord, I said that I thought it would be wise to set aside $500,000 . . . as a death benefit for Ollie. I recall that Richard was opposed to this figure.	connected to Nicaragua and the contras."].) See id., 5/27/87, at 272-74 [after meeting with North on 6/25/87, Rodriguez goes to Bush's office to pick up this photo].)	

". . . .

". . . As a matter of fact, he made a remark that the point of reference that I use is my own lifestyle and I have no understanding of what a soldier's life is, and that there are benefits that the government provides, and I came up with the figure of $200,000. General Secord made no opposition to this. He did not disagree, and yet he did not come right out and say that, fine, go ahead and do it. And I did not pursue this.

"That is how this was developed and the reason I came up with this figure in addition to the fact that General Secord had been opposed to my original idea, I figured that the interest on $200,000 could cover a good part of a child's university education."
(Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 265-67. See id., 6/3/87, at 299-307; id, 6/4/87, at 95-102. See also id., 6/5/87, at 135 [". . .I am a human being . . . . By eliminating that important fact and also undercutting my understanding that in Rome, I do as the Romans do, you are leaving a bad taint on me. I understand how business is conducted in the United States. I understand the ethics here. . . . But definitely, definitely, I assure you that in no way I wanted to compromise Ollie."].)

86/05/20-050
FEBRUARY -
MAY 1986

THE BUTTON ACCOUNT: LOVE AT FIRST SIGHT
HAKIM TESTIMONY:

Hakim testifying on why he set up the Button account for North:

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, as I understand your

testimony, you said that you set this account up because--and I quote from yesterday--'because you become emotionally very attached to Ollie,' and you still are, 'and I really love this man.'

"Do you remember that?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes. I really would like to elaborate on that, if I can.

"Mr. LIMAN. I will let you, but I would like you to answer some questions first.

"Mr. HAKIM. The answer is yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. The account was set up in May; is that not so?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that you met Colonel North for the first time in the end of February?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes. I also testified that I got to learn about him through General Secord prior to that time.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that the first time you met him was the end of February?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that you had very little personal contact with him between the time that you met him in Frankfurt in the end of February and the time you set up this account?

"Mr. HAKIM. You are correct, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. So, would it be a fair description, to use your term of 'love,' that this was love at first sight?

"Mr. HAKIM. You are correct on that, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And now you can give your explanation.

"Mr. HAKIM. Through the description of

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	General Secord, I learned about a man that I was very anxious to meet, and the fact that it took until late February to meet him, it was a disappointment to me. "And when I met him I discovered that the description of General Secord of Colonel North was accurate. I came to learn about the man even during this February meeting in Frankfurt--that he works around the clock, he doesn't care about when he eats or he does eat or doesn't. "I saw a man dissipating so much love for his country and his associates that the radiation of that love--it really immediately penetrated through my system. I saw so much sincerity, so--I was acclimated, Mr. Liman, for this encounter. So, when I saw what I saw, it fell quite in line with what I heard. "Mr. LIMAN. Mr. Hakim, do you normally set up accounts for workaholics? "Mr. HAKIM. I set up accounts for anyone that falls within my financial and commerical network, and if it's necessary to set up such accounts." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 97-99.)		
86/05/20-110 MAY 20, 1986	THE BUTTON ACCOUNT: NORTH FAMILY FINANCIAL SECURITY HAKIM TESTIMONY: Hakim testifying on North's lack of knowledge of the Button account: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell Colonel North that you had set the money aside? "Mr. HAKIM. I cannot recall having told		

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	Colonel North that I have set money aside for his family's benefit, but I do recall my reaction to the times that we were discussing his family problem, basically for not being able to attend to his family, and also his concern about the education of his kids and his concern what would happen if he should get killed and so on. "The way I remarked to him was, 'Ollie, you are part of the family for as long as one of us is alive, you need not worry about your family.' That is what I remember having told him. I do not recall sitting him down and saying that I have set aside $200,000 for your family's benefit." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 268.)		
86/05/20-180 PRIOR TO MAY 24, 1986	NORTH FAMILY FINANCIAL SECURITY NORTH ACCOUNT: During their meetings to plan for the Tehran trip, North testified that Hakim told him, "If you don't come back, I will do something for your family." North emphasized, "He did not say 'we' that I recall; he said 'I.'" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 117.)		
86/05/20-190 AFTER MAY 20, 1986 [?]	THE BUTTON ACCOUNT: NORTH'S UNAWARENESS NORTH TESTIMONY: "Mr. NIELDS. Colonel North, did you have any personal interest in any of the monies that flowed from the arms sales to Iran or that were kept in Swiss accounts under General Secord's control? "Mr. NORTH. Not one penny. "Mr. NIELDS. There has been testimony, as I am sure you are aware, that a death benefit		

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	account was set up by Mr. Hakim with the name Button, for the benefit of your family in the event of your death. "We were aware of any such account? [Sic.] "Mr. NORTH. No. I was totally unaware of it. The first I heard of it was through these hearings. I had never heard of it before, and it was a shock, an absolute shock." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 85-86. See id., 7/8/87, at 120 [North: "The only thing that it can be said that I ever received as a consequence of what I did in the course of these activities or as a result of perhaps one of those accounts is the security system which is at my home, and I still, to this day, don't know exactly who paid for it."].)		
86/05/20-750 SOMETIME AFTER FEBRUARY 1986	ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL SECURITY NORTH ACCOUNT: North related a conversation with Secord in which they discussed the financial security of the enterprise: "I did at one point express concern after I would guess February, March, April, somewhere after I met Mr. Hakim . . . express concern to General Secord, 'Suppose both of you guys go down on the same airplane flight back and forth to Europe; what happens then?' "I was told, 'Don't worry, arrangements will be made so these operations can continue', but nobody ever told me that a single penny was set aside for my purposes, for my benefit whatsoever, ever, and I never heard of Buttons or Belly		

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	Buttons until this hearing began." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 86-87.)		
86/05/20-900 MAY 20, 1986		RODRIGUEZ-BUSH CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, notes a meeting between the Vice President and Felix Rodriguez: "On May 20, 1986, the Vice President spoke briefly with Mr. Rodriguez and El Salvador Air Force Commander Bustillo at a large reception in Miami, Florida on Cuban Independence Day." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see 86/05/01-250; chronology continues at 86/08/08-250].)	
86/05/21-100 AFTER MAY 20, 1986	BETSY NORTH'S PHILADELPHIA TRIP HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testifying on Zucker's meeting with Betsy North in Philadelphia: "Mr. NIELDS. You have also said some things about his children's education. Did you ever take any steps to get some part of this money or any other money into his possession for his children's education? "Mr. HAKIM. The answer is yes. I consulted Mr. Zucker and he--I gave him an Iranian proverb. I told him that I want to do this, but the proverb is that if you want to fix the eyebrow, we don't want to blind the eye, meaning that I want to find a proper way of getting this money to his kid without compromising Ollie's position or his		

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	family, and consequently, we came to the conclusion that Mr. Zucker, during his forthcoming trip to the U.S.[, was] to contact Mrs. North, without mentioning my name, to tell her that there is a certain person who admires her husband and wishes to help out with the university and the education expenses of the children. "And I provided him with the telephone number, home telephone number of Mrs. North, and I was told later that Mr. Zucker did call Mrs. North and as a result of that, a meeting took place, I believe in Mr. Zucker's attorney's offices in Philadelphia. "Mr. NIELDS. Did Mr. Zucker tell you anything about what happened during the meeting? "Mr. HAKIM. What I can recall the purpose of his meeting was, was to learn more about the family structure of Mr. and Mrs. North, to see who is who, what the family structure is, who are the relatives. "I have never met Mrs. North or any of the children, and I do not have any personal knowledge to this date about Colonel North's family structure. Bill Zucker basically wanted to learn about the family, and when I asked him, he said that he has an idea about the family structure, and I believe what he had in mind was to see if he could find a proper way of getting the money in some sort of fashion, which was never determined, through the relatives to North's family, and the bottom line of that investigation was that he could not find a proper way to do that. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you and Mr. Zucker ever talk		

about another way to do that?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes. I was persistent and I had additional discussion with Mr. Zucker. The idea that we came up with was maybe we could arrange for a part-time job for Mrs. North, and since we did not know what the qualifications of Mrs. North were, we decided that maybe if Mr. Zucker could find someone that could offer that position to her, and even if she did not qualify, we could make use of the button set aside to cover her salary, and Mr. Zucker told me that he knew of a land real estate developer that he was going to contact and see if he could find a way, approaching the problem that way.

"And that was the last time that we discussed about this issue, and to the best of my knowledge, no money was sent to North's family and no solution, no proper solution was found.
(Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 268-71.)

86/05/21-120
AFTER MAY 20,
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BETSY NORTH'S PHILADELPHIA TRIP
HAKIM ACCOUNT (cont'd):

Hakim adjusting his answer on whether North would have known about the Betsy North/Zucker meeting in Philadelphia:

"Mr. LIMAN. The point that I obviously am pressing you on, Mr. Hakim, is that this story that Colonel North was not going to know who was offering to provide money to the family is pretty preposterous, isn't it?

"Mr. HAKIM. Well, I wouldn't go that far, Mr. Liman.

". . . .

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	"Mr. LIMAN. Look on line 7, page 70 [of Hakim deposition transcript, 5/31/87]. 'Is there any doubt in your mind that if Zucker contacted Mrs. North, that Oliver North would know who was sending Zucker?['] "'Answer. I would have found it, maybe it would have taken time, but eventually I would have found it impossible for him not to know.' "It goes on. "Mr. HAKIM. That is my testimony. "Mr. LIMAN. That still is your testimony? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 109, 113.)		
86/05/22-100 MAY 22, 1986			HOSTAGE RECOVERY PLAN: WHO KNEW CLARRIDGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Eggleston. If you could look at Exhibit [DRC] 16 -- the second paragraph, it is a memorandum from North to Poindexter, dated May 22, 1986. It indicates 'The following people will have copies of this time table, Clair[] George, Dewey Clarridge and Bob Earl.' It seems to indicate that you were one of three people who will have copies of a time table, again with regard to flights that were going to take place in late May of 1986. Did you have this time table? "Mr. Clarridge. This is the first time I have seen this. "Mr. Eggleston. You certainly didn't have it in May, 1986? "Mr. Clarridge. No. Was this ever sent anywhere by the NSC -- I see, it was just going to

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			Poindexter. "Mr. Eggleston. The memorandum was just going to Poindexter, but it indicates -- "Mr. Clarridge. That this attachment -- okay, yes. The operational plan I guess was sent there -- do you know whether it was ever sent to anybody? "Mr. Eggleston. Well, I guess the more relevant question is, did you ever get an operational plan, this one or any other one,in May of 1986? "Mr. Clarridge. Not to my recollection. "Mr. Eggleston. So to the extent that this indicates that you were continually to be involved in the planning of this operation, that is not accurate? "Mr. Clarridge. That was not true. The only time I came near being involved was when [redacted] Chief of the Near East Division, went on a trip somewhere, and he asked me to over[]see his efforts in getting the logistics of this whole thing put together." (Clarridge Testim., JHICI, 8/4/87, at 58-59; JHICI Ex. DRC 16 [North memo to Poindexter, "Hostage Recovery Plan," 5/22/86].)
86/05/22-200 MAY 22-23, 1986 [?]		ABRAMS-MELTON-SINGLAUB MEETING MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 1: Following his testimony on his memo to Abrams on his May 15, 1986 telephone conversation with Singlaub (see above at 86/05/15-103), Melton testified on his May 22, 1986 memo to Abrams: "Q. . . . That [memo] sets forth some talking	

points or [is] a memo to Assistant Secretary Abrams to prepare him for a meeting with General Singlaub at 3:45 p.m. on May 23. Now, do you recall that such a meeting took place?

"A. As I recall it did. I would have to check the calendars.

"Q. Let me just tell you that --

"A. I believe it did.

"Q. Let me just tell you that Assistant Secretary Abrams' calendar shows for May 23 at that time a meeting with General Singlaub. Mr. Abrams does not have any specific recollection of that meeting. So he can't say one way or the other whether it did or didn't take place. But he doesn't deny that the meeting took place. He just has no specific recollection.

"So knowing that the calendar, his calendar shows such a meeting and that your memo sets forth preparation for the meeting, my question is, can you tell us you have a specific recollection of your own that such a meeting took place on or about that time? Let me ask it this way.

"A. I can't.

"Q. Wait. Let me ask it this way: You recall that at least some point during this process Assistant Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub were face to face after that April '86 meeting; is that correct?

"A. I just assumed that this was when it was. I believe that is true. But I don't have any calendars here for my own schedule, so I really, I would have to look at my calendars. Did anyone ask Assistant Secretary Abrams' secretary whether the meeting took place? There is a log in the State Department that he would sign in if he came in that day.

"Q. We don't -- I don't have that information. But let me just put it this way: Separate and apart from any of your memos and any of your calendars, you can recall that you were present for a meeting with -- between General Singlaub and Secretary Abrams on two occasions, one shortly after the Pastora agreement matter, and one sometime during this process involving solicitation from foreign countries. Is that a fair statement?

"A. Yes.

"Q. All right. Given the fact that your memo indicates a meeting on May 23 concerning that matter and that Secretary Abrams' calendar shows a meeting on that particular date, I think we can safely assume that it was at or about that time that you had a meeting.

"I don't want to tie you down to that particular date engraved in stone, but I want to get your memory of the meeting that took place at about that time between Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub. Go ahead.

"A. I think that is true, but I am looking over the points now and I don't recall -- I don't recall these points being made specifically by Assistant Secretary Abrams to General Singlaub. So I am just not sure whether --

"Q. All right. I will tell you what. Put the memo aside for a minute and just tell us everything you can about the second time that

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		Abrams and Singlaub met. "A. I have no specific recollection really. In my own mind some of these things are blended together, there were a series of meetings that took place with -- well, meetings, conversations, and I am not -- I am really not very clear that such a meeting -- "Q. All right. Well, I want you to understand -- "A. I am thinking. "Q. I want you to understand, Mr. Melton, that obviously we want your best recollection. We don't want you to speculate. We don't want you to guess, but on the other hand, you don't have to be 100 percent certain of something in order to testify that it is your best recollection that something took place. So with that in mind, let me just ask you again what you can recall, if anything, about the second time in which Assistant Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub met face to face to discuss matters. What independent recollection do you have? "A. I am afraid I don't have any. "Q. All right. "A. I really don't recall." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 43-46; JHICI Ex. EA 7 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Your Meeting with General Singlaub; 3:45 p.m., May 23," 5/22/86; Committee Documents S 4029-30].)	
86/05/22-201 MAY 22-23, 1986 [?]		ABRAMS-MELTON-SINGLAUB MEETING MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:]	

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		"Q. Let's look at the memo you wrote. "From all indications, looking at your copy of this, this is a memo that you wrote on or about May 22nd; is that correct? "A. Yes. "Q. We don't have any reason to assume that somebody made up this memo and put your name on it? "A. No, no, I wrote the memo. "Q. Okay. "Under the category of 'fund raising for the resistance,' do you see that toward the bottom of the first page? "A. The memo number 6? "Q. May 22nd, yes. Do you see that? "A. Where is the -- oh, yes, I see that. "Q. 'Fund raising for the resistance.' "A. Yes. "Q. It states, 'Singlaub is a good soldier and at our request stood down on his planned approaches to the foreign countries.' That is what it states; is that correct? "A. That is right. "Q. Now, that was in fact true, wasn't it, that he had in fact stood down on his planned approaches at your request; isn't that correct? "A. It is not specific. It is not precisely -- it is not precise. He never was authorized to do these things. He had asked us to, in effect to provide some indication to those governments that he was, that he at least was doing, was known and approved of by the U.S. Government, and he never got that. So that is what it really means.	

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		"He wanted to make these solicitations, I think, and the way he expressed it, that they would not prosper, I don't think he thought they would prosper unless he -- there was some indication that there was a sponsorship or that at least we knew about it. And he never got that. So that is what actually happened. "Q. I understand. I am just, I don't want you to read too much into my question. I am just simply saying that he certainly planned to make some approaches and he had to stand down from his approaches at your request; isn't that correct? "A. As I recall it, he was going to these two countries and he wanted to make solicitations while he was there; as I recall it, he was going there for other business. But while he was there, he wanted to make these solicitations. And he, because he was, he didn't get what he wanted from us, I don't believe he made those solicitations. "Q. All right. "Going on to the next page of your memo, you list three points to make with General Singlaub. Do you recall setting forth those three points in your memo? "A. Yes. "Q. All right. The first point simply says, 'I appreciate your willingness to cancel your planned approaches on such sketchy information.' What did you mean by 'sketchy information'? "A. It was the telephone information that I had given him that was laid out in the previous memos. "Q. You go on to say 'important national	

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		security considerations were involved (explained).' Would you please explain for us? "A. There is no explanation. That is just a heading that I didn't have anything more about this than I had already conveyed to General Singlaub. If there was anything else to be conveyed, it would have to be conveyed by Elliott Abrams. This is basically a heading to explain this; he will have to say what it is, if anything, that goes under that heading. If I had more details, had something specifically in mind, I would have put it there. But I didn't have anything specifically in mind." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 46-49; JHICI Ex. EA 7 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Your Meeting with General Singlaub; 3:45 p.m., May 23," 5/22/86; Committee Documents S 4029-30].)	
86/05/22-202 MAY 22, 1986		ABRAMS-MELTON-SINGLAUB MEETING MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did you believe that, I am just asking you for your own belief and perception now, did you believe that Assistant Secretary Abrams had made this up about national security considerations as an excuse to put off an important man like General Singlaub? "A. Well, I think that, and this is now based on what I know now about solicitations that were made, and knowing now that this was approximately the time when these things were being considered, I would take it that that, that that is what the considerations were that were on the table at this	

time. But at the time I didn't know that.

"Q. Okay. Do you recall in the meeting in which you were present when Assistant Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub were talking, do you recall any part of the discussion between the two of them concerning these national security considerations?

"A. No.

"Q. Let me ask you this: Are you telling us that you were not present when such discussions took place or that you just don't recall one way or the other whether such discussions took place or thirdly --

"A. I really don't have any recollection of that at all, that the -- I think that the -- subsequently I learned that the factor -- in this case, if solicitations were going to be made, they would be made by the U.S. Government, and not on behalf of the U.S. Government. I think that is what the decision that was subsequently reached was.

"Q. When did you learn that?

"A. Very recently. Some of it on the hearings.

"Q. Oh, you mean this isn't something you learned back then?

"A. No. No.

"Q. Oh, okay. Going back to what you knew then and not when we all know now, are you telling us that it is your best recollection that such discussions were not held in your presence, or simply that you don't recall one way or the other?

"A. I really don't recall. I don't recall really.

"Q. All right. You state in there your final point under that category is, 'private fund raising is a key element of our strategy (explained).' Would you please explain that for us?

"A. I had in mind basically that the President and on down, that it was, we had stated we would need their support for the resistance and they -- they were receiving funds and we were aware that they were receiving funds from private donors. And the President on down, that was, we had hopefully stated that was support for the resistance. It was in that context. Nothing specific about any specific fund raising.

"Q. You talk of it in terms of a key element of our strategy as though it were a part of an overall approach.

"A. I was trying to, when I wrote this, I was trying to outline sort of the topics that would likely come up, and the things that Assistant Secretary Abrams would need to respond to without providing a detailed script for him to use in such a meeting, so that the points are really in the nature of headings rather than in the nature of specific talking points for him to use.

"Q. All right. I don't mean to imply by asking this question that there is some implication that there is anything wrong with any of this, but isn't it true that private, that his effort[] at private fund raising to generate cash for use by the Contras was in fact something that was known to be taking place and that was, it was

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		felt, . . . consistent with your Central American policy? "A. A general point, not a specific point. "Q. I don't understand what you mean by that, a general point. Not a specific point. "A. Contra fund raising? "Q. Yes. "A. Fund raising, I think most people were aware that there was, that the resistance was receiving private funds. And the U.S. Government did not take a position against that. "Q. Well, in addition to not taking a position against it, was it in fact a key element of the Central American strategy? "A. That is an overstatement in the sense that there was a strategy in which the private fund raising had a place which we had decided where that place was and that sort of thing. That is not an accurate statement. "Q. Well, let me understand this though, if it is not an accurate statement, why did you put it forth here as a point for Secretary Abrams to make to General Singlaub? "A. It is a heading that private fund raising, what I had indicated there was that a point to be made in the meeting was something that would say that we think this is, private fund raising is fine, so long as it is within the legal requirements of the United States." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 49-53; JHICI Ex. EA 7 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Your Meeting with General Singlaub,; 3:45 p.m., May 23," 5/22/86; Committee Documents S 4029-30].)	

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86/05/23-105 PRIOR TO MAY 24, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NO ADVANCE PARTY TO MAKE THE PREPARATIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Did the Iranians, to your knowledge, ever agree that all of the hostages would be released prior to or on Mr. McFarlane's arrival in Tehran? "Mr. NORTH. It turns out that the Iranians did not. Manucher Ghorbanifar told us that they had agreed to that. And what had happened was we had gone too far down the line with Ghorbanifar. What was his--his process, if you will, was to tell the Iranians one thing and tell us another. Then let the two sides sit down and duke it out. "Well, as I said, we knew Ghorbanifar for what he was. We did not know of the letters that he had sent to Tehran committing us to certain things until after we got there. "When we exchanged letters face to face with the Iranians in Tehran, it was very obvious that he had lied to both sides and we knew that he did this, but we didn't know that the lie was quite so blatant. "We had expectations from him, communicated to us directly and through the Israelis, that that would be the outcome if things went well in Tehran. "We did not know all of the expectations of the Iranians as to what it would take to make things go well. And thus, when we got there, both sides were surprised at the intransigence of the other side's opinions. And that is why I had

advocated [--] despite the risks, despite the deep concern of Director Casey, that information about a very covert program would be revealed if I went on the trip and were tortured, despite all of that [--] I was a proponent of the advance party trip because I knew Ghorbanifar to be what he was.

"I knew he was a duplicitous sneak, and I thought that we could do better by General Secord and I [sic] going to Tehran.

"It was that trip, the advance trip, that resulted in Director Casey saying, 'I am not going to allow you to go because of a project you were involved in unless you are prepared to deny that information under torture.'

"And he was very concerned about that. Now I think it was an error on our part not to have the advance trip. I am not saying that the May trip would have necessarily gone better. I am not blaming anybody for the fact we didn't bring any hostages out or ended up with a strategic treaty with Iran.

"What I am saying is I think it was an error not to have gone on that trip. I think that opinion is shared by some of the experts on Iran who participated to include Mr. Cave.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. So is it your testimony that Mr. McFarlane's understanding as to the conditions under which the hostages were to be released was based on assurances that you had received from Ghorbanifar?

"Mr. NORTH. And the Israelis. And I think they got theirs from him. I am not blaming them. I am just saying that is how we got them, yes."

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			(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 110-12.)
86/05/23-110 PRIOR TO MAY 24, 1986			CASEY, NORTH, AND SUICIDE PILLS GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Chairman Hamilton. Mr. George, in his testimony before the committee, Lt. Colonel North indicated that in preparation for his trip to Tehran, the Director had given him some suicide pills to use in the event he was taken hostage or tortured. [See 86/05/23-105.] Do you know anything about that? "Mr. George. That's absolutely impossible. "Chairman Hamilton. It's impossible? Why do you say it's impossible? "Mr. George. [Redacted.] The rules, regulations, controls, signing procedures for such an activity are absolutely iron clad. It's like the controls on nuclear weapons. And William Casey would not have -- I mean, he may have given him a bottle of sleeping pills, but when you talk about a lethal pill to me, we are talking about something that is cyanide that will kill you on the spot. And I tell you, William Casey would not suggest or give Oliver North suicide pills. "Chairman Hamilton. Would he have had the authority to do so? "Mr. George. Casey? "Chairman Hamilton. Yes. "Mr. George. To give North suicide pills? "Chairman Hamilton. Could he have done that under the rules and regulations of the Agency? "Mr. George. I would think not." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 197-98.)

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86/05/23-115 PRIOR TO MAY 24, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NO ADVANCE PARTY TO MAKE THE PREPARATIONS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: . . . [W]hen we were off the record . . ., I had asked you about why there wasn't this pre-summit meeting before the Tehran meeting. Why don't you tell us on the record what you told me off the record? "THE WITNESS: Well, remember, I was concerned from a couple of -- well, several aspects. One was that I wanted for such a sensitive meeting that had long-range strategic implications for the United States, I wanted a more experienced person there than Colonel North. I was also a little bit concerned that we didn't want to wind up with another hostage situation that we had created. We were dealing with people that we didn't know very much about. We weren't certain what their motives were. We were trying very hard to find that out. That is, of course, why we wanted to move beyond Ghorbanifar and [redacted] neither one we thought were very good and reliable channels [sic] into the real political thinking in Iran. "So I felt that, you know, sending a pre-advance or advance team before Mr. McFarlane went, we stood the risk of getting -- their being held hostage themselves. I felt a higher level visitor, it would be much more difficult for the Israelis or the Iranians to pull something like that; and, you know, viewed at my level, the meeting that Mr. McFarlane had out there was a preliminary meeting. If eventually, if we had, if

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			it had not been exposed and if we had been more successful -- by the way, I think when it did end, we were making progress. The Iranian government was saying things that they had not said before; and, so, by and large I viewed Mr. McFarlane's trip out there as the preliminary trip. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Was it a test that if you didn't get the hostages back, that was the end? "A. Yes. "Q. Those were your instructions? "A. Those were my instructions. "Q. The President's instructions as well? "A. That's right." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 224-25.)
86/05/23-800 SOMETIME IN MAY 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: DUTTON INVOLVEMENT DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton assists in a project directed by North and Secord to fly spare parts and munitions from Israel to Iran. "Mr. BALLEN. And what, if anything, did Colonel North tell you was his authority for this operation as he had told you for the Central American operation? "Mr. DUTTON. My indication was that he was working for the President again. "Mr. BALLEN. What did . . . Colonel North say to you specifically? "Mr. DUTTON. I don't recall him ever saying that the President was in charge or was running it. It was a matter of indication, the fact that we were using so many agencies of the U.S.

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			Government in this particular effort, I guess it was a supposition on my part." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 99-100.)
86/05/23-900 APRIL - MAY 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: EARL'S ROLE AS BACKUP AT THE NSC EARL ACCOUNT: Robert Earl, on the NSC staff since mid-February 1986 as part of the counterterrorism office, learns about the Iran Initiative from North prior to the Tehran trip: " . . . April or May. Sometime before the trip. Colonel North, since he knew he was going to Tehran with Mr. McFarlane and others and would be gone for a period of time, needed some backup for working the problem back at the NSC, that he would be gone. So there was now a need to brief someone else into that compartment, and so he briefed me into it and asked that I take care of certain things on it, such as the communications. "We had secure communications with the McFarlane party, and [were] able to set those up and brief Admiral Poindexter so he could brief the President on the status of negotiations as they occurred, and I helped with various things on the project, development of the operation and order to cover it [sic], contingency, press guidance, various things to help." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 7-8, 13-14, 23.)
86/05/23-920 MAY THROUGH FALL 1986		DIVERSION FROM THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS EARL ACCOUNT, Part 1: See col. 3.	THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: PRICING AND DIVERSION EARL ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. When you were briefed in May by Colonel

North, did he talk to you at all about the pricing of the weapons that were involved in this program?

"A. I am having trouble differentiating the April-May timeframe, which was my first dealing . . . from a later evolution where I was more substantially involved, and differentiating what I knew about pricing this first time as opposed to what I learned later.

"Q. Why don't you tell us what you learned about the pricing and put a time on it, to the best of your ability. . . .

"A. There was a multi-page listing of spare parts which w[as] the list of Hawk spare parts that the Iranian Government wanted, and this was long paper with several columns of information, a dozen or so parts per page down the left side and would have the name of the part, the NSNOFSN, Federal stock number, the quantity of the parts desired, and the cost.

"Q. The cost to the CIA?

"A. That's where I am getting confused with the later timeframe. I know that at least in the second phase that I knew there were two columns, and I can't remember now actual or real, real or actual. That was always a point of confusion, which was which. But one was the cost that the DOD was charging CIA, and the other was the higher cost that was ultimately going up a very complex circuitous chain en route toward the Iranians, and I don't even know if it's the one the Iranians got. I doubt it. I think Ghorbanifar added on the top of that, and God knows who else. But I knew there were two columns for prices.

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			"Q. . . . [W]hat was the earliest you can now recall knowing there were two prices? . . . "A. In this timeframe of being briefed into the compartment, April-May, Colonel North also told me, I think at that time, that part of the money was going to help the contras, part of the Ayatollah's money. "Q. Is that how he put it? "A. Well, I can't recall the exact words, whether he said the Iranian Government, the Ayatollah. "Q. Whether he used the money, the Ayatollah, the Iranian Government, he told you part of the money Iran was paying for the weapons was going to the contras? "A. Was going to support the contras. Not necessarily to the contras, but in support of the contra cause would be the best way I could characterize it at this point. "Q. Did he tell you how much was going for that purpose? "A. I don't think so. "Q. Did he tell you what percentage of it was going for . . . that purpose? "A. No." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 31-33.)
86/05/23-921 MAY THROUGH FALL 1986		DIVERSION FROM THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS EARL ACCOUNT, Part 2: See col. 3.	THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: PRICING AND DIVERSION EARL ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did he tell you how [the money] was going to get to the contras or to some place where it would be used for the contras' benefit?

"A. No, not really. I will have to give some inferential things that might be relevant on that. I knew from at least the second time, prior to the Jacobsen release, that the ratio between the two columns, the difference, was a factor of 3.7, because --

"Q. Meaning the cost was --

"A. The higher price was 3.7 times higher.

"Q. -- than the actual cost from DOD?

"A. Actual or real, whichever.

"Q. Right.

"A. And I also knew from calls that I would receive from the CIA . . . that they were expecting the money to show up in their Swiss bank account, and it wouldn't show, and so it was late, and they would call up and reverify the number of their account to be passed on to Colonel North or General Secord to make sure that it didn't get put in the wrong account by the digits being wrong.

" . . . .

"Q. . . . [D]id you have an understanding of who was setting the initial markup?

"Let me tell you what I hear from your testimony, that you saw numbers indicating that the price to the Iranians so far as you knew would be at least roughly 3.7 times higher than the DOD price, right?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Now, it may have been that Ghorbanifar or the Israelis or other merchants were then slapping additional markup on top of that, right?

"A. Correct.

"Q. So, let's leave that additional layer out

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			of it. Did you have any understanding of who had set the 3.7 multiple? "A. No. The way that was derived the second time was in order to show consistency of markup from previous arms transactions, Colonel North and I took an aggregate of a previous transaction, it may have been the May transaction, I am not sure now which one, but in any case, did division to show what the markup in aggregate was and used that factor line by line in the list that we were talking about in the November timeframe, I think, or not November, but in the fall, prior to November. ". . . . "Q. Do you know, though, who was present at the creation of the first differentiation, who had initially decided they would pay at least, say, 3.7 times more? "A. No. "Q. Oliver North told you? "A. No." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 33-37.)
86/05/23-924 SHORTLY BEFORE MAY 24, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: COY'S AWARENESS COY ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. When is the first you learned Mr. North was involved in negotiations sending arms to Iran? "A. Would have been right before McFarlane's trip, two or three days before the McFarlane trip. "Q. So through the time period March, April, and sort of into mid-May of 1986, you were unaware that he was involved? "A. That is correct.

". . . .

"Q. How is it that you first learned that Colonel North was involved with negotiating with Iran concerning the sale of arms? What occurred that alerted you to that fact?

"A. I don't recall the specific instance or the moment in history in which I had this crashing revelation. But as I said, we were working in the same office, and after awhile, it is hard to not overhear things. So North had asked Earl to perform some back-up functions for him, to assist him in getting ready for the trip. I overheard something about that and I asked Earl about it. He was hesitant to say anything because I was not witting of what was going on. So I probably pushed him a little bit on it. Saying -- I am sitting here, this is a little silly, I am going to have to know something about it. So he -- I assume -- went to North. He said this is -- we can't keep this up. It is making it uncomfortable for me because I am sitting on the couch next to Craig, that type of thing. So North told me that he had asked Earl to do some preparations and help him back up -- as a back-up for the trip to Tehran. And that is what was going to happen.

"Q. Do you recall him telling you -- do you recall a specific time where North briefed you or told you about what was happening with regard to the trip to Tehran?

"A. I don't remember a specific sit-down type of briefing type of thing, but I recall asking questions about why we are doing this, how this was all happening. He had said it was authorized

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			by the President and McFarlane was going to go on this trip. I guess that is about it essentially. Some of the details of who was going to go, that type of thing. "Q. Did you understand -- McFarlane ends up leaving around May 25 of 1986, I think, according to the various chronologies. I assume that is a reasonably accurate date. Do you have any recollection of how much prior to May 25 that you were advised by North about the project? "A. I can't recall exactly, but it wasn't much. That is why I say it was two or three days." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 23, 26-27.)
86/05/23-925 SHORTLY BEFORE MAY 24, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: COY'S AWARENESS COY ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did you know at that time that these Hawk spare parts were going to accompany McFarlane? "A. Yes. I knew that some spare parts, some electronic spare parts or missile spare parts. "Q. Were going to accompany the trip? "A. Yes. "Q. . . . Did you know it was with reference to an initiative relating to the hostages? "A. Yes, I knew that. "Q. Did you have any conversation, if you recall, with Colonel North about whether or not this was a good idea? "A. I don't recall a conversation along those lines specifically, no. "Q. You were never asked that you recall for

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			your input about whether this type of initiative was a good policy decision? "A. From my perspective, the decision was made. It was not a -- open for debate. It was something that had already been decided and the President had approved and it was going to happen. So it was not subject to what I thought or what anybody else thought. It was -- this is what was going to happen. "Q. Right. Were you aware that there had been a presidential finding? "A. To tell you the truth, I didn't know what a finding was at the time. That was something that was a new term of art to me, but I was told that the President had approved it and signed some piece of paper. If he used the word 'finding' and he probably did, it would have -- I didn't understand it. I did not see it. "I was told that it was something that the President had signed that authorized it." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 27-29.)
86/05/23-926 MAY 24-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: COY'S AWARENESS COY ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you have any role in McFarlane's trip? Did you provide any support, any back-up? "A. Not directly. Since I was no[]w aware of it, Ollie told me not to tell Poindexter that I was aware of it, because he was concerned with the operational security, and too many people being aware of it. So Ollie said I will tell you about it, but don't tell Poindexter, you know, about it because he doesn't know you know about it. So

Earl was the one designated to be the point of contact. So I would sit with Earl when he got messages and did things like that. I think one of the things we tried to work on was press guidance, what to say if the thing was exposed in some way.

"Q. Do you recall what that press guidance was? What was it that you were prepared to say?

"A. Very difficult.

"Q. In the event it was exposed?

"A. As I recall, there were three scenarios. One was that if it was just -- let's see. I think there were three scenarios. I can't recall exactly.

"One was if Poindexter is captured or taken --

"Q. McFarlane?

". . . .

"A. . . . If McFarlane is taken hostage in some way, the group is taken hostage, two would be if the trip is exposed while he is there.

"Q. By exposed, you mean publicly?

"A. Publicly exposed. The third one I can't remember exactly what it was. There must be --

"Q. I suppose one of them would be all the hostages being released?

"A. Yes. I guess that probably is it. I can't recall.

"Q. Did you know who else was going on the trip besides Mr. McFarlane and Colonel North?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you recall today who else went on the trip?

"A. McFarlane, North[,] Teicher, Cave, and Nir. And two CIA communicators.

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			"Q. Were you involved in communications or any other aspects during the period of time that Colonel North and Mr. McFarlane were in Tehran? "A. I don't think I was personally. I think I was probably there when Earl received something, but I was not personally." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 30-32. See Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 6-7 [Coy on the Tehran trip].)
86/05/23-928 MAY - NOVEMBER 1986			IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: FINANCING COY ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you have any knowledge as of this time . . . about the method by which . . . the sale of spare parts was to be financed? ". . . . "A. I don't think I knew anything about financing at the time of the McFarlane trip. "Q. Did there come a time when you learned about how the McFarlane trip spare parts had been financed, had been sold to Iranians? "A. No. Not -- if you are talking about that transaction? "Q. Right. "A. Specifically, no. I, frankly, never really got a bubble on how all the transactions were being financed. I thought I had some general sense, but I didn't know any of the specifics. "Q. At what time did you have a general sense? "A. Later. Like August, September, October. Later. It was. "Q. Right. What was the sense you had about

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			how this had been financed? "A. It was not anything I was part of, but as I understood it, there was established an account in Switzerland. The CIA was establishing an account in Switzerland that would receive money for the arms and then the money would be taken out by the CIA and given to DOD for the weapons. The money was being put in originally by some middlemen, Ghorbanifar, I guess, and then subsequently it was attempted to make it so it was straight from the Iranians. That was my understanding. "Q. That was your understanding? Straight from the Iranians to the CIA account? "A. Yes." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 32-34. See Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 8-10 [Coy's awareness of pricing arrangements].)
86/05/23-930 FROM NOVEMBER 1985			IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: DoD UNDERPRICING WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. . . . I understand that the [TOW] missiles that were sold to Iran were provided by . . . the Department of Defense, at prices considerably less than their true value. "It is also my understanding that you had the Inspector General review this. Are you satisfied that any undercharging that occurred was purely inadvertent? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I am. Our Inspector General and the General Accounting Office I believe both reached that conclusion, and I did it as a result of an independent examination

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made later. That deficiency, or the actual price is still at question.

"For example, we believe that we, as a result of these errors that were compounded when the Army computed the actual price, we believe that we have billed the CIA for that additional amount. The General Accounting Office, I believe, thinks it was $2.1 million and the CIA is understandably relying on that, and we are in the middle of a dispute to try to get the full amount that we are entitled to back.

"The wrong model number was used and there was improper computation of the packing and handling charges, and it was a series of unfortunate errors.

"Mr. BROOMFIELD. When the CIA sells arms covertly overseas, should the DoD provide them at anything less than their full market value?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. No, and we do not." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 191-92. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 86-87 [underpricing of missiles].)

86/05/23-935
AFTER
NOVEMBER 1985

THE IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: THEIR CONFORMITY WITH DoD PROCEDURES

WEINBERGER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Several military officials, including General Powell, General Thurman, and the Army's General Counsel, Susan Crawford, have testified the order to transfer the parts was given in such a way as to bypass the Department of Defense's procedures for monitoring price and for military review of transfers to the

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			CIA. "Miss Crawford testified the transfers to Iran have been the only transfers made to bypass that system. "My first question is: Did the transfers to Iran take place in such a way as to avoid established procedures? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, the only way I can answer that question is, first of all, to say that this transaction was not one for which established procedures were set up or contemplated and; secondly, there was no bypassing, as you put it, of any of the procedures relating to price. "The pricing of the weapons was carried out in precisely the same way that it always is. But the procedures that I established much earlier, perhaps three years, four years ago, were designed for a situation in which an intelligence agency or an intelligence activity or individual assigned to intelligence would say that he had a requirement that could not be disclosed, but he needed--the reason for it couldn't be disclosed--but that he needed money or he needed the right to go buy some equipment, ship, release a plane, something of that kind, and I found, and as a result of that, we have had a number of, well, fewer prosecutions, convictions growing out of some earlier activities because what was happening was that the intelligence aspects of his request were overriding any review at all, and, so we instituted a situation that when an intelligence activity was contemplated or when there was a request for some kind of support that then there

would be a review of that by a number of people leading up to the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, and that it would include members of the service as well as members of my office, and the Office of the Secretary General.

"That system is still in effect and it is an important way of protecting against any abuses of the system.

"This was a totally different transaction; this was a transaction in which the President of the United States directed that with as small a knowledge as possible because of the safety of the hostages and the desire to preserve any hope we had of getting them out that these weapons should be transferred to the CIA directly, and we did that, but there was a full review of the pricing because there was never any instruction of any kind about the price and the price was determined in the normal fashion.

"Unfortunately, as we have talked about in the past, there were errors in that; in the computation of the price, but they were innocent errors.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Other than price, did you tell General Powell, Deputy Secretary Taft, or any other person, to transfer these weapons and parts to the CIA for transfer to Iran in such a way as to avoid otherwise applicable procedures?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. We didn't tell them specifically to do it to avoid otherwise applicable procedures. What we told them was exactly the information that I had heard and the orders I had received, and that was transfer them with the smallest number of circle of people being involved as possible and to do it by a direct transfer for value to the CIA.

"And I insisted on the the 'for value' part, because that was a critical part of the Economy Act.

"Mr. MITCHELL. But then is it fair to say that one effect of doing it in that manner was to avoid otherwise applicable procedures?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, avoid--the otherwise applicable procedures weren't used. It wasn't done deliberately to avoid anything. Those procedures were not used because this was a case that was in a sense completely outside the rationale and basis for those other procedures.

"Mr. MITCHELL. It had another objective, I understand, that--but one of the effects was the procedures established were not used. As you say, this was for another purpose, another reason.

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. One of the effects was the procedures weren't used and that was the natural consequence of the direction to do it with the smallest number of people involved." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 8/3/87, at 28-32.)

86/05/23-940
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- FEBRUARY
1987

DoD ROLE IN THE TOW TRANSFERS TO IRAN:
LOGISTICS

DoD PAPERS:

For Department of Defense documents on TOWs transferred to Iran, including price and quantity information, see:

Ex. CWW 42 - Form 49G, Request for Supply Action (from Army Missile Command to Anniston Army

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			Depot); Ex. CWW 43 - Ammunition Shipment Planning Worksheet (Anniston Army Depot); Ex. CWW 44 - DD Form 1348-1A, TOW Missile Transfer Document (Anniston Army Depot); Ex. CWW 45 - DD Form 1348-1A, TOW Missile Transfer Document transferring TOWs from Anniston Army Depot to Army Missile Command (MICOM); Ex. CWW 46 - DD Form 1348-1, TOW Missile Transfer Document transferring TOWs from Army Missile Command (MICOM) to Department of Army Logistics Office (DALO); Ex. CWW 47 - DD Form 1348, TOW Missile Transfer Document transferring TOWs from DALO to CIA; Ex. CWW 48 - Department of the Army, Office of the Inspector General, "Final Report of Investigation Into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Sale and/or Transfer of Missiles, Spare Parts, and Other Related Equipment to Selected Middle Eastern Countries," 2/5/87.
86/05/23-941 DURING 1986			DoD PRICING OF THE TOWs SUMMARY: For a summary of how the DoD prices for the TOWs were determined, see Iran-Contra Report, at 214-15.
86/05/24-000 MAY 24-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: SUMMARY McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact, sir, that before you went to Teheran you did not have a meeting with the President on the subject?

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you understood that this was a dangerous mission. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you undertook it with some reluctance, I take it, because of some doubts about whether it would succeed. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct that you had exchanged some telexes or PROF messages with Admiral Poindexter on April 2[2] in which Admiral Poindexter had instructed you clearly and unambiguously that unless the hostages were released upon your arrival, there were to be no arms shipments? [See entries starting at 86/04/22-100.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you had sent him back a message, and these are [Exhibits] 4[6]-A and -B, applauding him for his firmness? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And those were your instructions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And when you went to Teheran, you weren't there to engage in a negotiation of the type you had in London of one hostage for X number of TOWs, etc. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. You understood the personal danger of going to Teheran. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. You were going with a false passport.

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. I took my own. I understand that others were carried. But, yes, I understood that. "Mr. LIMAN. And you went on a plane that carried Hawk missile parts. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I think that to me it was understandable that people conducting meetings with Americans were surrounded by great numbers of extremist people and consequently that the desire for operational security or keeping this private was very understandable. "So I was not put off by the idea of not having a red carpet and gun salute and all of the trappings like that. This was a reasonable masking of the party. "Mr. LIMAN. That isn't what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that you went there under conditions in which you had no real safe conduct. "Mr. MCFARLANE. True. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you went there with the hope--no assurance--that those hostages would be released. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I was relying upon the confidence of others that finally they had come to terms that would be fulfilled, but I thought that there was a high risk that that would not happen. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it fair to say that your visit to Teheran is well documented in those memos and messages that are printed in the Tower Report [at B-96 through -119]? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Pretty well, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And that you found when you arrived there that you were not met by the top

official that you had been told you would meet with?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you found that, contrary to the assurances that had been conveyed to you, the Iranians were not ready to secure the release of the hostages?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that's right.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you found that, indeed, you were being pressed to deliver the rest of the Hawk parts before the hostages were released?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you also had some demands added that you found outrageous and incredible--

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. --such as that the United States pay for the upkeep of the hostages, correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that you get Israel to withdraw from the Golan and other territories?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that you get Kuwait to release prisoners?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Right.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you described the quality of the negotiations in one of your first messages from there, when you talked about what the picture was like, saying it may be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after nuclear attack a surviving tailor became Vice President, a recent graduate student became Secretary of State, and a bookie became interlocutor, etc. Those were your words. You found this wasn't like opening

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			the doors to China, dealing with Chou En-Lai. "Mr. MCFARLANE. No." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 155-58.)
86/05/24-001 MAY 24-28, 1986		THE TEHRAN TRIP: MENTION OF DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [D]id you have a discussion with Colonel North about the proceeds of the sale? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not truly a discussion. If you are referring to the tarmac exchange, that is a very short bit of news that I learned. "Mr. LIMAN. Where did it occur and tell us in your own words what you recall of what Colonel North said? "Mr. MCFARLANE. We left Tehran in the morning, Tehran time, so it would have been darkness here in this country. So I didn't take time to try to reach Admiral Poindexter or anyone else. "We got on the plane and went back to Israel and upon arrival in the afternoon, by which time people in Washington would have been at work, I asked the communicator to set up the secure radio right there at Ben-Gurion, the airstrip. And while waiting for him to do that, the others in my party were unloading the baggage and personal effects from the aircraft and I suppose I was obviously dispirited by the events in Tehran and Colonel North, I think, in an effort to be supportive, mentioned to me offhandedly that I shouldn't count it a total loss, that we are applying some of the funds from the Iranian connection to Central America, or words to that	THE TEHRAN TRIP: SUMMARY McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. And did you also one evening awake to find that Colonel North had ordered the plane that was still in Israel with other Hawk parts to come forward and deliver them? [See entries starting at 86/05/27-200.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. The plane was in the air and-- "Mr. LIMAN. Tell us about the incident. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I was told that the second aircraft--I had come in on the first of three--that the second of three was on its way into Tehran and this was the product of discussions during the night with Iranian interlocutors, Ghorbanifar, Colonel North, and Mr. Nir and that they believed that they would have by morning two hostages turned over to U.S. custody in Lebanon; and I said that was unacceptable and that the aircraft should be turned around and sent back. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you pressed, Mr. McFarlane, to agree to exchange the HAWK parts for two hostages? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And to leave the other three for further discussions? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, yes, by Mr. Nir with

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		effect. And I was a little startled. . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 158-62.) See col. 3.	some strength, but the others understood my reasoning, I think. I don't know whether they agreed with it or not, but it was pretty emphatic. "Mr. LIMAN. And it was a princip[al] decision that you were not going to engage in that kind of trading? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And so when the Iranians said that they were not going to or could not secure the release of the hostages, you got on the plane with the group and left? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you carried out the instruction that you had gone with, which was no more arms if those hostages were not released? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. I had checked first with the President. I had recommended against it and he concurred. "Mr. LIMAN. You recommended against a delivery of the arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And the President concurred? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. And you checked with him by secure communication? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, while--did you have a discussion with Colonel North about the proceeds of the sale? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not truly a discussion. If you are referring to the tarmac exchange, that is a very short bit of news that I learned. "Mr. LIMAN. Where did it occur and tell us in

your own words what you recall of what Colonel North said?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. We left Tehran in the morning, Tehran time, so it would have been darkness here in this country. So I didn't take time to try to reach Admiral Poindexter or anyone else.

"We got on the plane and went back to Israel and upon arrival in the afternoon, by which time people in Washington would have been at work, I asked the communicator to set up the secure radio right there at Ben-Gurion, the airstrip. And while waiting for him to do that, the others in my party were unloading the baggage and personal effects from the aircraft and I suppose I was obviously dispirited by the events in Tehran and Colonel North, I think, in an effort to be supportive, mentioned to me offhandedly that I shouldn't count it a total loss, that we are applying some of the funds from the Iranian connection to Central America, or words to that effect. And I was a little startled.

"I went ahead at the time to get on the radio by this time connected to Admiral Poindexter and reported the completion of the mission and asked for instructions recommending that I simply proceed back to Washington and he acknowledged that and said, fine, go ahead, he would advise the President, and that he would look forward to getting my debrief when I got back.

"As I recall, I got off the radio and by this time there was someone from the Shinbet that picked me up and took me around the airfield to

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			the other side of it where an aircraft was waiting to take us ultimately back to the United States. "Colonel North had gone on, I was told, to see about whether or not a separate effort to secure the release of hostages that involved perhaps the DEA connection that was being played out in Cyprus had been fruit [sic] or not and ultimately I went back to Washington." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 158-62.)
86/05/24-002 MAY 24-28, 1986		THE TEHRAN TRIP: MENTION OF DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable with what he [sc. North] told you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. It was of a piece with a half dozen items that I had learned which seemed to me either unorthodox or very risky, but I was not in the government and I took it to be part and parcel of a number of things that I learned, however. "Mr. LIMAN. These were things that you learned that North was doing while you were in Tehran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. In connection with this trip, yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 162-63.) See col. 3.	THE TEHRAN TRIP McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Let's make the record absolutely clear. When you said that you communicated with Washington through this secure link, and that you got the approval from the President to return, you did not communicate to Washington what Colonel North had just told you about the application of the proceeds of the sale? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask Colonel North whether he had obtained any approval from Admiral Poindexter or anyone else for the application of the proceeds? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you give any thought as to how the proceeds could be applied to Central America? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. I was operating, Mr. Liman, under the context of a request to return and carry out a mission in

government as someone who was not in the government, who had no authority to know nor need to know matters beyond what it required to carry out my mission.

"Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable with what he told you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. It was of a piece with a half dozen items that I had learned which seemed to me either unorthodox or very risky, but I was not in the government and I took it to be part and parcel of a number of things that I learned, however.

"Mr. LIMAN. These were things that you learned that North was doing while you were in Tehran?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. In connection with this trip, yes."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 162-63.)

86/05/24-005
MAY 24-28,
1986

THE TEHRAN TRIP: SUMMARY, AND WHO OWNED THE HAWK SPARE PARTS

MCFARLANE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. I am going to briefly switch subjects once again to your May 1986 trip to Tehran.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I think this is all clear, but I want to make certain. Who was in charge of that mission?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I was.

"Mr. NIELDS. And when you first flew into Tehran, you were carrying, as I understand it, one pallet of Hawk spare parts.

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Perhaps it would useful to describe a pallet. I imagine that it was twice the length of this table and probably twice as wide and perhaps six feet high. "Mr. NIELDS. And there were many more pallets which were left behind in Tel Aviv? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, there were. "Mr. NIELDS. Then there came a time when you gave directions for a plane to take off carrying the remaining spare parts? [See entries starting at 86/05/27-200.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not give that direction. It was given during the night by Colonel North, and when advised of it, I turned it around and sent it back. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, okay. That, I think, leads into the question that I wanted to ask you. We had testimony last week from Mr. Secord that he was the owner of these spare parts, and that he could decide whatever he wanted with them. "Was that your understanding? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. It was my understanding that the parts were being sold by the United States Government, I thought directly to Iran. But I have to say, I can imagine that it would have made sense to go through a cut-out for it, but my assumption was they were being sold by the United States to Tehran. "They had come from warehouses in the United States, and I assumed were palletized by Americans in these planes. "Mr. NIELDS. And who could make the decision as to whether those Hawk parts would be delivered

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			to Tehran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I could. "Mr. NIELDS. And who could make the decision that they should not be delivered to Tehran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe myself and no others. "Mr. NIELDS. And you did, I take it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And General Secord obeyed your directions, did he not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Wouldn't it be fair to say, Mr. McFarlane, that it was the United States Government that was in control of what happened to those spare parts while you were in Tehran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 78-80.)
86/05/24-200 MAY 24, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: EXPANSION DUTTON ACCOUNT: A munitions load arrives in Central America from a European country the day after Dutton leaves. Because their warehouse is already jammed, Dutton makes arrangements with "the local commander" for his assistance in building an addition to the warehouse. North and Secord approve the construction. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 31-32.)	THE TEHRAN TRIP: SECORD ROLE SECORD ACCOUNT: While the McFarlane group travels to Tehran with 1 pallet of spare parts, Secord stays at his command post in Tel Aviv with the other 12 pallets. At the same time, he sends to Israel, in another Southern Air Transport plane, 508 replacement TOWs. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 74, 80.)
86/05/24-300 LATE MAY THROUGH LATE JULY 1986		PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testifying on the reorganization plan for the air resupply operation:	

"Mr. BALLEN. Is this [Ex. RCD 14] the reorganization plan that you drafted?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, the first portion of it is the reorganization plan. It was [sic] some additions to it.

"Mr. BALLEN. When you said the first portion, what are you referring to, which pages?

"Mr. DUTTON. From the cover sheet back through page 7 was the initial reorganization plan.

"Mr. BALLEN. When did you draft that?

"Mr. DUTTON. I started writing it actually in May, right after I came back from the first trip [May 19-23, 1986], when I realized at least what all the parts of the organization were. I finished it just before my second trip down there [June 5-8, 1986], and took a copy of it down and gave it to Mr. Cooper.

"Mr. BALLEN. Page 8 through page 14 dated 21 July 1986 --

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes.

"Mr. BALLEN. When did you draft that?

"Mr. DUTTON. Probably during the latter part of June and through July until the date it was dated.

"Mr. BALLEN. Okay. What does that represent, pages 9 through 14?

"Mr. DUTTON. Starting in, I guess, by the end of June, Colonel North was convinced that[,] in fact, the money was going to be voted by Congress --

"Mr. BALLEN. Money for who[m]?

"Mr. DUTTON. The $100 million so that the CIA could step back in and take over the operation. I am not sure if the discussions had taken place, but during this time there had been discussions with the CIA about what about the operation that is currently ongoing down there [sic]. The feeling at that point was that it was a tainted operation, unsuccessful, the aircraft looked terrible.

"It wasn't something that was very attractive. In order to put a frame around what the operation was, we added the last . . . six pages, which basically outlined what the opertion was made up of, what the assets were, where they were, how much they were worth, in order to be able to give Colonel North one plan that says here is the southern operation, here, Mr. CIA Director, if you want it, it is there for you.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. Sir, what was the total value that you had come up with?

"Mr. DUTTON. As I recall, it was around $4 million . . . $4.89 million.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. Who supplied the term Project Democracy to this plan?

"Mr. DUTTON. I wrote the initial draft and General Secord took it to Colonel North and when I got it back, the term 'Project Democracy' was written in.

"Mr. BALLEN. Whose term was that?

"Mr. DUTTON. I understood it was Colonel North's term.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. Who furnished you with the options on page 14?

"Mr. DUTTON. General Secord.

"Mr. BALLEN. And the first option -- sale of the entire operation and assets wherein the CIA takes over -- was that an option that General Secord had furnished to you?

"Mr. DUTTON. That is correct, along with the notes.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. Did Colonel North ever say whether in fact he had discussed the plan to sell the assets to the CIA with people from the CIA?

"Mr. DUTTON. As far as a specific discussion, I don't recall him saying that. . . . The indication I had was that there had been a number of discussions about what was going to happen when the takeover took place.

"Mr. BALLEN. And Colonel North conducted these discussions with CIA people?

"Mr. DUTTON. That is correct."
(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 52-58; JHICI Ex. RCD 14 [reorganization plan]. See Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 23, 45 [dates of Dutton's trips to Central America].)

86/05/24-400
LATE MAY
THROUGH LATE
JULY 1986

PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN
DUTTON ACCOUNT:

Dutton elaborated on his reorganization memo and on its opening sentence, "[T]he 'Benefactor Company,' hereinafter referred to as B.C. Washington, has taken more direct control of Project Democracy and its supporting elements":

"Mr. LIMAN. Who was BC Washington, benefactor company?

"Mr. DUTTON. Sir, that was a name that was made up. There is an ongoing lawsuit . . . by Avirg[a]n and Honey. Because of this lawsuit, and the involvement of both Colonel North and General Secord in that, there was concern that Max Gomex was, in fact, feeding information to the people that were behind that lawsuit.

"The purpose of this initial paragraph was to outline specifically for Max--and it was presented down in Central America to him--that Colonel North and General Secord had withdrawn from the operation, they were no longer part of it, and this new company, called BC Washington, which represented the donators, therefore the benefactors--that they had come in to take over the operation.

"If, in fact, Max passed that information on to the people he had been talking to before, it was felt by General Secord and Colonel North that that would relieve some of the pressure both on the operation and on themselves.

"Mr. LIMAN. What was the fact?

"Mr. DUTTON. The fact was that Colonel North and General Secord's relationship to the organization had not changed one bit.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that they were still directing the organization, correct?

"Mr. DUTTON. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And so this BC Washington was a facade that they developed in order to cloak their role; is that fair to say?

"Mr. DUTTON. That's fair."
(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 119-24; JHICI Ex. RCD 14. On the sale of Project Democracy, see entries starting at 86/07/15-200.)

86/05/24-420
MAY - JULY
1986

PROJECT DEMOCRACY: "A LOOSE DEFINITION"
NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:

"Mr. Rodino. Mr. Chairman, I just want some clarification. I heard the Colonel mention Project Democracy and I am confused in what context he made reference to Project Democracy.

"Mr. North. I developed a loose lexicon of describing the activities in which we were engaged as Project Democracy and I think on a couple of occasions I referred to them as Democracy Incorporated. It was -- that was a loose definition for those activities that we had undertaken in support of the Nicaraguan resistance.

"I think I even used it to refer to the DEA operation at one point, that they were being supported by Project Democracy funds. But one of the other press reports early on indicated that had some connection of some kind with the National Endowment of Democracy. Absolutely false. Nothing to do with it whatsoever.

"There was a proposal that was sent to me at one point that referred to Project Hope. It had nothing to do with Dr. Walsh's very, very valuable private volunteer organization, Project Hope. It was simply a euphemism that I used to refer to the activities that were being conducted with these non-government entities."

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		(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 73. See 86/07/15-250 [Coy's definition of "Project Democracy"].)	
86/05/24-700 MAY 24-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord on McFarlane's expectations for the May 1986 trip to Tehran: "Well, there were a lot of discussions. . . . [H]ostages were discussed at the Frankfurt meeting. Hostages were discussed with Nir and with Ghorbanifar frequently, by North and by me. But as far as I know, and this will surprise some people I guess, but as far as I know, there was no Iranian agreement to produce all the hostages at the time of the meeting in Tehran. . . . I don't know how exactly that expectation got into McFarlane's head." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 76.)
86/05/24-701 MAY 24-28, 1986			AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Asked about Secord's comment, McFarlane testified: "I was surprised to hear [Secord's statement]. . . . But in talking to my own staff at the time, Colonel North and others, all of them reconfirmed yes, we do expect, and have all along [expected], the complete release of the hostages." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 161; see id., 5/14/87, at 14.)

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86/05/24-702 MAY 24-28, 1986			AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testified, "I cannot recall any time that was spoken that all hostages would be released. That must have been [a] misconception by someone at sometime somewhere." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 84.)
86/05/24-704 MAY 24-28, 1986			AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES NORTH ACCOUNT: Asked whether the Iranians had ever agreed to release all hostages prior to or at the time of McFarlane's arrival in Tehran, North testified: "It turns out that the Iranians did not. Manucher Ghorbanifar told us that they had agreed to that. And what had happened was we had gone too far down the line with Ghorbanifar. What was his--his process, if you will, was to tell the Iranians one thing and tell us another. Then let the two sides sit down and duke it out. "Well, as I said, we knew Ghorbanifar for what he was. We did not know of the letters that he had sent to Tehran committing us to certain things until after we got there. "When we exchanged letters face to face with the Iranians in Tehran, it was very obvious that he had lied to both sides and we knew that he did this, but we didn't know that the lie was quite so blatant. "We had expectations from him, communicated to us directly and through the Israelis, that that would be the outcome if things went well in

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			Tehran. "We did not know all of the expectations of the Iranians as to what it would take to make things go well. And thus, when we got there, both sides were surprised at the intransigence of the other side's opinions. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 110-11.)
86/05/24-710 DURING MAY 1986			AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. . . . Did you call a meeting with McFarlane and others who were engaged in that [Tehran] meeting? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I believe we did have a meeting. "Mr. JENKINS. Who all attended that meeting to get your signals straight? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember who all was there. We had worked for some time on the terms of reference for such a meeting, and I had Mr. McFarlane before he left. There were probably other staff officers there, but I frankly can't remember who they were. Probably Colonel North, maybe Howard Teicher, who also went on the trip. "Mr. JENKINS. The reason I asked that, obviously there was a disagreement or has been a disagreement [among] the participants there as to whether or not all the prisoners were to be released or not. McFarlane obviously thought that they were. Mr. Secord, and I believe Colonel

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North, indicated that they were not.

"Did you discuss this at the meeting?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm certain we did, and, in fact, I think you have one of the exhibits, a PROFS note from me to Mr. McFarlane on that point. [See 86/04/22-200.] But I think it is important to put that in perspective.

"It was my understanding that we were going to get all of the hostages out, and it was also our clear objective to get all the hostages out.

"Mr. JENKINS. I understand that.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. There was no assurance--we had been misled up to that point. There was absolutely no assurance that we would get them all out. And the President's main point, which I passed on to Mr. McFarlane, was that there were to be no further arms or parts transfers at that point unless we got all the hostages out.

"Mr. JENKINS. But Secord and Hakim thought otherwise.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. From testimony I've heard, I understand that there is a disconnect there.

"Mr. JENKINS. It is inconceivable to me when you are arranging a trip of this importance that the players don't understand what the terms are.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't--I would not characterize it that way. As I said, no matter what we had been told, we clearly recognized that we had no assurances that we would--no positive, absolute assurances that we would get all the hostages out. That was our objective. That was our go-ahead position.

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . In the November, '85, endeavor the Iranians thought we were lying because of the mix-up on the Hawk missiles.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. They--to correct that, if I may, the Iranians felt the Israelis were lying.

"Mr. JENKINS. At any rate, they felt they were being double-crossed in the November, '85, meeting.

"In the February, '86, meeting in Frankfurt with the first channel, we thought at that time that Ghorbanifar was double-dealing, according to testimony of North and Hakim.

"In the May, '86, situation that I have just gone over, there seemed to be a lack of clear understanding between the players on our side. And it appears to me that you were having to run this operation without the cooperation of the other agencies that we would normally have, such as State Department and Defense Department and other agencies that would normally be involved; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We certainly did not include in the--other than the logistics portion of it, anybody from the Defense Department. As I said, I did discuss with Secretary Shultz the terms of reference for Mr. McFarlane's trip. He was aware of that, and I did not know who if anybody he had talked to within his department.

"But I think it is important, Mr. Jenkins, to understand that both in Colonel North and in the--in George Cave, who[m] Bill Casey was using, and the others at the CIA that were involved, and I think most of their names have been protected, and in General Secord, we had people that were very experienced, very professional, and were completely competent to carry out this project.

"Now I think it is fair to say, and I hope it is acknowledged, that you never have intelligence that is 100 percent accurate, and things don't always go according to plan. If they did, it wouldn't be a high-risk operation.

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . And the first impression that I gained was that we were trying to deal with moderates, but the facts are, of course, that the weapons didn't go to the moderates; they went to the radicals, didn't they?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that is entirely clear, Mr. Jenkins."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 111-15. Poindexter testimony on moderate or pragmatic Iranians continues at 85/12/07-707.)

86/05/24-718

THE TEHRAN TRIP: AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE ALL THE HOSTAGES, AND OTHER POINTS OF

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, in late May of 1986, the President . . . turned down a proposition that had been made to Mr. McFarlane for the delivery of two hostages for the Hawk spare parts that were being shipped through Israel.

"The President and Mr. McFarlane had insisted that all the hostages be released before any more parts would be delivered; isn't that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. That's right.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. All right.

"By November of 1986 the President had

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			authorized the delivery of all of the Hawk parts, 500 additional TOW missiles and two pallets of medicine, all in return for those same two hostages. "Why did our negotiating position collapse so completely during that time frame? "Mr. REGAN. I cannot offer you an explanation of that. I don't know. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, as someone who came into Government service from a phenomenal career on Wall Street, it must have occurred to you that the United States was being hustled? "Mr. REGAN. It was a bait and switch. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you so advise the President? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And what did the President say about why he was allowing this thing to continue? "Mr. REGAN. Well, I think he assumed that there are many times when a political leader has to deal with unsavory characters in order to accomplish an end, and I think he was under the impression, well, if we can get to the top there, someplace toward the top in Iran, perhaps, you know, we could deal with them, but we have to work our way up the ladder. "Mr. SMILJANICH. The committee has also learned, in addition to the above-added incentives which were thrown into the deal, the Iranians were told that we might be able to help with the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait, and we might be able to help with the overthrow of the Iraqi Government. Was

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			that ever discussed by Admiral Poindexter in your presence? "Mr. REGAN. Whenever that subject came up to the President, he was insistent he would never deal for those Dawa prisoners, never. He said, 'I will never go to the Emir of Kuwait, and ask him to release any of those, those people are criminals, they are in jail properly, I will never ask him to release those.' "As far as overthrowing the Government of Iraq, that was not our President, and I never heard it being brought up to the President. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It also was not our policy to be selling arms to Iran, but this was never discussed in the President's-- "Mr. REGAN. Again, you got to remember the circumstances under which we did this. This was the exception proving the rule. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Had anybody ever indicated to the President in your presence, or had the President ever stated that it would be all right to at least talk about these matters with the Iranians even if we didn't intend to do anything about it? "Mr. REGAN. Not about the Dawa prisoners, absolutely not, nor the overthrow of Saddam--you know who I mean--in Iraq. "Mr. SMILJANICH. That would be, those types of promises that were not going to be kept would not be consistent with the idea of a new vision of a new bilateral relationship with Iran, would they? "Mr. REGAN. That is right."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 50-54.)

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THE TEHRAN TRIP: HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. General Secord, who was over in Israel, indicated that he thought we should have grabbed the deal for the two hostages. Did you advocate that when you were in Tehran?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know what that has to do with this.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were overruled?

"Mr. NORTH. I was.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were overruled by higher authority?

"Mr. NORTH. Mr. McFarlane was in charge of the trip.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Mr. McFarlane was in communication with Washington?

"Mr. NORTH. And so was I.

"Mr. LIMAN. And were you told by Admiral Poindexter that the deal is clear, all the hostages have to be released or no more arms?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe I communicated that directly to Admiral Poindexter. I certainly articulated my opinion to Mr. McFarlane. Mr. McFarlane made a decision and I saluted smartly and carried it out.

"Mr. LIMAN. Didn't Mr. McFarlane have instructions from the President of the United States on what he could give and what he couldn't?

"Mr. NORTH. Apparently so.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. Well, you knew that, didn't you? "Mr. NORTH. I was not present when Mr. McFarlane was briefed by the President. "Mr. LIMAN. But you received these instructions yourself from Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you understood that the decisions here were being made in the Oval Office? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And is this testimony that you are giving now criticism of the fact that the decision was made to stand firm with the Iranians? "Mr. NORTH. I am not criticizing the President's decisions, Admiral Poindexter's decision, or Mr. McFarlane. My role as a subordinate on the NSC staff was to provide advice and input. My advice at the time was to take the two hostages and go home. "Mr. LIMAN. Was the American foreign policy being driven to a great extent by concern about the welfare for these hostages? "Mr. NORTH. Undoubtedly it was, but I viewed, and I think certainly Admiral Poindexter viewed, and in all of my discussions with the Iranians and Israelis and others, I viewed the hostages as an obstacle. The obstacle had to be overcome like a hurdle before you could proceed down the track, to use a little allegory. "What I am saying to you is that if we could have gotten beyond the hostage issue, it would have been palatable, publicly, internationally and every other way, to have meetings with high-level Iranian officials, first privately and ultimately

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			publicly, and I viewed it all as a step-by-step process. "Mr. LIMAN. Did there ever come a moment when you asked yourself, why doesn't the Secretary of State agree with me, why doesn't the Secretary of Defense agree with me? "Mr. NORTH. They don't have to agree with me. I was simply providing advice and input and recommendations and options to my superiors. When they gave me direction, I carried them out. I wasn't asking for the Secretary of State to agree with me." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 36-38.)
86/05/25-000 MAY 25-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP SECORD ACCOUNT: While the McFarlane group is in Tehran, Secord waits in Tel Aviv with 2 goals: (1) "to be ready to deliver the other 12 pallets of Hawk spare parts" (the plane with those pallets is ordered to take off "on I think the 27th of May, . . . and then after about four hours, I was told to order the plane to return to base"); (2) at North's order, "to support the DEA people [in Cyprus] in another attempt to locate and perhaps locate some of the hostages in Lebanon." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 77-78.)
86/05/25-020 DURING 1985 AND 1986			THE DEA HOSTAGE-RESCUE OPERATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . These committees have heard evidence that DEA agents work[ed] with you

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			in your efforts to locate and free the hostages held in Lebanon. My question, did you brief the Attorney General on that activitiy? "Mr. NORTH. It is my recollection that I did personally brief the Attorney General. I don't recall the specific meeting. In my records I turned over to the committee there is reference to that briefing and I believe in the documents that the committee was provided by the White House. ". . . . "Mr. RODINO. Did the Attorney General ever tell you that it would not be proper for you to use Government funds to bribe foreign officials, but that it would be acceptable to use private money for that purpose? "[Counsel confers with witness.] "Mr. NORTH. To answer who told me what, my recollection is that Director Casey and the Director of Operations at CIA had both indicated that U.S. Government moneys could not be used for those purposes, and I don't recall asking the Attorney General whether or not it was appropriate to use U.S. moneys. "It may well have been that the DEA officers themselves made it known that U.S. Government moneys couldn't be used for those purposes. I want to specify, when you say bribing foreign officials, I am not entirely certain that they were foreign officials. "Mr. RODINO. Foreigners? "Mr. NORTH. Foreigners, yes, sir. In any event, I came to understand by virtue of my discussions certainly with Director Casey, I think

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			with the Director of Operations at Langley, possibly with officers in the FBI with whom I worked on counterterrorism[,] that we couldn't use U.S. Government moneys for those purposes and that we would use outside moneys. "Mr. RODINO. But the Attorney General, as you recollect, did not advise you? "Mr. NORTH. I do not believe the Attorney General recommended one way or the other on that, sir. "Mr. RODINO. Did you tell the Attorney General that expenses for the DEA agents were paid for from private sources such as Albert Hakim, Richard Miller, and Adolfo Calero? "Mr. NORTH. I honestly don't recall the full nature of that discussion. I do know that in a memorandum I did for Admiral Poindexer on this, that I did specify where the source of funds was coming from and I believe I probably told the Attorney General, but I don't recall the conversation with specificity." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 154-56.)
86/05/25-050 MAY 25-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: MINUTES AND REPORTS BACKGROUND SOURCES: Source documents, including cables sent by participants during the Tehran trip, PROF messages, minutes of meetings, and summary memoranda are reprinted in the Tower Report, at B-95 through -119. Ghorbanifar's account is given at Tower, B-119 through -121. For discussion of the Tehran Trip in the Iran-Contra Report, see Report, at pages 237-42.

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86/05/25-100 MAY 25, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: McFARLANE'S INITIAL REACTION McFARLANE CABLE: Shortly after his arrival in Tehran, McFarlane cables to Poindexter his first reactions to the Tehran negotiations: ". . . . "It may be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after nuclear attack, a surviving tailor became Vice President; a recent grad student became Deputy Secretary of State; and a bookie became the interlocutor for all discourse with forei[g]n countries. While the principals are a cut above this level of qualification the incompetence of the Iranian government to do business requires a rethinking on our part of why there have been so many frustrating failure[s] to deliver on their part. . . . ". . . ." (McFarlane cable to Poindexter, 5/25/86 [Committee Documents N 1334-1336]. For full text, see Tower, at B-100 through -102. See Iran-Contra Report, at 238.)
86/05/27-050 MAY 27, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: CONDITIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS McFARLANE MESSAGE: For three hours on May 27, 1986, McFarlane meets one-on-one with the Iranian Prime Minister's designee, a member of the Majlis and foreign affairs designee to Rafsanjani (the "Adviser"; for codes, see 86/01/11-180). Immediately after the meeting, McFarlane sends the following message to Poindexter:

". . . .

". . . He [the Adviser] reported that Hizbollah had made several preconditions to the release: 1. Israeli withdrawal from the Golan; 2. Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon; 3. Lahad movement into East Beirut and 4. Someone (undefined) to pay the bills the hostages have accumulated. How's that for Chutzpa!!! He hurriedly added (before I unloaded on him) that 'these demands are not acceptable and we are negotiating with them and believe that the only real problem is when you deliver the items [the HAWK parts and the radar] we have requested.'

". . . .

"I then carefully recounted . . . that he [the President] had only reluctantly agreed to this meeting under a very clear and precise understanding of the arrangements. I then went over in detail what those arrangements were: 1. The U.S. would send a high-level delegation to Tehran. They would bring with them a portion of the items they had requested and paid for (which we had done). 2. Upon our arrival, they had agreed to secure the release of the hostages promptly. 3. Upon release of the hostages to our custody, we would call forward the balance of items that had been paid for and those that had not been paid for would be dispatched as soon as payment had been received.

"At this point he became somewhat agitated wanting to know just who had agreed to these terms. (I fingered Gorba and [the Second Iranian; see 86/01/11-180]). He stated that these were not

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			the terms as he understood them. The basic difference was that they expected all deliveries to occur before any release took place. . . . "He was obviously concerned over the very real possibility that his people (Gorba and [the Second Iranian]) had misled him and asked for a break to confer with his colleagues. I agreed noting that I had to leave tonight. (Actually I don't have to leave tonight but recognizing that we have been here for three working days and they have not produced I wanted to try to build a little fire under them.) . . . ". . . . ". . . I tend to think we should hold firm on our intention to leave and in fact do so unless we have word of release in the next[ ]six or seven hours. I can imagine circumstances in which if they said tonight that they guarantee the release at a precise hour tomorrow we would stand by, but not agree to any change in the terms or call the aircraft forward. ". . . My judgment is that they are in a state of great upset, schizophrenic over their wish to get more from the deal but sobered to the fact that their interlocutors may have misled them. We are staying entirely at arm[']s length while this plays out. We should hear something from them before long!however [sic] . . . ." (McFarlane Message to Poindexter, 5/27/86 [Committee Documents N 1337-39]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 239-40; Tower, at B-112 through -114.)
86/05/27-055			THE TEHRAN TRIP: THE DAWA PRISONERS

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MAY 27, 1986			TEICHER MEMO: Several hours after McFarlane's meeting with the Adviser (see 86/05/27-050; 86/01/11-180), the Adviser addresses the group consisting of the Iranian delegation, plus McFarlane, North, Cave, Teicher, and Nir. He reports that the Hizballah have dropped all their demands except for the release of the Dawa held in Kuwait: "The only remaining problem is Kuwait. We agreed to try to get a promise from you that they would be released in the future." (Howard Teicher Memorandum of 5/27/86 5 p.m. conversation with Iranian Officials in Tehran [Committee Document N 49481]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 240; Tower, at B-115.)
86/05/27-060 MAY 27, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NEGOTIATIONS U.S.-IRANIAN DRAFT AGREEMENT, Part 1: When negotiations between the Iranians and the U.S. delegation reach an impasse, the Adviser (see 86/05/27-050; 86/01/11-180) suggests the groups meet without McFarlane to try to formulate an agreement on the hostages and HAWK parts which could be presented to both sides. McFarlane consents with the caveat that "staff agreements must be approved by our leaders." The two groups then meet for several hours until near midnight. They hammer out a proposal that provides that Secord's aircraft with the remaining HAWK parts will take off for Tehran but turn around in midflight if the hostages have not been released by morning. The agreement drafted May 27, 1986 provides:

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			"On this twenty seventh day of May 1986 and the sixth day of Khordad in the year 1365, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a spirit of mutual understanding, and recognizing the importance of building respect, trust and confidence hereby agree to the following sequence of steps designed to lead to a new era of bi-lateral relations: "(1) The United States Government will cause a 707 aircraft to launch from a neutral site at 0100 in the morning to arrive in Tehran, Iran at 1000 on the morning of May 28, the seventh day of Khordad. This aircraft will contain the remainder of the HAWK missile parts purchased and paid for by the Government of Iran, a portion of which was delivered on May 24. "(2) The Iranian Government, having recognized the plight of the hostages in the Lebanon, and in the spirit of humanitarian assistance, agrees to cause the release and safe return of the living American hostages and the return of the body of the deceased American and that this release will be completed not later than 0400 Tehran time. "(3) It is further agreed by both sides that if by 0400 Tehran time, the hostages are not safely in the hands of U.S. authorities, the aircraft with the HAWK missile parts will be turned around and will not land in Iran and the U.S. delegation will depart Tehran immediately. If, however, the hostages are released at 0400, as indicated above, the U.S. delegation will remain

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			in Tehran until 1200 Noon on May 28, 1986." (U.S.-Iranian draft agreement, untitled and otherwise unlabeled [Committee Documents N 1490 through 1492]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 240-41; Tower, at B-118 and -119. Text of agreement continues in next entry.)
86/05/27-061 MAY 27, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NEGOTIATIONS U.S.-IRANIAN DRAFT AGREEMENT, Part 2: [Text continues from preceding entry:] "(4) The Government of the United States commits to deliver to Bandar Abbas, Iran, two phase one IHIPIR radar sets, fully compatible with the HAWK missile system now in the pos[s]ession of the Iranian Government. This delivery to take place after the arrival of the hostages in U.S. custody and within ten days after the receipt of payment through existing financial channels for these radar systems. It is further agreed that the Government of the United States will make every effort to locate and identify those items from the original list of 240 parts which were not immediately available, and to provide those available as soon as possible after payment is received and the hostages are in U.S. custody. "(5) Both Governments agree to a continuation of a political dialogue to be conducted in secrecy until such time as both sides agree to make such a dialogue public. It is agreed by both sides that this dialogue shall include discussions on the Soviet threat to Iran, the situation in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other political topics as may be mutually agreed. Both sides agree in

advance that these discussions will include consideration of further defense needs of Iran.

"(6) Both Governments recognize that the lack of a clear channel of communications has contributed to misunderstanding and confusion in the past and agree that this problem is best resolved by having the United States provide a secure channel of communications between our two governments by placing a secure satellite communications team, and appropriate equipment secre[t]ly in Tehran. The Government of Iran agrees that the U.S. communicators will be accorded normal diplomatic privileges and immunity on an informal basis and without attribution." (U.S.-Iranian draft agreement, untitled and otherwise unlabeled [Committee Documents N 1490 through 1492]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 240-41; Tower, at B-118 and -119.)

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THE TEHRAN TRIP: THE DAWA PRISONERS
NORTH PROPOSAL:

When the Adviser (see 86/05/27-050; 86/01/11-180) presses North for concessions on the Dawa, North suggests a statement such as:

"The U.S. will make every effort through and with international organizations, private individuals, religious organizations and other third parties in an humanitarian effort to achieve the release and just and fair treatment for Shiites held in confinement, as soon as possible." (Teicher Memorandum of 5/27/86 9:30 p.m. Conversation with Iranian Officials in Tehran [Committee Document N 49484, at N 49485]. See

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			Iran-Contra Report, at 241 and n.46; Tower, at B-116. For McFarlane's position on the Dawa, see 86/05/27-400.)
86/05/27-075 1985-86			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: OIL PRICES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. The last question: Was there any discussion to your knowledge with the Iranians about oil prices as part of this initiative? "A. I don't recall anything about oil prices." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 80.)
86/05/27-080 DURING 1986		NICARAGUAN OIL CREDITS AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 3.	THE IRAN INITIATIVE: OIL PRICES NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Liman. There are also references in your notebooks to oil as one of the subjects that was being discussed with the Iranians, particularly the second channel, but to some extent the first channel[.] What was that all about? "Mr. North. One of the things we wanted them to do was shut off the oil credits to Nicaragua, which I would point out they just turned on again. "Second of all, we were trying to make sure that they didn't interfere with the movement of Western European oil through the straits. And again -- "Mr. Liman. But there are references to oil pricing. Were they asking you to insist on a stablizing price? "Mr. North. One of the things that they accused us of was manipulating OPEC to keep the price down. And they really believed it. I mean,

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			that was -- if you -- if the transcript of the tape recordings I made in Iran, in Tehran are ever made available, I would bet we spent a third of our time there not talking about the strategic relationship or hostages or weapons, about the fact that the price of oil being below a certain level was a serious problem for them and they kept accusing us of being the ones that were keeping the price down. "[Redacted.]" (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 29-30.)
86/05/27-195 MAY 25-28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: THE FIRST PLANE-LOAD OF HAWK PARTS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "MR. LEON: . . . During the time frame from May of '86 to November of '86, do you recall any actions on the part of Colonel North that you learned about after they had taken place, that you would have objected to and wish to have had a chance to know prior to the fact they took place? "THE WITNESS: A few times. "Just to give you an example that comes to mind. I was disappointed in May of '86 for the Tehran trip they had taken any parts on the aircraft. They took about a third of the parts with the idea being they were to remain in U.S. custody. As I recall, I learned about that after the fact and was not particularly happy with that. But it was in the view of the people on the ground, and my general policy is to not to try to second-guess the people that are --

"BY MR. LEON:

"Q. Was that related to the fact that you had indicated to Colonel North that you didn't want, until all the hostages were released, you didn't want any parts transferred over to the Iranians?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. That was inconsistent with your o[r]ders?

"A. Yes. But it was not something that I felt was entirely out of line. I would have preferred it not be that way. The plan that they had would have been consistent with my guidance. The mechanics of doing it made them vulnerable to having them taken away from them, which is what happened."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 106-07.)

86/05/27-200
MAY 27 [?],
1986

THE TEHRAN TRIP: NORTH'S SUMMONING THE SECOND PLANE

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

McFarlane testifying on the second plane-load of spare parts headed into Iran during the night of May 27 (?), 1986:

"Mr. NIELDS. Then there came a time when you gave directions for a plane to take off carrying the remaining spare parts?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I did not give that direction. It was given during the night by Colonel North, and when advised of it, I turned it around and sent it back."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 79.)

THE TEHRAN TRIP: NORTH'S SUMMONING THE SECOND PLANE

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			McFARLANE ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Well, I was told that the second aircraft . . . of three was on its way to Tehran and this was the product of discussions during the night with Iranian interlocutors, Ghorbanifar, Colonel North, and Mr. Nir and that they believed that they would have by morning two hostages turned over to U.S. custody in Lebanon, and I said that was unacceptable and that the aircraft should be turned around and sent back." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 158-59; see id., 5/14/87, at 9-11.)
86/05/27-220 MAY 27 [?], 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NORTH'S SUMMONING THE SECOND PLANE NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified the plane set out for Iran in accord with a prearranged plan: "It was the plan consistent throughout that that aircraft, which was based at an Israeli air force base, would have to launch by a certain time of day in order to get to Tehran. It was always the plan that the aircraft could be turned around at what we call the fail safe or turn-around point, wherein if it went beyond that, it had to go all the way into Tehran because it would run out of fuel before it got back. It was always a part of the plan. It was in the OP plan that I wrote up for this entire thing, and it all proceeded accordingly. "Thus, at 6:00 in the morning when Mr. McFarlane got up, I told him, in accord with the plan, the airplane is two hours from turn-around

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			point and we allowed the meeting to go on for a little bit longer to see if we were going to prosper, and then both of us reluctantly agreed to turn the plane around. "I don't know--there were many other people who were there. There was a CIA communicator. The communications were being monitored in Tel Aviv and in Washington. Everybody knew what was going on with that airplane. It wasn't some secret 'Ollie North, middle of the night, flying off on his own hook.' Ollie North didn't do that, and I don't know why the committee was left with that impression. You'd have to ask others, but there were others who were there that know that this entire plan was already in the OP plan, fully briefed, and that's just exactly the way it went. In a very calm, moderate, and reasoned way, we decided that we would turn the airplane around in accordance with the plan that we had all worked on. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And your testimony is that you had been specifically authorized in advance to make that decision while Mr. McFarlane was asleep; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I didn't even have to make a decision. The plane launched in accord with a . . . previously established schedule. I don't even recall that we even confirmed it except that I got the call from the command center in Tel Aviv. The airplane is up. It made it off the ground. It didn't crash with that fuel load aboard. "It had to launch in the early morning or

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			midnight hours because of the heat and the air temperature and all the rest of that stuff that makes airplanes fly." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 113-15.)
86/05/27-223 MAY 27 [?], 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: NORTH'S SUMMONING THE SECOND PLANE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. COURTER. . . .[T]here seems to be a dispute between Colonel North's testimony on this point and yours . . . . It was my recollection of your testimony that there [were] meetings that Oliver North had or apparently was having when you went to sleep that night in Tehran and that you were awakened by Colonel North and you were surprised to know that a second plane was approaching the point of no return that had additional military equipment on it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. ". . . . "Mr. COURTER. It was Oliver North's testimony about that incident that that was part of the original plan, that the second plane would have to leave, that there would be a window of opportunity some time late in the evening or early in the morning during which a final decision would be made, and that if it was made to abort the program and the mission then the plane would be told to turn back. That was his testimony. Is that in your opinion today radically different, substantively different than yours? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think it is radically different, Mr. Courter. The only point that is

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			perhaps worth noting is that if a plan had existed, and I think to the extent that hours of take-off and transit and landing of each aircraft were planned, obviously to coincide with hours of darkness and so forth, also it has to acknowledge that if you go in with step 1 of the plan and things go wrong, then step 2 you don't take, and that is the point. It was very obvious to all of us that the Iranians had breached their end of the bargain. I agree today in hindsight that it is their [sic] own communcations problems that led to that, but nevertheless it had broken down and so to go forward automatically with a second step we just didn't do or didn't intend to do. "Mr. COURTER. Is it your testimony that you advised Oliver North of the fact that we must abort the mission and that the mission was, in fact, aborted? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 264-66.)
86/05/27-225 MAY 27[?], 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: THE SECOND PLANE EARL ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . Do you recall whether an order was given during that trip for the second aircraft? "A. Oh, yes, that did happen. "Q. Who gave the order? "A. Well, I don't recall specifically. It seems to me it was Bud McFarlane, but my recollection is it was cleared by everyone. I mean, everyone was aware of it. It was in these phone calls and hard copy messages back and forth discussing what to do to take action in response

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			to the situation as we then saw it, that that was agreed to by everyone as the way we would proceed on attempting to put a little more pressure on their side and get some success out of this thing before the party left. "Q. Put more pressure on them by having the second aircraft carrying the arms leave Tel Aviv? "A. Yes, so that the U.S. side could say they are en route now. You have sent your folks to deal with the hostage-holders. You show something from your side and we will have, and they will be here in X number of hours. "Q. Did Admiral Poindexter approve that order, as far as you recall? "A. I can't recall specifically, but it's inconceivable to me that that would have occurred without Admiral Poindexter being aware of it and approving it. That wasn't something that -- "Q. Same for the President? "A. -- that anybody would have generated on his own. "Q. The same for the President as you understood the chain of command in this? "A. I would assume so generally. Whether that specific level of detail would have been briefed and approved by the President, I don't know. But certainly the more general context in which that arose seemed to me to be going to the President. "Q. That order was given and then subsequently the order was reversed and the aircraft was sent back? "A. When they flew for several hours, two

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			hours-something, when they came to that point, at which we were supposed to have something to show for it on the Iranian side, there was nothing and we were getting continued delaying and stalling tactics and the Iranians then -- the aircraft was ordered to return. I think it had a fail-safe built in. The crew was briefed that if they got no communications at that point that they would turn around. "So even if we had a radio problem we were not going to have inadvertent delivery of the second aircraft." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 48-50.)
86/05/27-400 MAY 27, 1986			THE DAWA PRISONERS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Mr. McFarlane, a good deal has been said about Colonel North operating within established guidelines. . . . I would like to call your atteniton to . . . the Tower report, . . . pages B-115 and 116. . . . It indicates on May 27 of 1986 at 5:00 p.m., you were part of the discussions with the Iran representatives, and it is reflected on page B-115 when they asked about the question of the Dawa terrorists, I should say, held in Kuwait, it said that with regard to the problem raised by the captors, the Dawa prisoners, 'It is much in our mind, as has been raised before, our position is derived from our policy which respects all nations' judicial policies. We cannot ignore their process. I am sad to report all of this. I respect what you said. I will report it to my President, but I cannot be

optimistic.'

"That is what was said at the meeting that started at 5:00 p.m. this day. Apparently there was another meeting that evening around 9:30 p.m. at which you were not present. It is recorded on page B-116 of the Tower Report that Colonel North made a statement such as the following: 'The United States will make every effort through and with international organizations, private individuals, religious organizations and any other third parties in a humanitarian effort to achieve the release and just and fair shipment for the Shiites held in confinement as soon as possible.'

"That is in direct opposition of what you had said at 5:00 p.m. or approximately thereafter earlier that evening. I wondered, when did you learn of this change in representation being made to the Iranians?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. When the Tower Report was published.

"Mr. COHEN. That was the first occasion that it came to your attention that such a representation had been made to the Iranians?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. COHEN. Is that true with respect to the need for Suddam Hussein to go?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. COHEN. Was that something that you would have expected Colonel North to have reported to you during the flight back or shortly thereafter."

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 281-83. On the Dawa and Saddam Hussein, see entries starting

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			at 86/10/08-420.)
86/05/28-050 MAY 28, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: CONTRA AID INQUIRIES MELTON ACCOUNT: Richard Melton testified on his May 28, 1986 memo to Abrams recording his contact with Gen. Singlaub about aid to the Contras: "Q. . . . [The memo i]ndicates that General Singlaub called again to ask for reconsideration of the counsel not to solicit funds. Do you have any independent recollection of that call? "A. As I recall, it is basically as recorded there. "Q. Do you remember where General Singlaub was calling from? "A. No, I don't. "Q. Okay. "A. Well, it is indicated where it was, he was calling from someplace in Washington. ". . . . "Q. . . . In your memo you state that Singlaub had said he had transferred funds from an overseas to a domestic account to have them available for quick disbursal if needed. Did General Singlaub indicate how much money he had available to him at that time for disbursement to the contras? "A. No. "Q. He never gave you a ballpark figure? "A. No. Never discussed it with him. "Q. Did he ever tell you how much money he intended to ask for from the foreign countries? "A. Yes. That is in the memo. That is in	

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		one of the early memos. "Q. Do you have an independent recollection that he told you $10 million? "A. Yes. That is my recollection. I think that is what is in the memo, yes. "Q. Okay. And he asked then if in light of the circumstances concerning pending legislation and the need for cash, if it might not be wise to reactivate his proposal to seek funding from his sources in these foreign countries. "And you state there, I confined my response to stating that I would raise the matter with you and get back in touch. Is there any reason why you just didn't tell him then that a decision had been made and that was the end of it? "A. No. In any circumstance like this, I would pass the information on any similar kind, not even similar but something where a request was conveyed to me where it would require a policy decision. I would always pass that request forward." (Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 53-56; JHICI Ex. EA 8 [Melton memo to Abrams, "Singlaub Asks for Reconsideration of Solicitation Offer," 5/28/86; Committee Document S 4028].)	
86/05/28-400 MAY 28, 1986		TARMAC DISCUSSION: North mentions to McFarlane on the tarmac in Israel that some of the funds are being applied to Central America. See col. 3.	THE TEHRAN TRIP McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane and his group leave Tehran after McFarlane declares there would be no more arms before the hostages are released: (1) LEAVING TEHRAN

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			"Mr. MCFARLANE. . . .I had checked first with the President. I had recommended against it and he concurred. "Mr. LIMAN. You recommended against a delivery of the arms? "Mr. MCFARLANE. And the President concurred? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. And you checked with him by secure communication? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did." (2) TARMAC DISCUSSION When they arrive at Ben-Gurion airstrip in Israel, McFarlane requests that a secure radio be set up. While that is being done, North "mentioned to me [sc. McFarlane] offhandedly that I shouldn't count it a total loss, that we are applying some of the funds from the Iranian connection to Central America, or words to that effect. And I was a little startled." (3) McFARLANE CALLS WASHINGTON McFarlane then speaks with Poindexter on the radio and requests instructions that he should return to Washington. Poindexter says, "[F]ine, go ahead, he would advise the President." McFarlane does not mention to Poindexter what North has just told him about the funds. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable with what he [sc. North] told you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it was of a piece with a half dozen items that I had learned which seemed to me either unorthodox or very risky, but I was

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			not in the government . . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 160-63; see id., 5/12/87, at 161-62.)
86/05/28-450 MAY 24 - 28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: McFARLANE'S CONTACT WITH POINDEXTER EARL ACCOUNT: Robert Earl, acting as backup at the NSC for the McFarlane party, described McFarlane's contact with Poindexter during the Tehran trip: " . . . My recollection is that Admiral Poindexter was involved whenever necessary in guiding the operation, and toward the later stages, as it turned out that the Iranians were expecting something different than what we had in our understanding -- whether it was miscommunication or deliberate deception on Ghorbanifar's part and there was not this meeting of the minds as had been hoped -- that there were extensive secure voice radio calls direct between Admiral Poindexter and Bud McFarlane." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 31.)
86/05/28-500 MAY 28, 1986		TARMAC (OR THEREABOUTS) DISCUSSION NORTH ACCOUNT: North "first confirmed" for McFarlane the diversion of funds "during the May trip to Tehran." See col. 3.	TARMAC (OR THEREABOUTS) DISCUSSION NORTH ACCOUNT: North generally agreed with McFarlane on when McFarlane first learned from him of the diversion. He placed their discussion on the return leg of the Tehran trip (though not necessarily on the Israeli tarmac): "Mr. NIELDS. . . . When did McFarlane, to your knowledge, first learn that the proceeds from

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			the arms sales to Iran had been used for the contras? "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is that I first confirmed it with him during the May trip to Tehran, and it was probably on the return leg from that, either on board the aircraft or as we were changing planes, we returned in an aircraft to Israel, and boarded another aircraft and flew back to the United States, so it was somewhere in that time frame that I can recall specifically telling him. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you have any reason to believe he was aware of it earlier? "Mr. NORTH. He may have been. I have seen some of my own notes that would lead me to believe I had talked to him about it, but I don't recall the events. "I so specifically recall, however, talking to him about it at the time of our return." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 123. See id., 7/10/87, at 38 [North: "I don't recall doing it [having the discussion with McFarlane] specifically on the tarmac in Ben Gurion Airport, but I am sure I said it to him at some point in the process."].)
86/05/28-750 MAY 28, 1986 OR THEREAFTER			THE TEHRAN TRIP: CAVE'S REPORT CAVE MEMO: In a post-trip report, Cave states that Ghorbanifar is a "dishonest interlocutor," who "gave each side a different picture of the structure of the deal." But Cave favors continuing the Initiative:

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			"Since both Gorba and the Second Iranian stood to make a lot of money out of the deal, they presumably will work hard to bring it off." Cave concludes that the Kuwaitis hold the key to the impasse, and that the U.S. hostages will not be released until Kuwait releases the Dawa. He grounds his conclusion on the independence of the hostage-holders in Lebanon. Until then, he believes that the Hizballah will not release all the hostages. (Iran-Contra Report, at 242 [citing Cave summary of Tehran Trip, undated (Committee Document N 1483, at 1487); Cave Int., 9/29/87, at 21-22].)
86/05/28-900 MAY 28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "OAKLEY tells PLATT that the NORTH operation has 'fizzled,' negotiations have broken down, and that MCFARLANE was involved and may have been in Tehran. PLATT advises HILL, who informs GPS." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/05/00-609.)
86/05/29-010 MAY 29, 1986		BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE TEHRAN TRIP NO MENTION OF DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane, in a meeting with the President and Poindexter following McFarlane's return from Tehran, does not mention North's comment on the Israeli tarmac that the funds are going to Central America. See col. 3.	BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE TEHRAN TRIP McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane returns to Washington, meets briefly ("[p]robably for a moment or two") with Poindexter, "and then went on to see the President." McFarlane does not report North's comment about the use of the money for Central America. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 164-65.)

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86/05/29-011 MAY 29, 1986		BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE TEHRAN TRIP: NO MENTION OF DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE TEHRAN TRIP McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you report to them [the President and Poindexter] on what North told you about the use of the money for Central America? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. And when he said to you that it was being used for Central America, is it fair to say you understood he was saying it was being used for the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I took it to be a matter of approved policy and one of which the Government must be witting. "Mr. LIMAN. What do you mean by the approved, an approved policy? "Mr. MCFARLANE. The decision-makers, Admiral Poindexter, the DCI, the other principals who would have to be party to that kind of decision. "Mr. LIMAN. You did not know at that time that there was a middleman's profit that could be used? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Your understanding at that time was that this was a sale by the CIA to the Iranian Government? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I did know there was a finding. Therefore, I deduced that the CIA was involved, and I also rationalized, I guess, that the CIA would probably have hired some cutout and that they would naturally turn to someone of known reliability or someone who had worked for them. "So it didn't seem to me out of place that

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			General Secord might have become involved in that way. "Mr. LIMAN. Were you told that it was General Secord who was applying the funds? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I wasn't told who or what or how or anything else about the funds. "Mr. LIMAN. When was the next time you had any discussion with Oliver North about this subject? "Mr. MCFARLANE. In November of 1986." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 165-66. See 86/05/29-013, 86/11/18-650, 86/11/19-250, 86/11/23-100 [McFarlane's discussions with North about the diversion].)
86/05/29-012 AFTER MAY 28, 1986		DIVERSION: McFARLANE, ONCE AWARE, DOESN'T REPEAT THE STORY McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. When Lieutenant Colonel North told you while in Iran that funds received from the Iran arms sales would go to support the contras, did you ever discuss this with Admiral Poindexter or others in the administration? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "Mr. BROOMFIELD. Did you ever tell anyone in the administration, including Lieutenant Colonel North, that there was a big problem with the concept of diverting funds in support of the contras? "Mr. McFARLANE. Not until November, 1986. No, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 224.)	DIVERSION: McFARLANE, ONCE AWARE, DOESN'T REPEAT THE STORY McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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86/05/29-013 MAY AND NOVEMBER 1986		DIVERSION: WHETHER THE POLICY WAS APPROVED McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: WHETHER THE POLICY WAS APPROVED McFARLANE ACCOUNT: In November 1986, McFarlane and North next raise the topic of diversion when McFarlane tells North -- "in the company of Admiral Poindexter and Dr. Keel and Mr. North, so that the issue could not have been ambiguous, at least between the Admiral and Colonel North" -- that the diversion remains a problem. (See 86/11/18-650, 86/11/19-250.) "Mr. LIMAN. And when you said, 'You have a problem,' what did you mean? What kind of problem? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It just seemed to me that unless someone could stand up and say that this is on the basis of a finding, or is chartered by specific decision by the Admiral or the President, that I could not imagine this kind of thinking being justified in law or at least not that I had heard of, and-- "Mr. LIMAN. Yes, sir, this was the same thing he told you originally in Tehran. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Or on the tarmac, yes, in Israel. "Mr. LIMAN. Or on the tarmac in Israel. And now some months later, you are telling him that he has got a problem, and you can't imagine unless there was some kind of finding or other authority that this would be lawful; right? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. In those circumstances, why didn't you raise it with Poindexter when you

returned from your trip to Tehran and Israel?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, there is no good reason for that. I did raise with the Admiral what I thought to be--what would serve Ollie's interest. That was to reassign him to the Marine Corps [see 86/06/11-103] and avoid the exhaustion that he was experiencing, but bear in mind that I heard--within a matter of days of learning of that news on the tarmac, that there had been earlier shipments of weapons; that there had been no hostages released; that there was a finding extant that legitimized that; that the CIA was managing and participating in all this, and--

"Mr. LIMAN. So you are saying that there was so much that you didn't know that others were doing that you just concluded that you shouldn't raise questions about what people knew and what they didn't know?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is the way I felt at the time. It seemed to me, however, in November that after the disclosures had been made that it was worth at least making sure that it really was the way I had taken it to be, a matter of approved policy. I doubted that it was.

"Mr. LIMAN. You say you doubted that it was. Did you ask North was it a matter of approved policy?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I did in a meeting which occurred later that I suppose we will get to. [See 86/11/23-100.]"

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 172-74.)

86/05/29-080 THE TEHRAN TRIP: NORTH'S VIEW

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
AFTER MAY 28, 1986			COY ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you talk to Colonel North after he returned from Tehran about the Tehran trip in late May or early June of 1986? "A. Yes. "Q. What did he tell you about the trip, whether it had been successful, unsuccessful, how it went? "A. The parts I recall about the trip are that it was unsuccessful, that McFarlane was upset about the reception that he received, that they didn't meet with the people he thought he was going to meet with, hostages were not released, so it was a frustrating trip and -- that is generally what I recall." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 62.)
86/05/29-100 SOMETIME AFTER MAY 28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, when were you first informed of the McFarlane mission to Tehran? "Secretary SHULTZ. It was after the mission, but I think shortly after it was completed. "Mr. BELNICK. And were you given the details of the mission at that time? "Secretary SHULTZ. I was told that it had fizzled and that with those events in mind, the fizzling of that initiative, that the whole project had been told to stand down. "Mr. BELNICK. Were you told at that time that Mr. McFarlane had brought U.S. weapons with him to Tehran? "Secretary SHULTZ. No."

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			(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 8.)
86/05/29-150 AFTER MAY 28, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: WEINBERGER'S KNOWLEDGE WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. When McFarlane made his trip to Tehran in late May of 1986, you said you did not know about that ahead of time; is that correct? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct. "Mr. SARBANES. But you subsequently picked up information about it from non-U.S. sources? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Information to the effect that there were meetings going on with high U.S. representatives and when inquiries were made, we ultimately learned who it was." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 220-21. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 88-89 [Weinberger's knowledge of the Tehran trip].)
86/05/29-500 MAY 29, 1986		SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: MELTON CONVEYS ABRAMS' RESPONSE TO SINGLAUB MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 1: Following Melton's memo to Abrams on May 28, 1986 (see 86/05/28-050), Melton conveys a response to Singlaub's inquiries about Contra aid. Melton testified on his contact with Abrams and his response to Singlaub: "A. I sent the memo, and as would be normal in this case, he [Abrams] wouldn't respond, I wouldn't get a memo back but I saw him frequently and he would say, well, this is what we or I would raise it, I said what should I tell General Singlaub, and in the course of going over a series	

of things, he gave me the guidance on that and that is basically the guidance that is reflected in the memo.

"Q. So your May 29 memo sets forth the substance of what Mr. Abrams told you to tell General Singlaub?

"A. That is correct.

". . . .

"Q. . . . Now, let's go to the message that you conveyed to General Singlaub. First of all, how did you convey this to him, by telephone?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Okay. Do you recall whether he was in town?

"A. I think that is right, because the previous one says he would be there until Friday, and I would, I think probably the 29th probably was Friday.

"Q. Do you recall whether you called him or he called you?

"A. I don't, but I may have called him in this instance. I think I probably did call him.

"Q. Okay. And you state then the situation on fund raising is basically the same as previously described to him, to wit, it would still be premature for him to reactivate his efforts with these countries.

"When you referred in there to the situation being as previously described to him, does that jog your memory that you were ever, that you can recall what discussions were held between General Singlaub and Mr. Abrams about what the situation was that was described to him?

"A. Regurgitation of what was conveyed in the previous conversations with him. There is no more than is there, and in some ways there is not as much as there seems to be in the brief messages that were conveyed. But there is no more substance. It was basically saying, no, there is no change in the decision, and it is conveyed in language that is designed to be sort of less categorical than really the position was.

"Q. Your next paragraph says 'we applaud his efforts on behalf of the resistance and urge him on in his other endeavors.' Do you recall what other endeavors of General Singlaub were referred to there?

"A. None at all. That is very general and it is in the context of General Singlaub is, you know, an authentic American war hero.

"Q. And when you talk about his efforts on behalf of the resistance, what perception did you have of the role General Singlaub was playing with regard to the Nicaraguan resistance?

"A. I had no detailed knowledge at all of what his role was. I have subsequently learned a great deal by listening to some of the hearings.

"Q. Let me exclude that, and I am not asking for --

"A. I really didn't have any real knowledge of what activity he was engaged in.

"Q. All right. You said detailed knowledge. I realize you didn't have any detailed knowledge, but what general knowledge did you have as to his activities. I mean, he was a pretty public figure. He didn't hide what he was up to. I am just trying to find out what you perceived at that time.

"A. I had read things in the paper about what he was doing and that sort of thing and charges and counter charges. And he was, he has never been hesitant to talk to the press. So I read some of those things that, what he was doing and that sort of thing, but I had no -- frankly, I really didn't focus on him and what his activities were. I really didn't have any great knowledge of what his activities were."
(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 56-61; JHICI Ex. EA 9 [Melton Memorandum for the Record, "Singlaub Request for Reconsideration of Solicitation Offer," 5/29/86; Committee Document S 4027].)

86/05/29-501
MAY 29, 1986

SINGLAUB-MELTON CONTACT: MELTON CONVEYS ABRAMS' RESPONSE TO SINGLAUB

MELTON ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Okay. Let me go back to the meeting, the face-to-face meeting with General Singlaub which took place after he had come back from his visits to countries 3 and 5. [See 86/05/22-200 through -202.] I with like you to focus on that conversation one more time. . . .

". . . .

"Q. . . . General Singlaub remembers a meeting, Assistant Secretary Abrams remembers a meeting, but recollections differ as to whether, who else was present for those meetings. What is your best recollection? A meeting took place. There is no question about it. I am just trying to find out who[m] you can recall being present.

"A. If we have definitely established that the meeting took place, then I would have been there. It may have been just me.

"Q. All right. Do you recall at any time, at any meeting between Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub, whether or not Abrams ever made a comment to General Singlaub telling him that the highest levels of government, or words to that effect, had made the decision that General Singlaub should not go forward with his efforts with countries 3 and 5 due to other important matters at the highest level?

"A. Not specifically in those terms, but something like that would be sort of consistent with the messages I was conveying to him, designed to convey a, really a 'no' to him in a way that would be more acceptable than just a categorical 'no' and explanation.

"Q. Well, I understand that. Again, by asking the question, I don't mean to imply that there is anything wrong with any of this.

"A. Consistent with the way in which all of the messages were conveyed to General Singlaub. So I have no specific recollection of that language, but some language which put the decision in less than categorical terms, no, we don't want your help was consistent with the kinds of messages that I was conveying to him throughout this process."
(Melton, Senate Dep., 5/27/87, at 61-64. For Melton's testimony on his contact with Singlaub see 86/04/30-300; 86/05/08-500 and -501;

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		86/05/12-101 through -103; 86/05/14-101 through -103; 86/05/15-103; 86/05/22-200 through -202; 86/05/20-050.)	
86/05/30-100 SOMETIME IN MID-1986	DIVERSION: OTHER PROJECTS HAKIM ACCOUNT: The enterprise also paid for Motorola radios for the Caribbean, a Mediterranean ship, and the DEA hostage-rescue operation. See col. 2.	DIVERSION HAKIM ACCOUNT: Secord testified that after the February and May 1986 sales of weapons to the Iranians, about $14 million remained. Asked about this money, Hakim testified it was "to be used to primarily assist the contras and also try to make the so-called [] enterprise that we had created self[-]sustained and create a financial backbone for it." But Hakim also testified that Secord had remarked to him, "We don't know what Oliver will need next, so we have to have money available." Hakim related some of North's projects: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it one of them involved Motorola radios for a Caribbean country? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And another involved a ship for a special operation in the Mediterranean? "Mr. HAKIM. You are correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Another example would be cash that was required for DEA agents in connection with an effort to release the hostages? "Mr. HAKIM. you are correct on that, too." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 230.)	DIVERSION HAKIM ACCOUNT: Distribution of the Iranian arms sales profits. See col. 2.
86/05/31-200 LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: TAMBS' ROLE TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testified that sometime "in late May,	

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1986		early June of 1986" the Costa Rican Government instructed him to shut down the airstrip: "Mr. BELNICK. And you carried out that instruction? "Mr. TAMBS. I told Tomas Castillo to shut it down. "Mr. BELNICK. It was shut down as far as you knew? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 172. See id., 5/28/87, at 236 [Tambs: "I told [Castillo] to tell North and Udall Corporation to shut it down." He did not pass the message on to the State Department.], 264.)	
86/06/00-100 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: HOW IT WAS TARGETED FOR SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams selects Brunei as the country to solicit in June 1986: "Mr. BELNICK: How? "Mr. ABRAMS.– Take a list of countries in the world and exclude those with insufficient resources to make a humanitarian contribution. Exclude further those which are right-wing dictatorships, or which are, if you will, on the other side, allied with the Soviet Union. Then exclude those . . . over which we can be said to have some leverage. You are left essentially with oil producers. Then look for non-Arab--since I had been to Ambassador Murphy already, non-Middle East, non-Arab oil producers. Venezuela, I thought, would not do this. You are down to	

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		Brunei. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. . . . You discussed it with Dr. Sigur, this selection? "Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. And you discussed it with the Secretary of State? "Mr. ABRAMS. I think I went back to the Secretary and said, I have a suggestion. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. How did you formulate $10 million? "Mr. ABRAMS. We were spending in the humanitarian aid program at the rate of $3 million a month, $27 million for what was supposed to be about nine months initially. In the end it was less then nine months. But we thought we wanted this to get us to the end of the summer, about three months. Ten million, 3 million a month was the ball park. ". . . . "Mr. ABRAMS. . . . It was precisely bridge funding. We used that term. "Mr. BELNICK. And it was going to be bridge funding for humanitarian purposes? "Mr. ABRAMS. Exactly. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. You recall the Secretary of State was going to be traveling to a meeting in Asia in June and it was at that point thought that he himself might make the solicitation? "Mr. ABRAMS. Well, the Secretary was going to Brunei.	

"Mr. BELNICK. And it was thought he would make the solicitation on that occasion?

"Mr. ABRAMS. I wouldn't say it was thought. It was certainly a possibility, yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Prior to his leaving, did you do anything to get a bank account into which the hoped-for contribution could be deposited?

"Mr. ABRAMS. Yes.

". . . .

". . . I think I called Colonel North and said, here is my problem, we are going to do a solicitation. They may say yes. There has to be a contra account into which this money can be put [].

". . . How does the State Department deal with this?

". . . [H]e said, well, . . . that is easy. We can set up an account or they can set up an account [--] rather easy to do, we will do it. I will take care of it. Something like that.

". . . .

". . . [A]t one point I was in Colonel North's office and he, I guess, had forgotten. In any event, I said to him, hey, the account. And he said, oh, yes. And he directed Fawn Hall to type up a card.

". . . [S]he then handed it to me." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 112-16. See id., 6/2/87, at 222-23 [Abrams suggested Brunei, but it was Shultz who decided on it.], 235 [North's only role in the Brunei solicitation was to provide an account number.]. See also id., 6/3/87, at 3 [Shultz and Abrams never discussed

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		whether the Brunei solicitation would ever be disclosed to Congress if the money should arrive.].)	
86/06/00-110 AFTER MAY 16, 1986		BRUNEI: HOW IT WAS TARGETED FOR SOLICITATION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. BELNICK. Now, sir, after the May 16, 1986 [NSPG] meeting, did you pursue the assignment you had been given to come up with candidate donor countries? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I did. But it is not that easy. At least given the way it seemed to me you should think about it. It seemed to me not a particularly good idea to go to countries with which we had a big military or economic assistance relationship, because it could be too easily misinterpreted; and I didn't think it was a good idea to go to a country where we would, in a sense, be giving them a major marker and where we had things that were very difficult and delicate to deal with or to a country that was being run in a way that we found essentially undesirable and somehow could wind up compromising us. "So by the time you place all these restrictions down, you eliminate a lot of countries. "Mr. BELNICK. Among which would have been Countries 2 and 3 and 4 for various reasons? "Secretary SHULTZ. Probably, I think it was questionable. But at any rate, you ought to try to think of something else first, I thought, and rack your brains about that. "Mr. BELNICK. And what country did you come	

up with?

"Secretary SHULTZ. It wasn't my idea, but I think it was a very good idea, and I will say the name of the country, although I have been resisting it all this time, because we told them we wouldn't. But they have made their own announcement. We came up with the idea of Brunei; or Elliott Abrams, at least to my knowledge, thought about it and it seemed perfect.

"Mr. BELNICK. And you tasked Elliott Abrams with the assignment of attending to the details of approaching Brunei at that time, of getting things set up so that the approach could be made?

"Let me be specific. You knew that Mr. Abrams obtained an account number from Colonel North into which a contribution from Brunei, if it were obtained, would be deposited?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think what happened was that he made this proposal, I thought it was a good idea, kind of in the abstract or in principle. This was just before I was about to go on a trip to Asia, an annual meeting with the ASEAN foreign ministers, and when I do that, I always try to go to one country in the ASEAN group beyond the one where we happened to meet, so that I go to all of those countries. And I had planned to go to Brunei as part of this effort and everybody knew that schedule.

"So the question was should I bring this up when I was in Brunei. I decided it wasn't appropriate for me to do that, but at any rate, I raised the question with Elliott, 'Suppose I am there and they agree, then what do I tell them to

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		do next? How do they make this contribution?' And that is what brought forth the bank account number." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 46-48.)	
86/06/00-111 AFTER MAY 16, 1986		BRUNEI: HOW IT WAS TARGETED FOR SOLICITATION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BELNICK. And am I correct that you were informed that the [bank account] number was the number of a contra account? "Secretary SHULTZ. The idea was that we were making a solicitation for humanitarian aid to help the freedom fighters and that the way to do it was to deposit the money in an account that the freedom fighters controlled and then that transaction would have been made. That was a way of having that happen so that it didn't--the money didn't come to us and then go to them. It was a direct contribution of Brunei to the freedom fighters. "Mr. BELNICK. And were you informed that the account you were given was, in fact, an account that the contras controlled? "Secretary SHULTZ. That was my understanding, which I got from Elliott; and I--he has told me that is the information he got from Colonel North, from whom he solicited--or whose advice he sought, who gave him this number. "Mr. BELNICK. And as I understand it, Secretary Abrams gave you the account number on a card which you carried with you to the conference in Asia in the event you were going to see the	

Chief of State of Brunei and the contribution was discussed, you were to give him that card or at least the number on it; is that correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That was the idea. I don't know that I carried it around personally, but anyway, we had it on the trip.

"Mr. BELNICK. And had you on that trip seen the sultan or a representative of the government, and had the contribution been discussed and agreed to, you would have given him the account number that Secretary Abrams had given you?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. And I didn't.

"Mr. BELNICK. I understand, sir.

"Secretary SHULTZ. As it turned out.

"Mr. BELNICK. But those who sent you with the account number, Colonel North, others knew that that account number was one which the Secretary of State might hand to the Chief of State of Brunei in connection with seeking a humanitarian contribution to the Nicaraguan opposition; correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, without--I don't want to overdo the niceties of things, but I doubt that in the end I would have handed it to the sultan. I think probably that would have been--if I had done it, it would have been discussed and some way would have been found to give them the number, a proper way.

"Mr. BELNICK. But the number was intended--

"Secretary SHULTZ. It's not relevant, but I think--I wouldn't want the sultan to think that I would try to conduct that level of business with him.

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		"Mr. BELNICK. The account number was intended to get to the sultan? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. All right. "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, get to the government in an authoritative way. "Mr. BELNICK. All right. And nobody informed you at that time--not Colonel North, not Admiral Poindexter--that the account number you were given which was intended to get to the Government of Brunei for the purpose of the humanitarian contribution was the account number of Lake Resources, which was an account that was used for buying arms and furnishing lethal assistance to the contras as well as for other purposes, and was under the control of Messrs. Albert Hakim and Richard Secord? You were not informed of those facts, were you, sir? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. We were informed otherwise; that this was an account controlled by the Nicaraguan Resistance. "Mr. BELNICK. The remainder of the-- "Secretary SHULTZ. I would say Elliott was informed of that and that is the information he gave me. I didn't--I wasn't that much involved directly in the discussion about that number." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 49-51. See JHICI Exx. GPS 56-A through -U [account number for the Brunei deposit and cable traffic between the DoS and Government of Brunei, 7/18/86 - 12/4/86].)	
86/06/00-150 SOMETIME IN		BRUNEI: THE WRONG ACCOUNT NORTH TESTIMONY:	

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JUNE 1986		North testified he provided Abrams with the bank account number for the Brunei deposit. Had he noticed that the number had been scrambled, "it wouldn't have been transposed." North testified, "I would not have given intentionally a wrong number to Mr. Abrams, you can be sure." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, 120-121.)	
86/06/00-160 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: NO NOTICE TO THE CIA NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask Mr. Abrams not to tell the CIA about the bank account number that you gave him? "Mr. NORTH. No. As I recall, he asked me not to tell the CIA. "Mr. LIMAN. So that there was a request and an agreement that the CIA wouldn't be told about that? "Mr. NORTH. Yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 121.)	
86/06/00-165 JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: CIA INVOLVEMENT C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. . . . I take it it's correct that in the summer of 1986 Elliott Abrams told you of the possibility of receiving a sum of money from Brunei, [redacted] about getting an account set up in the [redacted] and that took place. "Is that roughly correct? "[C/CATF.] That's roughly correct. "Mr. Carome. I have just two specific questions on this. "First, did you have any discussions with Mr.	

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		Abrams at the time about what will be done to make sure that the Brunei money that was anticipated would only be used for the humanitarian purpose for which it might lawfully be solicited? "[C/CATF.] I absolutely recall this, yes. "Mr. Carome. Had you such discussions with him? "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Carome. What was the plan to make sure that money would only be used for humanitarian purposes? "[C/CATF.] I don't think you can call it a plan. I remember two snatches of meetings, a phone call and two meetings in the Situation Room attendant to the legislative process. At that point in time we were right in the process of high political intrigue. As most of you recall, both chambers, both chambers had passed a hundred million dollar legislation, the Administration was trying to get it to continue and authorize before the August recess, certain elements of the legislature were trying to block that and to drag it out. "There was high intrigue. The House was ragingly divided against itself, and we were having a lot of meetings about how to deal with this in mostly legislative meetings. Elliott said I'm going off to Brunei, I have a possibility of soliciting some money. As I recall it, he said how much do we need? I did some rough calculations. At that point in time I knew where the program was. I said $10 million would bring us both the rest of this fiscal year and would	

give us something to work with, a little margin next fiscal year.

"And I said, he said how do we handle it? I said the best way to handle it is to go to [redacted] and have him open a bank account because we trust the man and the man will help us account for the money, you can make sure that you will be able to have the same accountability apply to that money, [redacted] and we will be able to work with him so that we can control it and have it spent for the things it should be spent for. We didn't go into --

"Mr. Carome. Who was going to control the money?

"[C/CATF.] [Redacted] UNO.

"Mr. Carome. Would he [sic] be overseen in doing that by the United States?

"[C/CATF.] Absolutely. [Redacted] what I was implying in that conversation and Elliott I don't think recalls it, we do the same thing with this money and this would allow the State Department to have control over that money, so it didn't get diverted around and used for other purposes.

"Mr. Carome. Did you specifically have a discussion with Elliott Abrams in which it was decided that this money would be used only for humanitarian purposes?

"[C/CATF.] That was clear. I mean in my mind it was clear.

"Mr. Carome. Did you discuss that with him?

"[C/CATF.] I don't -- I recall it, Elliott doesn't recall it. I recall something like if you put it in the [redacted] bank account -- excuse

me, into the bank account [redacted] you will be able to be sure it is used for the proper purpose, intended purpose consistent with what you can do, something like that. Remember, these were snatches of conversation on the margin of a meeting. I remember them pretty clearly. My short-term memory is not too bad. That meeting I recall because we had to press very, very hard to open the bank account."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 45-48. See id. at 217-18 [the bank account used for the Brunei deposit].)

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BRUNEI: CIA INVOLVEMENT
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[C/CATF's response continues from preceding entry:]

"[C/CATF.] I would like to add one other thing because this is important to me, it's important to me in my relationship with this committee. I want to go back to a meeting that took place in the spring of 1986. It became very clear to us that the $7 million of humanitarian money was going to run out before the legislation was ultimately passed. By May I think most of us in the Administration that were dealing with this problem were fairly confident the Congress was going to authorize renewed assistance for the resistance. But NHAO money wasn't going to get us there. We calculated NHAO money, Ambassador Duemling and I ran calculations, would be fully expended sometime by the end of June, legislation may not make it until September and we needed to

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		do something. "That was the subject of an NSPG meeting at the White House, and I think that you have records of that NSPG meeting. On the agenda of that NSPG meeting there were several alternatives discussed. One alternative was coming to the Congress, seeking under the authorities in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1986 reprogramming of funds to bridge the money. That was the option that I was pushing. I pushed that very hard. I said let's go to the committees, let's go to Congress, let's tell them our problem and let's see if we can't get two or three million dollars reprogrammed under the Intelligence Authorization Act and bridge ourselves through to this program. I briefed the Director, I argued in the interagency group meeting, got it put on the agenda, and at that meeting one of the cabinet officials that's testified in front of this committee, said that was a breathtaking, breathtaking to even think we would consider that. [See 86/05/16-292.] "And after the meeting the Director turned to me and said I'm not going to break my pick on that one[,] I'm sorry. Once again I tried to do it a different way, but it wasn't done, and somebody -- and I take it, I sort of was a little bit disappointed that the -- at the way that played out. Because I wanted to go right back and face the issue heads up and see if we couldn't deal with it but others didn't want to deal with it that way." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 49-50.)	

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86/06/00-200 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: THE SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on Shultz' trip to Brunei: "Mr. BELNICK. In any event, Secretary Shultz did travel to the meeting in Asia in June, correct? "Mr. ABRAMS. Correct. "Mr. BELNICK. He had with him from you the account number? "Mr. ABRAMS. He had physically that card. "Mr. BELNICK. That card, Exhibit [EA] 10. But in the event he did not make any solicitation of the government of Brunei on that trip? "Mr. ABRAMS. As I understand it, he had discussions, I think on the plane going out there and maybe with the ambassador when he got there, and I don't remember whether the decision was reached on the plane . . . or when he arrived, that . . . he would . . . raise the general issue of Central America with the officials of Brunei with whom he met, but not solicit any support from them. "Mr. BELNICK. It was decided another representative of the United States Government would do the actual solicitation, correct, subsequently? "Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. ABRAMS. Well, in the first week of August, it was decided that I would be the representative. It . . . had not been assumed throughout I would be, since I did not know	

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		anybody in the government of Brunei." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 119-21.)	
86/06/00-202 SOMETIME IN MAY OR JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: THE SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: In May and June 1986, the plan is for Shultz to do the soliciting on his trip to Brunei. The Sultan has scheduled a carrier ship visit in September or October, and the U.S. Ambassador recommends that the solicitation be put off until after that visit. Abrams testified, "His view was that the relationship with Brunei was such that we needed to have a better and closer one before we could make any such solicitation. That is reflected in the cable traffic. He tried to slow down the process." The solicitation by Abrams occurs on August 8, prior to the ship visit. (Abrams: "The ship visit had no relationship to this at all.") (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 63.)	
		BRUNEI: THE SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT (cont'd): Abrams testified it is correct that the deployment of U.S. naval forces to Brunei and the visit by the Sultan to these ships was planned well in advance and had absolutely nothing to do with the solicitation of funds. Abrams added, "[I]t was long planned, as was the Secretary's visit." He clarified that the ships were not actually deployed to Brunei. They were in the area, not at Brunei. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 64.)	

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86/06/00-400 SOMETIME IN JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: HOW THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on the Lake Resources account into which the money from Brunei was to be deposited: "Mr. NORTH. . . . [A]ll I remember is that at some point in time I gave him [Abrams] a sheet of paper or a card, or whatever, with the account number on it, and I knew at the time that either he or someone from the Department of State was going to talk to a representative from . . . Brunei. . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell him anything about the account? "Mr. NORTH. I told him that it was an account in which he could determine what he wanted done with the moneys in that account, that it would be under U.S. rather than foreign control. "Mr. NIELDS. When you say foreign, do you mean U.S. as opposed to Nicaraguan? "Mr. NORTH. U.S. as opposed to any other -- in other words, a U.S. person would have control over the account, that it wouldn't be a foreigner of some other banking company or some other country, or whatever. That is what I recall. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell him that it was a pre-existing account, one that you were already using for the contras? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall whether I told him that or not. "Mr. NIELDS. The only thing you recall about your conversation was that you told him it was an	

account under the control of a U.S. person?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes. Unless you can refresh my memory better, that is all I remember."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 170-71.)

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AFTER JUNE
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BRUNEI: HOW THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED
HAKIM ACCOUNT:

"Mr. HEFLIN. Now, you have probably read or seen on television some discussions of the Nation of Brunei, that there was to be a $10 million contribution to [sic] Brunei.

"Do you remember having any discussions with anyone pertaining to a donation coming in a substantial amount from any foreign country?

"Mr. HAKIM. I recall about an amount of $10 million to be in the pipeline. The origin of it was not disclosed to me. However, I do recall that I was told it is coming from the Far East when I was trying to trace the money back which we had not received. I was not aware that it came from a foreign government.

"Mr. HEFLIN. Who told you this?

"Mr. HAKIM. General Secord, I believe, sir.

"Mr. HEFLIN. All right.

"Did you--was it identified to you in what account it would be deposited?

"Mr. HAKIM. To the best of my recollection, we had given the account of Lake Resources, if I am not mistaken.

". . . .

"Mr. HEFLIN. Was there any instructions or any information given to you that it was to be segregated and separated from the main account?

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		"Mr. HAKIM. What main account, sir? "Mr. HEFLIN. The main account of Lake Resources. "Mr. HAKIM. Lake Resources was the main account. ". . . . "Mr. HEFLIN. The $10 million, were any instructions given to you that it should be separated from that account and put into another account after receipt? "Mr. HAKIM. What I can recollect, sir, was that--I could be off on this--but I remember was that we had to segregate $7 million of this. I can't remember the details of this. I knew that we were receiving this money and only part of it was supposed to remain in our account for the purchase of weapons and the rest had to be segregated and no specific instruction was given to me. "It was left to the time that we would collect the money. "Mr. HEFLIN. But you remember specifically that a certain portion of the money was to be spent on weapons? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. "Mr. HEFLIN. Not humanitarian aid? "Mr. HAKIM. I believe we were short of money at the time. Again, I am speaking from my memory. That a set amount of that was supposed to be spent for the purpose of the contras. "I understood that it would be for the purchase of arms. I could be wrong, sir. "Mr. HEFLIN. So now you got from General	

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		Secord that it was to be divided into two parts, one $3 million and one $7 million? "Mr. HAKIM. That is my recollection. "Mr. HEFLIN. Which of those, the $3 million or the $7 million, was to be spent on arms for the contras? "Mr. HAKIM. The three, sir. "Mr. HEFLIN. The $3 million was to spent on arms for the contras? "Mr. HAKIM. That is what I recall, sir. "Mr. HEFLIN. What [were] the instructions that you had pertaining to the $7 million as to where it would go? "Mr. HAKIM. I was told as the money gets there, I would be given the instructions." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/5/87, at 181-84.)	
86/06/00-430 AFTER JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: HOW THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you understand that the money from Brunei had been solicited for humanitarian purposes pursuant to the authorization of Congress? "Mr. NORTH. I am not--I quite honestly don't think I focused on that. I knew that there was an authorization for the State Department to proceed and solicit moneys from other governments, and I honestly don't know that it was specifically for one purpose or--I don't recall knowing at the time or focusing at the time that it was for one specific purpose or another. "I assured Mr. Abrams that those moneys would indeed be set aside for whatever purposes he	

deemed appropriate.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you what purposes would be deemed appropriate?

"Mr. NORTH. I deemed that the purpose was to support the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that would have included if they needed lethal support, not just--

"Mr. NORTH. I was fully willing to live within whatever constraints he wished to impose on that account.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he impose constraints?

"Mr. NORTH. We never got any money.

"Mr. LIMAN. But you thought you were getting money when you gave him the number.

"Mr. NORTH. True. We looked for it assiduously up until the day I was--literally the day I was leaving the NSC.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, did he, when he asked you for the account, say anything to you about the fact that this is supposed to be used for the purpose for which it was solicited, humanitarian aid?

"Mr. NORTH. He may well have. I guess my problem is I think folks may be trying to make things appear more sinister than they already were, if they were indeed at all, and the point I am trying to make is that if Mr. Abrams had asked me to do that, I would have done it. I am not saying he did and I am not saying he didn't.

"Those moneys were to be allocated for the purposes that the Department of State solicited them for. There was never an intention on my part to allocate them to some other purpose.

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		"Mr. LIMAN. Are you saying that those funds as opposed to the other money in the Lake account would be disbursed at the direction of Mr. Abrams? "Mr. NORTH. Precisely. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you give instructions to Mr. Hakim or to General Secord that of the $10 million, $7 million was to be set aside and $3 million was to be available for other purposes? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall those instructions, but it was not infrequent that we would hope to have some operating revenue, for example, to support airlift [sic], which certainly some can argue was a lethal activity, and yet we funded airlift out of the $27 million in humanitarian assistance. "I do believe that I talked to Mr. Abrams about the need for additional aircraft and supporting--continued support for the operations in Central America." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 121-23.)	
86/06/00-435 AFTER JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: HOW THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. On the Brunei money, was there ever any discussion that some of that money was going to be used to repay the financiers of the first channel? "Mr. NORTH. Never. "Mr. LIMAN. That was never contemplated? "Mr. NORTH. That was never a contemplation in my mind. I never heard it mentioned to me and I never mentioned it to anyone else. "Mr. LIMAN. It was never discussed?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NORTH. Never, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 125.)	
86/06/00-440 FROM JUNE 1986		BRUNEI: THE BANK ACCOUNT AND ~~HOW THE MONEY~~ WAS TO BE USED SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. HEFLIN. Let me ask you a little bit about the solicitation of Brunei. You mentioned that the law had changed, the law at the time that the officials of Brunei were solicited, that there was specific authorization for the State Department to make such solicitation. However, I am fuzzy about the testimony that has occurred concerning the selection of the bank account that the money would be deposited in. "There has been testimony to the effect that, first, Colonel North was requested to provide such an account. He gave the number. Then the Chief of the Central American Task Force of the CIA was asked to provide an account. He established an account separate and apart where there would have been no commingling. Then the decision was made to go to the original North account which had transposed numbers and caused some confusion. "Relative to this, was there any discussion with you and the Assistant Secretary Abrams pertaining to what bank account would be selected? "Secretary SHULTZ. There was discussion. I was involved in a little of it, but it was more between Assistant Secretary Abrams and some others. "But basically the account number that we got, that Mr. Abrams got from Colonel North, was	

described to us or described to Mr. Abrams as an account that, so to speak, belonged to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, the freedom fighters. It was their account. And that is the one that I knew about when I went on a trip that included a stop in Brunei, but I didn't use it or make any solicitation on that occasion, but that number was in our possession at that time.

"I believe that later the CIA account number was provided. That was a CIA account. And so in the discussion that ensued, and I was not a part of it, but they discussed this question of which account to use. It was thought that if the money went from Brunei into an account controlled by an agency of the U.S. Government, then it becomes the government's money, so to speak. And what we were authorized to do was to solicit third countries to contribute to the cause of the democratic resistance. And so we thought, well, it is better then to have Brunei make the deposit into an account that is controlled by the democratic resistance, and that was the line of reasoning that the people involved went through, and I think it was a good line of reasoning.

"Mr. HEFLIN. Well, in your investigations and discussions with people concerning this, have you uncovered any evidence that there was any direction given to the Hakim-Secord enterprises that $3 million out of that $10 million would be used for arms purchases and that the other $7 million would be reserved for some decision to be made at a later date as to its disposition?

"Secretary SHULTZ. The only information on

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		their plan that I have is what I saw, and I happened to be watching the hearings, when I guess Mr. Hakim or somebody testified along the lines that you suggest. "Mr. HEFLIN. Let me ask you about the-- "Secretary SHULTZ. I might say that what that shows, among other things, is that the representation to us that this was an account controlled by the democratic resistance was not correct. That was bum dope." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 49-52.)	
86/06/00-500 SOMETIME IN JUNE [?] 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES DUTTON ACCOUNT: While the C-123 is out of operation in the air resupply operation, Dutton arranges for a C-7 to make the flight to a drop zone for the southern Contra forces. The mission, which is successfully completed, includes landing and refueling the plane in a neighboring country. ". . . . "Mr. BALLEN. Who made the arrangements for the C-7 to refuel with the CIA station chief and with the military group commander? ". . . . "Mr. DUTTON. To my knowledge, Colonel North made the arrangements with the MIL Group Commander and the chief of station." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 32, 38-41.)	
86/06/01-140 AROUND JUNE	BETSY NORTH'S PHILADELPHIA TRIP: EPILOGUE NORTH ACCOUNT:		

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1, 1986	After the meeting between his wife and Hakim's lawyer at the Touche Ross offices in Philadelphia, North traveled to Tehran. North testified on the outcome of Hakim's financial preparations on North's behalf following North's return from Tehran: "I then went and, thank God, returned safely from Iran. After that trip, there was one more call to my wife from the lawyer on or about the 1st of June, almost immediately after my return from Tehran. The lawyer called again and asked for the name of an adult executor for our family in the event, I suppose, that neither my wife nor I [was] around. "I told my wife, 'Do not call him back. It is unnecessary.' She never did. She never heard from him again and she has never made contact with him again. "No money was ever transferred to my possession, control, account or that of my wife or that of my children. I have never heard about Bellybutton, until these hearings, again." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 117-18. See id., 7/13/87, at 56-58 [North on the appearance that Hakim and Zucker were trying to compromise him: "[E]ven if that attempt was known to me . . . it doesn't mean that it works."]. See also 86/03/01-180 [Betsy North's Philadelphia trip].)		
86/06/01-200 SOMETIME IN JUNE OR JULY 1986		THE MUNITIONS PLANE STUCK IN THE COSTA RICAN MUD TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testifying on the plane immobilized in	

the mud at the Costa Rican airstrip:

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall the event in June or July of 1986 when a plane got stuck in the mud at the air strip?

"Mr. TAMBS. That is why I suggested to you, Mr. Belnick, that perhaps the field was not completed. Because they had at least--was it three or four aircraft eventually stuck in the mud there?

"Mr. BELNICK. All right, sir. And do you recall that in the specific occasion that I am referring to, June or July of 1986, the plane which landed there and got stuck there was carrying military cargo?

"Mr. TAMBS. It was. Indeed it was.

"Mr. BELNICK. What happened to that cargo, do you know?

". . . .

"Mr. TAMBS. Eventually, it was airlifted out.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did there come a time in the same period--

"Mr. TAMBS. May I also pause here a moment?

"Mr. BELNICK. Yes, sir.

"Mr. TAMBS. That is that the agreement we had with the Costa Rican government was that the air field would not be used either for storage of supplies or provisions and that any aircraft landing there would have already completed its mission; that it, it would land empty and it would be refueled, and so I was consequently somewhat surprised to find out that the aircraft was stuck in the mud.

"That is probably why it was stuck in the mud because it was loaded, and I guess it was an emergency.

"Mr. BELNICK. Were you surprised also to find out that it was carrying military cargo?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, not really. I never saw a manifest, but I did not certainly assume they were only dropping--

"Mr. BELNICK. Want to finish the sentence?

"Mr. TAMBS. No, not really.

"Mr. BELNICK. You didn't assume they were dropping--

"Mr. TAMBS. Band-Aids. How is Band-Aids. Right.

"Mr. BELNICK. It didn't surprise you military cargo was involved?

"Mr. TAMBS. No.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you speak to Colonel North or any other official of the United States Government about your concern that the plane being loaded period violated the agreement you had negotiated with the Government of Costa Rica?

"Mr. TAMBS. I believe I fumed around, but I don't recall calling Colonel North.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you speak to Tomas Castillo about that?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes. . . ."
(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 167-69.)

86/06/01-400
FIRST WEEK OF
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OWEN'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: PUBLICITY
OWEN ACCOUNT:

A Miami Herald article discusses Owen's involvement with the Contras. (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 32-33.)

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86/06/04-150 AROUND JUNE 4, 1986	BETSY NORTH'S PHILADELPHIA TRIP: EPILOGUE SUMMARY: Willard Zucker makes further contact with Betsy North. (See 86/06/01-040; see also 86/03/06-150 [Zucker's prior contact with Betsy North].)		
86/06/05-300 JUNE 5-8, 1986		DUTTON'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton makes his second trip to Central America after joining the air resupply program. He meets with "Cooper, Ramon and Max." Dutton sends a message to North by KL-43 that Max Gomez (Felix Rodriguez) "is the only problem. . . . [H]e didn't understand how we were organizing." He tells North, as well, that Gomez has relayed the wrong information to Col. Steele, "the commander of the military group in our Central American country . . . ." Steele has made Gomez his deputy, given him his KL-43, "a military group car, a State Department mobile radio and he now wants a $10,000 emergency fund that he will control." Dutton refuses to give the money for the emergency fund. "Mr. DUTTON. . . . I said, if you have an emergency . . . , there is only way we are going to get out of it, and that is get hold of the CIA and State Department and we will have to get them out that way. . . . "Mr. BALLEN. Did Colonel North subsequently make a request to you regarding Max Gomez or Felix Rodriguez?	

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		"Mr. DUTTON. Yes. A little later in the month, he asked that I have Max come up to Washington, that he -- Colonel North -- had information that Max had been on the open telephone discussing our operation . . . ." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 45-48; JHICI Ex. RCD 1 ["after-action report" from Dutton to North on Dutton's second trip].)	
86/06/06-100 JUNE 6, 1986	NORTH'S PROPOSAL TO THE ABA NORTH ACCOUNT: North gives a speech to the ABA, as part of a panel on Trends in International Terrorism, in which he supports the formation of a joint Congressional intelligence committee: "I would also point out to you, Mr. Nields, that in June of 1986, not the Tower Commission, I gave a speech before the American Bar Association on very short notice, I stood on the podium with Senator Moynihan, and I advocated formation of a small discreet joint intelligence committee with a very professional small staff in which the administration would feel comfortable confiding in planning and conducting and funding these kinds of activities. I still believe that to be a good and thoughtful thing to do. There has to be that kind of proposal that allows the administration to talk straightforward with the Congress." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 231. See id., 7/10/87, at 172; id., 7/13/87, at 25.)		
86/06/10-030 JUNE 10, 1986		THIRD-COUNTRY AID TO THE CONTRAS NORTH PROF:	

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		North PROF to Poindexter recommends that Poindexter and McFarlane talk with Secretary of State Shultz about third-country assistance to the Contras: ". . . At this point I need your help. As you know, I have the accounts and the means by which this thing needs to be accomplished. I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of [redacted] aid that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Did RCM [McFarlane] ever tell Shultz? ". . . At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Help. . . ." (JHICI Ex. 46-C [= Ex. OLN 70; North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 6/10/86]. See McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 183-84.)	
86/06/10-090 JUNE 10, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH PROF: In the same PROF to Poindexter, North reports on the resupply operation: ". . . At this point the only liability we still have is one of DEMOCRACY INC.'s airplanes is mired in the mud (it is the rainy season down there) [redacted] . . . . "I am very concerned that we are bifurcating an effort that has, up to now, worked relatively well. An extraordinary amount of good has been done and money truly is not the thing which is most needed at this point. What we most need is to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that	

it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine LtCol. Money will again become an issue in July, but probably not until mid-month. There are several million rounds of most types of ammo now on hand and more ($3M) worth on the way by ship [redacted.] Critically needed items are being flown in from Europe to the expanded warehouse facility [redacted.] Boots, uniforms, ponchos etc. are bein[]g purchased locally and Calero will receive $500K for food purchases by the end of the week. Somehow we will mo[l]lify the wounded egos of the triple A with not being able to see RR. [Redacted] on the blowpipes if we are going to do anything at all about outside support in the next few days, and I wd love to carry the letter from RR [redacted] if we are going to move on something. Meanwhile, I wd recommend that you and RCM have a talk about how much Sec Shultz does or does not know abt [redacted] so that we don't make any mistakes. I don't know who in the [redacted] knows since [redacted] never told me. At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Help."
(JHICI Ex. OLN 70 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 6/10/86]. See JHICI Ex. JMP 52 [Poindexter response].)

86/06/10-100
JUNE 10, 1986

CONTRA FUNDING: SECRECY AND WHAT SHULTZ KNEW
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, one last one on this matter of secrecy . . . in the Executive Branch on the contras. If you look at Exhibit [JMP] 52, it's another memorandum from you to Colonel North,

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		and there it says, 'To my knowledge, Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing.' "Do you see that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I see that, Mr. Liman. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, at the time you wrote that, it was your understanding that the Secretary of State had not been told that Country Two or Three, or whatever numbers we now have assigned, had been contributing to the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That--I was not sure at that point whether he knew about it or not. "Mr. LIMAN. And you said that to your knowledge he had not been told, and you asked Mr. McFarlane, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. "I think it's important for me to put this in perspective here. I added the second sentence, 'I think it should stay that way,' with respect to Secretary Shultz knowing about it, for a very specific purpose. I didn't want Colonel North talking to anybody in the State Department about it, and--but as I recall, after I sent this note to Colonel North, I did call Mr. McFarlane in and ask him if the Secretary knew, because frankly I thought the Secretary should know, but I wanted it to come from Mr. McFarlane, not from anybody else. "Mr. LIMAN. So when you said I think it should stay that way, you really meant-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. As far as Colonel North-- "Mr. LIMAN. That Colonel North should not tell him. "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Can I read this again? I am	

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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		a little bit confused. "Mr. LIMAN. Let me read it so that the audience knows what we are talking about. It is dated June 10, 1986. It is three weeks or so, almost a month after the NSPG meeting we have talked about on third country solicitation. "It says, 'Out of the last NSPG on Central America, Shultz agreed that he would think about third country sources.[] "[']I wanted to get an answer from him so we could get out of the business. As I understand the law, there is nothing that prevents State from getting involved in this now. To my knowledge, Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way. My concern was to find out what they were thinking so there would not be a screw up,' and then it goes on to talk about Mr. Abrams, and I am going to come to that in a moment. "You did speak to Mr. McFarlane after this, am I correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And you learned from Mr. McFarlane that the State Department had in fact not been told about the contributions of country 2 and country 3? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And it was at that point they were told? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct, by Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Was it your view that balancing what you saw as the need for secrecy	

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		versus the needs of the State Department in carrying out its functions, should they have been told earlier? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think--you know, it is hard to second guess Mr. McFarlane in the early stages of this. I think I would put it this way--if I had been doing it, I think I would probably have told Secretary Shultz about the country 2 contribution, but in a very private way." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 200-03; JHICI Ex. JMP 52 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 6/10/86]. For Shultz response, see above at 86/05/16-351.)	
86/06/10-101 JUNE 10, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: SECRECY, WHAT SHULTZ KNEW, AND THE BRUNEI SOLICITATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. In this memorandum, there was a discussion about the solicitation of Brunei. Brunei and Israel are two countries we can mention by name. And you say there that, 'He said he had recommended a country[′], which turned out to be Brunei, [′]where Shultz is going to visit. They have lots of money. It seems like a good project. Shultz agrees. I asked Elliott how the money could be transferred. He said he thought Shultz could just hand them an account number. I said that was a bad idea, not at all letting on that we had access to accounts.' "Remember that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, that was not my	

recollection of what I said, but I guess it is what I said.

"Mr. LIMAN. It is your note.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. My note.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, it obviously wasn't a good idea for the Secretary of State to go around handing account numbers to the head of another state--that you would agree with?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I agree with that.

"Mr. LIMAN. But you suggest there that the way the money should be transferred . . . would be to accounts that you say we had access to, and I take it you are referring to the Lake accounts there, am I correct, the Secord accounts?

"Mr. BECKLER. I think if you continue on, Counselor, there is some indication--

"Mr. LIMAN. 'I told Elliott that the best way was for the country to direct their embassy here to receive a person that we would designate and the funds could be transferred through him. Don't you think that would be best?'

"You were referring to the Secord operation, weren't you?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, the private network.

" . . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, did you understand that the Secord accounts were being used not just for humanitarian purposes, but to supply munitions and air support?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I understood that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you understand that the money being solicited from Brunei by the State Department was being solicited pursuant to law for humanitarian purposes?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. My best recollection of my thinking the time was that it was being solicited under the provisions of the new version of the law. I don't frankly recall making a big distinction in my thinking about it between humanitarian and non-humanitarian.

"Mr. LIMAN. But did you give any thought at the time that what you were suggesting was that the money that was being solicited by the State Department for humanitarian purposes was going to end up in an account that was used for lethal supplies?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that possibility really entered into my thinking on this. I did not spend much time on this particular issue."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 203-06. See JHICI Ex. JMP 52 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 6/10/86]. See also Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 39-41 [Poindexter tells Abrams to call North to make arrangements to get the Brunei contribution to the Contras].)

86/06/10-110
JUNE 10, 1986

CONTRA FUNDING: SECRECY AND WHAT SHULTZ KNEW
SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

"Mr. TRIBLE. . . . There have been a number of questions raised about your knowledge and participation in the solicitation of moneys from Brunei and there is a PROF note that I think confirms what you have said . . . .

"It is Exhibit [GPS] No. 28, which is a

communication between John Poindexter and Oliver North on June 10, 1986. . . . And I quote: 'To my knowledge, Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way. My concern was to find out what they were thinking so there would not be a screw-up. I asked Elliott at lunch. He said he had recommended Brunei, where Shultz is going to visit. They have lots of money. It seems like a good prospect. Shultz agrees. I asked Elliott how the money could be transferred. He said he thought Shultz could just hand them the account number. I said I thought that was a bad idea, not at all letting on that we had access to the accounts.'

"Would you like to respond to that?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't think it needs any response. It is just another example of the kind of deception that was practiced, because our information was that that was an account number belonging to the freedom fighters, and the money would go to the freedom fighters. They gave us that impression knowing, according to that note you just read, that the account belonged to them or their partners. And I could only react when I saw the hearings, in describing how this money was supposed to be handled, that I was glad that the numbers or something had been transposed and they didn't get their hands on it after all.

". . . .

"Secretary SHULTZ. Sometimes I feel like I would like to wring somebody's neck."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 79-80; JHICI Ex. GPS 28 [Poindexter PROF to North, 6/10/86].)

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86/06/10-400 JUNE 10, 1986			PRESIDENT'S THANKS TO H. ROSS PEROT NORTH MEMO: North, in a memo to Poindexter, attaches a thank-you letter for the President to sign for Ross Perot's "efforts to recover the American hostages in Beirut." A cover memo, titled "Hostage Rescue Effort," prepared by North for Poindexter to give to the President, states: "BACKGROUND "For several months, [redacted] effort to secure the release of the American hostages abducted in Beirut. Three weeks ago, those working in the area developed a plan [redacted] would undertake an operation to recover the hostages. The plan involved the use of privately-provided aircraft, personnel, and vessels. Unfortunately, the security situation inside Beirut deteriorated before this plan could be put into effect. "DISCUSSION "Ross Perot provided the resources required to bring this plan to fruition. He dispatched one of his personal staff to oversee the mission and maintained communications between his offices in Texas and the forward operating team in Cyprus. Perot is, understandably, disappointed that this operation did not succeed, but should be commended for trying. Because it is possible that such a plan could well work in the future, a letter from you (Tab A) thanking him for his help would be most appropriate."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(JHICI Ex. OLN 292.)
86/06/11-101 JUNE 11, 1986	THE BETHESDA PROF: McFarlane PROF to Poindexter recommends sending North "to Bethesda for disability review board": see col. 2. THE BETHESDA PROF McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane elaborating on the memo's context: "Mr. COHEN. Can you tell me why -- what happened on that tarmac in Israel that prompted you to raise the issue of perhaps asking Ollie North to go to Bethesda for some rest? . . . "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [T]hat isn't really what I was suggesting. I think anybody reading it gets that impression, but it is this: the Bethesda connotation, for me, was a Board of Survey based upon combat wounds. There is nothing at all psychiatric involved in it. Years ago in the war, Ollie had wounds which for the normal person would have resulted in his being surveyed out of the Marine Corps." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 217-18; JHICI Ex. 46-D.)	THE BETHESDA PROF: McFarlane PROF to Poindexter: "It seems increasingly clear that the Democratic left is coming after him [North] with a vengeance in the election year . . . --too many people are talking to reporters from the donor community and within the administration. I don't [know] what you do about it but in Ollie's interest I would like to get him transfered or sent to Bethesda for disability review board (appartwently [sic] the Marine Corps has already tried to survey him once[)]. That wuld [sic] represent a major loss to the staff and contra effort but I think we can probably find a way to continue to do those things. In the end it may be better anyway." (JHICI Ex. 46-D; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 168-70.)	
86/06/11-103 JUNE 11, 1986	THE BETHESDA PROF McFARLANE ACCOUNT: Asked whether McFarlane was prompted by information he learned on the Tehran trip, including the tarmac discussion (see 86/05/24-002, 86/05/28-400), to send the PROF to Poindexter suggesting that North be sent to Bethesda,		

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	McFarlane testified: "Well, I don't think I recommended that. I had known Colonel North for years and years, and had felt responsible when I left that he ultimately have an assignment of command in the Marine Corps and had intervened to try to make that possible before I left. I wanted it to happen even six months after I left. "The Bethesda connection has nothing to do with anything except that I knew that as a consequence of injuries and back problems and leg problems, that the Marine Corps had tried to discharge Colonel North for injuries in combat and that that was one course of action that one had to keep in mind, but the preference was that he be given what he deserved, which was command." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 164; JHICI Ex. 46-D [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Odds and Ends," 6/11/86].)		
86/06/12-100 JUNE 12, 1986			ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAN INITIATIVE: COMPLICATIONS FORESEEN BY SHULTZ DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS advises PLATT that he told Attorney General MEESE that, while the United States is prosecuting Israelis for arms sales to Iran, Israel could point a finger back at the United States. MEESE was 'not deterred' by GPS' comments." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/07/02-100.)

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86/06/15-400 SOMETIME BETWEEN JUNE AND AUGUST OF 1986		CASTILLO'S AND TAMBS' CONTRA ACTIVITIES CASTILLO ACCOUNT: After the airstrip at Santa Elena is shut down, Tomas Castillo advises Tambs on one or two occasions "that an aircraft would have to land" because it was short of fuel. Tambs does not seek the Costa Rican Government's permission. Instead, he asks two of his officers to make certain the aircraft refuels and speedily takes off. Tambs testified, "I understand it was cleared by officials at the airport." He knows of no communication from North asking that Tambs obtain Costa Rican Government approval for the refueling. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 194-97.)	
86/06/16-080 DURING JUNE 1986		COUNTRY 2's SECOND CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS: SHULTZ FINDS OUT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Let's go over this again. The amount this time at $2 million a month was roughly 24, 25 million dollars; is that what you understood you were being offered? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. I heard both figures mentioned later, but soon after that news was reported to me by the foreign official. The Secretary of Defense here and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also told me they had heard the same thing, but their figure was 25. "Mr. LIMAN. And you received that information from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.	

"Mr. LIMAN. So that the President was aware, through discussion with you, if not through other means, of the $25 million contribution, correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. The Secretary of Defense told you he had heard about it directly; am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. From--and the Secretary--and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told you he knew of it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Secretary of State?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I did not, at that time. Later.

"Mr. LIMAN. And was that a matter of conscious choice to keep the Secretary of State unaware of this?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, not of conscious choice. I shared virtually everything--I think indeed everything with the Secretary of State that I would learn of relevance. I did not foreclose doing that. I would have, I believe--not have done it in a way that risked disclosure beyond him personally, but the truth is that I did not until sometime later on.

"Mr. LIMAN. The truth is that you didn't until sometime around June of 1986; is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct, yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you did it then when you were asked by your successor, Admiral Poindexter, whether the Secretary of State knew; is that fair to say?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think that is likely, yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And the decision, therefore, not to tell the Secretary of State at the time was one that you made, and what I am trying to find out is why. Why not tell the Secretary of State?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, there is no reason not to.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, what was in your mind in terms of not telling him?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think it was probably oversight, Mr. Liman. Just error on my part. I had no personal inhibition about telling him. I think I should have.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the DCI?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No. I didn't.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that you regarded this source of funding as a matter to be held as a closely held secret?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Now you had regular meetings with Mr. Casey; is that right?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And those were generally meetings once a week?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And am I correct that you made a point of not mentioning the name of the country to him and he made a point of not asking you the name of the country?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. We never had an exchange on it, to my knowledge

"Mr. LIMAN. And is it also correct, sir, that the Secretary of State never asked you where is the funding coming [from] for 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Without that funding, the contras couldn't have continued; that is correct, isn't it? The $25 million?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is.

"Mr. LIMAN. But this was an affair in which people didn't ask you and you didn't thrust this knowledge upon them?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Except for informing the President; is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is.

"Mr. LIMAN. And what about the President [sic (Vice President)]? Did you feel obligated to tell him also?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I am not certain. It was my habit to do that. The Vice President was privy to whatever the President knew. I recall it in the earlier situation rather vividly. I don't in this one. It is likely, I think."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 53-57. See entries starting at 85/02/00-400 [Country 2 second contribution to the Contras].)

86/06/16-090
JUNE 16, 1986

COUNTRY 2's CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS: SHULTZ FINDS OUT

DoS CHRONOLOGY:

"MCFARLANE advises GPS that Country 2 volunteered and delivered $31 million to the

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		Nicaraguan opposition while USG aid was barred." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/06/24-400.)	
86/06/16-100 JUNE 16, 1986		COUNTRY 2's CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS: SHULTZ FINDS OUT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary of State, when were you first informed that country number 2, a major Middle Eastern Nation, had provided $31 million to the . . . contras, between 1984 and 1985? "Secretary SHULTZ. In June--I think it was June 16th, according to my records, I received a telephone call, a secure phone call, from Mr. McFarlane, who gave me that information. "Mr. BELNICK. June 16 of what year, sir? "Secretary SHULTZ. 1986." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 8-9.)	
86/06/16-150 MID-JUNE 1986		COUNTRY 2's CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS: SHULTZ FINDS OUT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. At the break you were going to tell us about the circumstances under which you found out that the Secretary of State did not know about [redacted] contribution and so on. "A. Right. I can't recall exactly what prompted Colonel North's PROFs note to me [see 86/06/11-100], which I have seen since and so my memory has been refreshed that he sent such a note, but when he asked me whether the Secretary	

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		of State knew and I responded to him in some rather definitive way that I didn't know, and said that, as I recall, the less he knew, the better. "Q. You said in essence -- I could get the note out -- that we'd better check with McFarlane, or he said that, as to what the Secretary of State knew or didn't know. "A. But the point I want to make is that I would often tell Colonel North -- I mean, I didn't necessarily tell Colonel North everything that I was doing, but I didn't want him inquiring around as to whether the Secretary of State knew or didn't know. After his note my recollection is that I called Mr. McFarlane, asked him, and my recollection is that he said that he didn't think that he had told the Secretary of State but that he would. And I said fine." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 261-62.)	
86/06/16-300 JUNE 16, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH MESSAGE: By KL-43 message, North tells Castillo that Quintero is to direct the resupply operation: ". . . To facilitate, have asked Ralph to proceed immediately to your location. I do not think we ought to contemplate these operations without him being on scene. Too many things go wrong that then directly involve you and me in what should be deniable for both of us. . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 89.)	
86/06/21-400			THE SECOND CHANNEL: THE BEGINNING

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SOMETIME IN EARLY SUMMER 1986			HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testified that efforts to open a Second Channel began in the summer of 1986. At that time the prospect of personal financial gain for Hakim was also discussed. (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 231. See id., 6/3/87, at 293.)
86/06/21-500 SOMETIME IN EARLY SUMMER 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL HAKIM ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Whose idea was it to look for a second channel? "Mr. HAKIM. I believe, effectively General Secord's, but the unhappiness about the first channel was shared by all people involved. So he came up, I think, with the idea for the first time. "Mr. NIELDS. And who actually set out to look for a second channel? "Mr. HAKIM. I organized that. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you not only organize it, did you also do it? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. Was anyone in the U.S. Government aware of the fact that you were doing it? "Mr. HAKIM. Again, through the same chain of command, if you will, General Secord knew, and I do recall also direct conversations that I had from my home in California with Lieutenant Colonel North to, from his office and to his office from my home, that he wanted to get firsthand report on my progress. "I believe General Secord [w]as not available

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			so there were times that [I] reported directly about the status of the situation to Colonel North. "Mr. NIELDS. So Colonel North was aware of the fact that you were looking for a second channel, but I take it that you were taking the initiative in deciding exactly how to go about doing that. "Mr. HAKIM. You are correct, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that there came a time when you were successful in identifying an Iranian official through whom you thought you might be able to open a second channel. "Mr. HAKIM. Essentially, yes, that's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And that was sometime towards the end of the summer of 1986? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. And was there a meeting in Brussels with the Iranian official? "Mr. HAKIM. There was a meeting arranged that General Secord and I attended to actually evaluate the second channel, evaluation meeting, if you will. "Mr. NIELDS. And you met with the official? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And that was in Brussels in August of 1986? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And was any official of the United States Government present? "Mr. HAKIM. No, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you in fact meet with this official?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes, I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. And did you evaluate him?

"Mr. HAKIM. I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. And what was your evaluation? How did he compare to the officials that we have been calling the first channel?

"Mr. HAKIM. I was extremely impressed. I found a new generation that I had not come across before. This gentleman is a younger person and he impressed me very well."
(Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 26-28.)

86/06/21-550
SUMMER 1986

THE SECOND CHANNEL: THE BEGINNING
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Were you involved in the decision to seek the second channel?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you got approval on that from Admiral Poindexter?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were involved in the various negotiations with that channel?

"Mr. NORTH. I am not sure how many there were before I got involved, but the initial contact was made, I think by General Secord, in a European country. He evaluated it, reported back, and if my recollection serves me right, we then had a meeting here in the United States.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you understood that Mr. Hakim was the person who helped locate that channel?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did Hakim tell you that a $2 million reserve had been set aside in order to

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			make payoffs for the second channel? "Mr. NORTH. . . . Mr. Hakim made it clear that there was a necessity to compensate those engaged in the activity. I did not press the issue. "I know well the meaning of the term baksheesh and I know it is a long-established tradition in that part of the world. I do not recall discussing a specific amount, but it was very clear to me that that was part of the activity." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 125-26.)
86/06/21-570 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BRIEFED REGAN DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [W]hen the second channel began to open in the summer, let's say, of '86, no one went back to NSPG to brief them? "A. No. That was brought up by Admiral Poindexter to the President with myself and the Vice President there. We were told more than asked that there was this new initiative and it was going to be explored and that agreement, okay, go ahead and explore it and see how it comes out. [Sic.] "Q. But that was not the discussion at the NSPG meeting you are saying? "A. No." (Regan, House Dep., 7/15/87, at 60.)
86/06/21-575 SUMMER-FALL 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: NOTICE TO CABINET WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. In the later summer, fall of 1986, there was a development, an opening of what

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			has been called the second channel. Did you know that that had taken place? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 124.)
86/06/21-630 SOMETIME IN LATE JUNE 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CROWE FIRST HEARS OF ARMS TRANSFERS CROWE ACCOUNT: Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on his first awareness of the arms transfers to Iran: "Q. . . . With respect, sir, to the Iran Initiative, could you tell us when you first came to know of the transfers of HAWKs and TOWs to Iran and the circumstances by which you came to know? "A. . . . Well, I was first aware that transfers had been made to Iran I believe in late June of 1986. "I came into my post on the First of October in 1985 and had not been in there very long until I began to see various pieces of information concerning and regarding our hostages in Beirut. I then from then on occasionally saw [redacted] and was briefed occasionally on matters concerning the hostages and proposals that might be made to either free the hostages or improve that situation. "I have a special assistant, General Moellering who attends a great many meetings on my behalf around town and one of the groups that he belonged to was the TWG, I believe that is the Terrorist Incident Working Group. "In late June General Moellering attended a

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			meeting . . . where there were some references made to arms transfers to Iran, which confused him. He had not heard of this. He didn't understand what it was about and when he raised some questions, one of the attendees from our Department, Rich Armitage said, 'I will talk to you about it later, John.' "They returned to the Pentagon and Rich Armitage told John Moellering about[,] in a sort of general fashion, about some of the things that had been going on with Iran and in particular, that some arms transfers had been made to Iran. "Whereupon John Moellering came in to see me and told me or repeated his conversations with Armitage. "Q. When do you recall that he told you specifically in that conversation? "A. That evidently there had been some contacts made between I believe he said North and the Iranians and that he wasn't aware of all the substance of those contacts, but that one of the purposes was to deal with the hostages and that evidently was the reason it came up in the TWG and that in the process some arms transfers had been made to Iran, specifically TOW missiles. "Q. Did he tell you when those TOWs had been transferred? "A. No, he did not. "Q. Did General Moellering provide you information about how many or the circumstances? "A. We were under the impression it was somewhere between a thousand and 1500. "Q. Did he indicate whether or not the

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			transfers had taken place in 1985? "A. No. He did not know exactly when the transfers had taken place. Or if he did he did not repeat it to me." (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 2-5. See id., at 24-25 [Crowe first learned of the August-September 1985 TOW transfers and the November 1985 HAWK shipment "[i]n the newspaper" after the events were publicly disclosed in November 1986.].)
86/06/21-632 AFTER LATE JUNE 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: HAWK SPARE PARTS MENTIONED CROWE ACCOUNT: Adm. Crowe testified when he first heard from General John Moellering, Crowe's special assistant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the involvement of HAWKs in the Iran arms transactions: "Q. Did he [sc. Moellering] discuss anything about HAWKs? "A. I believe we did subsequently in another meeting shortly after that [see 86/06/21-630], he had learned that there were some spare parts on HAWKs but he did not know how much or any of the details. "Q. Were HAWK missiles or HAWK missile systems discussed? "A. Between he and I? [Sic.] ". . . . "Q. As opposed to HAWK repair parts. "A. No, not as part of the transfers, no. At no time did I hear HAWK missile launchers had been transferred.

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			"Q. Did you understand at the time that the transfers were coming from the United States Army? "A. Yes. "Q. Did you come to know of the mechanisms for those transfers? "A. No, not until the story had become more public." (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 6-7. See id., at 24-25 [Crowe testified he first learned of the August-September 1985 TOW transfer and the November 1985 HAWK shipment "[i]n the newspaper," after the events were publicly disclosed in November 1986.].)
86/06/21-640 MID-SUMMER 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CROWE CONSULTS WITH WEINBERGER CROWE ACCOUNT: Adm. William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on his conversation with Defense Secretary Weinberger about the TOW transfers to Iran in 1986: "Q. When did you first learn that the TOWs which were transferred in 1986 were transferred from the Army's point of view pursuant to the Economy Act type transfer to the CIA? "A. When I talked to Secretary Weinberger. "Q. And when was that, sir? "A. A few -- within 2 or 3 weeks after that [see 86/06/21-630 and -632]. "Q. You are referring to November 1986? "A. The middle of the summer 1986. "Q. I understand. So in the middle of the summer 1986 then you spoke to the Secretary on

this matter?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was this . . . at his initiative?

"A. No, at my initiative.

"Q. At your initiative. Did you seek to speak with him specifically on this issue?

"A. Yes. We were alone and I told him I had learned of it and we talked about it for a few minutes.

"Q. Can you please relate to us the substance of this conversation?

"A. Well, I was interested in whatever background he could tell me and why I had not been kept informed, and he told me that he had known about it for some time and that he had opposed it and that the decision had been made by the President and that there had been some transfers in a specific way in order to keep distribution to a low level, and that it was his understanding that a conscious decision had been made that it was not a military matter so it was not necessary to bring in the military and that he had made strong representations opposing it, and that it was an accomplished fact and we talked in a few more minutes and both agreed that the Commander-in-Chief of the United States can do what he wants to do. That is within his purview.

"Whether it is wise or not is a separate question.

"[Q.] Did you agree with Secretary Weinberger's definition of what constitutes a military matter?

"[A.] I don't know that he told me what

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constituted a military matter, no.

"Q. Did he indicate there would be additional transfers following that summer?

"A. No, he did not, if he knew about it he didn't say. I really had the impression that it was winding down if not completed.

"Q. Did he indicate, provide you with information regarding the legalities of that?

"A. No, we did not talk about a finding.

"Q. So there is nothing about a finding?

"A. No.

"Q. Or the Economy Act transfer?

"A. No.

"Q. Or the financial details?

"A. No.

"Q. Okay.

"A. I clearly concluded number one, it was intended as a covert operation, it was a sensitive matter and that obviously some deliberate decisions had been made to do it in a certain way which didn't include me.

"Q. Did the Secretary make a reference to transfers in 1985?

"A. No, he did not.

"Q. By Israel?

"A. No, he did not.

"Now, Israel -- I had never heard that mentioned by Moellering or the Secretary.

"Q. Sir, independently of the Secretary and General Moellering and prior to November of 1986 when these matters became public, did you have information brought to your attention or did you acquire information from whatever source that

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JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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			Israel had or was in the process of making a transfer of weapons to Iran? "A. No, I was not aware of that." (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 7-9.)
86/06/21-650 SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER OF 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CROWE CONSULTS WITH WEINBERGER WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . Do you remember [in the summer of 1986] having a conversation with Admiral Crowe, who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. He inquired about the details of the matter and I told him all that we knew about it, which was simply the points that I have made; that the direction had come to make the transfer and that we were transferring it in accordance with the direction. "Mr. EGGLESTON. He had not been advised or brought into the circle at the begnning, I take it? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was he angry or concerned that-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I think he just was anxious to have all the facts that he could get because he had heard about it from some members of his staff. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did he make any statement to you that he was concerned that there may not have been sufficient analysis of the military impact of this initiative? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Not that point, no. I

think he raised the same policy points that I had previously raised, arguments that I had made that had been rejected, and I found we were obviously in full agreement.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. How were you able to explain to him why it was that he was not brought in at the time?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know that I attempted to explain that or that it was necessary to explain that. This was a decision by the Commander-in-Chief to carry out a very specific set of instructions and consultation with others below the Commander-in-Chief's level would not have perhaps been very fruitful."
(Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 131-33. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 89 [Crowe's knowledge of the Iran Initiative and his dissatisfaction on being left out].)

86/06/21-670
AFTER JUNE
1986

DoD PROCEDURES AND THE TOW TRANSFERS
CROWE ACCOUNT:

Adm. William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on DoD procedures for handling requests for assistance from other agencies, and how the NSC handled the TOW transfers in 1986:

"Q. So I take it that even in the case of very closely held covert incidents that it is a general rule that requests from other agencies for DoD assistance would pass through the [redacted] system?

"A. [Redacted] system, yes, and that is the mechanism that we assumed that would keep us informed.

"Q. I have gone through this line because we have gone through some conversation indicating that the incident of the TOW transfers was not informed to you or went [sic] through the [redacted] system. There was some implication that that is because it was covert, but what I obviously am trying to develop is that in virtually every other case that we are aware of, that you are aware of, even covert requests for assistance to the DoD pass through the [redacted] sustem.

"A. Oh, yes, absolutely. This is all covert.

"Q. So in your learning of this, I take it, that this TOW transfer incident was a unique surprise.

"A. That is absolutely correct.

"Q. In general, sir, are you now and were you then -- 'then' being summer '86 -- satisfied with the response of the [redacted] system?

"A. I -- of course John Moellering and I talked about our participation and we didn't have any reason to object to the [redacted] system, but it became clear to me I think very quickly that I wasn't totally satisfied with the NSC relationship to the JCS.

"Q. All right, sir, that is exactly the next point I wish to go into, and that is what is that relationship and I would appreciate if you would expand on that statement further.

"A. Well, I can expand on it. I hope it is germane. I mean if you are just going to hear some of my own personal biases that I am not so

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			sure are germane to what we are talking about at all, but it was my reluctant conclusion that there were military people on the NSC that in certain instances were willing to, in order to keep something closed for whatever the purpose, would say, well, we will provide the military advice. So you have the military input and you don't need to worry about going further afield outside of this very small select circle and I didn't necessarily appreciate that. "And that was a deduction, not a -- nobody told me that. This was over a period of time on a variety of issues." (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 15-16. See id. at 40-42.)
86/06/21-675 AFTER JUNE 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CROWE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS TRANSFERS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CROWE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. . . . [D]o you know of any studies done to relate or to assess the impact of the transfer of the TOWs and the HAWK parts and earlier TOWs and HAWK missiles to Iran given that Iran was then engaged in and is engaged in a war? "A. When I learned about it I did considerable looking into it on my own initiative without -- I was dealing with a sensitive covert matter here which I was not necessarily supposed to know about, so I attempted to keep my own investigations, my own inquiries restricted and without connecting them to anyting, but I looked at the TOW situation both in our own military and

also what impact I felt it had on hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war as well as our ability to deal with it if we had to confront it.

"I really didn't feel that the HAWK parts were going to be that crucial or critical one way or another. The TOWs worried me.

"Q. Why is that, sir?

"A. Well, we were transferring arms with some capability, at least that was my initial conclusion until I knew more about it, that was my conclusion. Of course the U.S. Army inventory at that time was about [redacted] TOWs. When we left Iran we left [redacted] TOWs in Iran. They had already run through that inventory, of quite a few TOWs. The TOWs we were transferring were [redacted] TOWs, 2000 of them, no launchers. My people thought that Iran probably had [redacted] launchers left, no fewer. That was just our best estimate.

"I went back and looked over a lot of the information we had on the battles, how the TOWs had been used and our information was by no means complete, but I could find no evidence first of all that Iran had employed the TOWs in a very skilled fashion. As a matter of fact, it looked like they worked through the original inventory very quickly in '82 and '83 with very little result.

"Q. I take it you are basing your analysis on information which the Pentagon has at its disposal.

"A. And we follow the Iran-Iraq war further. This has nothing to do with anything. This is

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			just the analysis of the battles we followed day by day, the way the Iranians and Iraqis were using tanks didn't necessarily lend itself to a TOW battle. "I could find no evidence after that, of course there was a little quid, there was no way to show how soon they would show up, I could find no evidence the TOWs were influencing the course of the war. Now, whether they influenced the course of the individual action or battle is another matter, and I couldn't really nail it down. "Q. But to your knowledge, sir, prior to the time you did such an inquiry, do you know that resources of the Pentagon were employed prior to that transfer of TOWs initially? "A. The arms transfers? "Q. Yes. "A. No, not to Iran, no." (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 17-20.)
86/06/21-676 AFTER JUNE 1986			JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE: CROWE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS TRANSFERS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CROWE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. So those transfers which you first learned in approximately June '86 had gone forward, correct me if I am wrong, had gone forward without the benefit of the analysis and the resource, the analytic resource of the Pentagon? "A. That is correct.

"Q. And in your opinion, sir, did the NSC then in existence and the staff which we are acquainted with now that made its own decisions on these matters, did they have at their fingertips the kinds of resources to make these analytical decisions?

"A. They may have, but I am not aware of it. Now, they have access to the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], they have access to the studies of the battles and so forth like I do. They have access to the intelligence sources.

"I think if I could express an opinion on it that they concluded that the number was so small that it was giving the size of the opponents and scope of the battle that it was not that important.

"And to be frank about it, in retrospect looking at it I am not so sure it was. But I suspect that their judgment was an intuitive one, not an analytical one.

"Q. I take it that one purpose of the [redacted] system --

"A. Would be to draw our judgments in, absolutely.

"Q. And that by avoiding [redacted] system the transaction proceeds without the sure benefit of those procedures and analyses.

"A. Absolutely.

"Q. And in this case it proceeded without even the knowledge of the top military leadership?

"A. You are essentially right.

"Now, please understand that the Commander-in-Chief, if he is playing for stakes he feels justifies [sic] something like that -- you can rationalize a move like that.

"Q. I do understand that, sir.

"A. You don't want to put it in a cut and dried light that everything must be done in a certain way for certain reasons where the Commander-in-Chief has no discretion or other way.

"Q. Do you know, sir, in looking back now and having perhaps looked at these events more closely, how it came to be specifically that the [redacted] system was bypassed? That is, it was a decision by the Commander-in-Chief.

"A. I think it was done by discretion.

"Q. And there was a finding -- well, do you know where that direction actually same from?

"A. No, I understood it came from the NSC but I do not know that personally.

"Q. I am as you appreciate trying to determine -- I understand that the Commander-in-Chief can make a decision. We know today that there was a finding. But in other circumstances where similar events have taken place with a finding and an order, the [redacted] system came into play.

"A. And I suspect the decision to go around the [redacted] system was not made by the Commander-in-Chief.

"Q. Do you know who made that decision?

"A. No, I do not."

(Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 20-22.)

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE IRAN INITIATIVE:
CROWE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE

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1986			ARMS TRANSFERS ON U.S. READINESS AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CROWE ACCOUNT, Part 3: "Q. Let me ask you, sir, about the questions that you raised. You said questions were raised in your mind once you found out about this with reg[ard] to specific types of analysis that you thought should have been examined. You touched on this briefly in response to a question from Mr. Saba, but when we interviewed you back in April, I believe you indicated there were three specific questions. "A. There were, yes. "Q. What can you tell us about those? "A. I looked at the question of what we do to U.S. inventories. "Q. The readiness impact? "A. Yes. I concluded that given the overall numbers and amount transferred and what was coming off the production line that really it was negligible. "Q. I believe you said, second, you looked at the strategic impact of the Iran/Iraq War? "A. The impact on the Iran/Iraq War and I could find no measurable impact. "[Redacted.] "Q. So after this -- "A. Incidentally, the people in NSC that did this may have done a simil[a]r look at it. I cannot say they didn't. "Q. If they did, sir, we have not found it. "A. Okay. "Q. Let me just say to make sure we have this

clear on the record then, after you did that examination or had your staff assist you in taking that look at these three issues, you concluded that there would have been no objection raised to having gone forward?

"A. I concluded the military questions were -- if there were good reasons to do this, the military questions were probably not influential, or shouldn't be.

"Q. But it is fair to say as far as you know, in terms of the Pentagon, this examination had not taken place with their input previously?

"A. It did not, that is right.

". . . .

"Q. What if you were to know, sir, that individuals were to take the Iraqi battlefield strategy and order of battle and reveal it to the Iranians, and reveal that information to them? What would you say if you knew that had been passed?

"A. I would say 'wow.'

"Q. Would you say that that is something the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should know about, or have input?

"A. Yes."

(Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 35-37.)

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THE ARMS TRANSFERS ON U.S. READINESS
CROWE ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. You indicated, Admiral, that the

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			readiness concern which you might have had, really was more addressed to the Tows than the Hawks. "A. Yes. "Q. But I also recall when we met in April, that I provided some data to you which we took directly from the IG [Inspector General's] report from the Department of the Army that indicated with regard to the 234 repair parts for the Hawks, which were requested, and most of which were transferred to the CIA and ultimately to Iran, th[a]t the Army concluded that at the time the decision was made to meet the requirement and send it forward, that [of] those 234 repair parts there would have been 46 on which there would have been something classified at the level of significant depletion -- specifically, 15 of those repair parts would[ ]have been totally depleted, 100 percent of our inventories. "Eleven of those repair parts would have been in excess of 50 percent depletion, and 20 percent of the repair parts would have been under 50 percent but still significant depletion. And I recall having asked you what your reaction was when you found out about those figures, and I believe I am correct in saying you indicated that that had not been brought to your attention until -- "A. No, it did not, and I found that rather, that is a rather significant finding, that if I understood at the time should have been flagged. "Q. I should make clear for the record that the DAIG [Department of the Army Inspector General] at the time it conducted [its report] in

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			late '86 concluded that with some things that had come on line, with some different snapshot of a different day of the U.S. inventories that the numbers were not that alarming, but at the time the decision was made to make that transfer, those were the numbers that they were looking at. "A. [Redacted.]" (Crowe, House Dep., 6/18/87, at 37-39.)
86/06/21-680 1985-86			IRAN ARMS TRANSFERS: IMPACT ON U.S. READINESS CHAPMAN AND REYER ACCOUNTS: On the impact of the Iran arms transfers on U.S. military readiness, see John R. Chapman and Billy Ray Reyer, Senate Depositions, 8/10/87.
86/06/21-700 LATE SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER 1986		SECORD-CASEY CONTACT AND THE RESUPPLY OPERATION GADD ACCOUNT: By late April 1986, the resupply operation has purchased two C-7 Caribou and a C-123 aircraft. Secord tells Gadd that if Congress authorizes funds for the Contras, the aircraft will be sold to the CIA. Secord tells Gadd, as well, of a meeting with Casey at the Director's office in late spring 1986 in which Secord told Casey about the aircraft supporting the Contras, their capability, and the need for CIA help. Secord also stresses to Gadd the need to increase air support to improve the image of the resupply operation with the CIA. In the summer of 1986, Secord tells Gadd that the CIA does not want to buy the "ATWs" because they are "tainted." Secord says he will try to reverse the CIA's view while improving air	

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		operations support. He does not tell Gadd how the proceeds of the sale will be used. (Gadd, House Dep., 5/1/87, at 39-42.)	
86/06/21-900 SUMMER THROUGH NOVEMBER 1986		MAULE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION INVESTIGATION SUMMARY: On the U.S. Customs Service investigation of the Maule Aircraft Corporation, and involvement of North and the NSC staff in that inquiry, see Iran-Contra Report, at 105-06. (See also 86/04/07-230 [NSC staff involvement in investigations by law enforcement agencies].)	
86/06/24-090 JUNE - AUGUST 1986		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC STAFF SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the summer 1986 Congressional inquiries about the Contra-related activities of North and others on the NSC staff, including the House Resolution of Inquiry, Poindexter's letters to three House Committee Chairmen, and North's meeting in August 1986 with members of Congress, see Iran-Contra Report, at 139-42.	
86/06/24-100 JUNE 24, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY ON NORTH TEXT: "RESOLUTION "Directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Nicaraguan resistance.	

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Resolved, That not later than 7 days after the adoption of this resolution, the President shall provide to the House of Representatives the following information, to the extent such information [is] in the possession of the President: "(1) A complete list and description of any contact or other communication between Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council and any private individual or any representative of a foreign government concerning the provision to the Nicaraguan resistance of any funding or other assistance from any source other than the United States Government (including assistance by any private group or individual or by any foreign government); and any document prepared by or in the possession of any member of the staff of the National Security Council concerning the provision of any such assistance, specifically including any document concerning any discussion of or involvement in private fund-raising activities on behalf of the Nicaraguan resistance by any member of the staff of the National Security Council. "(2) A complete list and d[e]scription of and any document concerning any contact or other communication, directly or through intermediaries, since July 28, 1983, between Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council and any member or representative of the Nicaraguan resistance, including any communications concerning the military strategy or tactics, coordination of the	

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		activities, or the military equipment or training needs of the Nicaraguan resistance. "(3) A complete list and d[e]scription of and any document concerning any contacts or other communication since July 28, 1983, between Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council and Robert W. Owen (who has served as a consultant to the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office), Major General John K. Singlaub (United States Army, retired), John Hull (a United States citizen operating a ranch in northern Costa Rica). "SEC. 2. As used in this resolution, the term 'document' includes any report, memorandum, meeting schedule or minutes, log or other record of telephone calls or other communications, appointment calendar, or other record or document of any other kind." (JHICI Ex. JMP 13.)	
86/06/24-200 JUNE 24, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I would like to turn now to the subject of the resolution of inquiry. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. I take it this [Ex. JMP 13] was a document that was brought to your attention some time in the summer of 1986? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The subject of the resolution I generally understood. I doubt if I ever actually read the resolution. "Mr. NIELDS. But you were aware, I take it,	

that the resolution sought an inquiry into conduct of Colonel North, among others, or maybe just Colonel North?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I understood that was an issue.

"Mr. NIELDS. And--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. There were a lot of stories in the press at that point.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the resolution was inquiring into contacts that Colonel North had had with private persons and third countries with respect to the funding of the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I generally understood that was the issue.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it sought a description of Colonel North's contacts concerning provision of military equipment to the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand that was in there.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it specifically sought information about his contacts on the subject of the contras with General Singlaub and Robert Owen, among others?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am not sure I understood those names were specifically mentioned in the resolution.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, just for the record, they are.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand. I have since read the resolution.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, you, I take it, arranged for Colonel North to have a face-to-face meeting with members of the House Intelligence Committee in connection with this resolution of inquiry?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. But I think it is important to put it in perspective as to the timing of that meeting. As I testified earlier, the resolution had been referred to three committees of the House, the House Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Intelligence Committees. The House Armed Services Committee, I think, took action first and produced a negative report and in my conversation with Chairman Hamilton that set up this meeting, I understood that under the House rules, that essentially killed the resolution and Chairman Hamilton indicated that he was not going to push that, his committee did not have to issue a report at that time, and he did not intend to.

"That was my understanding.

"He indicated that he thought it would still be useful for at least some members of his committee to talk to Colonel North and we discussed the method of doing that and eventually I agreed that Colonel North could meet with the committee informally in the Situation Room in the White House and that was agreeable to Chairman Hamilton.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it, although you have testified the Armed Services Committee had resolved it in some way or the other, I take it you were aware that the House Intelligence Committee, chaired by Chairman Hamilton, wanted to talk to Colonel North about the matters raised in the resolution of inquiry?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I understood that the Chairman thought it would be helpful. I didn't

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		see it as something that, frankly, he was pushing, but that he did think it would be helpful. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you arrange it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did arrange it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 30-32. For North account of his HPSCI meeting, see 86/08/06-100; see also Poindexter response to North at 86/08/06-115, -116,-250.)	
86/06/24-400 JUNE 24, 1986		BRUNEI: DELAYED SOLICITATION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS advised by ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIGUR and AMBASSADOR that Brunei should not be approached on Secretary's current trip to Asia; need to lay ground work. GPS agrees." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/08/05-100.)	
86/06/25-100 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86 SECORD ACCOUNT: Felix Rodriguez meets in Washington with North and Robert Dutton to resolve difficulties raised by Rodriguez' dissatisfaction, in particular his view that outsiders were "profiteering at the contras' expense. . . . The meeting, however, did not go so well . . . and Mr. Rodriguez had a subsequent meeting with the assistant to the Vice President, [Donald] Gregg, and I [sc. Secord] was told with the Vice President, as well. . . . I don't know exactly what was said." Secord dates the meeting to August 1986, while Dutton and Rodriguez place it in June 1986.	

(Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 178-79; see also id., 5/6/87, at 156-57; id., 5/7/87, at 230.)

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RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86
DUTTON ACCOUNT:

Meeting at North's office with Felix Rodriguez and Dutton:

"Mr. BALLEN. What did Colonel North say to Max or Felix Rodriguez?

"Mr. DUTTON. That he understood that he was valuable as a liaison with the host military, but that he was very concerned about Max's lack of communication security, and he told him that he had NSA intercepts that had Max on the phone talking about our operation with unauthorized people.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. . . . [H]ow did Rodriguez respond?

"Mr. DUTTON. He didn't believe him. He didn't believe that Colonel North had the intercepts.

"Mr. BALLEN. What, if anything, did Colonel North decide would be Rodriguez'[] posiiton in the organization at this meeting?

"Mr. DUTTON. We wanted him -- we were going to have to keep him in the operation, because of the relationship with the host general officer. The fear amongst all of the people that were aware of that relationship was that if Max went, we went, and that they would just throw us off the base and say you are not welcome anymore.

"So, we set him up as the host liaison officer

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		to act as a go-between between Bill Cooper, who was the manager down south, and the Embassy and the local government and military officials. "Mr. BALLEN. How did Mr. Rodriguez respond to that designation by Colonel North of his position? "Mr. DUTTON. He didn't like it. . . . He wanted to manage the operation. "Mr. BALLEN. What happened after the meeting? Where did you go? "Mr. DUTTON. I went with Max downstairs into the Vice President's office suite . . . and I met who I understood was Don Gregg, said hello. . . . [H]e and Max had about a 10 or 15-minute meeting; Max came out and we left." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 49-51; see id., 5/27/87, at 184-85 [Dutton agrees that Rodriguez could have been meeting with Watson, not Gregg]. See also id., 5/27/87, at 185-87 [the date of the meeting; Dutton also testifies Robert Earl never discussed with Dutton any meetings with Rodriguez], 191-92 [North does not show Rodriguez the NSA intercepts].)	
86/06/25-300 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86 RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: (1) Meeting with North and Dutton Quintero calls Rodriguez and tells him "that they were considering making me [sc. Rodriguez] a manager for the area. I had no idea one way or the other. And they wanted me to go to talk to them in Washington." Rodriguez flies to Washington June 24, 1986, and goes to North's office for a meeting at noon.	

Rodriguez later testified, "Well, let me tell you when I get in I was thinking Mr. Roman I and II punch, and it was something a little bit sinister here [sic]." Dutton is cleared at the White House gate; Rodriguez is not. (Rodriguez: "I think it was purposely or not [sic].")

Finally Dutton and Rodriguez reach North's office:

"Mr. BARBADORO. When you got into the meeting with Colonel North and Mr. Dutton, did you discuss this proposed reorganization plan?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He showed me the paper of the reorganization which had more blocks than people that we had. But it looks pretty impressive on paper.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What was your role to be in this reorganized operation?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I was the liaison between them and the host government.

"Mr. BARBADORO. What was your reaction when you were shown the reorganization plan?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I smiled. I just gave it back to him the papers [sic].

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did Colonel North also talk to you about a communications security problem at that meeting?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. . . . [North said,] I have been told that you are a security risk. . . .[Y]ou speak openly over the telephone, over a radio that you have. . . .

"I told him that [if] he thought I was a security risk, he could, a bit stronger word, keep his operation and I will have nothing to do with it. He told me that I had to understand that it was a matter of record that I had been a security risk, and I say, well, prove it to me.

". . . .

"The Colonel told me that because of the Freedom of Information Act or whatever--I don't recall exactly what he said--he could not show it to me. I said, well, I will give you an authority on paper . . . .

"He lowered his face and took some notes and he didn't mention that again. He asked, he wanted me to accept that job, and receive compensation of $3,000 a month.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you agree to work for 3,000 a month?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir . . . ."

(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 262-67.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

At the June 25 meeting, Rodriguez also shows North a letter written by one of the pilots after he had survived a plane crash. North reads the letter and asks, "[T]his is a joke?" North adds, "[A] letter like this if it goes to the press would do a lot of harm." Dutton tells North, "[D]on't worry about it. He is now our chief maintenance officer for the whole program [and] we have increased his salary tremendously starting next month."

Rodriguez returns to Central America with a small radar detector for cars. Rodriguez testified, "I would imagine it was to detect the

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		radar system inside Nicaragua. It . . . was a Fox-XX made by Radio Shack." "Mr. BARBADORO. And they were using a radar detector for cars to detect radar in the airplanes? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. "Mr. BARBADORO. Were there other problems with the aircraft? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Ask me if anything was right and I might be able to answer. ". . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. And in your opinion did these aircraft because of their poor condition pose a safety risk for the people flying them? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Absolutely, sir." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 265-70. See JHICI Ex. FIR 4 [letter from Lieut. Col. Piowaty, ret., describing the plane which crashed]. See also Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 74-75 [security risk accusation]; id., 5/27/87, at 295; id., 5/28/87, at 43-44, 67 [all on the 6/25/86 meeting].)	
86/06/25-310 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86 RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT (cont'd): (2) Private Meeting with North After his meeting with North and Dutton, Rodriguez asks to speak with North alone. He tells North, "I have learned that people are stealing here." He mentions hand grenades bought at three dollars and then sold at nine. He concludes, "[I]f this is known and the people which are[ ]involved, connected to the Wilson case	

before[, this] is going to be worse than Watergate, and this could destroy the President of the United States."

North tells Rodriguez "that that was not the case, that Mr. Clines was a patriot." Rodriguez testified later, "So, at that point I told him I was going to leave to go down to pick up some pictures and I left the room." This is Rodriguez' last meeting with North.

"Mr. BARBADORO. At some point before the end of the meeting, Colonel North also made a reference to Congress, did he not?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. That was the day, if I recall, when you all had the voting on the aid to the contras. . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. A Congressional debate was going on and it was being shown on TV, right?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He looked at the TV and said, those people want me but they cannot touch me because the old man love [sic] my ass. I'm sorry but you told me to say it that way."
(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 271-72. See generally [all on price of grenades:] id., 5/27/87, at 287 [third party informed Rodriguez of price paid for grenades; Rodriguez unclear on date: "It could have been before" the summer of 1985, prior to the time Calero stopped purchasing arms]; id., 5/28/87, at 20-23 [Mario Delamico was the third-party source], 59-60 [Mario Delamico], id., 5/28/87, at 30, 56-58. See also [all on overcharges for pilots' salaries:] id., 5/27/87, at 290; id., 5/28/87, at 104-110. See also [on meaning of Rodriguez' comment that this "is going

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		to be worse than Watergate":] id., 5/28/87, at 69 ["It is just the thing that came to my mind without any other thought about it. It--I don't know why I related Watergate specifically."].) Rodriguez testifying on the identity of the "old man" protecting North: "Mr. TRIBLE. Now, what did you believe he meant when he said the old man? Who did he mean? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. It could be the President. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 45-46.) Rodriguez testified further: "Mr. RODINO. . . . I assume that you believed . . . that the old man that Colonel North referred to was the President? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, I think it is everybody's belief of that. Stated in those terms. It is an assumption on all of us." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 68.)	
86/06/25-312 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. . . . Mr. Felix Rodriguez, also known as Max Gomez, testified before the committee at one point you and he were together and looked up at a television screen and you said, 'See those guys up there,' meaning Members of Congress, 'They are out to get me, but they are not going to get me'--or words to the effect--'because the old man loves me.' "I was wondering who the old man was. "Mr. NORTH. I have absolutely no recall	

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		whatsoever of that conversation, Senator." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 148.)	
86/06/25-320 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86 RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT (cont'd): (3) At the Vice President's Office After he speaks privately with North, Rodriguez goes to the Vice President's office. (Rodriguez: "I went on my own, not escorted by" Dutton.) The Vice President and Don Gregg are away at the time. Rodriguez runs into Sam Watson, and they go into Gregg's office to talk. They discuss "some problems that we had in getting helicopters approved for 1985 for the area where I [sc. Rodriguez] was, and the spare parts we badly needed for those helicopters." North then arrives with Dutton: "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. . . . When Colonel North came in with Mr. Dutton we stopped the conversation and Mr. Dutton waited outside the room and then very short [sic] after this I went with somebody who came to the other room to pick up the pictures . . . . And then we left together. "Mr. BARBADORO. Did you tell Mr. Watson anything about what you were doing with the resupply effort or your dissatisfaction with the resupply effort? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. We were discussing the helicopter program. "Mr. BARBADORO. After that meeting did you return to Central America. "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, I did." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 272-74.	

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		See id., 5/27/87, at 161-62 [the photos Rodriguez retrieves on 6/25/86 were shots of the Vice President and an acquaintance of Rodriguez, taken in Miami on 5/20/86 at a Cuban Independence Day celebration.].)	
86/06/25-325 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86: AT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE ADDENDUM TO GREGG CHRONOLOGY: The Vice President's press secretary issued a statement on May 14, 1987 that a review of the files and records in the Vice President's Office had revealed a June 25, 1986 meeting between Samuel Watson (the deputy to the Vice President's National Security Adviser, Donald Gregg) and Felix Rodriguez. This meeting had not previously been noted on the chronology prepared by Donald Gregg: "The review i[]dentified an additional meeting between Samuel J. Watson and Rodriguez on June 25, 1986 that was not indicated in the original chronology. This meeting was not scheduled ahead of time and did not appear on Colonel Watson's schedule which had been consulted in preparing the original chronology. It was discovered when Watson's personal notes were reviewed. The meeting was short and involved the counter insurgency operations in El Salvador and needed helicopter parts to support it. The Vice President was neither in the meeting nor aware it had taken place. Donald Gregg was overseas at the time and not aware of the meeting." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1-A. For Gregg chronology, see 83/11/03-100.)	

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86/06/25-326 JUNE 25, 1986		RODRIGUEZ AT THE OEOB, 6/25/86: RODRIGUEZ MEETS WITH WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . You might recall Felix testified that on June 25th he met with Colonel North in Colonel North's office. When that meeting was over, he pulled North aside and expressed concern one on one with North with regard to problems down in the resupply effort. "He was with Bob Dutton at that time, and it was during that meeting, before he pulled North aside, that North had chastized him with regard to his conduct down there, and North was concerned about it. "After that, speaking to North, he testified that he and Dutton went down to the Vice President's office, that Donald Gregg was not present, but that he met with you for a very short time. "A. I listened and watched that testimony. "Q. Do you have any recollection of meeting with Felix Rodriguez on June 25th, 1986? "A. Yes, I did. I met with Felix Rodriguez on June 25th. I would make a correction, though, based on what you said and what Dutton and others said. He did not visit the Vice President's office. It's a rather large complex of offices. "He came to my office, Room 298, which is not the Vice President's office. Technical point. "Q. I notice it's not on your chronology. "A. It is not on Watson [Dep. Ex.] 1. It was a mistake and an error. When we discovered it was	

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		not, we put out a press release May 15th, something like that, of this year making that correction. "Q. I just want to make sure the record is clear on that. And what is your recollection about that conversation on that occasion with Felix? "A. First, I don't recall that it was a scheduled meeting that was on my schedule. I think it was put on at the last minute or telephoned in or something like that. I don't know how the meeting came up. "I recall that Felix came down and wanted to say hello. He was in the building, wanted to pick up some photographs from Natalie Wozniak, one of the secretaries, of either the May 1st or May 20th meeting, something like that. "And he wanted to tell me he was here, the standard stuff: What can you do for me? "Q. Was it one on one? "A. Yes, my meeting with Felix was one on one. I think it was in my office. It may have been in Don's. I may have used Don's office for the meeting. I don't recall. "I remember that either at some point before, during, or after the meeting -- meeting Bob Dutton, Robert Dutton, whom I had never met before and never seen or heard of before. "Q. Was he introduced as Colonel Dutton? "A. No, not that I recall. And I remember that Felix and I were talking. I remember meeting this fellow when I was standing in the doorway. I think Felix introduced him as one of his	

assistants.

"But I have since heard that Ollie North says that Ollie or Dutton say[s] that he introduced him to me. I don't recall whether it was North or not.

"Q. Did Felix mention during that conversation on that day anything about resupply?

"A. Nothing whatsoever. Not that, nor did he mention that he was having any problems in El Salvador other than dealing with the helicopters.

"Q. Did he mention the fact that he had just come from a meeting with Colonel North?

"A. I don't believe he did.

"Q. And did you talk to Colonel North subsequent to that meeting with Felix on June 25th about what happened during the meeting?

"A. Well, I didn't know they had a meeting.

"Q. Okay. Well, did Colonel North bring it to your attention?

"A. He did not bring to my attention that he and Felix met on June 25th. Thus I was not able." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 57-60. See Watson Dep. Ex. 1 [Watson's list of contacts with Rodriguez].)

86/06/25-330
JANUARY 1985
- JUNE 1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ, AND GREGG'S KNOWLEDGE

GREGG ACCOUNT:

"Q. From the time Felix [Rodriguez] went down to El Salvador until the summer of 1986 -- and let's start the summer as of June, so from the beginning of 1985 through June of 1986, did Felix tell you in any way about his role in assisting resupply or supply of the contras?

"A. No.

"Q. At any time during that same period, January '85 through June 1986, did he tell you about his involvement with Colonel North?

"A. I don't recall Felix telling me about any structured involvement. I was aware that Ollie was traveling down there from time to time. I was aware from some things that Ollie said to me that he would run into Felix and from time to time Ollie would express irritation to me about some things Felix was doing. I now understand what Ollie was talking about.

"I did not understand at that point. So I knew that they met, but I did not know that there was any continuing structure to that relationship.

"Q. What did you understand North's role to be vis-a-vis the contras and the Nicaraguan situation in that same period we've been discussing, roughly the beginning of January '85 through June 1986?

"A. I was aware that he was involved in what I took to be coordinating, aiding and abetting the informal private network of people who would contribute humanitarian assistance to the contras. There were groups that would come into the White House that one heard about and one knew that Ollie was involved in that. That's what I considered he was doing.

"Q. And what, Don, did you understand to be the nature of his involvement with these private fundraising groups?

"A. I didn't really have a clear sense as to

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		what that was. I knew that he was very interested in Central America. I knew from his role in setting up the Vice President's trip in 1983, I knew he was interested in trying to keep the contras afloat during what was seen as a sort of hand-to-mouth period. But beyond that I did not have a clear sense of what he was doing on a day-to-day basis." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 9-11.)	
86/06/25-800 AFTER JUNE 25, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: The Central American air base, where North has requested that Rodriguez arrange for aircraft maintenance space, is in full operation. The aircraft include two C-123s, two C-7 Caribou and a Maule. Between May and September 1986, nine resupply drops are made from the base to Southern Front forces, and nine more to FDN forces in the North. Most of the drops occur in September: "That was about the time that all the problems that the aircraft were having were able to be corrected . . ., engines, communication equipment and navigational gears . . . ." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 237-39.)	
86/07/01-400 JULY - AUGUST 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: THE RESUPPLY OPERATION DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testifying further on the air resupply operation: "Mr. BALLEN. How many successful operations were you able to conduct with southern forces in	

82-745 O - 88 - 18

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		July and August, to your knowledge? "Mr. DUTTON. To my knowledge, we only had one. ". . . . "Mr. DUTTON. Our successful mission was a repeat of the C-7 mission [in June 1986]. "Mr. BALLEN. That was a refueling that again Colonel North obtained permission for? "Mr. DUTTON. That is correct." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 41; see id., at 38-41 [previous C-7 mission].)	
86/07/02-100 JULY 2, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: SPECULATION ON ITS STATUS AT THE DoS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ARMACOST writes GPS concerning renewed conjecture about arms sales to Iran; he argues against the policy." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. Dos Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/09/16-100.)
86/07/12-100 MAY - JULY 1986		THE CIA AND THE CONTRAS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. [C/CATF] Exhibit 33 is a cable from you I take it to [redacted] dated July 12, 1986. This is the cable in which [redacted] is being told that for political reasons the communicator [see 86/04/10-123] is not going to be put in place and that -- that is essentially what the cable says. "Do you recall sending this cable out? "[C/CATF.] Yes, I do. I recall this cable	

very clearly.

"Mr. Carome. [Redacted] has testified that he did not see this cable as telling him to cease and desist his contacts and his role with the resupply operators in [redacted.] Do you see the cable that way?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, I do. If you will indulge me for a moment, I want to look up a piece of documentation I would like to insert into the record, and it will take me just a minute and then I want to make some comments on this point. I would like to insert this in the record in partial answer to your cable. Let me read it.

"As I understand, this is a KL-43 message. I think it is -- I don't know who is the -- Secord I think is the originator. I don't know who[m] it is going to but it says, 'Our understanding CIA, Steele and possibly Ambassador had a long meeting over last two days' -- this is dated 30 May. 'Results thus far. [Redacted] can no longer speak to anyone, including Ralph, on operational matters. CIA says there will be one operator/controller sent here. [Redacted] must turn in his [KL]-43, we don't know about Steele's. In [redacted] conversation with Ralph last night, he said he will be his only means of support, none will come from [redacted.] Do you know yet what Steele's role will be in future. Evidently CIA has done much discussing with Washington lawyers on this and are concerned with their legal status in this program. Know you have the same concern for our position, but can work out with Goode.'

"I think this is from Dutton to Secord.

"Another cable I also want to put into the record, 28 May --

"Mr. Cohen. Would you clarify how you got that?

"Ms. McGinn. They were provided to us by the committee, all the declassified exhibits.

"[C/CATF.] This is a 28 May message which I released to our [redacted] and [redacted.] 'Headquarters wishes to reaffirm with station guidelines that no repeat no [redacted] materiel or monetary support can be provided to UNO/FDN or UNO/South representatives [redacted.] Station can provide advice and commo equipment as approved by Headquarters, and can engage in intelligence exchange as approved by Headquarters.'

". . . .

"I believe very strongly that there is a cause and effect relationship between these two messages and the meeting a[redacted] and I think it is clear from those messages that [redacted] got the problem and that he had to break.

". . . ."

(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 31-34; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 33. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 68-69 [the 7/12/86 cable], 246-53 [Castillo's Contra role]. For Castillo testimony on the July 12, 1986 CIA cable, see Castillo Testim., JHICI, 5/29/87, at 83-88, 110-12, 113-14.)

86/07/12-101
MAY - JULY
1986

THE CIA AND THE CONTRAS
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"[C/CATF.] Let me make another point here.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		The day before [redacted] talked to the [redacted] in April in [redacted] my task force attorney [redacted] was in [redacted] the day before. In the meeting with [redacted] as I understand it from [redacted] testimony and as I understand it from my discussion with [redacted] said I need some legal guidance here. I need to know what to do on this thing. Why didn't he ask the attorney? This man right back here, [redacted] is the guy who would have written the guidance. He was there the day before. I can't answer why he didn't ask. This is the guy we would have turned to and he was there one day before and it never came up. I am mystified by this and this is one of three things that troubles me the most about this whole endeavor, because something went wrong someplace. I can't tell you what went wrong. I can't tell you why it went wrong. "If you will go back and read all the traffic, and I won't insert it into the record, we made a concerted effort. We went to train and select the man, there is communications about getting the man a visa, getting him down there and then came the cable, we are going to have to pay for his housing and his support and his transportation to [redacted.] My task force attorney came to me and said [redacted] if you do that you are over the line, that is material support and that takes you too far and you have come too far politically in terms of credibility with the Congress and where you are going in the legislative process to take that chance, don't do it. "[C/CATF.] I wrote the cable, I said, 'All	

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		right, go write me a cable that stops it,' and that was this cable, and this cable was meant to be within the context of all that's gone before, and it was clear to us we were saying again don't get there, just ride it out. Find another way but don't do it because it crosses the line, it constitutes materiel or material support of those people at [redacted] and we were being very strict. We wouldn't provide a car to the FDN communicator there or this or that. That's the way it was meant. If it is misinterpreted, then that's a problem that comes with the written word and not being together, and I'm sorry it was misinterpreted. For our mind it was supposed to be clear. "I know that in your testimony and discussion with [redected] this was seen as a CYA cable. Trying to get out from under the loa[]d and say, hey, guys, fix it. I know there has been a lot of criticism about me about this cable. That's the context it was in, that's what it meant to do. It may have been poorly written. It was clear to me, it was clear to all the rest of us. "What I was saying to him was, 'You can't do it that way; you have to stand down. If you can't get him there with a visa, don't get him there. We're not going to do it.'" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 34-36.)	
86/07/12-102 MAY - JULY 1986		THE CIA AND THE CONTRAS C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Carome. This cable left [redacted]	

without a solution to the problem that you had discussed at the May meeting [see 86/04/10-122], didn't it?

"[C/CATF.] It left him without the May solution, that's right.

"Mr. Carome. And it also says, 'To date we have maintained our distance from the private benefactors.' That wasn't quite right. You knew [redacted] had direct contact with the private benefactors, didn't you?

"[C/CATF.] I knew that he had been in contact with them. I saw that out of the May meeting. I was not sure at that point in time of the depth or scope of the contact. I had no idea they were like they were. I thought we had fixed that problem and had pulled back away from it and considered it a blip on the screen that we had gone back and corrected the record as it was and fixed it. I felt fairly good about where we were with the private benefactors at that point in time, with the exception of where I felt I had gotten out a little too far ahead of myself in February and pulled myself back. But I still thought that we were in a defendable position both politically and legally at that point in time, and that's really what that's saying.

"Mr. Carome. The flights continued after this cable, didn't they, the lethal drops to the southern front?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, they did.

"Mr. Carome. And you knew that [redacted] was continuing the monitor those flights and play the role that he had played before, didn't you?

"[C/CATF.] I knew he was monitoring those flights, but I really honestly thought he had fixed a way so he was not in the middle of the things. I did not think he was in the middle.

"Mr. Carome. How do you think he had fixed it?

"[CATF.] I thought he would go through one of two ways. I thought he would either go through the FDN or do it the way I thought before, put an intermediary between himself and the private benefactors.

"Mr. Carome. Did you check and see whether or not he had done so?

"[C/CATF.] No."

(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 36-38.)

86/07/15-050
JULY 15, 1986

NORTH AND LEAKS
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. COHEN. . . . Did there come a time in July of 1986 when you came to suspect Colonel North was leaking information to the press and that he had lost his objectivity in formulating policy issues for you and the President?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Do you have a reference for that?

"Mr. COHEN. Well, I do. It is in the Tower Commission. B-125. Basically it is a PROFS note to you from Colonel North which indicates that he regrets very deeply that he had now become a suspect of leaks to CBS, Newsweek magazine, that even a luncheon with his sister the prior day had been considered to be--had been questioned as to whether he had in fact done this, but he went on to say that 'I'm sorry that you regret that I've become too passionately involved and I can't give objective advice.'

"Do you recall that memo?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I vaguely recall that memo, but let me put that in perspective.

"I have never felt that Colonel North made any leaks to the press. The whole episode came about because of the fact that I wanted to lower Colonel North's profile on the contra support activity and his operational roles in general; and I recognized by July, we had finally gotten the Senate to approve the $100 million; the House had. There were some discrepancies or differences between the two bills at that point, and so we didn't actually have the authorization or appropriation, but I knew that we would shortly; and as CIA phased back into the contra operation, Colonel North I wanted to phase out.

"It became public that he was going to be phased out and I frankly was getting a lot of static from Colonel North's supporters here on the Hill as to why I was trying to take him out of the program. And I think Ollie misunderstood what I was trying to do.

"Mr. COHEN. He remained on the program?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He did."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 71-72 [citing North PROF to Poindexter, 7/15/86, quoted in Tower Report at B-125 and -126].)

86/07/15-100
SOMETIME IN

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES
DUTTON ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
MID-JULY 1986		Dutton testifying on a meeting to review the Contra operation: "Mr. MCCLURE. Mr. Dutton, in mid-July 1986, General Secord, Colonel North, Mr. Hakim and yourself met to discuss the entire contra operation. What was your impression of Mr. Hakim's role and knowledge of that operation? "Mr. DUTTON. The occasion of the meeting was Mr. Hakim's birthday, and in that evening, we generally went over how the operation was going, the problems that we were having; my feeling was that he was totally out of the operational side; that he was handling the financial side. That was his bag. "The rest of it was being run by General Secord and Colonel North." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 152-53.)	
86/07/15-200 JULY 15, 1985		PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN NORTH PROF: North PROF titled "Private Blank Check" and marked "Reply to note of 07/15/86": "We are rapidly approaching the point where the PROJECT DEMOCRACY [PRODEM] assets in CentAm need to be turned over to CIA for use in the new program. The total value of the assets (six aircraft, warehouses, supplies, maintenance facilities, ships, boats, leased houses, vehicles, ordnance, munitions, communications equipment, and a 6520' runway on property owned by a PRODEM proprietary) is over $4.5M. "All of these assets--and the personnel--are owned/paid by overseas companies with no U.S.	

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		connection. All of the equipment is in first rate condition and is already in place. It wd be ludicrous for this to simply disappear just because CIA does not want to be 'tainted' with picking up the assets and then have them spend $8-10M of the $100M to replace it--weeks or months later. Yet, that seems to be the direction they are heading, apparently based on NSC guidance. "If you have already given Casey instructions to this effect. I wd vy much like to talk to you about it in hopes that we can reclama [sic] the issue. All seriously believe that immediately after the Senate vote the DRF [Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance] will be subjected to a major Sandinista effort to break them before the U.S. aid can become effective. PRODEM currently has the only assets available to support the DRF and the CIA'S most ambitious estimate is 30 days after a bill is signed before their own assets will be available. This will be a disaster for the DRF if they have to wait that long. Given our lack of movement on other funding options, and Elliot [redacted] plea for PRODEM to get food to the resistance ASAP, PRODEM will have to borrow at least $2M to pay for the food. That's O.K, and Dick is willing to do so tomorrow--but only if there is reasonable assurance that the lenders can be repaid. The only way that the $2M in food money can be repaid is if CIA purchases the $4.5M+ worth of PRODEM equipment for about $2.25M when the law passes. "[Redacted] told them where they can get them com[m]ercially from the USAF as excess -- the same	

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		way PRODEM bought them under proprietary arrangements. It is just unbelievable. If you wish I can send you a copy of the PROJECT DEMOCRACY status report which includes a breakdown of assets. It is useful, nonattributable reading. Warm regards, North" (JHICI Ex. 12 [= Ex. OLN 198]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 72-73.)	
86/07/15-201 JULY 15, 1986		PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF: Poindexter writes to North in a PROF note in response to North's prior note (see 86/07/15-200) that he has not given Casey any "guidance" against the sale of Project Democracy assets to the CIA and, indeed, that Poindexter approves of North's plan. Poindexter explains that he has told CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates "the private effort should be phased out," but Poindexter agrees with North and asks him to talk to Casey about the plan to sell Project Democracy to the CIA. (Iran-Contra Report, at 73; Poindexter PROF to North, "Private Blank Check," 7/26/86 [Committee Document N 18251].)	
86/07/15-215 LATE MAY THROUGH LATE JULY 1986		PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton elaborated on his reorganization memo and on its opening sentence, "[T]he 'Benefactor Company,' hereinafter referred to as B.C. Washington, has taken more direct control of Project Democracy and its supporting elements":	

"Mr. LIMAN. Who was BC Washington, benefactor company?

"Mr. DUTTON. Sir, that was a name that was made up. There is an ongoing lawsuit . . . by Avirg[a]n and Honey. Because of this lawsuit, and the involvement of both Colonel North and General Secord in that, there was concern that Max Gomex was, in fact, feeding information to the people that were behind that lawsuit.

"The purpose of this initial paragraph was to outline specifically for Max--and it was presented down in Central America to him--that Colonel North and General Secord had withdrawn from the operation, they were no longer part of it, and this new company, called BC Washington, which represented the donators, therefore the benefactors--that they had come in to take over the operation.

"If, in fact, Max passed that information on to the people he had been talking to before, it was felt by General Secord and Colonel North that that would relieve some of the pressure both on the operation and on themselves.

"Mr. LIMAN. What was the fact?

"Mr. DUTTON. The fact was that Colonel North and General Secord's relationship to the organization had not changed one bit.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that they were still directing the organization, correct?

"Mr. DUTTON. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And so this BC Washington was a facade that they developed in order to cloak their role; is that fair to say?

"Mr. DUTTON. That's fair.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, you have also testified a moment ago that after the memorandum was prepared, General Secord concluded that he wanted to give the assets to the CIA, do you recall that?

"Mr. DUTTON. As I said, sir, this document was written on the 21st of July. The operation didn't even become viable until mid-September and when I said in the fall of 1986, the discussion to give the assets to the CIA was another option that was being discussed seriously.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall giving testimony at your deposition at pages 55 and 56? You were being asked by Mr. Ballen then, . . .

". . . .

"Question, 'And you had never heard what General Secord's decision was on that matter or did you ever hear what General Secord's decision was on that matter?'

"Answer, 'No, I think he was waiting to hear what the CIA wanted to do and that he was basically willing to do whatever they wanted to do, but rightfully it was his feelings that the assets belonged to a private company and they should be reimbursed for them.'

"Was that testimony given by you?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, sir. I believe it goes on to say, 'Did he ever talk about a profit?' And the answer to that was no.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he talk about getting reimbursement for that?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, he did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And this was true testimony that it was his feeling that rightfully the assets belonged to a private company and they should be reimbursed for them?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, sir."

(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 119-24; JHICI Ex. RCD 14. On the Reorganization Plan, see also entries starting at 86/05/24-200.)

86/07/15-216
LATE MAY
THROUGH LATE
JULY 1986

PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN
DUTTON AND SECORD CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS:

Dutton testifying on the conflicting recollections of him and Secord over who drafted the options at the end of the reorganization plan:

"Mr. RUDMAN. Who prepared [the options section]?

"Mr. DUTTON. I did the actual preparation. The information was provided to me by General Secord.

". . . .

"Mr. RUDMAN. Essentially General Secord was structuring this paper and he was telling you what the structure was and you, as his staff person, were reducing it to writing?

"Mr. DUTTON. That would be accurate.

". . . .

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . The clear meaning of [General Secord's] testimony is that you, not General Secord, w[ere] the inventor, the conceiver, the author of this plan, which was never implemented, but that is not the point.

"If I understand your testimony, you deny that, that is not true.

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		"Mr. DUTTON. . . . I gave it to you the way I know it." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 172-78; JHICI Ex. RCD 14 [reorganization plan]. Contra Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/5/87, at 216-19 [Secord: "That was Dutton's view. It was not my view. He wrote it. I was busy elsewhere at the time."], and id., 5/7/87, at 80-84 [Secord: Dutton proposed selling the operation to the CIA for $4 million. Secord's proposal was to give it for free. Secord denies that he authorized the options, made the proposals, or approved of them. He does not recall whether he authorized that the document be given to North.].)	
86/07/15-217 LATE MAY-LATE JULY 1986		PROJECT DEMOCRACY: THE REOGANIZATION PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . [W]hen General Secord was on the stand [sic] and he was confronted on cross-examination by a statement that had been made by Robert Dutton in a deposition and it seemed to contradict what Secord said about the willingness to give some . . . or all of the assets of the enterprise over to the CIA, I . . . found that was really taken out of context. When you read the whole deposition, just one page later actually, what you found is that there wasn't a contradiction at all. "Is that the type of picking things out of context maybe you are talking about? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, and I don't want to take too much of your time but I want to be clear about the idea of whose idea it was to cause those assets to	

be sold to the CIA. That idea was Director William J. Casey's, and I caused it to be put back into the proposals."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 140.)

86/07/15-218
AFTER JULY
15, 1986

PROJECT DEMOCRACY: SALE TO THE CIA
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

Poindexter testified, when questioned about North's PROF message that Project Democracy assets needed to be turned over to the CIA in Central America:

"Q. Just so I can focus you on it, I would like you to tell us what you know about 'Project Democracy,' the entity that Colonel North refers to here.

"A. Yes. May I just finish reading it?

"I don't recall when it was -- and it was probably sometime in '86. Colonel North coined the name Project Democracy, must as the same way on those code sheets he called it project something else. But it was his shorthand way of talking about the network that had been set up to keep the contras supported through this private third-party, third-country logistics arrangement.

"Q. Did you take it --

"A. Go ahead.

"Q. Go ahead.

"A. I was going to say it didn't have any other significance. I recognize the name is the same as, or similar, and I suppose that's where he came up with the name, but it's unrelated.

"The President made a speech to the Parliament in London back in 1982 or 1983 in which he talked

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		about Project Democracy in general terms; but there is no other connection. "Q. Did you ask the CIA to purchase these assets? "A. I can't recall whether -- as I told you earlier, Colonel North wanted me to talk to Director [C]asey. My recollection is I didn't talk to Director Casey. I think I talked to Bob Gates. I can't recall whether I asked him to purchase them or not. "My best recollection is that I simply said that these assets are available and you ought to look at them, or something to that effect." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 208-09; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 22 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 54; North PROF to Poindexter, "Private Blank Check," 7/15/86].)	
86/07/15-220 SOMETIME AFTER MID-1986		SELLING THE SECORD OPERATION TO THE CIA POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did [North] ever ask you to intervene with Director Casey to persuade Casey once the CIA came back in to buy the assets that the Secord group had? "A. That's correct. But that was -- ". . . . "[A.] Yes. I remember that incident. As I recall, it was presented to me from the standpoint that -- all during the latter part of 1986, once we got the two votes through the House and the Senate, and we kept pushing to get the conference report out and get the appropriation, but we were preparing for [redacted] and Colonel North's point	

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		to me, as I recall, was that it's ridiculous to have this logistics apparatus set up, functioning well, and the CIA not pick it up and go off and re-establish and set up their own; time will be lost that we can ill afford. It would be a terrible waste of those assets. "So he asked me to talk to Director Casey. He said the lower-level people at the CIA didn't want to touch it because of their fear that they would somehow be contaminated by that; and as I recall, I agreed to talk to Director Casey. "I don't remember -- I don't believe I actually talked to Bill about it, but I think I did talk to Bob Gates. "Q. Were you asked to talk to him about buying them, buying the assets? "A. I believe so. I believe so. "Q. Do you remember what price was put on them? "A. I don't remember that. "Q. You did talk to Gates? "A. I believe I did talk to Gates. And I went over the arguments about why it would be useful to do that; and Bob said, 'Let me check into it,' or something like that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 186-88.)	
86/07/15-225 DURING 1986		SELLING THE SECORD-HAKIM OPERATION TO THE CIA, AND THEIR PROFITS, GENERALLY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. TRIBLE. It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, the Colonel North was always talking [to] you that Secord was losing money?	SECORD-HAKIM PROFITS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		"Mr. POINDEXTER. Colonel North and others. "Mr. TRIBLE. That is a fact, is it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is correct. "Mr. TRIBLE. Now, isn't it a fact as well that Colonel North asked you to intervene with the CIA to help Secord and company sell their material to the CIA? "Mr. POINDEXTER. There were some PROFS notes that covered that subject, and I think you have them as exhibits. "Mr. TRIBLE. Is the answer yes or no, Admiral? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He did want me to talk to Director Casey. There were several aspects of this. "Number one, he thought that it as not prudent or efficient for the CIA to completely build a new logistics operation from scratch; that there would be previous [sic (precious?)] time lost in getting the supplies flowing to the contras out of the hundred million dollars, and they could take over an existing operation and be on line much more quickly. "I also, in preparing for these hearings, I note that there were apparently requests made to General Secord to provide some food after the humanitarian aid ran out; and I believe the PROFS note indicates that General Secord did not have a source for that. "My recollection is that when I eventually spoke to the CIA, I don't believe I spoke to Director Casey. I think it was Mr. Gates. And I simply indicated to him that there was an	

effective private logistics operation and that they ought to look into the possibilities of taking that over and didn't get into the details with Mr. Gates, whether it would be purchased or given or what sort of arrangements might be worked out.

"Mr. TRIBLE. So in response to my question, a request was made by Colonel North that you talk to the CIA and you did talk to the CIA?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct?

"Mr. TRIBLE. What was your response when you first learned that Hakim and Secord had amassed some $8 million in the bank in their own name when the venture ended?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, that obviously became--I became aware of that in preparation for these hearings and I don't care to give my personal reaction.

"Mr. TRIBLE. Colonel North was shocked. You don't have a response--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I frankly don't know enough of the facts, Senator Trible. You know, I would want to talk to--I would want to talk to Dick Secord and Hakim. They were testifying here under difficult circumstances, and I am not prepared to draw any conclusions.

"Mr. TRIBLE. All right, sir.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand there are some uncertainties and there are possible discrepancies, but I am not going to pass judgment on them."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 90-92. For Poindexter testimony preceding this entry, see

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		86/00/04-713.)	
86/07/15-230 DURING 1986		SELLING THE PRIVATE BENEFACTORS' EQUIPMENT TO THE CIA GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. . . . The other point that I wanted to make sure gets fleshed out, Colonel North was offering to sell the aircraft, not give them to you. [See 86/10/14-300 for preceding George testimony on sale of the private benefactors' aircraft to the CIA.] "Mr. George. God bless poor Colonel North. Everything was his, the world is mine, I'm going to see the President, I'm going to see the king, I'm going to fly down to Central America and have a private conference. How would you like some tickets to the Redskins game? Christ -- Colonel North calls me up and says, 'How would you like to buy my airplanes?' I guess what I'm saying, Counsel, is, were I to have been so foolish as to say yes, I'll buy your airplanes, I'm not sure he could even produce any airplanes. "Mr. Kerr. You did not go and kick the tires on the car, I understand. But your perception was that he was asking the CIA -- "Mr. George. Would the CIA please buy back all the equipment that the private benefactors had put together in Central America now that the administration had achieved its goal of renewing [redacted] financial support to the contras in Central America." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 35.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/07/15-240 JULY 1986		SELLING THE PRIVATE BENEFACTORS' EQUIPMENT TO THE CIA C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. In July of '86, did you have a discussion with Oliver North in which he offered or suggested the Central Intelligence Agency purchase the assets, the planes being used by the [redacted] team? "[C/CATF.] I don't know if it was July of '86 but in the summer of '86, after the authorizing legislation passed the House of Representatives and it was fairly certain we would have a bill, that was discussed many times, once with Oliver North directly with me, once the Clair George, once with Director Casey and once at a meeting at the Pentagon, and there were a number of discussions on that. So let us accept if it wasn't in July, it was on or about July, yes. "Mr. Carome. Who was the proposed seller of these assets? "[C/CATF.] He didn't say. "Mr. Carome. What was the proposed price? "[C/CATF.] I don't recall. I don't recall him mentioning a price. He just said, 'You ought to buy those airplanes.' I've seen prices of $2 million and $4.2 million subsequent to that, but I don't recall him having mentioned a price at that point in time. "Mr. Carome. What was your position as to whether or not this should happen? "[C/CATF.] My position was very, very clear. We were not going off anything to do with what	

went before. [Sic.] As I said, and as will probably come out in subsequent testimony, by May or certainly June I was not unlike Tennessee Williams, 'Cat on a Hot Tin Roof.' I did not like what I was seeing; I was uncomfortable, and I was back-peddling, trying to disengage, and I specifically said, 'Look, I don't want to contaminate the new program with anything that's got any clutter from the past. I'm not going to buy those.' I was relating back to my conversations with Gadd, back to some other things that I had seen in May that bothered me, and I wanted to start over with a clean sheet.

"We had already figured out how we were going to supply our air operations and for both operational and political reasons, I wasn't going to touch those airplanes at all, and I told everybody that and was very clear about it."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 38-40.)

86/07/15-250
DURING 1986

PROJECT DEMOCRACY, AND NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE
COY ACCOUNT:

"Q. What does the word Project Democracy mean to you in connection with Colonel North? Was there something that he called Project Democracy?

"A. It was -- as far as I knew, it was a slang or jargon term that he applied to efforts relating to aiding contras."
(Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 52. See 86/05/24-420 [North's "loose definition" of Project Democracy].)

Asked at a later deposition to identify

Democracy, Inc., Coy testified:

"A. It was the code name or the jargon Ollie used to describe the activities for the contras.

"Q. The activities involving who[m]?

"A. Well, I'm not sure at this time whether I knew specifically or not, but I probably did, that it was Secord.

"Q. And what activities?

"A. The airlift, providing military supplies.

"Q. And for how long had you know[n] that that was going on?

"A. I'm not sure exactly, but having come in in March or so [of 1986] and kind of just picking up bits and pieces and reading newspapers and hearing things going on in the office, I would guess in the summer sometime.

"Q. Were you formally briefed into that matter by anyone?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you learn it again just sort of fortuitously?

"A. Just kind of picking bits and pieces up.

"Q. And what did you understand North's role to be in connection with this military airlift?

"A. Well, it was never really clear to me exactly what his role was. I knew that was his account on the NSC and that was something he was supposed to be doing and supposed to be following. I never saw him or attended any meetings where he gave any direct orders, but I saw a number of people come into the office and he would talk of his involvement with this, his attempt at running a war from his desk, and that type of thing.

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		"But I discounted a lot of that. There's only so many hours in the day and there were other things going on. I just thought it was kind of bragging, if you will, or boasting of doing more than he really was doing, but that he was involved in it certainly." (Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 32-33.)	
86/07/21-100 JULY 21, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY ON NORTH POINDEXTER RESPONSE: Poindexter, in letters to the persons chairing the House Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Armed Services Committees, responds to the House Resolution of Inquiry, dated June 24, 1986, on North's activities: " . . . The Administration strongly opposes enactment of the resolution. "Last fall, in an effort to cooperate with Chairman Barnes, my predecessor, Robert C. McFarlane, met with members of your committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. While I did not participate in these discussions, I understand that information on the specific issues raised in H. Res. 485, was provided to your Committee and that this information made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaraguan resistance. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. JMP 14. For text of the Resolution of Inquiry, see 86/06/24-100.)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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86/07/21-110 SEPTEMBER 1985 - AUGUST 1986		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT NORTH: McFARLANE'S "TOO CATEGORICAL" STATEMENT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. In the first session of your examination I asked you about the 1986 [sic (1985)] Barnes and Hamilton inquiry concerning Colonel North's activities on behalf of the contras. I will show [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 52, which consists of a transmitt[al] slip, a memo, which purports to have your writing on it, and the Barnes letter, and I will ask you if this is your note on the second page and if you would read it into the record? "A. Yes, this is my handwriting, with the one exception. "Q. What is the one exception? "A. The addition of the name Bur[g]har[d]t to the list. "Q. You indicated that sometime later, almost a year later, you received a copy of Mr. McFarlane's response and that you thought that some of his responses were phrased more broadly than you would have had you been the author of this letter. "I will show you Exhibit 53, which is his September 12, '85 response to Congressman Barnes and ask you to look at it. I have only one question: whether the statement in the second paragraph which says: 'based on this review, I want to assure you that my actions, and those of my staff, have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law.' "Is [that] one of those sentences you felt too	

categorical?

"A. To correct what you said a moment ago, I don't think I have ever seen this. A[t] some point in August of '86 I asked Commander Thompson if he had -- this was in conjunction with the letter Chairman Hamilton sent me -- I asked Commander Thompson if he had a copy of Mr. McFarlane's response the previous year. He said he did.

"I said, 'I may want to look at it.'

"I never go [sic] around to looking at it. I have seen excerpts of this in the Tower Commission report.

"Q. And when you saw it in the Tower Commission report you said there was some language in it which you felt was more categorical then you would have used. Is that fair to say?

"A. I think that is fair to say.

"Q. Is the sentence I read to you one of them?

"Let the record reflect a consultation.

"A. As I have testified before, I wouldn't have responded the way that Mr. McFarlane did, and I would not have that that way. [Sic.] I am not quite sure what Bud had in mind.

"Q. Why would you not have felt comfortable saying that my actions, and those of my staff, have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law?

"MR. BECKLER: I am going to object to that. You are asking him what the operation of his mind is in view of violating the Boland Amendment in a letter written by somebody else.

"MR. LIMAN: I am asking him why he would be uncomfortable making that kind of statement to Congress.

"I will rephrase it and make it very simple.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Did you believe that in September of 1985 that the activities of Colonel North were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the Boland Amendment?

"(Witness consulting with counsel)

"THE WITNESS: As I have said earlier, I would not have been a[s] categorical in the letter as Mr. McFarlane was. I don't know, I don't know what Bud had in mind. I am probably not aware of everything that Colonel North did, and I just -- it is too categorical a statement."
(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 55-57; Poindexter Dep. Exx. 52 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 7-A; Barnes letter to McFarlane, 8/16/85], 53 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 12; McFarlane letter to Barnes, 9/12/85].)

86/07/21-120
JULY 21, 1986

HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY: POINDEXTER RESPONSE

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

[For testimony preceding this excerpt, see 85/08/16-430 through -435.]

"Mr. LIMAN. Right. Now, Admiral, when you said that you felt that Mr. McFarlane's statements were too categorical [in 8/85], is it a fact, sir, that in the summer of 1986, you, yourself, had to write to Congress in connection with an inquiry then about Mr. North?

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object, and here is the reason why. Mr. Liman said, 'Isn't it a fact that you, Admiral Poindexter, said the letters were too categorical?'

"Admiral Poindexter has never testified to that. In his May 2nd deposition, he said something to the effect that, 'I would never have written the letters that way.'

"However, Mr. Liman, since May 2nd, has been trying to get Admiral Poindexter to say the letters were too categorical. We have denied that over and over and over. But he is not going to stop.

"Mr. LIMAN. I think that Mr. Beckler is mistaken, that the witness did, in fact, say that some of the language--

". . . .

"Mr. NUNN. Back to the objection the counsel made relating to the question posed by Mr. Liman and about whether he felt--whether Admiral Poindexter felt the McFarlane letter was too categorical, I think if counsel will simply read transcript page 56, you will see that Admiral Poindexter has already agreed that the McFarlane letter was too categorical. So the original objection of counsel, it seems to me, is out of order and has no bearing on the counsel's point.

". . . .

"Mr. NUNN. You had it in his own words. We agreed with Mr. Liman's description of it as being too categorical. The question says, 'And when you saw it in the Tower Commission report, you said there was some language in there which you felt

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		was more categorical than you would have used; is that fair to say?' That is the question. "The answer: 'I think that is fair to say.' "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Senator, if you have to go back--this was on the fifth--fourth day of depositions. Mr. Liman kept going over and over. . . . ". . . . "That question was asked over and over. My objection was that Admiral Poindexter from the beginning has testified that he wouldn't have written any letters this way. I am saying Mr. Liman for some reason wants him to use the word 'categorical' and he will continually ask him over and over, 'is it fair to say, is it fair to say?' That is my point." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 7-17 [citing Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 55-56].)	
86/07/21-121 JULY 21, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY: POINDEXTER RESPONSE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral Poindexter, would you look at Exhibit [JMP] 14. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I have it and I just read it. "Mr. LIMAN. Is that a letter that you sent to Chairman Hamilton as a result of an inquiry into Colonel North's activities in support of the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is a letter I wrote, but	

the description of it I would make differently.

"Some time in the late summer of 1986 a resolution was introduced into the House, a resolution of inquiry. It was referred by the House legislative process to three committees of the House. It was referred to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Armed Service Committee, and the House Foreign Relations Committee. All three of those chairmen as I recall wrote to me and asked the Administration's position on the resolution.

"The Administration was against the resolution. These letters were written back to the chairman to provide the Administration position on the resolution of inquiry that had been introduced. That resolution was later, I am not sure of the right term but think tabled, or it was killed.

"Mr. LIMAN. Was the inquiry that the resolution was directed to an inquiry into the activities of Colonel North and the NSC staff in support of the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I can't remember the exact wording of the resolution, but it was something close to that.

"Mr. LIMAN. When you sent this letter to Chairman Hamilton, did you intend him to rely upon your word as expressed in that letter?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I intended to answer the question and give the Administration position that we were opposed to the resolution and that the questions had been addressed by Mr. McFarlane in the previous year.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you intend for Chairman Hamilton to rely upon your word as expressed in that letter?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I intended for Chairman Hamilton to not vote for or put out a report from this committee that was in favor of the resolution. As it turns out, the House Armed Services Committee addressed the issue first and they voted to not recommend the resolution.

"I am not an expert on congressional procedures, so I may be using the wrong terms, but the House Armed Services Committee put out a negative report. Later in the month, Chairman Hamilton called me and indicated that the House Armed Services Committee had put out a negative report and under the rules of the House that really was all that needed to be done.

"There was no further action that was required, but that he thought that it would be helpful if the House Intelligence Committee had an opportunity to talk to Colonel North in an informal way.

"He said that he was not personally going to push the issue, and we had a discussion about the various forums that could be used for such a meeting.

"I made the point as I recall that I didn't want to establish the precedent of a[n] NSC staff officer testifying before a congressional committee because the White House, this White House and previous White Houses, have been very strong on the point that they didn't want the presidential staff, the personal staff of the

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		President testifying on the Hill and we did not want to set a precedent; and after some discussion with the Chairman and my staff, it was agreed that Colonel North could informally meet with the committee in the Situation Room and that was acceptable to Chairman Hamilton and that took place. "But this was all after the resolution of inquiry was essentially killed." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 19-22; JHICI Ex. JMP 14 [Poindexter letter to Rep. Hamilton, 7/21/86].)	
86/07/21-122 JULY 21, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY: POINDEXTER RESPONSE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Do you believe that you cannot answer my question as to whether you intended Chairman Hamilton to rely upon your word with a yes or no answer? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I intended to withhold information from Chairman Hamilton, which I did, which I admitted to yesterday. I wanted to withhold information on the NSC operational activities in support of the contras from most everybody. "Mr. LIMAN. Let me read this letter. It says, ['T]his is in reply to your letter to the President of June 25, 1986, requesting comments on House Resolution 485 relating to the allegations of improper activities by members of the National Security Council staff in support of the Nicaragua	

resistance[.] The Administration strongly opposes enactment of the resolution.'

"Now, in that sentence, you stated the Administration position that it opposed the resolution.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, we opposed it very vigorously.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, you went on to say: 'Last fall in an effort to cooperate with Chairman Barnes, my predecessor Robert C. McFarlane met with members of your committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. While I did not participate in these discussions, I understand that information on the specific issues raised in House Resolution 485 was provided to your committee and that this information made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaragua resistance. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on House Resolution 485.

"'I have forwarded similar letters to Chairman Fascell and Chairman Aspin and sincerely hope this matter can finally be put to rest.'

"Did you write that letter, sir?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't write it, but I signed it. My staff prepared it for me.

"Mr. LIMAN. When you signed that letter, did you agree with the statements in it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. And I still do. I think it is an accurate letter. It doesn't tell everything, it withholds information, but it is accurate.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you intend to associate yourself with Mr. McFarlane's statement that the staff was in compliance with the letter and spirit of the law? Or were you just simply repeating his statement? What was your intent in that language?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I am not sure I understand your question.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you intend in sending this letter to associate yourself with the statement that the National Security Council staff was in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, as I have testified yesterday and today, I have always felt that the Boland amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and that the NSC staff was complying with the letter and spirit of the law. The letter says what it says. I think it is accurate. It withholds information, it clearly withholds information.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is one of the facts it withholds that you felt that Boland did not apply to the NSC staff?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It withholds that information, yes."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 22-26; JHICI Ex. JMP 14 [Poindexter letter to Rep. Hamilton, 7/21/86].)

86/07/21-125
1984-86

POINDEXTER'S VIEW OF BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. BOLAND. Admiral, when you were in the process of relieving Mr. McFarlane as National Security Adviser, I assume that you had one or more sessions with him in which he described matters of which he was aware that you had not needed to know as his deputy but which you would need to know in your new post, is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember that.

"Mr. BOLAND. Mr. McFarlane has testified twice before these committees that he thought the NSC, the National Security Council, was covered by the Boland Amendment and that he repeatedly advised his staff of his belief and his desire that the law be complied with. Do you recall Mr. McFarlane's discussing that subject with the NSC staff?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No.

"Mr. BOLAND. You have made it clear that you did not share Mr. McFarlane's view of the applicability of Boland to the NSC. Did you ever discuss your contrary views with Mr. McFarlane and if so, what did he say?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Again I don't recall a specific conversation on that. I think that Mr. McFarlane was aware of my position, especially with regard to coming back to the Congress to try to get it clarified about talking to third countries. The reason that I did not want to do that was that I didn't think it was necessary because there wasn't any restriction in Boland that I could see that prevented us from talking to third countries and I didn't want to resurface the issue on the Hill and get an answer that we didn't want to hear, and I think he was well aware of that.

"Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you, when you became the National Security Adviser did you inform your staff that a new view of the coverage of the Boland Amendment would henceforth apply?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, Mr. Boland, I do not recall Mr. McFarlane making that kind of issue with the staff. In my view, things didn't really change when I became National Security Adviser. I did meet with Colonel North and tell him to continue on course with the way that he had been managing the Central American account up to that point. So that was not a change.

"Mr. BOLAND. Did you depend upon Mr. Sciaroni's opinion from the Oversight Board?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified before, I was aware of the Intelligence Oversight Board's determination with regard to the applicability. I don't think it is fair to call it Mr. Sciaroni's decision. It was ratified by three very prominent U.S. citizens that are [e]minently qualified in this field. I was aware of that. I had reached a conclusion on my own earlier that the Boland Amendment didn't apply and this simply confirmed it.

"Mr. BOLAND. Did you rely on Mr. Sciaroni's opinion?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I believed that the opinion of the Intelligence Oversight Board, you keep calling it Mr. Sciaroni's opinion, I think that is misleading. I felt it was a conditioned, well-thought out opinion.

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		"Mr. BOLAND. The Sciaroni opinion was written in September of '85. . . . North's contra activities began well before that. Thus there was no thought given to checking the legality of those actions before they commenced. No one asked Sciaroni to do an opinion. McFarlane said he never saw it. Why didn't you discuss it with Mr. McFarlane if you found it persuasive, especially since you knew McFarlane held a contrary view on the applicability of Boland to the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, Mr. Boland, I did not simply rely on the Intelligence Oversight Board's opinion on this issue. I had reached my own independent conclusions much before that and I became aware of the Intelligence Oversight Board's opinion at some later point, I don't recall when that was. It may well have been after Mr. McFarlane left. In September and October of 1985 we were getting ready for the Geneva Summit with Mr. Gorbachev and I don't recall focusing on that particular aspect of the issue at that time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 48-51.)	
86/07/21-126 1984-86		POINDEXTER'S VIEW OF BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BOLAND. You testified that it was your opinion that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC. You have also testified that you were generally aware of Colonel North's activities on behalf of the contras. Colonel North has	

testified that he sought assistance for the Secord lethal resupply operation from employees of agencies that you have testified were covered by the Boland Amendment.

"Colonel North has testified that his superiors were aware that he had done so. Were you aware that Colonel North had made requests of or issued instructions to employees of the CIA, the Department of Defense and the State Department for assistance in the operation to resupply the contras with weapons?

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, there is one point in this record that I have to emphasize and that is Admiral Poindexter has never stated in answers to Mr. Boland or anybody else that he was ever under the opinion so [sic (as?)] to Mr. McFarlane's opinions about the Boland Amendment applying. He has never stated that he understood that Mr. McFarlane felt that Boland applied. I want to make that absolutely clear on this record. I don't think there is any basis of his testimony for Mr. Boland to assume that Admiral Poindexter has stated that he felt that McFarlane said it applied.

"Mr. BOLAND. The question, Mr. Counsel, is whether or not in his opinion the Admiral believes that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC. But he has testified that employees of other agencies were covered by the Boland amendment. So I raise the question as to whether or not he was aware that Colonel North had issued instructions to employees of the CIA, the DoD and State Department for assistance in the operation to

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resupply the contras with weapons.

"Now that is a fair question.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have said before, I did not micromanage Colonel North in carrying out his mission. I am not aware of specific conversations that he may have had with employees of other departments. He understood, and he also has testified, that he did everything possible to comply with the letter and spirit of Boland, and I believe him and I think that is very accurate.

"Mr. BOLAND. Did--were you aware that Colonel North made requests of the employees of these agencies?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am not going to say I am aware unless I know of something specific and I do not recall anything specific that you may be referring to.

"Mr. BOLAND. You are certainly aware of the fact that he was involved in the Secord operations in Costa Rica?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely.

"Mr. BOLAND. And you were aware of the fact that there were employees of these agencies that were doing some of the work that they were instructed to do by Colonel North, I presume?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that that is an incontroverted fact at all.

"Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you whether or not you believe that it was lawful for Colonel North to make those requests and issue those instructions for people who were clearly covered by the Boland Amendment?

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Boland, the decision as to what is lawful and unlawful is not the function of this committee. It will be determined by the courts, by the independent counsel, and I am not going to sit here and debate you on that particular issue.

"Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask you whether or not--Ambassador Tambs of course is an employee of the State Department, is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He is a representative of the President of the United States.

"Mr. BOLAND. And Colonel Steele was with the Department of Defense, is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. BOLAND. And Joe Fernandez was with the CIA, is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am not sure who[m] you are referring to.

"Mr. BOLAND. Were you aware that all three were involved in the Secord lethal operation? At any time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I again did not micromanage this operation. I don't think it is appropriate and I didn't do it, and so the precise knowledge that I have on that issue is not significant enough to give you a positive answer."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 51-54.)

86/07/21-127
1984-86

POINDEXTER'S VIEW OF BOLAND'S APPLICATION TO THE NSC

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. DEWINE. . . . You know that Bud McFarlane has said that he believed the Boland

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		Amendment applied to the NSC. We have been through this several times. Colonel North, as you know, testified that Mr. McFarlane never told him that Boland applied to the NSC. In fact, we got into this a moment ago with Mr. Boland. Mr. Boland was questioning you. [See 86/07/21-125, 126.] "Now you told Mr. Boland that Bud McFarlane never told you the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall his ever telling me that. "Mr. DEWINE. I would like to be a little more specific, if I could. Take that just a little further. "Did he ever send you a memo saying he believed that? This is when you are the deputy, he's the head? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I don't recall it. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Congressman, if you have a memo to that effect, we would be happy to look at it? "Mr. DEWINE. I don't. No. No. I don't. I am just asking if he ever got a memo because I want to be very specific about this. "Did he ever call a staff meeting where he would have explained this, his position on Boland and the NSC and the applicability? Do you ever recall a staff meeting when he was head, and you were the deputy? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We had a small staff meeting every morning at 7:30 in the Situation Room with the office directors, and we had a weekly staff	

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		meeting on Wednesday evening which all members of the NSC staff were invited to attend. So those were regularly scheduled meetings. I don't recall a specific meeting on this subject, and I don't recall in those regularly scheduled staff meetings the point being made. "Mr. DEWINE. How do you account then for Mr. McFarlane's lack of candor with this committee about that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm not--I don't care to characterize it as lack of candor. "Mr. DEWINE. How would you characterize it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. His recollection of events is different from mine. "Mr. DEWINE. But you don't recall. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 85-86. On McFarlane's view of Boland's application to the NSC, and whether he conveyed that at staff meetings, see above at 84/10/03-251.)	
86/07/21-150 JULY 21, 1986		HOUSE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY: POINDEXTER RESPONSE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. I think everyone noted that the letter that I read to you which you sent to Chairman Hamilton was in response to a letter that was addressed to the President of the United States? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you show your response to that letter to the President of the United States? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Probably not.	

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you discuss with the President what your response was?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think in general terms, I probably did. I probably told him about the resolution of inquiry and told him that we were opposed to it. He agreed.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell him that you were going to be indicating that you were in compliance with letter and spirit of Boland?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall the conversation specifically.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you review that letter with the Chief of Staff, Don Regan?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. The staff may have. The letter--letters addressed to the President from Members of Congress come into the Legislative Affairs Office headed up by Will Ball during this time frame and the letter is then tasked out and Will's staff and mine work together to get the appropriate clearances.

"Then the clearances came in, the letter was sent to me to sign, and I signed it, because I felt it was accurate and I thought the staff had done a good job of staffing it.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you said that the letter was prepared for you by someone. Was it prepared for you by Colonel North?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 41-43. See JHICI Ex. JMP 14 [Poindexter letter to Rep. Hamilton, 7/21/86].)

86/07/25-000 DIVERSION HAWK SPARE PARTS DELIVERY

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LATE JULY - EARLY AUGUST 1986		SECORD ACCOUNT: Money for the Contras results from the I-HAWK spare parts transaction: see col. 3.	SECORD ACCOUNT: After discussions among Nir, North, a CIA representative, and Ghorbanifar, an agreement is reached to deliver to Iran the 12 remaining pallets of I-HAWK spare parts left over from the aborted May meetings in Tehran. One hostage is released in late July. In early August, the I-HAWK spare parts are delivered. "Up until that time we were in some financial jeopardy" since some of the money had already been spent on the Contras. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 83.)
86/07/25-100 LATE JULY 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: CASEY'S AWARENESS TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs discusses the airstrip project with Casey at Langley. The discussion "was very general. Basically, we talked about the Reagan doctrine, and we referred in passing to the southern front of Nicaragua and the airstrip and the idea was, of course, that hopefully this would be the beginning of a reverse domino theory against the Soviets . . . ." Tambs assumes, although he "really can't say," that Casey is familiar already with the airstrip. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 163-64.)	
86/07/26-100 JULY 26, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE: Fr. Lawrence Jenco, a U.S. hostage, is released in Lebanon. (CRS Rep. 86-190F [4/29/87 Update], at 56.)
86/07/26-120 JULY 26, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE: POINDEXTER NOTIFIES SHULTZ SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

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			"Mr. BELNICK. Now, sir, there came a time on July 26, 1986, that Admiral Poindexter . . . advised you of the release from captivity of Father Jenco. Did the Admiral inform you this release had been achieved in any way as a result of the U.S. Iran initiative? "Secretary SHULTZ. No. "Mr. BELNICK. At that time, sir, in fact were you operating under the assumption that there was no initiative? "Secretary SHULTZ. I was operating under the assumption after the stand down discussion that we would continue to work at the problems presented by Iran, and we had normal ways of doing that. And I think by that time we had initiated one additional one that you never know what may have some promise, but, anyway, it was a different and official proper way of trying to have a sensible discourse with them. "So that I didn't assume that we had lost interest in the Iran problem, we didn't, we never lost interest in it but it is a question of how you do it." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 26-27.)
86/07/26-200 SOMETIME IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: COLLAPSE RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: While Rodriguez is in Central America, he hears that his friend, a military official "from another South American country, way out, far from Central America" is in Miami. Rodriguez gets a ride to Miami with another friend on a private plane. He plans to return on the C-123 then being	

repaired in the U.S. that was loaded with spare parts for other aircraft in Central America.

Rodriguez calls Quintero to tell him his plans, but Quintero tells him to wait for a load of mountain leprosy medicine. Rodriguez tells him he thinks it "uneconomical to keep a C-123 for a box of medicine." Quintero responds it is "a half planeful of medicine."

Meanwhile, the C-123 is being loaded with "about 1,500 pounds worth of IV's" donated by one of Rodriguez' friends for the Contras. Rodriguez testified he feared they would go bad if they sat around in the heat.

Rodriguez calls Jim Stevenson of Southern Air Transport to explain the situation, and asks him to consult with Mr. Langton, the President of Southern Air. They determine that "they had enough material in there to fill a C-130, and that if [the] load of medicine would arrive, they could always charter a C-130 from Southern Air and it would be considerably cheaper than to fly the 123 back and forth." Rodriguez agrees, and flies to Central America on the C-123.

Seven hours later, when he arrives in Central America, a friend meets him on landing and says, "[Y]ou have stolen aircraft." They joke about it, and the friend "said that he got instructions from Mr. Quintero or higher--not from him--to refuel the aircraft and send it back just the way it was to Miami, with all the spare parts and everything aboard."

Rodriguez calls the order ridiculous and tells his workers "to go ahead and unload the aircraft on my responsibility."

Quintero later reaches Rodriguez by phone. He asks Rodriguez, "[W]ell, are you with me or against me." He then says, "We have terminated the operation and should be back in your area in the next three days to close down all the houses . . . . This thing is finished."

Rodriguez approaches his friend, [Vernon?] Hughes, to "ask him if he could get for me a crew that would fly for free." Hughes returns later with the news that he and Mr. Cooney and Bob Sawyer had agreed to fly without pay.

Rodriguez then undertakes to find a fuel source, and at Hughes' suggestion, sets up a meeting with "the American members of the crew" to discuss the situation.
(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 274-78; see id., 5/28/87, at 46.)

86/07/26-300
SOMETIME IN
LATE JULY OR
EARLY AUGUST
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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: REBELLION AND ARMED GUARDS

RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

Rodriguez meets with the members of his crew in House C and tells them what Quintero has said about closing their operation. Rodriguez tells the crew "that the operation was terminated, that they had the blessing of nobody from there on, that if they touched any of those aircraft, it was on their own, there were no salaries involved for them, there would be no compensation and no fuel account. . . . All of them agreed to continue the operation with no pay."

Rodriguez testified he did not reach an

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		agreement with the aircraft owners to resume the resupply missions. A cable is subsequently sent (by and to whom are ambiguous in Rodriguez' testimony) which states "that they [antecedent unspecified] have reconsidered . . . and they [the owners] had agreed to continue the operation but make it very clear that those aircraft did not belong to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, that it was a private proprietor who owned them and as soon as . . . the operation was finished, the aircraft would be taken away by them." After that, an FDN soldier is placed on the aircraft with an AK-47 to make sure the aircraft are not stolen. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 283-85.)	
86/07/26-320 SOMETIME IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: ARMED GUARDS RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT (cont'd): Rodriguez testifying further on the termination of the air resupply operation: "Mr. TRIBLE. . . . Why do you believe they attempted to terminate the operation? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, sir -- "Mr. TRIBLE. In your testimony, in your transcript, you said they had decided they were not going to get the CIA contract, they were trying to move everything out and I was not going to let them steal it. "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. ". . . . "Mr. TRIBLE. . . . You also indicated that because you stood them down, the resupply continued, but then you said you put contra guards	

on board the aircraft to make sure they were not stolen.

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir.

". . . .

"Mr. TRIBLE. . . . Who were you concerned about trying to steal those aircraft?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, sir, I was concerned they would receive orders from the owner, which is General Secord, and take the airplanes somewhere else."

(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 47-49. See id., 5/28/87, at 108-09 [Rodriguez agrees with Sen. Rudman's statements that "[y]ou had to put armed guards on these aircraft because quite frankly, you were afraid they would be stolen" and "they were arms dealers and they were also flesh peddlers"], 85-86.)

86/07/27-330
JULY 27, 1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: BERMUDEZ' CONCURRENCE ON ARMED GUARDS

RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

After he placed armed guards on the planes to prevent their being taken away in the ownership dispute, Rodriguez apparently met with Enrique Bermudez:

"Mr. BOREN. . . . Did the contras at the time that the operation was going on and during this time that you placed guards, did they themselves believe that these aircraft had been donated to them?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I explained that to them, sir, that it was my belief it was a donation and that is the understanding Bermudez and all the people had down there.

"Mr. BOREN. So Bermudez was also concerned they might lose the aircraft which they felt really belonged to them?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. He [sic (I?)] spoke to him on the 27th of July. That's the only time I went to visit him. We discussed it.

"Mr. BOREN. Did you discuss with him and other contra leaders the placing of guards to make sure the planes were not taken out of support for the contras?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. At the time that I talked to him we already had placed the guards and when I talked to Bermudez on the 27th of July to make sure to see we would get their people to be trained in those aircraft, so when the time came for them to take over, they could continue--

"Mr. BOREN. So Bermudez was in agreement with you that this action should be taken to make sure that the contras got to keep the aircraft?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir."

(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 101-02.)

86/07/28-200
JULY 17 AND
28, 1986

JACK TERRELL

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"MR. LIMAN: . . . [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 45 is a memorandum of July 28, 1986 from you to the President that was prepared by Oliver North and bears the initials 'R.R.' After you have looked at it, the question I have is for you to explain to me why you elevated this issue of Mr. Terrell to the President of the United States.

". . . .

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		"Q. Look at Exhibit 44. Is that your handwriting? "A. Yes. "Q. What does it say? "A. 'Ollie, give me another memo for the President, this time including the results of OSG. What do you want me to tell the AG?['] "Q. If you look at Exhibit 45, are those your initials on the memorandum to the President? "A. Yes, they are. "Q. Are those the President's initials, do you know? "A. Yes. "Q. That means that he has seen that memorandum? "A. That he has seen it and probably read it. "Q. And it was your decision to present this to the President of the United States? "A. That is correct. "Q. Do you recall the incident now, as you sit here now? "A. No. I haven't had a chance to read either one of them yet. "Q. Well, if you look at -- I would ask you to look at 44. Tell me as you read Exhibit 44 why it is that you asked Oliver North to prepare a memorandum from you to the President of the United States? "A. Your question is? "Q. Why did you elevate that to the President? "A. Because the talks about a possib[]le assassination attempt against him.	

"Q. That was the reason for sending that to the President?

"A. Those[] things are always judgment calls, but reading it now, I would guess that that was my rationale.

"Q. What is the reference in that memorandum to Project Democracy Security Officer, and who is the Project Democracy Security Officer?

"A. I don't know that.

"Q. Did you ever discuss with the President of the United States the lawsuit that is described here as Avirgan/Honey lawsuit, in the first paragraph of the note?

"A. I don't know the answer to that.

". . . .

"Q. The question is: Did you discuss that lawsuit with the President of the United States?

"A. Well, it is mentioned in the second page of Exhibit 45.

"Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing it with the President of the United States?

"A. I don't have any -- other than this memo -- I don't have any other recollection.

"Q. Did you follow the progress of that lawsuit?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Were you aware that a lawsuit was brought against Secord and others?

"A. I obviously was, because that is covered in --

"Q. In the exhibit?

"A. -- In Exhibit 44.

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		"Q. Were you aware of the fact a lawsuit was brought against Secord and others before this was sent to you? "A. I can't remember that. I may have been. But, as I said, I did not follow that closely." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 30-38; Poindexter Dep. Exx. 44 [North memo to Poindexter, 7/17/86], 45 [Poindexter memorandum for the President, "Terrorist Threat: Terrell," 7/28/86].)	
86/07/29[illegible]00 JULY 29, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ROLE: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF: "Mr. BELNICK. Would you look, sir, at Exhibit [GPS] 31 in your book, which is a PROF note to Colonel North from Mr. McFarlane dated July 29, 1986, . . . which states, 'George Shultz finally realizes what an enormous job you have done. If he didn't before, he does now. After four hours this evening at his place with just the four of us preaching the gospel to him to include Elliott's key role.' "Do you recall that occasion with Mr. McFarlane? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. It was an informal supper at my house that our respective wives had arranged, and he came over and we talked about this and that, and I don't remember precisely, but this perhaps was one of the occasions when he talked to me a lot about the work of Colonel North and the fact that he had been singled out by people who were very much against our help to the Nicaraguan Resistance, was taking a beating on	

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		that accord, and so on. "He had made the same presentation and [sic (that?)] Admiral Poindexter had as questions had been raised about Colonel North's role to us and to Members of Congress. I think there were a couple of occasions on which questions were raised and it was looked into; and on one, Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter weighted heavily with you, Mr. Chairman. So these questions had been raised and people satisfied themselves that everything was being done in a proper way. "Mr. BELNICK. And you were not informed by Mr. McFarlane or Admiral Poindexter, as I understand your testimony, or anyone else of the extent of Colonel North's activities regarding the contras except to the extent you've testified this morning? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is right." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 55-56. JHICI Ex. GPS 31.)	
86/07/29-200 JULY 29, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE PROPOSAL: SEQUENTIAL RELEASE NORTH MEMO, Part 1: After the release of Rev. Lawrence Jenco on July 26, North and Cave meet in Frankfurt with Ghorbanifar, who describes the arrangements he had made with the Iranians for Jenco's release. These include the sequential release of the hostages and the delivery of arms to Iran. Ghorbanifar tells the group that, on his own accord, he has promised the Iranians that if they could prove the claim that they had been overcharged by $10 million for the HAWK spare parts, the United States would make

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			up for it by giving Iran 1,000 free TOWs. In a July 29 memo to Poindexter, North sets out Ghorbanifar's 6-step plan for the sequential release of the hostages in exchange for the remaining HAWK parts, 2 HAWK radars, and 1,000 TOWs: "Step 1: One hostage released and $4M to Ghorbanifar for items removed from the aircraft in Tehran during the May visit (Ghorbanifar received the $4M on July 28). "Step 2: Remainder of 240 parts plus full quota of electron tubes (Item 24 on Iranian parts list) and 500 TOWs delivered to Iran. "Step 3: Second hostage released and Ghorbanifar paid for remainder of 240 parts. "Step 4: 500 TOWs and 1 HIPAR [HAWK] radar delivered. "Step 5: Third hostage released and Ghorbanifar paid for one radar. "Step 6: Meeting in Tehran to discuss future followed by release of the last hostage and delivery of second HIPAR radar. "We believe that the mixture of HAWK parts and TOWs was designed to satisfy both the military and the revolutionary guards in Iran. . . ." (Iran-Contra Report, at 246; JHICI Ex. JMP 56 [North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps on the American Hostages," 7/29/86].)
86/07/29-201 JULY 29, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE PROPOSAL: SEQUENTIAL RELEASE NORTH MEMO, Part 2: In the same memo, North warns that if the HAWK parts are not delivered, one of the hostages might

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			be killed: "It is entirely possible that if nothing is received [the Second Iranian; see 86/01/11-180] will be killed by his opponents in Tehran, Ghorbanifar will be killed by his creditors . . ., and one American hostage will probably be killed in order to demonstrate displeasure." North recommends that Poindexter brief the President and "obtain his approval for having the 240 HAWK missile parts shipped from Israel to Iran as soon as possible, followed by a meeting with the Iranians in Europe." Poindexter initials the "Approve" line and notes, "7/30/86 President approved." (JHICI Ex. JMP 56 [North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps on the American Hostages," 7/29/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 246-47.)
86/07/29-225 JULY 29, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE PROPOSAL POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: I will mark as [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 46] a memorandum dated July 29, 1986, from Oliver North to you entitled '[N]ext steps on the American hostages.' ". . . . "Q. Admiral, the only question I am going to have on this one is if you look at the last page. It says 'recommendations, that you brief the President regarding our conclusions on the Jenco release as indicated above and obtain his approval for having the 240 Hawk missile parts shipped from Israel to Iran as soon as possible, followed by a meeting with the Iranians in Europe.'

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			"Then is that your signature or initials -- JP -- next to approved? "A. It is. "Q. It says 'President approved, JP.' That is your writing? "A. That is my writing. "Q. Does that signify you in fact briefed the President and he approved what was proposed? "A. That is correct. "Q. And this is a System 4 document? "A. Yes, it is." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 38-39; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 46 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 56; North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps on the American Hostages," 7/29/86]. For Poindexter testimony on System IV documents and their removal from that system, see Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 39-41 [excerpted at 86/11/21-633].)
86/07/29-300 JULY 29, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT FULLER MEMO, Part 1: At North's request, Nir briefs the Vice President during his visit to Jerusalem on July 29, shortly before the HAWK parts shipment. Craig Fuller, the Vice President's Chief of Staff, attends the briefing and later prepares a memo on it. "1. SUMMARY. Mr. Nir indicated that he had briefed Prime Minister Peres and had been asked to brief the VP by his White House contacts. He described the details of the efforts from last year through the current period to gain the

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			release of the U.S. hostages. He reviewed what had been learned which was essentially that the radical group was the group that could deliver. He reviewed the issues to be considered--namely that there needed to be ad [sic] decision as to whether the items requested would be delivered in separate shipments or whether we would continue to press for the release of the hostages prior to delivering the items in an amount agreed to previously. "2. The VP's 25 minute meeting was arranged after Mr. Nir called Craig Fuller and requested the meeting and after it was discussed with the VP by Fuller and North. Only Fuller was aware of the meeting and no other member of the VP's staff or traveling party had been advised about the meeting. No cables were generated nor was there other reporting except a brief phone call between Fuller and North to advise that 'no requests were made.' "3. Nir began by indicating that Peres had asked him to brief the VP. In addition, Nir's White House contacts with whom he had recent discussions asked him to brief the VP. "4. Nir began by providing an historical perspective from his vantage point. He stated that the effort began last summer. This early phase he said 'didn't work well.' There were more discussions in November and in January 'we thought we had a better approach with the Iranian side,' said Nir. He said, 'Poindexter accepted the decision.' "5. He characterized the decision as 'having

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			two layers -- tactical and strategic.' The tactical layer was described as an effort 'to get the hostages out.' The strategic layer was designed 'to build better contact with Iran and to insure we are better prepared when a change (in leadership) occurs.' 'Working through our Iranian contact, we used the hostage problem and efforts there as a test,' suggested Nir. He seemed to suggest the test was to determine how best to establish relationships that worked with various Iranian factions. "6. Nir described Israel's role in the effort by saying, 'we activated the channel; we gave a front to the operation; provided a physical base; provided aircraft.' All this to 'make sure the U.S. will not be involved in logistical aspects.' Nir indicated that in the early phase they 'began moving things over there.'" (Fuller memo, "The Vice President's Meeting with Mr. Nir," 7/29/86 0735-0805 [Committee Documents N 2560 through 2562]; Tower, at B-145. See Iran-Contra Report, at 247-48. Text of memo continues in next 2 entries.)
86/07/29-301 JULY 29, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT FULLER MEMO, Part 2: [Text of memo continues from preceding entry:] "7. Before a second phase a meeting was desired. Nir indicated a February meeting took place with 'the Prime Minister on the other side.' Nir did not make it clear who else attended the meeting. He said the meeting was 'dramatic and

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			interesting.' He said 'an agreement was made on 4,000 units--1,000 first and then 3,000.' [']The agreement was made on the basis that we would get the group,' Nir said. 'The whole package for a fixed price,' he said. "8. Although there was agreement the other side changed their minds and 'then they asked for the other items,' according to Nir. 'We were pleased because these were defensive items and we got to work with the military,' said Nir. He continued, 'there were 240 items on the list we were provided and we agreed to it.' "9. A meeting was organized for mid May in Tehran to finalize the operation. The VP asked Nir if he attended the meeting and Nir indicated he did attend. Nir said, 'two mistakes were made during this phase.' 'Two people were to be sent to prepare for the meeting but the U.S. had concerns about McFarlane,' according to Nir. He described the meetings as 'more difficult--total frustration because we didn't prepare.' And he said, 'their top level was not prepared adequately.' During the meeting in Tehran the other side kept reminding the group that 'in 1982 there was a meeting which leaked and the Prime Minister was thrown out of office.' Nir said that at the end of the May meeting, 'they began to see the light.' 'McFarlane was making it clear that we wanted all hostages released,' Nir reported and, 'at the last moment the other side suggested two would be released if those at the meeting stayed six more hours.' According to Nir, 'the Deputy Prime Minister delivered the request (to

delay departure) and when the group said "no," they all departed without anything.'

"10. According to Nir, 'the reason for delay is to squeeze as much as possible as long as they have assets. They don't believe that we want overall strategic cooperation to be better in the future. If they believed us they would have not bothered so much with the price right now.' Further, according to Nir, 'there are serious struggles now within the Iran power groups. Three leaders share the view that we should go ahead but each wants to prove his own toughness.'

"11. Turning to what Nir said was the final or most recent phase, he reported, 'we felt things would just die if we didn't push forward to see what could be delivered. They asked for four sequences, but we said no to talks until they showed something."

(Fuller memo, "The Vice President's Meeting with Mr. Nir," 7/29/86 0735-0805 [Committee Documents N 2560 through 2562]; Tower, at B-145 to -146. See Iran-Contra Report, at 247-48. Text of memo continues in next entry.)

86/07/29-302
JULY 29, 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT

FULLER MEMO, Part 3:

[Text of memo continues from preceding 2 entries:]

"12. According to Nir, he told them about 10 days ago he would cancel the deal. Then nine days ago their Prime Minister called saying that they were taking steps to release one--the Priest. The second one to be released would be Jacobson [sic]. The Prime Minister also said that one would be released and then 'we should give some equipment.' Nir indicated to the VP that the bottom line on the items to be delivered was understood to be the same or even less but it was not the way the deal was originally made. The items involved spares for Hawks and TOWs. No denial or approval was given according to Nir. Nir said he made it clear that no deal would be discussed unless evidence is seen of a release.

"13. On Tuesday or Wednesday a message was intercepted between Tehran and the guards according to Nir. On Friday, three hostages were taken out and on Saturday Janco [sic] was taken out, put into a trunk and driven to a village in the Bakka [sic] Valley. Nir then described what Janco reported with regard to the conditions under which he was held and what he knew of the other hostages including Buckley. (I assume we have detailed briefing already.) The VP asked Nir if he had briefed Peres on all of this and he indicated that he had.

"14. Nir described some of the lessons learned: 'we are dealing with the most radical elements. The Deputy Prime Minister is an emissary. They can deliver . . . [ellipsis in original] that's for sure. They were called yesterday and thanked and today more phone calls. This is good because we've learned they can deliver and the moderates can't. We should think about diversity and establish other contacts with other factions. We have started to establish contact with some success and now more success is expected since if these groups feel if the extremes are in contact with us then it is less risky for the other groups--nothing operational is being done . . . [ellipsis in original] this is contact only.'

"15. Nir described some of the problems and choices: 'Should we accept sequencing? What are alternatives to sequencing? They fear if they give all hostages they won[']t get anything from us. If we do want to move along these lines we'd have to move quickly. It would be a matter still of several weeks not several days, in part because they have to move the hostages every time one is released.'

"16. Nir concluded with the following points: 'The bottom line is that we won't give them more than previously agreed to. It is important that we have assets there 2 to 3 years out when change occurs. We have no real choice than to proceed.'

"17. The VP made no commitments nor did he give any direction to Nir. The VP expressed his appreciation for the briefing and thanked Nir for having pursued this effort despite doubts and reservations throughout the process."
[initialed:] "CF 8/6/86
"BY: CRAIG L. FULLER"
(Fuller memo, "The Vice President's Meeting with Mr. Nir," 7/29/86 0735-0805 [Committee Documents N 2560 through 2562]; Tower, at B-146 to -147. See Iran-Contra Report, at 247-28.)

86/07/29-310

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
JULY 25-29, 1986			VICE PRESIDENT FULLER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. I have a copy of your memorandum here in front of me dated July 29, 1986 . . . . "Where did this meeting take place? "A. In the King David Hotel, the Vice-President's suite. "Q. In Jerusalem? "A. Yes. "Q. For what reason was the Vice-President in Jerusalem? "A. We were on a Middle East trip to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, really to go and meet with the Heads of State and other people in those three countries. "Q. When had the Vice-President left the United States? "A. I believe it would have been about July 25 or 26. Israel was our first stop. "Q. Israel was the first stop. "Do you recall how long you had been in Israel as of the time that this meeting took place? "A. One day, maybe two. "We were in Frankfurt, Germany when Jenco was released, and we went from Frankfurt, Germany into Israel. "Q. Could you describe how this meeting came about, how it was set up? "A. On July 28, Colonel North phoned me and indicated on a secure telephone that he would like for the Vice-President to meet with Mr. Nir. He indicated that Mr. Nir had briefed the Prime Minister, Peres, on a highly classified effort

that involved our reaching out to Iran, involved the U.S. hostages, and that he realized that I may not know a lot about the progam, but that the Vice-President was fully aware of it and asked for a half hour or so for Mr. Nir to come in, indicating that the Prime Minister would like for the Vice-President to have the same briefing that the Prime Minister had.

"Recognizing and fully respecting the notion that there might well be a classified program that I had not had access to, I sort of took the requests under advisement.

"I indicated that if the Vice-President was willing to have the meeting, 7:30 was probably the logical time, and Mr. Nir--or Colonel North indicated that he would have Mr. Nir phone me.

"Q. Colonel North, as far as you know, was in Washington at the time?

"A. I don't know where he was.

"Q. Do you know where he was?

"A. I do not know where he was.

"We ended the conversation on that basis.

"Oh, before we ended the conversation, Colonel North indicated that if the meeting was held, that no one else should know about it except for the Vice-President and me, and that no member of our party should be advised about this classified program or about the nature of our conversation.

"At some point during the day, I went to the Vice-President and indicated that there had been a request for the meeting. The Vice-President indicated that he was a little surprised that Colonel North had given me any background on the

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			nature of the classified program since the information about it had been strictly limited, but he indicated that he was willing to consider the meeting." (Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 22-24. See id. at 46-48 [North called Fuller on an unspecified date at the secure communications room at the base in Frankfurt. Fuller testified he was unsure whether North used a secure phone line. "The issue presented was whether or not the Vice President should remain at the Air Base there to receive the hostage that had been released, Father Jenco." North contacted Fuller again in Israel on 7/28/86: "We didn't discuss Nir while I was in Frankfurt. The first contact was on the 28th while I was in Israel, and that call, to the best of my recollection, was on a secured phone."].)
86/07/29-311 JULY 29, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT FULLER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Craig Fuller's testimony continues from preceding entry:] "[A.] And I indicated [to the Vice President] that Mr. Nir would be phoning me and we would look -- we anticipated having it [sc. the meeting] at 7:30, provided no further reservations. "At that time the Vice-President indicated that he wanted to talk to John Poindexter about it, and he tried to reach John Poindexter on a secure phone, was unable to do so, because John Poindexter was traveling or otherwise unable and ultimately spoke with Colonel North directly. And

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			I was not present for the conversation, but whatever transpired, it was agreed that I would attend the meeting and would take thorough notes of what was discussed and brief Colonel North following the meeting. "Mr. Nir called, and I confirmed at 7:30. He was aware 7:30 was the time we identified for the meeting. "He arrived in my suite the next morning about 7:15, and we went from my suite to the Vice-President's suite at 7:30 and held a half-hour meeting. "Q. Okay. "I would like to ask you then about the meeting that took place. I have read your memorandum of the meeting. "Did you take handwritten notes during the meeting? "A. I took -- yes, I took handwritten notes. We had no recording devices at all in the room, and I then wrote them out in longhand during the course of the day, in order to insure that we didn't lose the essence of what had been said, and then typed them when we returned to Washington and provided them to Colonel North. "Q. As the meeting began between the Vice-President and Mr. Nir, did they appear to know each other? "A. They did not know, no -- they did not appear to know each other, and I have no reason to believe the Vice-President knew of him or knew him prior to this initial meeting. "Q. Was there any discussion at the beginning

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			about -- let me ask you this to amplify various parts of the memorandum that I am not sure are really there and see if you can recollect. "Was there any discussion at the beginning of the meeting about the reason that the Vice-President was being briefed on this matter directly by Mr. Nir? "A. There was an indication by Mr. Nir that he -- similar to what Ollie North has stated. Mr. Nir indicated he had briefed the Prime Minister; and since we were in Israel, the Prime Minister wanted the Vice-President to receive the same briefing. "Mr. Nir also indicated that he had been encouraged to brief us by his U.S. contacts, who[m] he did not name, to the best of my recollection. "Q. Did you know who[m], or did you have an understanding about who[m] he referred to? "A. I assumed it was Ollie North. "Q. Did you know Colonel North? "A. Yes. "Q. Were you or are you personal friends with Ollie North? "A. I would not characterize it as a personal friendship. I have never socialized with him. In the course of the six years at the White House I have seen him ten or twelve times, participated in meetings with him on occasion. That is, meetings at which he was present on occasion, so I knew him, and I certainly respected him as a senior member of the National Security staff." (Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 25-27.)

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JULY 29, 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT

FULLER ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry;]

"Q. Let me ask you some questions, since there is a fairly complete memorandum of this meeting, which at least according to the memorandum, took 25 minutes or so. I have a few questions about it.

"At the beginning he [sc. Nir] began by describing the early phase. Do you recall what it was? Did he describe what the early phase was, what had actually taken place during the early phase? It is a little vague from your memorandum just what it was that he was describing.

"A. I am not sure I can answer that question without putting the notes in context or describing a little bit about the notes themselves. Since I had no knowledge of the program at all until the 28th, and I had no specific, or any detailed information, literally, everything that was said during the course of the meeting was a relevation to me, and so in taking the notes, and in transcribing them later, I really tried to set forth in almost verbatim material what had been said. As a result, what you have there is in many ways better than my recollection because it was really an endeavor not to miss anything that had been stated at the meeting.

"Having said that, I grant you that there are some ambiguities and some points that at the time were not clear to me, and in a way remain unclear

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			even now, but what is in there is about as complete a description as to what he said as I can offer. "Q. I think that statement, notwithstanding, I am going to ask you about various statements. "A. That is fine. The early phase is what he said and I grant you it is not thoroughly enlightening. "MR. LEON: Did the Vice President question him as to what he meant? "THE WITNESS: No, he did not. The nature of the meeting was such that the Vice President really, he and I both, for that matter, sat and listened to Mr. Nir's presentation, and neither, except where indicated, asked very few questions. [Sic.] "MR. LEON: Did he appear, he being Nir, appear to be, by the way he was speaking to the Vice President, appear to be assuming certain knowledge on the part of the Vice President, as if perhaps he had been informed the Vice President had that knowledge? "THE WITNESS: No, he really approached the briefing in a way that suggested he was trying to describe for the Vice President as much detail that he could, not assuming that the Vice President had the detail. "BY MR. EGGLESTON: "Q. Did Mr. Nir come alone? "A. Yes, he did. "Q. What was your understanding of what Mr. Nir's position or title was at the time? "A. We were told he was counterterrorism

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			advisor to Prime Minister Peres. "Q. Told by Colonel North? "A. By Colonel North and by Mr. Nir. "Q. In paragraph 4 it says there were more discussions in November and January, 'We thought we had a better approach with the Iranian side.' "Do you recall anything more about that issue, what he said was better in January about his approach to the Iranian side? "A. I don't. I don't think I can amplify on it. He was expressing certain degrees of frustration that the approach in the early phase hadn't been as productive as he would have hoped. "Q. But did you have any indication about what he thought had changed in January that led him to conclude that it was 'A better approach.' "A. No." (Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 27-30.)
86/07/29-313 JULY 29, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT FULLY ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. In another paragraph the memo states, 'Nir described Israel's role in the effort by saying, "We activated the channel. We gave a front to the operation, provided a physical base, provided aircraft."' "Do you recall whether he made any distinction between pre- and post-January 1, 1986, in terms of the degree or the method or the nature of the Israeli involvement in the operation. "A. No, I don't recall him making any

distinction.

"Q. . . . [I]s this the first that you learned there had been a delegation that included McFarlane that had gone to Tehran?

"A. Before I answer the question -- one of the great difficulties about this is remembering when you learn things.

"I don't believe that I knew of McFarlane's involvement from this. Yes, I did, okay.

"Q. I am looking at paragraph 9, which seems to set forth this event.

"A. Okay, this is the first time I learned of McFarlane's involvement, but I didn't learn any more than was in this paragraph until subsequent reports came out about the nature of the May visit.

"Q. Let me just ask you, I am not going to ask you any more questions about that conversation itself. How did this meeting end? What happened at the end of it?

"A. We had a scheduled departure, it seems to me about 8:15 or 8:30, but we had a limit on the amount of time we could spend. And as we indicated, we were nearing the end of the time we had available, and as Mr. Nir reached the end of his own chronological briefing, the Vice President really just thanked him for coming in and for the briefing, and was really very non-commital, and in no way gave him any direction at all, and with regard to this question that Nir posed, which was the question of, as he described it, sequencing, and so the meeting ended with a general thanks, and Nir left. And I think literally 15, 20 minutes later we left.

"Q. Two places in the memorandum, you mentioned that Nir had indicated that they were dealing with the most radical elements and that the moderates could not deliver. I take it that is your recollection of what Nir said during the course of that meeting?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Subsequently, it became a hot document in some ways.

"A. That is correct, he indicated that.

"Q. After that meeting was over, did you have any conversation with the Vice President about the meeting with Mr. Nir?

"A. The Vice President asked me to provide a brief report as soon as possible to Ollie North, and then to provide him with a record of the meeting as soon as I could. Since we were in the process of getting ready to leave, we really didn't sit and discuss what had been described.

"The Vice President indicated that we should, reminded me we should adhere to the request not to inform others that the meeting had taken place. The meeting really did take place without anybody else being aware of it, and even the Secret Service detail, the President was aware that I brought a guest in, and they didn't question that.

"MR. LEON: Did they know his name?

"THE WITNESS: No.

"Within a matter of a few hours, I phoned Colonel North and indicated that we had had the meeting.

"He asked if any requests had been made, and I said no requests had been made. I indicated that I had a complete set of notes from what had been discussed and he indicated that it would be sufficient to provide those to the NSC when we returned, and they were provided on August 6, 1986.

"BY MR. EGGLESTON:

"Q. Is that the day you actually returned?

"A. I think it was the day after. I am not certain when we returned. I think this was a sufficient priority that the first working day we were back, I made sure that Colonel North had the material."

(Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 30-33.)

86/07/29-314
JULY 29, 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT

FULLER ACCOUNT, Part 5:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Did you maintain or have you retained the handwritten notes that you used to prepare the typed version?

"A. Yes, I have.

"Q. Are there any differences between the handwritten notes and the typed version, anything in the handwritten notes that is not in the typewritten version?

"A. No, nothing was omitted. My own knowledge was limited, I sought to provide everything I could to them, to Colonel North."

(Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 33.)

Fuller testified on Nir's discussion of

moderate and radical Iranians at the July 29 meeting:

"Q. As this event became public in November of '86, various individuals announced that we were dealing with [--] part of the strategic initiative was to deal with moderates in Iran and that was to increase their stature, in a post-Khomeini or even during the time that Khomeini [--] some prominence could be given to various moderates. As of this time, you had this briefing from Mr. Nir where he indicated that we were not dealing with moderates and the moderates had no control over the hostages, and that is the reason we had to be dealing with the radicals, because there wasn't much point in dealing with the moderates because we would never get the hostages out. Did you have occasion during this November time period to discuss with the Vice President how your briefing from Mr. Nir diverged from the public statements about meetings with moderates?

"A. We really didn't have a detailed discussion of that. Neither one of us, I will say, clearly recalled or -- the statement Nir made at the time.

"As we subsequently began looking at the documents, the material that was being provided, we read it and recognized the conflict, but we also at the time, recognized the contact that North was involved in changed subsequent to this meeting.

"I have no knowledge whether there is any causal relationship and it is not clear to me and Nir did not make it clear to us just who was

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			having the contact with the radicals. I say that to suggest that the impact of the statement at the time was to me no greater that anything else that was being said and did not stick with the Vice President as something that was a contradiction to what he had known." (Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 56-57. See id. at 41-42 [Fuller on his role in preparing the President's speech of 11/13/86: "I had no formal role. We did receive a draft of the speech. In discussing the draft with the Vice President, there were phrases in there that described the shipments to Iran as shipments that would fit inside of a cargo plane, and I cautioned Mr. Buchanan about making sure he understood that that was an accurate description based upon what little knowledge I had from my July meetings and discussions with the Vice President. That was the only role I had."].)
86/07/29-315 JULY 29, 1986			NIR BRIEFS THE VICE PRESIDENT: ARMS AND HOSTAGES FULLER ACCOUNT: "Q. Okay. So this, this Nir meeting, the meeting with Nir and the Vice President was the first time that you saw a link between delivery of weapons and releasing of hostages? "A. That is correct, it is the first time." (Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 66.)
86/07/29-600 JULY 29, 1986		WATSON HEARS RODRIGUEZ IS CONNECTED WITH RESUPPLY WATSON ACCOUNT: "Q. The first page of Watson Exhibit 4, page	

N-46659, has a listing for Tuesday, 7/29. I take it that's July 29, 1986?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. 'ODSM,' what did that refer to?

"A. That means that on Tuesday, July 29th, 1986, I went to the ODSM, which is the National Security Council staff meeting at 7:30 in the morning, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday. And I believe it stands for 'Office Director Staff Meeting.'

"Q. That's--

"A. In the Situation Room.

"Q. And that's with the President's National Security Advisor?

"A. It is chaired by whomever--at that point it would have been chaired by Poindexter or whoever his deputy was.

"Q. The note under 'ODSM,' if I read it correctly, says 'Max shut down pilots' resupply'?

"A. Correct.

"Q. Did you take that note at the meeting?

"A. No, I wrote it down afterwards.

"Q. What does it mean?

"A. It probably means that at that meeting Ollie North or someone like that made a comment to me personally and privately that Max [sc. Felix Rodriguez] shut down a resupply, shut down the pilots, stopped the pilots from conducting the resupply.

"Q. A resupply of whom?

"A. I presumed he meant the contras.

"Q. What specifically do you recall that North, if it was North, told you about what Felix had done in that regard?

"A. As I recollect the meeting, I came to the ODSM--I was not a normal participant. Don, I believe, Gregg was out of the country. I sat down in an empty seat which happened to be next to Ollie North, and at some point either during the meeting or after the meeting he whispered to me. He said, without using foul language here, but words to the effect that Max had shut down the resupply of the pilots.

"And I said: What are you talking about, Ollie? Tell me more? And he brushed me off and said: Don't bother me; it's none of your business. And that was it.

"Q. First he told you and then when you asked him what he meant he told you it was none of your business?

"A. He told me it was none of my business, don't get involved.

"Q. But this was after he initiated the conversation?

"A. After he initiated it. And I think you will find another note somewhere, maybe not here, that on the next day and several days later either Craig Coy or Bob Earl, one o[r] the other or Ollie, made these same types of comments.

"Q. You made a note of Ollie's comment. Did you pass it on to anybody?

"A. I did not. I don't recall passing it on. Don and the Vice President were out of the country.

"Q. Did you understand from what Ollie North told you that Max had some connection with contra resupply?

"A. I took that to mean that Max Gomez had some connection with it. That's why I asked him, tell me more, because it surprised me. It shocked me.

"Q. And this was something, then, that you intended to pursue with Don Gregg when he got back?

"A. I don't know if I had that specific thought at that time of pursuing it with Don. Usually when he gets back from a trip, we will sit down and talk about things that occurred.

"Q. How would you decide what things to make note of in your notebook.

"A. Something that I thought was important or unusual, that I needed a memory aid on."
(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 42-45; Watson Dep. Ex. 4 [Watson's handwritten notes].)

86/07/29-601
JULY 29, 1986

WATSON HEARS RODRIGUEZ IS CONNECTED WITH RESUPPLY

WATSON ACCOUNT (cont'd):

"Q. When you spoke to Felix on the 29th, did you question him about what Colonel North told you earlier that morning, namely that he[,] Felix[,] had shut down the pilots who were resupplying the contras?

"A. I don't think so. . . .

"Q. Did you ask Felix about the cryptic statement that North had made to you that morning?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. Did you decide not to ask Felix that?

"A. I believe I decided not to ask him that, because it was Ollie North mentioned it very briefly in a teasing, almost a teasing manner. Ollie was always known to be a very secretive type of person. He wanted people to think he was doing things very special, and I took it to be part of that.

"But I also took the information on board, not just that he was playing a game of being important and secretive, but also here was some information that was interesting. But I'm not in the habit of taking one little bit of information like that, an accusation like that, and repeating it back to the person and saying: You've been accused of, without trying to get more information.

"Q. Have you now given us everything you recall about the July 29th telephone conversation with Felix?

"A. Yes, I have."

(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 48-49. Watson testimony continues at 86/07/31-100.)

86/07/30-050
JULY 30, 1986

HOSTAGE RELEASE PROPOSAL: PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL POINDEXTER NOTATION:

In a July 29 memo to Poindexter, North sets out a 6-step plan for sequential release of the hostages in exchange for the remaining HAWK parts, 2 HAWK radars, and 1,000 TOWs. (See 86/07/29-200, -201.) North recommends that Poindexter brief the President and "obtain his approval for having the 240 HAWK missile parts shipped from Israel to Iran as soon as possible, followed by a meeting with the Iranians in Europe."

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			Poindexter notes on the memo, "7/30/86 President approved." On August 4, 1986, the HAWK parts are flown into Iran. (JHICI Ex. JMP 56 [North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps on the American Hostages," 7/29/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 246-47. On the 8/4/86 delivery, see below at 86/08/04-200.)
86/07/31-100 JULY 31, 1986		WATSON HEARS OF PROBLEMS WITH RODRIGUEZ WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Continuing from 86/07/29-601:] "Q. Please turn to the next page of your notes, N-46661, Wednesday, July 30, 1986. And then under that it says, 'Thursday, 7/31 - Bob Earl - Max - problems.' Tell us what that entry means? "A. That means that, to me now, and I believe I made some other notes, that Bob Earl, probably at an O[D]SM had done the same thing Ollie had, had leaned over and said: Max is really giving us problems. And my response was: Bob, what are you talking about? What do you mean? And it was either at the meeting or I called him later and said: Bob, what's going on? "And he refused to tell me anything further. "Bob Earl, at some point in one of these meetings--I don't remember whether it was the August 12th meeting or what--but Earl made a comment to the effect, a sarcastic comment: Well, Max is your friend and your problem. "Q. I must tell you, these are bizarre conversations. People start talking to you and	

then when you ask them a question then don't answer?

"A. Do you know Ollie North?

"Q. No.

"A. Have you talked to him?

"Q. There's a certain Constitution standing between me and him for another day or so.

"A. Have you talked to Bob Earl?

"Q. Yes.

"A. Okay.

"Q. But they answer me.

"A. Well, you're in a different position.

"Q. Maybe so. But what I'm trying to understand is the nature of these routines. Either North or Earl say[s] something to you, we have problems. And then you say, okay, what are the problems, and then they decline to answer?

"A. That's right. That bothers me, too, and it ticked me off.

"Q. Did you tell him: Don't tell me you've got problems unless you're going to tell me what the problems are when I answer?

"A. I may have said something.

"Q. Why the teasing?

"I don't mean to be facetious. You are all professionals. You're working in matters of greatest sensitivity, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. These are national security matters, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Two members of the National Security staff, Council staff, are telling the Vice

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		President's deputy that they've got some kind of problem with a man that the Vice President's office sent down to El Salvador, correct? "A. That's right. "Q. And then when you ask what the problem is they say it's none of your business? "A. That's right. "Q. Well, didn't you think you ought to go to Don Gregg about that and say, something's got to be done about Earl and North? "A. Don was not in country. "Q. Well, he was coming back. "A. He was coming back at some point. "Q. And I take it you had had experiences like this, from the way you're talking now, with North and Early prior to July 30th or July 29th, 1986, correct? "A. With Bob Earl when he was part of the counterterrorism task force. He was very snippy about things. "Q. Well, after the Vice President's task force, when he now appeared as a member of North's unit, you had had experiences with North and Earl, I take it, which was not dissimilar from what was going on in July? "A. Well, the experience was more observing them at ODSM's or whatever, when they would be very close hold and keep the information to themselves. But I don't remember whether I discussed these specifically with Don when he got back. "But recall that the August 8th meeting occurred a week later, where we had a chance to	

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		air all these problems with Felix Rodriguez." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 49-52; Watson Dep. Ex. 4 [Watson's handwritten notes].)	
86/07/31-101 JULY 31 - AUGUST 1, 1986		WATSON HEARS OF PROBLEMS WITH RODRIGUEZ WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. At this stage, though, as of July 31, you now had received two cryptic communications, one from North and one from Earl, that there were some kind of problems involving Felix? "A. That's correct. "Q. And that the problems were relating to the contras, correct? "A. Correct. And if you go on to Friday, August 1st, you will see another comment to that effect. "Q. We are going there right now. Friday, August 1, on the same page, N-46661, this was a comment to you by Ollie North? "A. That's correct. "Q. And it says: 'F screwed up S front.' "A. Felix screwed up southern front. "Q. What did you understand the reference to the southern front to be? "A. That Felix had done something--and I pieced it back together to the July 29th--that Felix had done something about resupplying the southern front that Ollie North didn't like. "Q. The southern front against the Sandinistas? "A. Against the Sandinistas. [Redacted.] "Q. And that Rodriguez, North is telling you,	

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		did something to screw up that southern front military operation against the Sandinistas, correct? "A. That's what I understood him to mean. "Q. Now, the note continues. I guess there are ditto marks, meaning Felix screwed something else up, right? "A. It means that Felix screwed up by taking the mayor of Miami to [redacted.] "Q. And then it says 'et cetera.' "A. I think he said, and bringing [redacted] down, and that he shouldn't have done that, that it was too much visibility. "Q. From looking at these notes of yours on Friday, 8/1/86, now tell me in one series of statements what you recall North telling you at that time[.] "A. What I believe they were telling me on July 29th, July 30th, July 31st, August 1st, was that Felix Rodriguez was involved in some kind of resupply operation out of--in Central America to resupply the contras; that they didn't like his involvement and that he was doing things with which they didn't agree. "That they were telling me that because as a member of the Vice President's staff we had a special relationship with Rodriguez. They knew that we could point him, so to speak. I think they presumed we had more authority over Felix than we did; and that they were telling us there were problems with Felix, but they didn't pursue them. "I believe at some point that I even went up	

to Bob Earl's office and sat down and said, what's going on, I just got the real brushoff.

"Q. I believe you testified that you were surprised, stunned, to learn that Felix was involved in some way with contra resupply at that time?

"A. Surprised, yes. Stunned--surprised." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 52-55; Watson Dep. Ex. 4 [Watson's handwritten notes].)

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WHETHER WATSON REPORTED TO GREGG WHAT HE HAD HEARD ABOUT RODRIGUEZ

WATSON ACCOUNT:

"Q. . . . [W]hen Don Gregg returned on or about August 5, 1986, did you tell him what you had heard about Felix [see above at 86/07/29-600, -601, and 86/07/31-100, -101]?

"A. I don't know with specificity. I suspect I did, because I believe that, as a loyal deputy, that I tell my boss everything that I am involved in and what I am doing. I have no record that I did tell him, but I have nothing to the negative.

"And my general way of doing things is to tell my boss what I'm doing and keep him informed.

"Q. Well, particularly here, you were dealing with somebody who had, as you say, a special relationship with the Vice President's office, right?

"A. Correct.

"Q. About whom you had received surprising information from North and Earl, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. And so it's likely that you would have,

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		of all things, reported that information to Gregg, who had his own special relationship with Rodriguez, right? "A. It's probable that I did, but I could not testify that I did. I could not affirmatively testify that I did, nor could I negatively testify that I did not. But it is my pattern to do that sort of thing. "Q. But what you are telling me, I guess, is that you don't recall whether you did or you didn't? "A. That's right. "Q. You have no recollection of a conversation? "A. I have no recollection of a conversation." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 56-57.)	
86/08/00-030 SOMETIME IN MID 1983, 1985, AND AUGUST 1986	SHULTZ' PROFFERED RESIGNATIONS SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. . . . Mr. Secretary, I have another question and I ask this with great reluctance, because I realize it is rather personal in nature; but I think it is relevant. "On that basis, I wish to ask you this question: I have been advised that in August of 1986, you tend[er]ed a letter of resignation to the President of the United States. "Is that true? And if so, can you tell us something about it? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you must have learned that from the fact that these notes that I have kept have been shared with the committees and		

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	there is something about that in there. That is true. And I have asked the President to let me leave this office on a couple of other occasions earlier. That is the case. "I don't know if you have some question you want to ask me about that or-- "Chairman INOUYE. Was that in any way related to the Iran-contra affair? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, in August of 1986, I thought that it was over. There was no--I didn't know anything about the contra side of it anyway, but on the effort with Iran, I thought was basically on a proper track. But it was because I felt a sense of estrangement. "I knew the White House was very uncomfortable with me. I was very uncomfortable with what I was getting from the intelligence community, and I knew they were very uncomfortable with me, perhaps going back to the lie detector business. I could feel it. "What I have learned about the various things that were being done I suppose explains why I was not in good odor with the NSC staff and some of the others in the White House. I had a terrible time. There was a kind of guerrilla warfare going on on all kinds of little things. ". . . . "At an earlier time, in the middle of 1983, I resigned, and that was because I discovered that Bud McFarlane, who was then the Deputy National Security Adviser, was sent on a secret trip to the Middle East, to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, I guess, without my knowledge while		

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	we were busy negotiating out there, and also I found some things happened with respect to actions on Central America that I didn't know about beforehand. So I went to the President and said, 'Mr. President, you don't need a guy like me for Secretary of State if this is the way things are going to be done, because when you send somebody out like that McFarlane trip, I'm done.' "In the labor relations business--I used to be Secretary of Labor. There used to be a lot of intervention in labor disputes and we used to say when the President hangs out his shingle, he'll get all the business. When the President hangs out his shingle and says, 'You don't have to go through the State Department, just come right into the White House,' he'll get all the business. That's a big signal to countries out there about how to deal with the U.S. Government. "And it may have had something to do with how events transpired for all I know, but it's wrong. You can't do it that way. And on that occasion, we had a very strong discussion and that is the--how these regular meetings that I have with the President got started, and they have been very, very helpful. "So the other time I resigned was after my big lie detector flap, and again I could see that I was on the outs with everybody, so I said, 'Mr. President, why don't you let me go home. I like it in California.' And again he wouldn't let that happen. That was in late 1985. Mr. McFarlane had resigned, and Mr. McFarlane and I, I think, worked very effectively together in the--in our efforts		

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	with the U.S.S.R. and in what became that Geneva meeting, and in the end, I didn't feel, with Mr. McFarlane having left, that it was fair to the President of the country for me to leave at the same time, so I didn't. "But I do think that in jobs like the job I have where it is a real privilege to serve in this kind of job, or the others that you have recounted, that you can't do the job well if you want it too much. You have to be willing to say good-bye. And I am." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 147-52. See id., 7/24/87, at 4, 9.)		
86/08/00-300 SOMETIME IN EARLY AUGUST 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: STEELE'S ROLE DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton meets with Col. James Steele ("the U.S. military group commander in the Central American country where [the] main operating base was located") at a Washington hotel at the request of Secord and North: "Mr. BALLEN. Why did you meet with Colonel Steele in Washington? "Mr. DUTTON. Colonel North and General Secord wanted me to meet with him. He was traveling here with the ambassador who was up for a week of meetings. . . . [T]hey wanted me to sit down and talk with him about having him get back into the operation. "Colonel North and General Secord were displeased with the problems we were having with Max and the fact that Max had Colonel Steele's KL-43 and was basically the focal point of	

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		communications down there. ". . . . "Mr. BALLEN. What was discussed at this meeting? "Mr. DUTTON. Colonel Bob Earl from Colonel North's office attended as a representative of Colonel North's office and we discussed the support that was required on the problems we had been having in Central America with the resupply operation, sort of gave him an update of the desperate situation of the southern front and the fact that we needed all the help that he could give us. "Mr. BALLEN. How did Colonel Steele respond? "Mr. DUTTON. He was very -- he was receptive and said that he would do everything he could to help us . . . . "Mr. BALLEN. What role, if any, did Colonel Steele play in aiding your resupply operation? "Mr. DUTTON. There were times when he would provide us information on weather and whatever intelligence might be available. . . . [I]f there were problems with our guys and the local authorities, he was there to step in and assist. "If we had problems out at the air base, he had an office out there and . . . our people could go to him to get assistance from him. And on occasion I think he would monitor the operation to see if there were any things wrong with it and on occasion came up with some problems that he had found." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 63-65.)	

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86/08/01-100 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1986		ENTERPRISE PROFITS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. TRIBLE. . . . There has been testimony that Mr. Hakim and Secord were keeping large profits by marking up the arms being sold to the contras. For example, Albert Hakim has testified before us that during August of 1986, Mr. Secord agreed to a suggestion of Tom Clines that they maximize the profits from the last sale of arms to the contras. "Were you aware of that? "Mr. NORTH. No. "Mr. TRIBLE. Now, Hakim has testified from his records that a profit of $861,000 was made on that $2.1 million transaction. Now, that is a mark-up of about 41 percent. Were you aware that kind of profit was being made? "Mr. NORTH. No, I was not. ". . . . "Mr. TRIBLE. Were you aware that the $861,000 profit was divided equally [among] Hakim, Secord and Clines? "Mr. NORTH. No. As I have testified throughout, I was unaware of the fact these accounts even existed. ". . . . "Mr. TRIBLE. . . . [W]as anyone else in the Government of the United States aware of these kinds of profit margins? "Mr. NORTH. To my knowledge, no one else was aware of the details of those activities at all. "Mr. TRIBLE. So you would be the only person,	

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		and you were not aware. "Mr. NORTH. I was not. And I do not know of others who may have been." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 59-61.)	
86/08/01-200 DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST 1986			DELIVERY OF HAWK SPARE PARTS TO IRAN DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testifying on his involvement in delivering weapons to Iran: "Mr. DUTTON. I flew to Geneva, Switzerland, and met General Secord there. I picked up some--an amount of cash, I don't know how much, I never saw it, but I understood he was traveling with cash. "We met the air crew from Southern Air Transport in Geneva, flew in a Lear jet to Tel Aviv and within a day conducted a flight from Tel Aviv into Iran and back delivering I-Hawk spare parts. I had the KL-43 with me and General Secord showed me the net that he wanted set up talking about the White House as far as an information net and we were then also working with the Israelis to monitor the flight and make sure it went off safely. "Mr. BALLEN. . . . [D]id you use the KL-43 to communicate like you had in the Central American operation? "Mr. DUTTON. Yes, we did. "Mr. BALLEN. And who[m] did you communicate to? "Mr. DUTTON. The White House Situation Room, as I recall. It may have been with Colonel North's office, but on different occasions,

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			we--depending on where Colonel North's people were, we would either talk to his office or to the Situation Room." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 101-02.)
86/08/03-100 SOMETIME IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: COLLAPSE, AND RODRIGUEZ' DECISION TO INFORM GREGG RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: "Within a day or two after the meeting" of Rodriguez' crew about the termination of the resupply program, Don Gregg calls Rodriguez. Gregg says he has heard from North that there was a problem with the aircraft. Gregg asks, "Felix, do you have any idea of a plane that has been stolen, and a pending suit[?]" "Mr. BARBADORO. Colonel North was using your friendship with Don Gregg to get him to get you to release the aircraft; is that right? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes. "Mr. BARBADORO. And you told Don Gregg in that conversation that you wanted to come up and see him in Washington? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No. I told him first, okay, Don. Then I sat and thought about it . . . . But I thought he was legal now that the Congress had approved the aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters at that time, and I decided that it was time for me to go and talk to him and explain what had been going on, especially since the agency was in the process of taking over this operation." That meeting takes place on August 8, 1986. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 279-80. See id., 5/27/87, at 280 [Meeting in Washington	

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		8/8/86. Attendees: Rodriguez, Gregg and, "a little later, Mr. Watson."].)	
86/08/04-200 AUGUST 4, 1986			DELIVERY OF HAWK SPARE PARTS TO IRAN SUMMARY: On August 4, 240 HAWK spare parts (left in Israel after the Tehran trip in May 1986) are flown into Iran. Secord provides the crew; Israel provides the airplane. (Iran-Contra Report, at 246-47 [citing Israeli Historical Chronology]. On North's memo on the transaction, and Poindexter's notation of the President's approval, see above at 86/07/29-200, -201; 86/07/30-050. See also Tower, at B-147 to -148.)
86/08/05-100 AUGUST 5, 1986		BRUNEI: ABRAMS TO SOLICIT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS designated by GPS to make contact with Brunei." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/08/06-400.)	
86/08/06-045 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS SUMMARY: For a narrative account of North's meeting with HPSCI members, see Iran-Contra Report, at 141-42. On the Resolution of Inquiry issued by the House of Representatives in June 1986, see Iran-Contra Report, at 139-42. See also entries starting at 86/06/24-090.	
86/08/06-050		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS	

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AUGUST 6, 1986		PEARSON ACCOUNT: Bob Pearson of the NSC summarized North's meeting with HPSCI members concerning the Resolution of Inquiry of June 24, 1986 in a PROF to Poindexter: "Session was success -- Hamilton will entertain motion soonest to report unfavorably on Resolution of Inquiry and made clear believes HPSCI can turn aside future offers of similar resolutions. North's remarks were thorough and convincing. Hamilton underlined his appreciation to Admiral and to and for full cooperation offered by NSC. He restated there were no facts uncovered by or known to HPSCI to substantiate the allegations in the resolution of inquiry or media reports on North's activities. "In response to specific questions, Ollie covered following points: " - contact with FDN and UNO aimed to foster viable, democratic political strategy for Nicaraguan opposition, gave no military advice, knew of no specific military operations. " - Singlaub - gave no advice, has had no contact in 20 months; Owen - never worked from OLN office, OLN had casual contact, never provided Owen guidance. " - threats/harassment - in response to question, OLN recounted incidents of harassment/threats prior to '85 vote and again prior to '86 vote, speculated that possibly due in part to active measures effort." (JHICI Ex. JMP 15. For text of House Resolution of Inquiry, see 86/06/24-100.)	

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86/08/06-051 AUGUST 6-11, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS POINDEXTER RESPONSE: Poindexter, forwarding Pearson's note to North on August 11, 1986, writes a message of his own: "Well done." (JHICI Ex. JMP 15 [Poindexter PROF to North, "HPSCI Interview of North," 8/11/86].)	
86/08/06-100 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 1: North testified that, following a Resolution of Inquiry issued by the House of Representatives on June 24, 1986, he met with members of the HPSCI at the White House Situation Room on August 6, 1986: "Mr. NIELDS. This was you personally talking to them? "Mr. NORTH. It was on instructions of the National Security Adviser. I was instructed to meet with Chairman Hamilton and I believe many of the members of the committee. "Mr. NIELDS. And they were interested in finding out the answers to the questions raised by the resolution of inquiry. "Mr. NORTH. Exactly. "Mr. NIELDS. Your fund-raising activities? "Mr. NORTH. Precisely. "Mr. NIELDS. Military support for the contras? "Mr. NORTH. That's right. "Mr. NIELDS. Questions about Mr. Owen,	

General Singlaub and John Hull?

"[Witness confers with his attorney.]

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. . . . I will tell you right now, counsel, and all the members here gathered, that I misled the Congress. I misled --

"Mr. NIELDS. At that meeting?

"Mr. NORTH. At that meeting.

"Mr. NIELDS. Face to face?

"Mr. NORTH. Face to face.

"Mr. NIELDS. You made false statements to them about your activities in support of the contras?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Furthermore, I did so with a purpose, and I did so with a purpose of hopefully avoiding the very kind of thing that we have before us now, and avoiding a shut-off of help for the Nicaraguan resistance, and avoiding an elimination of the resistance facilities in three Central American countries wherein we had promised those heads of state on my specific orders, on specific orders to me -- I had gone down there and assured them of our absolute and total discretion.

"Mr. NIELDS. Would you --

"Mr. NORTH. And I am admitting to you that I participated in preparation of documents for the Congress that were erroneous, misleading, evasive and wrong, and I did it again here when I appeared before that committee convened in the White House Situation Room, and I make no excuses for what I did.

"I will tell you now that I am under oath and I was not then.

"Mr. NIELDS. We do live in a democracy, don't we?

"Mr. NORTH. We do, sir, thank God.

"Mr. NIELDS. In which it is the people, not one Marine lieutenant colonel, that get to decide the important policy decisions for the nation?

"[Witness confers with his attorney.]

"Mr. MORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And part of that --

"Mr. NORTH. I want to point out part of that answer is that this Marine lieutenant colonel was not making all of those decisions on his own. As I indicated yesterday in my testimony, Mr. Nields, I sought approval for everything that I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you denied Congress the facts.

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. You denied the elected representatives of our people the facts upon which they needed to make a very important decision for this nation?

"Mr. NORTH. I did because of what I have just described to you as our concerns. And I did it because we have had incredible leaks from discussions with closed committees of the Congress. I was a part of, as people now know, the coordination for the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua. When that one leaked, there were American lives at stake and it leaked from a member of one of the committees, who eventually admitted it.

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		"When there was a leak on the sensitive intelligence methods that we used to help capture the Achille Lauro terrorists, it almost wiped out that whole channel of communications. "Those kinds of things are devastating. They are devastating to the national security of the United States and I desperately hoped that one of the things that can derive from all this ordeal is that we can find a better way by which we can communicate those things properly with the Congress. "I am not admitting that what happened in this is proper. I am not admitting -- or claiming, rather -- that what I did and my role in it in communicating was proper." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 222-27; JHICI Exx. 122 [Resolution of Inquiry], 126 [notes of North meeting on 8/6/86 taken by Steven Berry, HPSCI Associate Counsel], 128 [Poindexter PROF to North, dated 8/11/86: "Well done."]. See North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 64 [North on lying to Congress: "I do not believe that there ought to be circumstances in which people like myself have to make judgments over lives or lies. . . . I am not justifying what I did except to say to you if I had divulged what I was doing, if Mr. McFarlane had divulged what I was doing, many, many lives were at stake."].)	
86/08/06-101 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] North, continuing his account of his meeting	

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		with HPSCI members at the White House Situation Room on August 6, 1986, was questioned about his authorization to give such answers: "Mr. NIELDS. Were you instructed to do it? "Mr. NORTH. I was not specifically instructed, no. "Mr. NIELDS. Were you generally instructed? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. By whom? "Mr. NORTH. By my superiors. I -- "Mr. NIELDS. Who? "Mr. NORTH. I prepared draft answers that they signed and sent. "I would also point out -- "Mr. NIELDS. What superior? "Mr. NORTH. Well, look who -- I didn't sign those letters to the -- "Mr. NIELDS. I am talking about the last -- about the last oral meeting in August of 1986. "Mr. NORTH. I went down to that oral meeting with the same kind of understanding that I had prepared those memos in 1985 and other communications. "Mr. NIELDS. You had a different boss, and in fairness, you ought to tell us whether he instructed you to do it, understood you did it, knew about it afterwards, or none of those. "Mr. NORTH. He did not specifically go down and say, 'Ollie, lie to the committee.' I told him what I had said afterwards, and he sent me a note saying, well done', Now, I would also like to point out one other thing. I deeply believe that the President of the United States is also an	

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		elected official of this land, and by the Constitution, as I understand it, he is the person charged with making and carrying out the foreign policy of this country. I believed from the moment I was engaged in this activity in 1984 that this was in furtherance of the foreign policy established by the President. I still believe that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 227-29; JHICI Ex. 128 [PROF from Poindexter to North, dated 8/11/86: "Well done."].)	
86/08/06-105 JULY 28, 1987	FALSE STATEMENTS TO CONGRESS, GENERALLY MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Attorney General, to your knowledge, is it an offense to make false statements to Congress? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, to the best of my knowledge, it is. "I think there's specific statutes that relate to that. "Mr. NIELDS. And does that apply to statements whether they are under oath or not? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe Section 1001 of U.S. Code Title XVIII does pertain to that. Again, I'm not used to giving horseback legal opinions without looking at the statutes, so what I'm saying here I hope will not be considered legal advice. "But it's my recollection that that is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Section 1001 is a section that criminal lawyers in the Department of Justice work		

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	with fairly frequently, I take it. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, indeed. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it there is no--it is a felony, I take it. "Attorney General MEESE. I believe it is, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And there's no exemption for employees or staff at the NSC, to your knowledge? "Attorney General MEESE. Not to my knowledge, and I doubt if there would be. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 176-77. See generally id., 7/29/87, at 337 [Meese: "I don't think that anyone should be exempt from the laws of the land, from the President on down, and I think that is the view of the President, as well."].)		
86/08/06-110 JUNE - AUGUST 1986		OWEN AND NORTH ON THEIR CONTRA ACTIVITIES OWEN ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. Mr. Owen, a moment ago you mentioned the Resolution of Inquiry which was issued by Congress in June of 1986. ". . . . "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . [T]he Resolution of Inquiry specifically mentioned you, did it not? "Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. ". . . . "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall that there actually came a time when Colonel North met with Members of Congress? "Mr. OWEN. I believe he met with them in	

August of 1986.

". . . .

"Mr. EGGLESTON. You did have a conversation with him afterwards, after the meeting?

"Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. And did he say anything to you about what he had said to the Members of Congress about his association with you?

"Mr. OWEN. Yes, he did. . . .

"I asked him if he had had the meeting. He said he had. He said that my name was brought up. And his comment to that question was, yes, I know Rob Owen. I have met him several times. But I think that that was the extent of his remarks.

". . . .

"Mr. EGGLESTON. And if Colonel North said he had met with you several times, I take it that he had met with you quite a number of times by August of 1986; is that correct?

"Mr. OWEN. I would say so. I have no idea of the number though.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Indeed, if you were to add up in his calendar for 1985, it appeared that you had about 20 or so meetings with him reflected in his calendar and up until August of 1986, about 20 or so additional meetings, would that sound consistent with what you think probably happened?

"Mr. OWEN. Easily. We wouldn't always meet in his office.

". . . .

"Mr. EGGLESTON. There had been a previous investigation of Colonel North in the summer of 1985. Were you aware of that?

"Mr. OWEN. Sir, I can't remember that one specifically, but I know there were a number of investigations that constantly involved Colonel North. We had some conversations about them.

"There were different times when he thought that he was probably going to be moved and he said I will just let the chips fall where they may. . . . [H]e said on several occasions that he would always be the fall guy if this story ever broke.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Let me ask you about that. Did Colonel North indicate to you whether or not his superiors at the NSC knew what it was that he was doing in Central America?

"Mr. OWEN. It was my understanding that he did. I was never given any clear indication. I once asked him what he did with my memos, and he said I take them across the street. I just assumed that that would probably go to the National Security Advisor, either Robert McFarlane or John Poindexter.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Did he ever indicate to you whether or not the President knew what he and you were doing in Central America?

"Mr. OWEN. I don't think the President has time to know who Robert Owen is. But I imagine that he had an idea that Colonel North was doing things to help the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. But you have no specific information about just what it was that the President may have known about Colonel North's activities.

"Mr. OWEN. No, I don't have specific information . . . ."

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		(Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 36-41.)	
86/08/06-115 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, Colonel North, as you undoubtedly know, has testified about what he said during that face-to-face meeting? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand that. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Now, my question to you is, did you authorize Colonel North to do that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not authorize him to make false statements. I did think that he would withhold information and be evasive, frankly, in answering questions. My objective all along was to withhold from the Congress exactly what the NSC staff was doing in carrying out the President's policy. "I felt that, as I have testified before, that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff. "The Government, the U.S. Government, was complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, as I thought that was sufficient. "Don't misunderstand me. I thought that Colonel North would withhold information. There was no doubt about that in my mind. There were a lot of stories in the press that had appeared that I had talked to Colonel North about periodically. "Most of the stories were patently false and in error. I thought most of the questions would be about these rather outrageous stories in the press, and I felt that Colonel North could knock those stories down by answering the questions	

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		truthfully. "Mr. NIELDS. My question to you is, did you put Colonel North in an absolutely impossible position? How could he answer the questions raised by the resolution of inquiry truthfully and still withhold information? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. First of all, Mr. Nields, as I testified a few moments ago, I don't believe I had actually read the resolution of inquiry as to the kinds of questions that were being raised there. I knew, in general, the issue was what was Colonel North doing to help the contras. As I testified before, I felt that Colonel North was a very capable officer. I did not micromanage him, and when I called him after discussing the matter on the telephone with Chairman Hamilton, I simply told him that the House Intelligence Committee wanted to talk to him, and would he be prepared, or would he be willing to talk to them? "And he indicated that he would. There was no discussion then or later as to what the likely questions would be or how he would answer them. "Obviously with hindsight, it would have been prudent to have sat down and talked to him about that before he did it to provide more detailed guidance, but that was not the manner in which I was manning and directing Colonel North at the time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 32-36 [quoting in elided portion North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 225]. See Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 100-02 [North's withholding	

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		information from Congress].)	
86/08/06-116 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. You have testified that you were aware that the resolution of inquiry, among other things, wanted to know about funding. Now, how did you understand Colonel North should answer a question such as the following one: Have the contras received money from any foreign governments in 1985 or 1986? How should he respond to that question? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is important to point out, Mr. Nields, again, so that the public is not misled here, the resolution of inquiry had not passed, and at that point I had reason to believe that it would never pass. I did not know exactly what questions they were going to ask. I had not, to my knowledge, to my recollection anyway, read the resolution. I simply didn't get into that level of detail of the issue at that point. It was a general issue, one of the many I am sure I handled that particular day. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, that is a logical question, isn't it, and I would like to know how did you understand Colonel North would answer a question like that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is a hypothetical question. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. The Admiral has testified that	

Colonel North would be asked questions based upon the resolution of inquiry.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me, Mr. Nields. I am not sure that in my conversation with Chairman Hamilton that that was clear. All that he indicated was that he thought it would be helpful if his committee, at least some of the members, had an opportunity to talk with Colonel North. The thing that brought it about was the introduction of the resolution of inquiry and referring it to his committee among others.

"Mr. NIELDS. I am taking my first question to you directly out of the first paragraph of the resolution of inquiry, which wants to know about Colonel North's contacts with private individuals or representatives of foreign governments concerning the provision to the Nicaraguan Resistance of any funding.

". . . .

"And my question to you is, how was Colonel North to answer a question, have the contras received money from any foreign government in 1985 or 1986?

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I said earlier, Mr. Nields, I didn't provide any guidance to Colonel North on how to answer the question. I did not know what the questions would be. I knew in general that they were going to ask about his involvement with support of the contras. I didn't--you know, he was not there as a spokesman for the entire U.S. Government on the U.S. relationship with the contras. He was there to talk about his particular involvement.

"Mr. NIELDS. You testified that he was supposed to withhold information.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. I did not--

"Mr. NIELDS. Was he authorized to disclose, in response to a direct question, that he had met with representatives of country 3 and as a result country 3 contributed $2 million to the contras last year?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would have expected him to withhold that information.

"Mr. NIELDS. How would he withhold that information in response to a question which I just read you, have the contras received money from any foreign governments in 1985 and 1986? It is a hypothetical, but it is a pretty logical hypothetical. Suppose that question were asked, what should he answer?

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't want to answer a hypothetical question. I don't know what the thinking was in Colonel North's mind at the time. I certainly did not analyze it in the detail you are asking at this point. I don't know how he would have answered."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 36-40.)

86/08/06-117
AUGUST 6,
1986

NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS

POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. Was [North] authorized to disclose, in response to a direct question, that the contras had received funding from the arms sales to Iran?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He should have withheld that information.

"Mr. NIELDS. Even if he was asked directly, what sources of funding are you aware of that the contras have received during the last six months?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Look, Mr. Nields, as we have said, these are hypothetical questions, and I don't know what I would have done at that point if that question had been asked and I don't want to speculate on it today.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, you were sending a subordinate to meet face to face with members of the House Intelligence Committee, knowing that they would ask him questions on these subjects, and as I understand your testimony, you told him he was not to provide them certain information.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't tell him that specifically. That was a general understanding, that he was to withhold information about our involvement.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]as it the general understanding between you and Colonel North that he was supposed to withhold information even if a member of the House Intelligence Committee asked him a direct question calling for it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Colonel North was a very competent individual, as I think you have observed. He had been in much tougher situations, I was sure. Colonel North is very resourceful. I thought he could handle it some way.

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		"The analysis as to exactly how he would do it did not enter my mind. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, he has testified here that he was unable to do that, that he was put in a position where he either had to give up the information that you didn't want him to or he had to lie. "Now, assume that he is faced and was faced with that choice. Which choice did you want him to make? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I've said before, I did not expect him to lie to the committee. I expected him to be evasive, say that he didn't want to answer the question, be uncooperative, if necessary, but I rather think that with his resourcefulness, I thought he could handle it. "And furthermore, I--I understand that there isn't one [sc. a transcript], and it is unfortunate, but I would really like to know exactly what was asked and what his answer were. I'm sure they were very carefully crafted, nuanced. The total impact, I'm sure, was one of withholding information from the Congress, but I'm still not convinced--I know he testified that he lied and made false statements--but I'm not totally convinced of that myself." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 40-44.)	
86/08/06-120 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, did there come a time, to your recollection, when there was a resolution of	

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		inquiry introduced in Congress with respect to Mr. North? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe there was such a resolution introduced in 1986, at least I do know that there were questions raised about Colonel North's activities. "Mr. NIELDS. Summer of 1986? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Also concerned with the question of North's support for the Contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. I would like you to turn to an exhibit that has been marked exhibit number 69. Do you have that in front of you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do. "Mr. NIELDS. Is that a PROF message that you were sent a copy of? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. It appears to be from the Executive Secretary of the NSC staff to a number of people. "Mr. NIELDS. Including you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it relates to an interview, does it not, between North and members of the House Intelligence Committee? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it is dated August 1986? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And it relates to this resolution of inquiry, does it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And whoever is reporting to you says the session was a success, North's remarks	

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		were thorough and convincing, and essentially that the inquiry is going to be dropped. Is that true? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then it gives a little more detail of the interview and it says, among other things, in response to specific questions, Ollie covered the following points: contact with FDN and UNO aimed to foster viable democratic political strategy for Nicaraguan opposition, gave no military advice, knew of no specific military operations? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 110-12; JHICI Ex. 69 [Pearson PROF, forwarded to McFarlane, "HPSCI Interview of North," 8/6/86].)	
86/08/06-200 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS EARL ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: . . . Did you ever have any discussions as to whether the NSC was covered by Boland? "THE WITNESS: Two answers to that question. One is a generic one, that from talk just amongst people at the staff my impression from that talk was that there were all kinds of loopholes in the law, so I think that's partially relevant. "But the specific answer to your question is I recall one conversation at around the time Colonel North was going to meet with or brief some members of one of the Committees. I think he did that in the White House situation room. And either before or after, but in that time frame, I asked him about that argument . . . that Boland did not	

apply to the NSC. . . .

". . . [B]ut I think . . . that there was an argument that the NSC was exempted because it was not part of the intelligence community.

"And so I asked that question of Colonel North, if that argument had utility, whether it was a credible argument. . . . I recall that it was a balanced answer, a neutral answer. It wasn't hell, no[,] it has no applicability, and it wasn't oh, yeah, that's absolutely right. It was a little grayer and more complicated than that, that I would characterize as neutral or middle.

". . . .

"MR. LIMAN: Well, do you remember that he was on the hot seat in terms of some kind of Congressional investigation?

"THE WITNESS: Well, I think that's what I'm referring to here.

". . . .

"MR. LIMAN: Was he concerned before he went for that interview? Did he express concern to you?

"THE WITNESS: I would say that there was concern, yes, that he was aware that he was going to be doing this, and his concern involved what he was authorized to say and going to say, I think.

"MR. LIMAN: Well, you knew, for example, that he was not in a position to disclose the use of the proceeds of the arms sale.

"THE WITNESS: Sure."

(Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 100-02.)

86/08/06-202 NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS: POINDEXTER'S

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
PRIOR TO AUGUST 6, 1986		LEAVE EARL ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: Was there any activity to prepare Colonel North for his interview with the Congressional Committee? "THE WITNESS: I think so. "MR. LIMAN: What do you remember? "THE WITNESS: My best recollection is that Colonel North was trying to get guidance for this meeting and was experiencing difficulty in getting that guidance. I know that NSC Congressional Affairs was involved in that. NSC Congressional Affairs was involved in setting up a meeting, so they were involved in a certain amount of the preparation of it. "But I recall that he was having difficulty getting guidance from Admiral Poindexter on the specific reason, and [sic (for the specific reason that?)] Admiral Poindexter was on leave during the time frame. ". . . . "MR. LIMAN: And the difficulty he was having getting guidance was that Admiral Poindexter wasn't accessible? "THE WITNESS: Yes, but it may have been more than that. I'm not sure. "MR. LIMAN: But I'm trying to find out whether it was more than that. Was it that he was a hot potato and people just sort of were leaving him to fend for himself? Or was that your impression? "THE WITNESS: My impression was that the leave was not accidental. The timing of the leave	

was just not a coincidence.

"MR. LIMAN: And did Ollie express that to you?

"THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know how I gathered it. . . . I don't recall that he specifically said that to me, but something about the way he was dealing and talking or calling over the phone, trying to get to see Poindexter, trying to prepare for his meeting, that is the impression that I recall.

"MR. LIMAN: So that your impression of it, your observation of it, was that Colonel North had some information to protect and that he was being left to figure out how to protect it on his own?

"THE WITNESS: I think that's a fair statement."

(Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 105-07. See 86/08/06-227 [Poindexter testimony on the timing of his leave].)

86/08/06-220
AUGUST 1985
AND AUGUST
1986

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND NORTH MEETING WITH HSPCI MEMBERS

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. . . . Do you recall that in August of '85, when the congressional committees made inquiries of the NSC about these activities, that a file search was done then? Were you aware of that?

"A. I am not aware of that.

"Q. Were you aware at that time of any effort to get rid of documents that were embarrassing?

"A. No. I don't recall that.

"Q. Were you involved in the formulation of the replies to the congressional committees about North?

"A. I was not. In fact, I don't think I have seen those letters other than the extracts that are in the Tower Commission Report.

"MR. VAN CLEVE: What about the period during the resolution of inquiry, which is 1986? Were you involved in a document search at that time?

"THE WITNESS: Not a document search.

"MR. VAN CLEVE: How about a document review?

"THE WITNESS: I don't believe so. But -- the 1986 activities came to my attention when Chairman Hamilton sent me a letter in which he wanted to -- he wanted me to make Colonel North available to talk to the House Intelligence Committee. I was aware that the letters had come in the previous year.

"Mr. McFarlane had worked those letters personally. He had come up to the Hill and had several meetings up here.

"In discussing -- and for some reason, not particularly deliberately, I had just never gotten around to reading the replies of the letters that he sent. In discussing with Commander Thompson and -- well, it was primarily Commander Thomson, I guess. I think it was at that point I asked him if he had copies of the letters that Bud had -- Mr. McFarlane had sent to the Hill the previous year. He said he did. I said, 'Well, I probably want to look at those.'

"As it turned out, I never did get around to looking at them.

"We did have a conversation at that point

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		about the letters that Mr. McFarlane had sent up and I can't remember whether Commander Thompson read from the letters or just told me approximately what he said; but at the time, I remember at least thinking that that was -- you know, I would not have done it that way. The statements that I have since reviewed in the Tower Commission Report are, in my opinion, much too broad, and I went, half said it that way [sic]; and so in talking to my legislative people and the White House legislative people about responding to Chairman Hamilton's request, I decided rather than to answer his letter, that I would call him, which I did. "By the time I called him, I think the House Armed Services Committee had already voted on the resolution and they had voted it down. Chairman Hamilton said to me that technically he didn't, with one committee having voted it down, that he really didn't have to do anything more; but, on the other hand, he thought that in order to satisfy the members of his committee, it would be very useful if they had an opportunity to meet with Colonel North and he went on to say that he really didn't intend to push this, but he thought that such a meeting would help clear the air." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 191-94. Adm. Poindexter's response continues in next entry. See entries starting at 85/08/16-200 [McFarlane's testimony on Poindexter's role in 8/85 in collecting documents related to North's Contra activities].)	

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86/08/06-221 AUGUST 1986		CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NSC, AND NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Adm. Poindexter's response continues from preceding entry:] "[A.] So we talked about the mode of such a meeting, and I asked if they would be willing to come down to the Situation Room for an informal meeting with Colonel North, that he [sc. Chairman Hamilton] understood that our general -- the administration's general policy was not to make members of the NSC staff available for hearings. He said, yes, he understood that. He thought that would probably be an acceptable arrangement. I said, 'Well, let me talk to Colonel North and our legislative people and I will get back to you.' "I called Colonel North and asked him if he would be willing to talk to the committee under those conditions, those informal conditions, in the Situation Room, rather than on the Hill. He said he could handle that. Our legislative people all agreed that that was an acceptable solution that didn't set a bad precedent. "So I either called or sent word back to Chairman Hamilton that we would agree to do that; and in August of '86, the meeting took place. I was on leave that particular week, my annual week leave, and that was essentially it. "MR. VAN CLEVE: Did you give Colonel North any instructions as to what to say or what not to say in the presentation? "THE WITNESS: Didn't give him any	

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		instructions. I didn't. Obviously -- my position on that, my thinking was that there was an awful lot of stuff in the press that was speculative. There was a lot of inaccurate stuff. You know, I knew there was some risk in Colonel North talking to the committee. I frankly did not expect him to lie to the committee, and certainly didn't tell him that. I assumed that what he would do is that he would answer the questions directly, and there was so much fictitious stuff out there that he would be able to do that in a truthful way and not lie to the committee. But, on the other hand, I didn't expect him to volunteer information to the committee. In other words, still withhold information but answer directly their specific questions." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 194-95.)	
86/08/06-223 AUGUST 6-11, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS: "WELL DONE" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: [For Poindexter testimony preceding this entry, see 86/07/21-110.] "Q. . . . Remember there came a time when you had to deal with a resolution of inquiry being prepared by Congress? That was a year later, in August of '86. "A. Yes. "Q. And you remember that Oliver North met with the Congressional representatives of Congressional committees? "A. Yes. In an informal meeting in the situation room. "Q. And did you receive a report of what	

Oliver North's responses were?

"A. As I recall, I received a summary that purported to be that.

"Q. Do you recall telling Oliver North by PROF note that his responses were, quote, 'well done?'

"MR. BECKLER: Let's look at the exact thing.

"MR. LIMAN: [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 54. [See 86/08/06-051, 86/08/11-050.] It is a PROF note from the Admiral dated August 11, 1986, and a PROF note from Mr. Pearson to him. The Pearson note reflects North's answers.

". . . .

"Q. Did you write 'well done,' Admiral?

"A. Let me read what I wrote well done for.

"Q. Does it say 'Subject: HPSCI Interview of North'?

"MR. BECKLER: Let me state for the record here, the question was something to the effect -- we can have it read back -- 'well done' for the responses. There is nothing in there about well done for the responses, it just says well done.

"MR. LIMAN: 'Subject: HPSCI Interview of North.' Does well done? [Sic.]

"MR. BECKLER: It that you? Does well done? [Sic.]

"THE WITNESS: That is my note. What well done refers to is not clear.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. It is not clear to you?

"A. It is not clear to me.

"MR. BECKLER: It is not clear from the face of this document?

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		"THE WITNESS: The first sentence of the PROF notes -- and, again, you have to recall that I saw many of these every[ ]day -- it says 'Session was success, Hamilton will entertain motion soonest to report unfavorably on resolution of inquiry.' "That is the point of the inquiry, and that is 'well done.' "Q. Did it say 'Forwarding note from Mr. Pearson'? "A. Yes. "Q. And -- "A. Well done is obviously in response to this PROF note from Pearson. "Q. Did you consider when you read the report of North's interview that North had given candid answers to the committee? "A. I really can't comment without reading a transcript of exactly what Ollie said. The point was that Chairman Hamilton was satisfied and I was pleased with that. "Q. Isn't the point that Oliver North had misrepresented facts to the House Committee? Isn't that what the fact is? "A. I don't know that, Mr. Liman. "Q. And isn't it a fact that you were telling him well done for deflecting this inquiry? "A. I was telling him well done that he had carried out the briefing and that Chairman Hamilton seemed to be satisfied." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 57-60; Poinexter Dep. Ex. 54 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 15; Poindexter PROF to North, "HPSCI Interview of North," 8/11/86].)	

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86/08/06-224 AUGUST 6-11, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS: "WELL DONE" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Didn't you know at that time that if he [sc. North] had been frank with Chairman Hamilton that he would have revealed that he was doing things that Congress disapproved of? "MR. BECKLER: Objection. If he had known this, if he had done this or that, those are questions you can ask Oliver North if you wish. "MR. LIMAN: I'm going to ask him because he has testified briefly as to what he knew North was doing. "THE WITNESS: May I go back to the May 2nd testimony. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Do you have to read what was said on May 2nd in order to testify today as to what you know that Oliver North was doing a year ago? "MR. BECKLER: He is trying to refresh his recollection on the testimony that he gave with regard to this same type of message back on May 2nd, and I would ask you not to badger the witness. "MR. LIMAN: I think what he is trying to do is conform his testimony now to something he said in May. "MR. BECKLER: I resent anything about conforming. We are not here to be badgered by you. Get on with your questions. He is not going to answer anything about what Oliver North said was true or not true.	

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		"BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Did you consider what Oliver North was doing to assist the contras to be consistent with the attitude of th[e] congressional committee towards the Boland Amendment? Did you consider that? "MR. BECKLER: Objection. We are not going to answer that question. That is asking him to draw a conclusion based on whether or not Oliver North acted in accordance with the attitudes of Congress. It is an impossible question to answer. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Admiral, did you understand Congress was looking into whether or not North's activities violated the Boland Amendment? "A. I understood that a resolution of inquiry had been introduced on the floor of the House, it had been referred to three committees: the House Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Relations Committee and the House Intelligence Committee. The House Armed Services Committee had considered it in committee and provided a negative report. Chairman Hamilton called me and said that under the Rules of the House they didn't have to take any further action but to satisfy some his members, he thought it would be helpful -- he did not plan to push it, but thought it would be helpful if they could meet with Colonel North. "After some discussion and negotiation with the Chairman and consultation with other White House staff members and my own staff members, I did agree that they could informally talk to Colonel North in the Situation Room. The meeting	

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		took place, I received a report that indicated Chairman Hamilton was satisfied, and I said, well done. I considered it the end of the issue." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 60-64.)	
86/08/06-225 AUGUST 6-11, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS: "WELL DONE" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did you consider that they were interviewing him on Libya or on the contras? "A. I can't remember the wording of the resolution. "Q. So you don't know as you sit here today whether or not the interview related to the contras? "A. Oh, I think it probably did. I don't know whether it was limited to that. "Q. Do you know that it included the contras? "A. Yes. "Q. And did you know that some of the activities that Oliver North was doing in support of the contras were activities that Members of Congress were concerned about? "A. I knew that some of his activities could be controversial and would not be agreed to by some Members of Congress. "Q. And did you know that if Oliver North revealed some of these controversial activities that there might be a problem on the Hill? "MR. BECKLER: Objection. "MR. LIM[A]N: Did you think that? "MR. BECKLER: You can answer that question. I will withdraw my objection.	

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"THE WITNESS: Rephrase the question.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Did you believe that if Oliver North revealed to this delegation some of the activities that are controversial that there would be a problem for the Administration on the Hill?

"A. Yes, I thought there would be.

"Q. Did you --

"MR. BECKLER: He is finishing his answer.

"THE WITNESS: My point is that I expected Colonel North to be truthful and answer the specific questions that were asked, but not necessarily to reveal everything that he knew to answer the questions.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. And when you got a report, did you discover whether he had revealed everything he knew?

"A. I couldn't conclude that from such a brief summary.

"Q. Were you able to conclude from that brief summary that whatever he said had satisfied Congress?

"A. I was able to conclude that.

"Q. And were you able to conclude that he was able to avoid getting into controversial subjects?

"A. That's a subjective question. What is controversial?

"Q. As you sit here today, Admiral, are you not able to say whether you were congratulating Oliver North on his having been able to avoid telling the Congress some things that would have troubled them?

"MR. BECKLER: The question has been asked and answered both on May 2 and several times today. It speaks for itself. There is a 'well done.' The 'well done' refers to the answer that Hamilton, that Congressman Hamilton will entertain a motion, so on and so forth.

"The question has been asked and answered. Let's move on the next question.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. I understand what Hamilton was going to do because it says 'entertain a motion.' What was it that Oliver North had done that was well?

"A. He had apparently appeared, had satisfied Chairman Hamilton."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 64-67; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 54 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 15; Poindexter PROF to North, "HPSCI Interview of North," 8/11/86]. See Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 100-02 [North's withholding statements from Congress]; id., 7/21/87, at 34-37 [Poindexter's expectation that North would evade questions of Congress].)

86/08/06-227
AUGUST 6 OR
8, 1986

NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS: POINDEXTER'S LEAVE

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Now, with regard to the August 8 . . . appearance that Colonel North had before the HPSCI committee, can you recall, Admiral, any attempts on Colonel North's part prior to that day to get in touch with you in order to review with you what he would be testifying on in his upcoming appearance before HPSCI?

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		"A. I don't recall that. "Q. Do you recall him at any time after he appeared before HPSCI indicating to you or anyone else that he was upset that he had been unable to meet with you before he appeared before HPSCI to get some guidance from you as to what he should tell them? "A. I don't think I'm aware of that. I was very busy, as I always was. "Q. In that August time frame? "A. Yes. "Q. Were you on vacation by any chance in that August time frame? "A. Yes. In fact, I was on my week's vacation the week that he met with them. "Q. And you don't recall any efforts of him trying to reach you before you went on vacation or even while you were on vacation? "A. He may have, but I don't think it came to my attention. I had a very protective outer office. "Q. Had it been indicated to you that's why he wanted to meet with you and talk with you -- "A. I probably would have met with him." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 90-92. See 86/08/06-202 [Earl testimony on the timing of Poindexter's leave].)	
86/08/06-250 AUGUST 6, 1986		NORTH MEETING WITH HPSCI MEMBERS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now you also testified earlier about the fact that Colonel North submitted to an interview?	

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Colonel North has said that in that interview, he gave answers that were evasive and wrong. You have heard that testimony?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard his testimony last week.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you, in fact--and you can look at Exhibit [JMP] 15--receive a report on what Colonel North told Congress in his interview? Is that a PROF note you received?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it is a PROFS note from Mr. Pearson who was the Deputy Executive Secretary of the staff.

"Mr. LIMAN. It indicated that Oliver North covered some points, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It starts off by saying--in fact, I think it might be helpful to read it.

"Mr. LIMAN. I will. [See 86/08/06-050 for text.] . . .

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . Now, North testified that these statements about Singlaub and about Owen and about the fact that he knew of no military--specific military operations and what else he had said to the committee were wrong and misleading.

"Is it a fact, sir, that in response to this note from Mr. Pearson, that you had a two-word response: 'Well done'?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I responded by forwarding a copy of Mr. Pearson's note to me to Colonel North and I did tell him, 'well done.' Well done meant that I was pleased that the session was a success and that Chairman Hamilton seemed satisfied.

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		"Our objective here all along was to withhold information. There is no question about that. And that was my intent all along. I had talked to Colonel North after talking to Chairman Hamilton and asking if he could meet with the committee, and he said that he could, and he could handle it. There had been a lot of false allegations in the press. "I expected Colonel North to be very careful in answering the specific questions. I thought he could knock down a lot of the issues by being truthful. By reading the summary in this note, I didn't attach any great significance to it because I knew that the questions and answers would be very carefully crafted. "I did not have any indication at this point that Colonel North had made a false statement. I expected him to withhold information. In fact, I am still not sure to this day, if you looked at the questions and the answers that he gave, whether you would conclude that there were false statements. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you think that the most effective way of knocking down false allegations about Colonel North's activities was by withholding information, the words you just used? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I thought that was an effective way of doing it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 43-46.)	
86/08/06-300 DURING 1986		BOLAND'S APPLICABILITY TO THE NSC: THE RECURRING ISSUE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:	

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		"Mr. LEON. Now, in August of 1986 after you had been NSC adviser for about nine months, eight months or so, and the resolution of inquiry issue arose, the question of Boland's applicability to the NSC was there again staring you in the face, was it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. In effect, it was. "Mr. LEON. Did you consider on that occasion, with a media blitz, as you've described, of accusations with regard to Colonel North, did you consider at that time seeking the counsel of the White House counsel's office or the Attorney General of the United States to help prepare yourself and your office for dealing with the resolution of inquiry? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. I just--I didn't think about it at the time. I was handling a lot of issues. I just didn't do that kind of analysis. "Mr. LEON. Had anybody suggested it to you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Not that I can recall. "Mr. LEON. Commander Thompson was an attorney, was he not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. LEON. Was it your impression that he concurred with the opinion of the Intelligence Oversight Board? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my impression. "Mr. LEON. And he didn't suggest to you that you should go to the Attorney General or the White House counsel? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. He did not." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 96-97.)	

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86/08/06-400 AUGUST 6, 1986		BRUNEI: ABRAMS TO SOLICIT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS reports that he will be meeting an official of Brunei. Reports also that he has received a second account number from CIA. Asks HILL's advice on which account to use. HILL says 'use original number.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/08/09-100.)	
86/08/07-200 AUGUST 7, 1986		OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (DoS) POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FASCELL. I would like for you and your counsel to refer to Exhibit [JMP] 112 for a minute, please. "That is a memorandum from Walt Raymond. "And the memorandum recommends that you send an attached draft memorandum which was prepared by Walt Raymond to Bill Casey and it ran through the NSC, as you can see by the initials of approval, intelligence section, North's desk, some others. "Mr. BECKLER. This is an exhibit we just got this morning. We have to take a few minutes to look through this. "Mr. FASCELL. Sure. Go ahead. "The subject matter of that memorandum is Central American diplomacy. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Public diplomacy. "Mr. FASCELL. Right. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Which I would like to	

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		explain. "Mr. FASCELL. Just concentrate on the second paragraph of the second page. "Mr. BECKLER. You are speaking now, when you say the second page, that marked 5840? "Mr. FASCELL. That is the draft memorandum, yes. You see that language that says, 'The departure of Otto Reich has not resulted in any reduction of effort. His public diplomacy coordination office, LPD, has continued. Although the independent office was folded into Elliott Abrams' bureau, the White House has sent a clear tasker to the community that this limited reorganization in no way reflected a diminution of activities. On the contrary, the same interagency responsibilities are being exercised, and the group reports directly to the NSC.' "Do you have that section? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I have it. "Mr. FASCELL. Is that a correct statement? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it is reasonably accurate. I think it is important to explain what we were trying to do here with public diplomacy. "Mr. FASCELL. You were trying to educate the American people and lobby Congress, right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We were trying to educate the American people. And, in effect, the result of that we thought was to make sure that members of Congress heard from their constituents on what they felt about Central America. "The problem is that for a very long time we have been involved with a war of words with the Soviet Union and their proxies. It was my	

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		feeling, fully supported by Mr. Raymond, who was the Director of the Public Diplomacy Office at the NSC, which by the way was established under this Administration in order to provide leadership and guidance and management of a more extensive public diplomacy effort across-the-board to explain to the American people the situation in this struggle we have with the Soviet Union over the minds of the people of the world. "Mr. FASCELL. I think that has been made plenty clear. The point I was getting at is Colonel North was tasked with this effort, was he not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Walt Raymond was tasked with the effort of supervising public diplomacy across-the-board, and, of course, on Latin America, which would have been part of that, he would have gotten a lot of assistance from Colonel North, who was the expert in the area." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 78-80; JHICI Ex. JMP 112 [Raymond memo to Poindexter, 8/7/86].)	
86/08/08-100 AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND THE DoS RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Rodriguez meets in Washington with Don Gregg. Sam Watson arrives at some point during the meeting. "Mr. BARBADORO. And in that meeting, you told Don Gregg that Ollie North was connected with the -- what you referred to as the Wilson Group in running this resupply operation, didn't you?	

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. Exactly what did you tell him?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. That I was very disturbed with the situation . . . . I explained that there has been a[n] operation to support a Nicaraguan freedom fighter from where I was. I don't recall in detail whether I gave him what I was involved or not [sic]. I . . . explained to him that I had a report from somebody that Tom Clines had been involved in purchasing equipment for them and explained the incident of the hand grenade [sold to the Contras at a $6 profit] . . . and also another incident that . . . Mr. Gadd[] was using a couple of people in the wrong way in the country south . . . .

". . . He was making $600 a day on these people . . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you tell him that Richard Secord was involved in the operation?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes[,] sir.

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you tell him Tom Clines was involved in the operation?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. What was Don Gregg's reaction when you told him that this group of people was involved with Ollie North in this resupply operation?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He was pretty surprised. He was pretty mad . . . . He merely got on the telephone and called upstairs to Colonel North's office and he was not there, so he spoke to Earl

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		and . . . told him that he had heard an outrageous report from my friend Felix . . . and he wanted him to come down to listen for himself and if he had known that people like Tom Clines were being used, it was outrageous. . . . "Mr. BARBADORO. Was the matter resolved at this meeting? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Well, sir, I left after that. I went back to my country in Central America and he thanks me for telling him. . . . "I subsequently learned that he took this matter up with a group of people, including the State Department agency and raised my concern to them." (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 279-83. See JHICI Ex. FIR 5 [handwritten notes of meeting with "Felix - 8 Aug '86"]; Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 64-67 [Rodriguez: "I didn't expect [Gregg] to tell the Vice President . . . . I don't think it was the business of the Vice President's office to be involved in that, sir."], 120-22. See generally id., 5/27/87, at 292-95; id., 5/28/87, at 1-6, 51-52, 58.)	
86/08/08-200 AUGUST 8, 1986		DIVERSION: GREGG'S NOTES RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT: Rodriguez testifying in response to questions about JHICI Ex. FIR 5, handwritten notes on stationery from the Office of the Vice President and marked at the top, "Felix, 8 August 1986": "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . And do you recognize these as notes that Mr. Gregg was taking as you were talking to him on August 8, 1986?	

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. He was taking notes, sir. But I do not recognize whether it was these.

". . . .

"Mr. MITCHELL. Now, it also says in here, in about the sixth sentence, 'a swap of weapons for dollars was arranged to get aid for the contras.'

"You did not say that to us here yesterday . . . did you say that to Mr. Gregg?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. So all of the sentences that he wrote before that one sentence accurately reflect what you said and all of the sentences that he wrote after that one sentence accurately reflect what you said, but that one sentence regarding a swap of weapons for dollars arranged to get aid for the contras you did not say?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir.

". . . .

"Mr. MITCHELL. Apart from what you said to Mr. Gregg, were you aware at that time of any swap of weapons for dollars to get aid to the contras?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No, sir. We didn't know exactly where it was coming from, had no idea. . . ."

(Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 1-8; JHICI Ex. FIR 5. See id., 5/28/87, at 31-32.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON

GREGG CHRONOLOGY:

Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes a meeting of Gregg, Felix Rodriguez, and Gregg's deputy, Samuel Watson:

"On August 8, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Gregg and Colonel Watson to express his concerns that the informal Contra supply organization which then existed might not survive until a United States Government organization directed by CIA to implement delivery of funds and equipment recently authorized by Congress could be established. This was the first time that such a subject had been discussed by Mr. Rodriguez in any of his meetings with the Vice President's office. Mr. Rodriguez was also concerned about the poor quality of the aircraft being used in the Contra supply operation."

(Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see above at 86/05/20-900; chronology continues at 86/08/12-100]. See Gregg Dep. Ex. 1-A ["The Office of the Vice President has completed a comprehensive review of its files . . . . [T]he review . . . confirmed that the first discussion of the private resupply network was in connection with the August 8, 1986 meeting described in some detail in the chronology."].)

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RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG, WATSON AND EARL

EARL ACCOUNT:

"Q. What happened at the August meeting, as your recollection and your notes indicate?

"A. Don Gregg introduced me to Felix. We sat down and they had already been meeting for some time, so Felix had already related to Don Gregg the substance of his concern, but because I did come to the meeting, I came in late, Don asked for him to repeat what he had already told him, Don, and so Felix said that he felt that -- it says the folks buying the aircraft, but the way I interpret it is that the folks operating the aircraft in Central America, the resupply operation, that he thought they were cutting and running, I guess is the best way to describe it.

"And that [redacted,] according to Felix, was under the impression that the aircraft that were supporting the contras belonged to the contras as opposed to were [sic] an independent entity's property in direct support of, and that therefore rather than lose these contra assets that Felix claimed that [redacted] was not going to release the three aircraft [redacted] that the U.S. would lose credibility if this all happened, that [redacted] would threaten to close down [redacted.]

"And there's a reference to SAT having cleared an aircraft down, but I'm not sure exactly what that means any more, but that this aircraft was loaded with medicines. Felix said that Quintero wanted to sell the aircraft for his own profit, and then we got into a discussion of the mayor of Miami and his flight from Miami to wherever it was, whether that was authorized or not.

"And Felix claimed that General Bermudez had requested that the Mayor of Miami come down and that that's why it was done or why he arranged it and it was authorized, et cetera, et cetera. And then Don Gregg made the observation to me that he had found out from Felix that a man named Tom

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		Clines was involved in this and that Don Gregg felt that this really shocked him, that Tom Clines was a sneak, that he'd sell his own mother, and that it really disturbed him that Tom Clines was involved in this operation in any way. "Then back to the subject of [redacted] and this business of what to do on the aircraft. Again, Felix threatened that [redacted] might impound the aircraft or he may charge $600,000 for takeoff rights and that he, [redacted,] was mad and waiting for word and, similarly, [redacted,] according to Felix, and that [redacted] position was that the three aircraft that were there should stay in business until replaced by Agency means, CIA means. "And then I think that's the end of the notes of that meeting. It then leads . . . since Colonel North was not around and this was obviously a problem, [to] my relaying of the substance of the meeting to McAlister, Bob Dutton, so that someone in the organization would be aware of this problem and deal with it." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 165-67. See id., 5/2/87, at 99-105 [the 8/8 and 8/12 meetings on Rodriguez].)	
86/08/08-255 AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON GREGG ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Now in August of 1986, according to the [Gregg] chronology, on August 8 Felix Rodriguez came to you with certain concerns; correct? "A. That's right.	

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		"Q. And there was a meeting held on August 8? "A. Right. "Q. Among you, Felix, and Sam Watson. "A. Yes, that's right. "Q. How was that meeting set up? "A. I had a call from Ollie North two or three days earlier expressing concern about Felix and saying in effect that he thought that Felix had made off with an airplane. So that gave me pause. And he said you're the only one who can control Felix. Will you call him and find out what the hell is going on? "I called Felix and I don't have a date for the call. But, anyway, I called him and said, Felix, do you know anything about a stolen airplane. And he sort of laughed and said, well, I know what you're referring to. And he said, I'm going to be coming up to Washington shortly. He said, I've got some things I want to talk to you about. "So he came up and the meeting of August 8 resulted. ". . . . "Q. You can feel free to refer to those notes [Gregg Dep. Ex. 2], but why don't we start, Don, by you giving us your best recollection of what occurred at the August 8, 1986 meeting? This is in your office? "A. In my office. "Q. Watson, Rodriguez and you? "A. Right. "Q. Okay. Shoot. "A. Felix came in and said, Don, I really	

hate to tell you this, but, he said, there are some things going on that--I've forgotten. I think he made a reference to Watergate, saying that this could be -- Ollie is using some people who are tied in to Ed Wilson.

"Now I ought to explain that as former Agency people Ed Wilson is to Felix and me an absolute bete noir[e]. He is one of a very small group of people whom we consider to have turned absolutely bad and the people who would have supported him would be people that Felix and I would disapprove of thoroughly.

"So the first thing in my notes is 'using Ed Wilson group for supplies'. Now the unwritten word is Ollie North there. Then Felix went on to say, Ollie asked me to help get a contra plane repaired. That was the only sort of thing that he said that indicated that he had a specific sort of organizational tie to what was going on.

"Q. 'He' who?

"A. 'He', Felix.

"A. So he then explained his relationship with Quintero and he said that he, Quintero, was also close to Tom Clines, a man that Felix had known in the Agency, used to [be] a friend with him, but they split over Libya. And that was the Ed Wilson case, where Clines was very supportive of what Ed Wilson was doing in Libya and Felix was thoroughly disapproving of that and they broke off their friendship at that point. I can't put a date on that.

"Felix then said a swap of weapons for money was arranged to get aid for the contras and Tom

Clines and General Secord were tied in. That was the first time I had heard of Secord's name.

"And as an example of the kind of thing he was concerned about, he said that old hand grenades were being bought for $3 and sold for $9, and he cited that as an example of the kind of ripoff he felt was taking place.

"Q. Don, let me ask you did he explain what he meant by his statement, as you have recorded it, that a swap of weapons for money or dollars had been arranged to get aid for the contras?

"A. I took that to mean that the proceeds which were coming from the public donations, et cetera, that I knew was going on had been effectuated and that the money was being used to purchase in this case hand grenades.
(Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 11-16.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE
TO GREGG AND WATSON
GREGG ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Gregg testimony continuing from preceding entry:]

"A. Felix then said that he was very fed up with the way this group was operating, that he had planned to quit in May. We were aware that he had had a lot of trouble getting parts for the helicopters he was using in El Salvador. He'd had a pilot killed because he hadn't had armor plating in the seats. A number of the helicopters were grounded. He had been working through Sam Watson and me to try to expedite getting parts.

"So when he said he planned to quit in May I took that more as discouragement over our inability to support him in his El Salvador operations than in his other relationship, which I didn't know about at that point.

"He then began to talk about Dick Gadd, who had been brought in as a purchasing agent. He said that he's been responsible for buying the first Caribous, which he bought at a big profit.

". . . .

"Then he said Bob Dutton had been brought in as a manager for the project. And what did he mean by 'project'? I assumed again it was whatever organization had been set up to administer the aid from the volunteer contributions. And he said he'd been brought in after a flap. I did not ask what the flap was.

"And he and Felix got into a conflict, I think again over the quality of equipment or the prices being charged. And then Dutton tried to set up a paper organization to sell to CIA, and this was one of the major concerns that Felix had at this meeting, that these people, all of whom he considered to be very corrupt, might be hired by CIA, which as of August 8 was getting geared up to administer the $100 million which Congress had at that point authorized to start on October 1.

"Then he said CIA had said no to this plan, had indicated that they weren't at least at that point going to buy it. And then Felix voiced a second concern, which was that the people involved in this organization said, well, we'll keep what we have and sort of take the money and run.

"Q. The people involved being the names he gave you --Secord, Gadd, Dutton, the others?

"A. That's right. Then, as an example, he said that Gadd had made a $20,000 profit on a piece of communications gear.

"Q. Which he called another ripoff, according to your notes.

"A. Yes, that's right. He also said there was a ripoff on two workers. He [Gadd] was making a profit of $650. I don't know whether that was profit or what he was charging. I didn't record." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 16-19.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON

GREGG ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Gregg testimony continuing from preceding entry:]

". . . Then, getting back to the supposed stolen airplane [see 86/07/26-200], Felix said the C-123 had been sent as a donation to the contra cause [redacted.]

"Q. [Redacted.]

"A. [Redacted.] That plane was sitting in Miami loaded with medicine that Felix got from the mayor of West Miami, and that means IVs, intravenous, and some spare parts. [Redacted] asked the Mayor of West Miami to come in to a contra base and Southern Air Transport, who were contracted by Felix, said that the plane was okay to go.

"Felix called Jim Steele to get concurrence there. Steele apparently said okay, but Rafael Quintero had said no, you shouldn't fly it back, and apparently that had been the cause of the flap.

"Quintero, according to Felix, said that the operations were finished and that it was going to be dissolved, [redacted] was very angry, felt that the plane was a donation, had been told so by Ollie, according to Felix, and the C-123 and two others were held [redacted] Colonel Steele would not release the planes to have them flown away because he feels, as Felix does, that these were planes that had been donated.

"[Redacted] told Felix that he felt U.S. credibility was at stake. He felt that the resupply organization had been essentially a money-making process. He feels the three planes belong to the contras. [Redacted] if the planes were pulled back [redacted] would be angered and would close the base down and not let any of those activities continue.

"And then I wrote, in a different pencil, I guess afterwards, Felix can get [redacted] to release the planes if he's convinced that the operation will continue. So I think that meeting took place at 9:30 in the morning. Felix had to get back down to El Salvador, but he asked me to pass along these concerns to the appropriate people, which I agreed to do.

"Is that enough?

"Q. Well, if that's all, then that's enough.

"Did you say anything to him beyond agreeing to pass along his concerns?

"A. Well, I certainly reacted very negatively to Tom Clines' name. I said that I had not

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		understood Ollie's call very well, that I now understood what the concern had been and I was, I think, certainly disappointed and angered and amazed to hear all of this. And I said I will certainly get the appropriate people together and see that something is done. "Felix had two concerns, just to repeat, one that these people might pretty themselves up and be hired by the CIA or, two, that they would pull themselves back from the operation, thereby leaving a hiatus between early August and the first of October where nothing would go to the contras." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 19-21. See id., at 71-72 [Rodriguez did not inform Gregg that he had met with North and Dutton on 6/25/86].)	
86/08/08-258 PRIOR TO AUGUST 8, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: GREGG'S AWARENESS GREGG ACCOUNT: Gregg testified that prior to August 8, 1986, what he knew of North's involvement with the Contras was not detailed and came from his observations in and around the White House. He knew North was involved with private fundraisers, such as Charnell. "Q. But not anything beyond that that would have indicated to you at least prior to August 8 that North was involved in contra resupply in any way? "A. That's right. Well -- "Q. Or was there? "A. Well, the one other thing which comes to mind is the videotape which I think I mentioned.	

. . .

". . . .

"A. That Ollie at one time showed in the situation room a videotape taken at the contra camps. Also, it seemed to show airplanes taking off and bundles being kicked out and contras receiving them. It wasn't clear what was in the bundles, but this was nothing that Ollie was hiding. And I also took that as the fruits of the informal supply network that I knew he was involved with.

"Q. That's where I'm getting confused. You say the informal supply network you knew he was involved with. Tell me what you mean by the 'informal supply network'.

"A. Well, I knew that there were American citizens who were willing to contribute money for humanitarian aid to the contras and he was involved in that.

"Q. Now did you know that any of those groups was involved also in supplying lethal aid to the contras?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. And, keeping it prior to August 8, did you know that North was involved in helping facilitate the supply of lethal aid to the contras in any way?

"A. No.

"Q. When did he show this videotape?

"A. I can't remember when it was.

"Q. Who else was there?

"A. I think it was shown to most of the members of what they call the Office Directors

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		Staff Meeting, which is held at 7:30 in the morning every day in the situation room." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 26-27.)	
86/08/08-270 AUGUST 8, 1986		DIVERSION: WHETHER RODRIGUEZ INFORMED THE VICE PRESIDENT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, includes "Additional Comments" related specifically to whether the Vice President was alerted by Felix Rodriguez about the diversion: "On the three occasions [see 85/01/22-200, 86/05/01-250, and 86/05/20-900] when the Vice President met with Mr. Rodriguez, discussions dealt entirely with the insurgency in El Salvador. There was no mention of supply or support operations for the Contras whatsoever. "At no point in his discussions with anyone in the Vice President's office did Mr. Rodriguez mention diversion of funds to the Contra operation from Iran. There is no indication that Mr. Rodriguez knew of such a diversion, and he has stated categorically to Mr. Gregg that he was unaware of the diversion. "During the period covered by this chronology, Mr. Rodriguez called Mr. Gregg and Colonel Watson from El Salvador and from his home in Miami, Florida. These calls concerned his counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador, and until the calls of October 5 and 6, contained no references to Contra operations." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1. For Gregg chronology, see	

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		83/11/03-100.)	
86/08/08-275 PRIOR TO AUGUST 8, 1986		REPORTS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RESUPPLYING THE CONTRAS WATSON ACCOUNT: "Q. Do you remember . . . that on August 8th, 1986, Felix Rodriguez provided certain details of American citizens who were down purporting at least to help the contras, correct? "A. That's true. "Q. Prior to then, had you heard about any private network of U.S. citizens that was engaged in resupplying the contras or facilitating contra resupply? "A. Not as a result of my questioning or asking anybody, but it was in the air, in the atmosphere. "Q. Surely you had heard the stories. "A. Surely. "Q. You were aware of newspaper stories, for example, in 1986, the first half of 1986, that Colonel North was somehow engaged in helping the contras in various ways? You were aware of stories to that effect? "A. I was aware of the stories, aware of the Congressional interest. "Q. Aware that Congressional inquiries had been made, correct? "A. Correct. "Q. Did you make any efforts to find out whether any of those stories were correct, were true or not? "A. I can't recall any specific inquiries to	

that effect. I made the assumption that somebody was contributing money because the intelligence reports daily said that the contras were in combat and they seemed to be an effective fighting force and getting supplies from somewhere. And without inquiring, I made the assumption, because of the intelligence, that they were being supplied somehow, or monied, provided ammo.

"But the answer to your question is no, I did not make specific inquiries.

"Q. Central America, the contras, you said was an area that was your responsibility?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. Why didn't you try to find out how the contras were getting all this money and military assistance?

"A. Two reasons. One is what I mentioned earlier, all the other things that I had to do.

"Q. But this was an important priority.

"A. It's an important priority.

"Q. You're not saying you didn't have enough time to ask, are you?

"A. Yes. I'm not sure I'm saying it quite that negatively, but I'm saying that when you have an awful lot of other things to do you don't spend all your time on one thing, and you have a lot of other responsibilities.

"Q. But this was one responsibility?

"A. This was one of many responsibilities.

"Q. So one reason you didn't ask was because--

"A. Because I had so much else to do and so many things to do that it didn't seem to me to be a high priority thing to ask about. And the second reason is, one never knows what is compartmented or committed or authorized in a classified, compartmented government action, and I didn't see fit to ask.

"Q. Well, you would find out if it was compartmented if you asked and were told it is none of your business, right?

"A. I would have.

"Q. Did anyone tell you, don't ask these questions?

"A. No, nobody has ever told me not to ask questions.

"Q. Did you feel that if you asked you would get an answer you didn't want to hear?

"A. No.

"Q. Do you know--did you ever discuss with Mr. Gregg how the contras were being resupplied and assisted during this same period?

"A. I don't think so. You have to remember that we see intelligence every day and it shows the contras acting, and so you're assuming that they're getting something. And so it's not necessary to ask where they're getting it from.

"You see the results of their actions in the combat reports."

(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 17-20.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON

WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 1:

Sam Watson testified on the August 8, 1986 meeting he attended with Rodriguez and Gregg:

"A. The meeting was scheduled. Felix came in and said he wanted to talk to us about some problems in Central America, and now that the Congress had authorized military assistance and aid to the freedom fighters, those seeking freedom in Nicaragua, that he wanted to tell us about a group of people that were conducting resupply.

"And I recall him saying that he heard about it, knew about that, now that it was authorized, that the CIA or somebody would be setting up a resupply operation to fly resupplies into Nicaragua, to drop them; and that he wanted to tell us that there were a bunch of crooks involved.

"He mentioned Edmund [sic] Wilson as one. Most people know Edmund [sic] Wilson and the people he ran around with. He mentioned Tom Clines, Richard Secord, and he said that these people are running such a corrupt, shoddy, unsafe operation down there, the U.S. Government should not get involved with them; and that if these people approached the United States Government wanting to sell their resupply operation to the government, that they should be turned down.

"He didn't feel that they were of the professional or moral character to be associated with the U.S. Government and anything that we were now authorized to do via the Congress and the President's signature.

"He raised several specific problems that I alluded to a moment ago. One is that they were the wrong crowd of people: Secord, who left government under quite a shadow in I believe 1984, allegations of profiteering or money under the table; Clines, who had a reputation as a bad apple out of CIA; and Edmund [sic] Wilson, who had supplied the Libyans with plastic explosives.

"So he indicated first that this was a bad group of people. Secondly, he said this group of people was profiteering, that they were buying and selling arms, weapons, military supplies, to give to the contras whether they were buying them for them or on their behalf, or however he phrased it, and that they were buying this stuff at low prices and charging the contras high prices.

"And he called it: Here are these freedom fighters in Nicaragua who are trying to regain their democracy, democracy that I as a Cuban lost in Cuba, and these people are profiteering on it while people are giving their blood and their lives. These people are making immoral profits.

"He cited an example of a hand grenade, three dollars purchase, nine dollars sale price to the contras.

"Thirdly, he mentioned the quality of the aircraft, that the aircraft were unsafe, they were poorly maintained; and that he feared that they would either get lost or crash, losing a life.

"The people, the profit, the quality of the aircraft, and I think there was one other major subject, or there was another subject that I think I raised with him, fourthly, that he had been accused by Ollie and company of having stolen some C-123's and moved them from Miami to [redacted.] And I asked him about that.

"And Felix explained that these had been

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		donations to the FDN, to UNO, and as donations [redacted] felt that they were donations and that they would stay there and not leave; that Secord and company had no right to take them away. "That was the essence of the conversation. "Q. What about the accusation that he had stolen or skyjacked one of these planes? "A. Well, that's the last one I just mentioned, that Felix rebutted that by saying, no, these were donations to the contra cause and he saw them as donations [redacted] saw them as donations, and that Ollie North and General Secord had no right to take them and take them away and then resell them to the United States Government. "The implication -- I don't know if he used the specific words, but his implication was that Secord and company were trying to sell them to the CIA, but they were donations." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 60-64.)	
86/08/08-281 AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did [Rodriguez] tell you how he happened to be involved with planes donated to the contras, he[,] Felix? "A. I don't think he told specifically, [redacted] Felix went back to Miami a lot [redacted] and I believe he said that at one point he flew -- he brought one of the planes back. It was ready to leave, it was loaded with supplies, and so he brought it back down to Central America.	

"He didn't consider it skyjacking or air piracy. He considered them the property of the FDN, and it was there ready to come back, so he would bring it back.

"Q. What did Felix tell you about North's involvement with this group?

"A. As I recall, he mentioned that -- I didn't take any notes. These were notes I wrote down afterwards. I think he mentioned that Ollie North was involved with these people and Ollie had some kind of directional role. I don't recall him discussing specific technical directive role that Ollie had; that Ollie was more the conceptualizer, the chairman of the board.

Those are my words, not his.

"Q. That's what you understood from Felix?

"A. That's what I understood, correct.

"Q. And did Felix associate North with the effort by Secord and the others to take away from the contras the planes which Felix [redacted] said had been donated to the contras, right?

"A. Rather, Felix said that rather vehemently.

"Q. And that North was one of these who was trying to take those planes away from the contras, correct? That's what you testified a few moments ago?

"A. Yes, generally.

"Q. You testified that Felix said that North and Secord had no right to take those planes away from the contras, correct?

"A. Yes, I said that.

"Q. And that's what you recall Felix

communicated to you?

"A. North, in the sense that he was chairman of the board; Secord, in that he was the chief operating officer.

"Q. Now, do you recall whether Felix told you at the August 8th meeting anything about where the contras were getting money from or where the money was coming from to pay for contra weapons?

"A. No. What I recall was that he said that these people are buying the weapons or providing them to the contras. I don't recall him -- he may have said that money was being donated by foreign governments. I thing he said they were being donated by [redacted] but I didn't take detailed notes. Don was writing madly.

"Q. Have you ever seen Don Gregg's notes?

"A. Yes, I have.

"Q. Let's look at those notes. [Gregg Dep. Ex. 2] . . .

". . . .

"Q. And there of course is a reference in those to the August 8, 1986, session with Felix, to Felix saying -- and you will see it in what looks like the first paragraph or so, the second paragraph actually -- Felix saying that Clines, C-l-i-n-e-s, 'was getting money from [redacted,]' correct?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. Does that square with your recollection?

"A. Let me find it in the document. Point it out, Don's writing -- getting dollars from [redacted] okay.

"Q. Do you remember Felix saying something

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		like that at the meeting? "A. I think he did." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 64-67; Gregg Dep. Ex. 2 [Gregg notes of 8/8/86 meeting with Rodriguez].)	
86/08/08-282 AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Look up the page a little. These are Don's notes again. We are looking at Gregg Exhibit 2. There is discussion that 'Green equals Rafael Quintero,' correct? "A. Correct. "Q. Then if we go a couple of lines down from there, the fourth line down, let me read what Don has written: 'A swap of weapons for dollars was arranged to get aid for contras.' Do you see that there? "A. I see it and that's what it says. "Q. What does it mean? "A. To me what it means, and reading it here, but also recalling the discussion at the August 8th meeting, was that Felix was talking about it in the sense that somebody is giving money to provide, to support the contras, their military aid; somebody is providing that, a foreign government, [redacted] and that Secord and Clines were going out on the world arms market buying things. "And he cited the hand grenades, buying them and giving them to the contras. It means nothing	

more than that.

"Q. Isn't it another way of saying we're buying weapons, to say a swap of weapons for dollars was arranged?

"A. Well, that's what you do. I give you dollars, you give me weapons. That's a swap.

"Q. But when you go to the supermarket you don't typically say a swap of oranges for dollars took place at the Giant Food Store, right? You say, I bought some oranges.

"You'll agree with me, this is not the usual way to say arms are being purchased, a swap of weapons for dollars, right?

"A. You could say it this way if you wanted to. I mean, colloquial English may not.

"Q. Is that how you remember Felix saying it?

"A. I don't remember Felix using the word 'swap.'

"Q. Don Gregg is fairly easy with the English language, right? I mean, he knows how to --

"A. He is facile.

"Q. I'm just saying, you would agree with me, I think, that one would not ordinarily write down, we are buying weapons with money supplied by [redacted] to someone else, this way, a swap of weapons for dollars?

"A. I might not write that down and you might not. But I can't tell you why or whether Don would. I mean, he did. That's all I can say.

"Q. In any event, you don't recall any reference at the meeting on August 8th to moneys from other transactions being sent down to aid the contras, right?

"A. No, I do not.

"Q. Like something we would nowadays call diversion? There was no discussion of Iran arms sales or anything like that?

"A. I recall none whatsoever.

"Q. . . . [R]eferring again to the fact that a few lines down it says 'Clines is getting dollars from [redacted] and wherever,' correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. Do you recall any discussion at that meeting in which Felix reported that he had heard from Tom Clines or somebody else associated with Clines boasting about their ability to get money from [redacted]?

"A. I don't recall any discussion of boasting about --

"Q. Well, talking about their ability to get moneys from [redacted]?

"A. I recall words to the effect that the contras are getting money from [redacted], but nothing more than that."

(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 67-70; Gregg Dep. Ex. 2 [Gregg notes of 8/8/86 meeting with Rodriguez].)

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WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Do you recall Felix discussing how [redacted] had been persuaded to give money to the contras?

"A. No, I don't.

"Q. And what [redacted] were getting in return for giving money to the contras?

"A. No, I don't

"Q. Do you recall him saying what Clines, reporting what Clines, anything that Clines had said about how [redacted] had been induced to give money to the contras?

"A. No, I don't.

"Q. Was this the first time you heard that [redacted] were giving money to the contras?

"A. No.

"Q. You had heard that prior to August 8th?

"A. [Redacted.]

"Q. Leaving aside those sources.

"A. I had never heard it in my function as a government official or in the context of government meetings. It was always outside that, in the newspapers, reading of Congressional inquiries or investigations.

". . . .

"Q. . . . Had you heard, as of August 1986, that the NSPG had discussed at a meeting in the spring the possibility of soliciting at high levels of our government, by high levels of our government, foreign countries to provide assistance to the contras?

"A. I don't think I did.

"Q. So this was on August 8th, that was, as you have said, the first occasion when in your capacity as a governmental official you heard that [redacted] were contributing?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. And again, you don't recall Felix saying anything about what he had heard concerning how [redacted] had been induced to contribute or compensated in some way for their contribution?

"A. I have no recollection. I think I would go further than no recollection. I just don't think it was discussed.

"Q. And you don't recall anything being discussed that would explain Don's reference to a swap of weapons, et cetera, except the statement that foreign countries were supplying money and that money was geing used to buy weapons for the contras by this profiteering group, correct?

"A. That's correct. And I would defend the right of anybody to take notes and use the words as they desire.

"Q. I certainly would join you in that defense. It's just an unusual way of saying weapons were bought, wouldn't you say.

"A. Well, I don[']t know.

"Q. Unless Don was getting very poetic.

"A. Well, Don is a learned man. I think he majored in philosophy in college.

"Q. Maybe that explains it, the ghost-written document [see 86/04/16-221] and the swap of weapons.

". . . ."

(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 70-72; Gregg Dep. Ex. 2 [Gregg notes of 8/8/86 meeting with Rodriguez].)

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WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 5:

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		[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. [Watson Ex. 5] is a one page document dated December 17, 1986, entitled 'Meeting with Felix Rodriguez on August 8th, 1986,' our Bates stamp N-36456. "Did you prepare this document? "A. I did. "Q. Why did you prepare this, this document, about an August meeting in December? "A. . . . [T]he issue was starting to heat up and people were starting to look into it and ask a lot of questions. We noted that David Hoffman on December 15th and 16th was asking a lot of questions, writing articles. And I thought it would be good for my own memory aid to jot down everything I could remember of the meeting, self-generated for my own use. "Q. Did you look at anything --did you have any notes you were looking at when you prepared this, or was it all from independent recollection? "A. I probably went back to my note, which you entered as an exhibit a couple of minutes ago, about the meeting. "Q. The one which appears at N-46663 on Watson Exhibit 3? "A. That's correct. "Q. We can compare it, but you will agree with me, I think, that your typed notes of the meeting which you prepared in December, Watson Exhibit 5, have a lot more detail than the handwritten notes you took back on August 8th, right? [See 86/08/08-290.] "A. That's correct.	

"Q. Where did you get this additional detail from when you prepared Watson 5?

"A. I believe I did it out of my own mind. I cannot -- I don't know if I had any other sources. I think it was just out of my own recollection.

"Q. Did you talk to Don Gregg at all?

"A. I don't know.

"Q. You don't recall, or do you, looking at Gregg's notes before you prepared this?

"A. I just don't know.

"Q. There's no reference to Oliver North in Watson Exhibit 5. Can you tell me why not?

"A. Probably because I didn't remember it.

"Q. Didn't it stike you on August 8th as fairly significant information that Rodriguez was telling you North was involved with this private contra supply network and in effect was the chairman of the board, to use your terms?

"A. I thought it significant, but apparently it wasn't in my notes, my handwritten notes. It wasn't in there.

". . . .

"Q. Did you ask Felix at the meeting on August 8th about the allegations that you had heard from North and Earl a week or so before that he, Felix, was giving problems to the contra resupply operation?

"A. I asked it in the sense of the stolen aircraft allegation, not in the sense of, are you running an operation or are you involved." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 72-77; Gregg Dep. Ex. 2 [Gregg notes of 8/8/86 meeting with Rodriguez]; Watson Dep. Ex. 5 [Watson notes, dated

12/17/86, of meeting with Rodriguez on 8/8/86].)

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WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 6:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Well, on July 29, as your notes reflect, North told you that Felix had shut down the pilots who were resupplying the contras. [See 86/07/29-600.] Did you ask Felix about that claim when you met with Felix on August 8th?

"A. I don't think I did specifically, because Felix was telling us all about the aircraft, that they were not good aircraft, and going into long expositions of that. And I felt that that sort of covered it, that he had some kind of involvement or that he knew something about them.

"Q. Well, you said, understandably, that you were surprised in the week before when you heard from North and then from Earl that Felix was involved with the resupply operation in some way, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Given that surprise, why didn't you ask Felix point blank, are you involved with this resupply operation, or what is the nature of your involvement with the contra resupply operation?

"A. First, I didn't know there was a resupply operation. I only had Ollie North's allegation that Felix had shut it down, he had screwed it up; that, whatever the words he and Earl had used.

"Q. Why didn't you ask Felix point blank about that: Is there a resupply operation? Are you screwing it up? Are you involved with it? What are North and Earl talking about?

"A. No good explanation.

"Q. Did Gregg ask, or you, at the August 8th meeting, ask any probing questions about North's involvement?

"A. I don't think we did.

"Q. Did you ask any probing questions about North's relationship with Felix, how it was that they knew each other or what communications they may have been having?

"A. I don't recall any.

"Q. Did you advise the Vice President, you personally, after this meeting on August 8th, of what you had learned from Felix?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did Don Gregg?

"A. Not that I know of. I'm told that he did not.

"Q. I'm sorry?

"A. I'm told that he did not.

"Q. By whom are you told?

"A. Don.

"Q. Did you have any understanding when the meeting ended as to whether Felix's allegations were going to be brought to the attention of the Vice President?

"A. I don't recall. I don't believe we had an understanding that it would go to the Vice President.

"Q. Did you have a view as of the end of the meeting on August 8th, 1986, as to whether the information that Felix Rodriguez had just provided

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		you should be brought to the Vice President's attention? "A. No, I think the more proper thing was to take these allegations and talk to other people in the U.S. Government about them before you take something like this to the Vice President of the United States, a series of allegations, a case of many little pieces, of which nothing gels. ". . . ." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 77-79; Watson Dep. Ex. 5 [Watson notes, dated 12/17/86, of meeting with Rodriguez on 8/8/86].)	
86/08/08-286 AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. When the meeting ended, did you and Don talk about what you had just heard from Felix? "A. I don't recall whether we did or whether the press of events carried us off to something else. "Q. And this was fairly shocking news that Felix was giving you? "A. Yes, we may well have. It's just that I don't recollect every single thing that we do in a day. "Q. I understand. But Felix was now telling you that one of the most notorious, corrupt, and treacherous groups that had ever infected the United States Government was now involved in the contra resupply, correct? "A. Yes.	

"Q. These were people that were well known to Don because he was at the CIA, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And they would have therefore also been well known to the Vice President, who had been DCI, correct?

"A. Well, I guess they would have.

"Q. They were known to many Americans?

"A. They were known to many Americans.

"Q. He told you also that, lo and behold, involved with this group as in effect chairman of the board was a member of the staff of the National Security Council, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Would you not consider this extremely significant information for the Vice President to have?

"A. At some point probably, but not immediately.

"Q. You and Don Gregg were and still are the Vice President's two senior national security advisors, correct?

"A. True.

". . . .

"Q. Did Don Gregg indicate to you on or after August 1986, August 8, 1986, that he for one[ ]minute doubted the truth of what Felix was reporting to you and to Don Gregg at that August 8 meeting?

"A. I don't think he told me that he doubted it.

"Q. This was not just one man coming in and making allegations?

"A. This was Felix.

"Q. This was Felix Rodriguez, who had a very close relationship of trust and confidence with the Vice President's national security advisor, correct?

"A. Correct.

"Q. So it's not . . . some isolated man landing from Mars and saying that there are bad things happening down there. In that light, didn't you consider that this was information that ought to be brought to the Vice President's attention?

"A. No, I would not speak to the Vice President immediately.

"Q. Would you take it to him after you had checked it out?

"A. I would want to get more information.

"Q. Because you doubted Felix?

"A. Not because I doubted Felix, but because I would want to check and find out what CIA knew about it, what State Department knew about it.

"Remember, to jump out of this context for a minute, there was a Restricted Inter-agency Group. There were IG's and SIG's on Nicaragua going on, meetings which we were having a hell of a time -- which we couldn't bust into. We were refused entry to the RIG on Central America, where the rumors were that these things were going on; that they were making decisions about Central America.

"I tried endlessly to get into those. So I didn't have good information on what was going on. And so what I wanted to do was to -- I thought, not what I wanted to do, but what I thought was

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		that the way you pursue these things is that you talk to more people about them. I conducted investigations in my military positions in the past." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 80-84.)	
86/08/08-288 AUGUST 8, 1986		AFTER RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE TO GREGG AND WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT: "Q. Now, going back to the August 8th meeting, do you remember Gregg calling Bob Earl[] to come down to the meeting when he couldn't meet North? "A. I remember that we tried to reach Bob Earl[], and it was either the August 8th or the August 12th meeting, to come down. I don't recall which it was. I think Phyllis [Byrne] had to make several phone calls to try to get them down, and they were very reluctant to come down. "I think we tried initially to get North, and Earl[] showed up at some point. But I don't remember which meeting it was. "Q. But to go back -- and then we will go forward -- your view at the time the August 8th session ended was that this was not something that should be brought immediately to the Vice President's attention, at least not until it had been further checked out and discussed, correct? "A. Correct." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 90-91. Watson's testimony continues at 86/08/12-150 with his account of the 8/12/86 meeting.)	
86/08/08-290		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE	

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AUGUST 8, 1986 AND DECEMBER 17, 1986		TO GREGG AND WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT: Memo of Col. Samuel Watson, dated December 17, 1986, and titled "Meeting with Felix Rodriguez on August 8, 1986": "Felix [Rodriguez], Don [Gregg] and Sam [Watson] met in Don's office about 0930am. FR concerned about three main issues: bridging the gap between private resupply and legal CIA resupply authorized by Congress; that Secord and Clines are ripping off the Contras; and safety of aircraft. "Resupply: FR felt CIA would not get supply system going soon enough and there would be a lapse between private effort and CIA effort. He felt that private effort would dry up and die as benefactors felt they did not have to do anything when US Congress appropriated money. Could he do anything? How could he help? "Secord and Clines: FR said they were ripping off the Contras. Buying shoddy stuff and selling it for high prices. They are buying hand grenades for $3 and charging $9 for them, not including freight charges. 'It's a fraud, a crime to profit.' "Quality of aircraft: 'They're a piece of shit.' Old, poorly maintained, broken parts, won't fly. "'Stolen aircraft:' Don and Sam: we hear allegations you've stolen a C-123 and have it at [redacted.] FR: No. I[ ]haven't stolen any airplanes. It was up in Miami to get a new engine and I brought it back. [Redacted] says it (and	

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		another) are at [redacted] have been donated to the Contras, and will stay there to help the Contras; they can not, will not leave, wrong for them to take planes back, they belong to the Contras, no one else." (Watson Dep. Ex. 5.)	
86/08/08-295 AUGUST 1986, AND DURING 1986		POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS OF RODRIGUEZ' ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did Colonel North inform you in August 1986 or any point thereafter of the meeting of Felix Rodriguez-with Donald Gregg, the adviser to the Vice President, on August 8 of 1986? "A. I'm not sure about that. Colonel North reported to me periodically. I mean, I can remember Rodriguez's name coming up several times. Whether he informed me of that meeting with Don Gregg, I don't know. He may have. "Q. Did Don Gregg or Colonel Watson from the Vice President's staff at any time inform you of their meeting on August 8 with Felix Rodriguez and the follow-up meeting on August 12 with various members . . . of the Department? ". . . . "THE WITNESS: Colonel North or Bob Earl may have informed me, I just don't remember it. I remember hearing about Rodriguez several times. "BY MR. LEON: "Q. Do you recall if Mr. Gregg or Mr. Watson came to you and relayed -- "A. I don't recall." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 103-05.)	

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86/08/08-300 AUGUST 8, 1986		BRUNEI: THE SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams travels to London in August 1986 and meets with a Brunei official. He has prearranged with the Brunei Government, at their suggestion, to use the name Mr. Kenilworth when he telephones the Brunei official. They meet in a hotel and walk to a park where Abrams gives him "probably something like a fifteen-minute discourse on Central America." Abrams tells the official the Contras need $10 million bridge money. The official says he does not have access to that kind of money while traveling. The decision whether to contribute will be made back at Brunei. Abrams assures the official that "through the congressional situation . . . we were expressly permitted to solicit humanitarian aid and that that is what I was soliciting." In response to the official's question what Brunei and the U.S. would get out of this, Abrams replies, "Well, . . . the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." The official persists, "What concrete do we get out of this?" Abrams replies, "You don't get anything concrete out of it." He copies the bank account number North had given him onto a slip of paper and gives it to the Brunei official. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 126-31.)	

86/08/08-500
AUGUST 8,
1986

THE FIRST CHANNEL: LONDON MEETING
NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY:

On August 8, 1986, North, accompanied by Nir, has his last face-to-face meeting with Ghorbanifar.

North describes in his notebook a plan, involving sequential release of the hostages, which results from the meeting:

"Proposed next step:
"1. 40 Tubes [HAWK Radar Parts]
    "500 TOWs
"2. [Hostage]
"3. 500+HP [HAWK Radar] + 137 missing items
"4. [Hostage]
"5. Meeting
"6. Remaining for disc:
    " --[Hostage]
    " --HP
    " --[William] Buckley location
    " --Pay us $15.5 M
        "for 1000 TOWs
        "177 missing units
        "40 Tubes
        "2 HP's"

(North notebook entry, 8/8/86 [Committee Documents Q 2339, 2340]; Iran-Contra Report, at 248.)

86/08/09-100
AUGUST 9,
1986

BRUNEI: THE SOLICITATION
DoS CHRONOLOGY:

"Meeting between ABRAMS and Bruneian official. Brunei will contribute $10 million. ABRAMS turns over Swiss account number."

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		(JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/09/15-100.)	
86/08/11-050 AUGUST 11, 1986		POINDEXTER TO NORTH: "WELL DONE" POINDEXTER PROF: Poindexter forwards to North a PROF he has received from Bob Pearson that summarizes North's meeting with HPSCI members on August 6, 1986. Poindexter attaches his own brief message to North: "Well done." (JHICI Ex. JMP 15 [Poindexter PROF to North, "HPSCI Interview of North," 8/11/86]. On North's meeting with HPSCI, and Poindexter's testimony on that meeting and on this PROF, see entries starting at 86/08/06-045. For Poindexter's testimony on the meaning of "Well done," see entries starting at 86/08/06-223.)	
86/08/12-100 AUGUST 12, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes events following Felix Rodriguez' disclosure to Gregg and his deputy, Sam Watson, of the Contra resupply operation: "On August 12, 1986, Mr. Gregg and Colonel Watson met with Ambassador Edwin Corr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Walker, Ray Burghardt and Bob Earl of the NSC, and a CIA officer, to pass along the concerns mentioned by Mr. Rodriguez. This meeting was convened since	

the Vice President's office had no jurisdiction or responsibility with regard to Contra supply operations. It was believed, however, that Mr. Rodriguez' observations were sufficiently important to pass along. In talking to the New York Times and the Washington Post, Mr. Gregg incorrectly placed Mr. Rodriguez in the August 12 meeting. This was not the case as Mr. Rodriguez had already departed from Washington."
(Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see above at 86/08/08-250; chronology continues at 86/10/05-160].)

86/08/12-110
AUGUST 12,
1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE

GREGG ACCOUNT:

"Q. Now tell me what happened at the August 12, 1986 meeting.

"A. Well, I went over the notes with the people who were there. I specifically remember cutt[]ing back on Felix's rhetoric. I did not make any references to Watergate. I also said that it was my feeling that Tom Clines was not a reliable person, that I had known Felix for many years. I felt that he had a very good sense of integrity, that if he was concerned about these things he had a right to be concerned. I expressed my admiration for Jim Steele, who he said felt just as he did.

"And the only specific reaction that I remember, other than people saying thank you very much, we will look at this, was from CIA or [redacted] saying thank you. We know about these guys and in effect we had no intention of hiring them anyway.

". . . .

"Q. Did you mention at this meeting that Felix had told you, or what Felix had told you of North's involvement with these people?

"A. No, I don't think I did. I think my concen[]tration was on what these people were doing, the profit that was being made, the confusion about who owned the airplanes, the quality of the airplanes, the quality of the equipment.

"Q. Now did you report any of this to the Vice President?

"A. I did not.

"Q. None of what Felix told you?

"A. None.

"Q. What was the reason you decided not to make such a report?

"A. Well, I felt that it was a very murky business. I spend a great deal of my time trying to send things to the Vice President that I think are really Vice Presidential. I try to keep him focused, help him keep focused on arms control or Mideast peace or things of that nature. We had never discussed the contras. We had no responsibility for it. We had no expertise in it. I wasn't at all certain what this amounted to.

". . . .

"Q. Did you confront North about his role?

"A. No. I didn't see Ollie for some time after that. . . ."

(Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 28-31.)

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86/08/12-115 AFTER AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG'S REACTION TO RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE, AND GREGG'S VIEW OF NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES GREGG ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . [Y]ou knew from Felix that this operation was involved in getting lethal assistance to the contras. "A. I did after he mentioned hand grenades. "Q. Hand grenades. He also told you, as your notes reflect, that proceeds, dollars, had been swapped for weapons, correct? "A. Yes. The only specific weapons were hand grenades. ". . . . "Q. But it would have been your assumption, wouldn't it, that there were other weapons they were supplying, too? "A. I would have thought certainly ammunition. "Q. Lethal as opposed to humanitarian aid? "A. Right. "Q. What I'm trying to probe, then, is, with all respect here, you're told on August 8, 1986, that there is this group, unsavory to boot, which is supplying lethal aid to the contras and North is using these people. North is involved with the group, right? "A. Um-hum. "Q. And North is a member of the staff of the National Security Council, correct? "A. Um-hum. "Q. The Vice President is a statutory member	

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		of the National Security Council, correct? "A. Um-hum. "Q. There is still a law in effect, at least until the next one kicks in, that bars this kind of activity, the Boland Amendment that has restrictions at that time. Didn't that strike you as a matter that was of some serious import? "A. I had no sense at that point, nor do I now -- and maybe that's from an insufficient reading of the Boland Amendment -- I had no sense then nor do I now that anything I had heard was, ipso facto, against the law. ". . . . "Q. Had you ever received any legal opinion on the Boland Amendment and what it applied to and what it didn't apply to? "A. We were aware that the Boland Amendment was a moveable feast, that there had been various versions of it, that the CIA had been authorized, for example, [redacted] that that had been briefed to the Boland Amendment. So I had no sense of illegality. I had a sense of corruption, which is what I thought I had taken care of by the meeting on the 12th. "Q. But corruption is pretty important as well. "A. Right. "Q. Especially when the man involved with the corrupt, wittingly or not, and you had no reason to believe it was wittingly, is a member of the National Security Council staff. "A. Okay, and his deputy attended that meeting, Bob Earl, and I knew Bob Earl, Rhodes	

Scholar, very bright guy, and I think I said to him at the end of the meeting, Bob, I assume you will pass all of this along to Ollie. He said, I certainly will.

". . . .

"Q. What about getting the word to Ollie's superior?

"A. Until I had had -- that's not the way I operate. If I see something that is questionable in the way somebody is going, I go to him and I say I think this is something you ought to know about, and I tried to do that with Ollie. It's just not my way to go running to his boss and say, hey, I think your guy's up to something.

"Q. So let me understand now, to go back to Boland and the restrictions. At the time, August of 1986, did you think, leaving legal analysis aside, did you think at that time that it would have been permissible for a member of the staff of the National Security Council to facilitate the provision of lethal aid to the contras?

"A. As long as the funds were private the flag of illegality did not arise in my mind at all.

"Q. So if a member of the National Security Council staff was directing lethal aid down to the contras but not paying for that lethal aid with government funds, in your mind that would have been okay?

"A. I had no question. The question of illegality did not arise in my mind.

"Q. And that was permissible, as far as you were concerned?

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		"A. Yes. "Q. Had anyone ever told you that? "A. No. There had been various exchanges of a jocular nature in the ODSMs [Office Directors Staff Meetings] about how busy Ollie was and about all of the things that he was doing, and he would refer to, in a jocular sense, to the fact that my lawyers tell me, you know, I'm all right -- that kind of thing. "Q. Did Ollie ever tell you who those lawyers were? "A. No. "Q. And you never saw such an opinion, did you? "A. No." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 33-37.)	
86/08/12-116 AFTER AUGUST 8, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG'S REACTION TO RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE, AND GREGG'S VIEW OF NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES GREGG ACCOUNT: "Q. Now what I'm wondering is what distinguished Salvador from the contras in terms of a willingness to bring Felix Rodriguez to the Vice President and tell him about Felix's interest in helping out and so forth, why again is that Vice Presidential material but when Felix comes and tells you that the contras are being ripped off by a band of thugs who are involved with Ollie North, a member of the National Security Council staff, that's not Vice Presidential material. "A. Well, I didn't know at that point that they were involved with Ollie North. All I knew	

was that it sounded as though there was some ripping off going on at [redacted] air base.

"Q. Well, you told me that he said to you that Ollie was using some people like that, that he invoked the word 'Watergate', and when we look at the note you say what's missing from your notes is the word 'Ollie'. So if it was there, it would say Ollie using Ed Wilson group for supplies, et cetera.

"A. Okay. Still, my feeling about Ollie is that he was doing far more than any one man should do, that he went out, having been given a broad mandate. I mean, he was charged with trying to get the hostages released. He was in charge of trying to keep the contras afloat. He went out into the world, found people who were ready, willing, and able to help, and they were not the best people, and that he was not in the position to exercise quality control.

"So when you say he was involved, I had no sense that he was involved in corruption. I had the feeling that he had set up something which wasn't working out as he would have wished and that I was, as I say, doing a favor to him in alerting him to it.

"Q. Did you know who had authorized Oliver North to use or set up this kind of resupply network?

"A. Not specifically, no.

"Q. Did you have any knowledge?

"A. Well, one sensed from what he said in the morning staff meetings that what he was doing was known certainly by Bud McFarlane and John

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		Poindexter, that he was trying to rally private support to keep the contras afloat." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 41-43.)	
86/08/12-120 AUGUST 12, 1986		RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE EARL ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . Do you recall attending a meeting on August 12, 1986, in Don Gregg's office, Bur[g]hardt was present, Ambassador Co[r]r, William Walker from the State Department -- "A. Yes. "Q. Can you just tell us everything that you recall about that meeting? "A. It was a meeting -- and I am not sure who initiated it, whether it was Ambassador Co[r]r or Don Gregg, but it seemed to be a follow-up meeting to a meeting several days before that Don Gregg had with Felix Rodriguez, in which he asked me to come down to hear what Felix had to say, since Colonel North was out of the building or out of the country, not available, and that meeting discussed the problem, if you will, I think, that was raised by Felix Rodriguez, which concerned the interim period between when the support that was currently being provided by various means and the transition to when the CIA would begin their support, and some problem with the aircraft that were down there in the current scenario and misunderstanding between [redacted] on the one side and others as to who owned the aircraft, whether they belonged to the contras or whether they were merely in support of the contras and	

what would happen to those aircraft once the CIA support began.

"Q. . . . [D]id Gregg mention that Rodriguez was concerned about the guys who were involved in the support operation for the contras, that those people included Tom Clines and others who had been associated with Wilson Temple [sic (Terpil?)] and were a bad bunch? Did Gregg mention that?

"A. That was mentioned in one of the two meetings [sc. 8/8 or 8/12/86].

"Q. I am talking about the 12. Was it mentioned at the 12?

"A. I think so, but I am not positive, and the reason I think so was the CIA representative, and I know --

"A. [Redacted.]

"A. Yes. Expressed some problems with the Cuban-American community in that interface and that there were bad characters in certain parts of this that were on the fringes in supporting the contras and that this was a problem, that there were bad characters on the fringes."
(Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 99-100.)

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RESUPPLY OPERATION: EARL'S NOTES OF THE MEETING
EARL ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. This is the August 12 meeting in Gregg's office?

"A. Yes. Ambassador Corr and Jim Steele from the Embassy.

"Q. You and Ray Bur[g]hardt?

"A. Ray Bur[g]hardt and I from the NSC.

"Q. William Walker from the State Department?

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		"A. Correct. [Redacted] from CIA, Don Gregg, and Sam Watson, I believe . . . . "Q. I want to ask you to go through that meeting . . . . These are all notes that you took at the meeting? "A. I think it is, yes. "Q. 'Felix claims working with Vice President, blessing for CIA.' What was that? Who said it and what did it mean? "A. I think that that is somebody's statement at the meeting -- and I'm not sure who[se]. Possibly Don Gregg was asserting that Felix was clean, that he was working for the CIA with the Vice President's blessing, and that triggers a more general recollection that there was a realization by at least some of the folks in that room, I think, that Felix was using the Vice President's name, that he was somewhat of a loose cannon and attributing things to the Vice President that weren't true, that he was embellishing on his role and, as I say, using the Vice President's name when it wasn't appropriate. "And I think that is a reference to that, that Felix was going around, so it may not have come from Don Gregg. It may have come from the Ambassador or Jim Steele that Felix was going around down in Salvador using the Vice President's name to make things happen and really trying to take control of this thing. "Q. What did Gregg say about that? "A. I don't know. In general my recollection is that Don Gregg had a very close friendship with Felix and that he trusted what Felix told him	

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		. . . . "Q. Why don't you go through the meeting as it is reflected in your notes, the August 12, 1986 meeting in Don Gregg's office? "A. My notes indicate that one of the first things that happened was that Ambassador Corr indicated concern on the transition and that [redacted] was concerned that the FDN were getting a bad deal concerning the aircraft, that they thought that the equipment, the aircraft, were being taken, that they in fact belonged to the contras and that Democracy, Incorporated intended to take them with them, and so there was this misunderstanding or difference of view as to who owned the aircraft, that there was an urgent need for resupply of the southern front." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 164-66.)	
86/08/12-122 AUGUST 12, 1986		RESUPPLY OPERATION: EARL'S NOTES OF THE MEETING EARL ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Earl response continuing from preceding entry:] "And then there was some discussion of the C-123 that had made this unauthorized trip from Miami, I believe, with Air Miami or Felix's involvement, and that I think this is still Corr talking about Felix being compadre with [redacted] that they were very close and had a close relationship, and that is what gave Felix a lot of authority, more authority than he should have had, that he derived from this relationship to [redacted] who controlled the air force and the air field.	

"[Redacted] can help with the [redacted] who are saying that, the [redacted] don't trust the gringos. A reference to $10 million of arms by ship from [redacted] and a question about whether these are to be expected, and that [redacted] was ensuring that the ship would be hidden and the possible use of an island for the offloading of the arms.

". . . .

"A. . . . The bottom line was that the aircraft should be sold and money given to the FDN as one resolution of this difference of view as to who owned the assets.

"MR. LIMAN: Who was expressing that?

"THE WITNESS: Well, underneath I say 'Corr recommends this', and I'm not sure. The bottom line above that is referring to [redacted] and that Corr is also concurring in that, or this is just a double reference to Corr's recommendation of it, and it is not -- my general impression is that [redacted] position as relayed by Felix and the Ambassador and others was that [redacted] had been convinced that the aircraft belonged to the contras, so that is one possibility.

"The other is, if that is not acceptable, that Colonel North would have to explain to [redacted] who owned the aircraft as a resolution of this problem.

". . . .

"A. Ambassador Corr didn't feel this would work.

"Q. Do you know what Colonel North's view was at the time as to who owned the aircraft?

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		"A. I'm not sure how firmly I knew. I think I suspected that the aircraft belonged to Democracy, Inc., but I don't think I was sure of that. I certainly wasn't sure enough of it to offer it up at the meeting." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 166-68.)	
86/08/12-125 AFTER AUGUST 8, 1986		NORTH NOTIFIES DUTTON TO SHUT DOWN THE RESUPPLY OPERATION EARL ACCOUNT: "THE WITNESS: . . . My recollection is that immediately after the first meeting on the 8th that I sent to Dutton what Felix was alleging. ". . . . "A. Whether it's flowing from the 8th or the 12th, eventually I sent to Dutton the message that had been given to me from Colonel North on withdrawing the people and the shutdown of the operation, if you will. "Q. And Colonel North gave you that order to relay? "A. Yes. "Q. And did Colonel North tell you why he made that decision? "A. No. "Q. Was it out of disgust with the fact that there was so much infighting? "A. That would be speculation on my part. I don't know what the reason was. I mean, it was a solution to the problem that had arisen on the 8th and the 12th of August -- how to deal with it. "Q. His solution to the problem was to give the order to shut it down?	

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		"A. Correct. "Q. And was that order observed? "A. That order was not -- that guidance, direction, suggestion, whatever it was, was not done. It was reversed by General Secord. General Secord said no, that they would not do that. "Q. And did he tell you that? "A. I don't know specifically how I got it. I think I got it from Dutton. I don't think I got it directly from General Secord. "Q. And so it was left that Oliver North would talk to General Secord about this? "A. Yes, I think so. . . ." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 178-80.)	
86/08/12-130 AUGUST 12, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. In August of '86 you attended a meeting around August 14, I believe, in Don Gregg's office; is that correct? "[C/CATF.] Yes, I did. "Mr. Carome. And also present were Bill Walker, Admiral Co[r]r, Ray Bur[g]hardt, Bob Earl, Sam Watson and possibly Colonel Steele; is that right? "[C/CATF.] Yes, to the best of my recollection. "Mr. Carome. How long was that meeting? "[C/CATF.] Forty-five minutes or under. "Mr. Carome. And the subject matter of that meeting was the inner workings of the resupply operation we have been talking about, wasn't it?	

"[C/CATF.] It was, as I recall, a meeting of two things. Fi[r]st off, I got beaten up very badly for my assessment of Felix Rodriguez. A lot of time was spent there by Don Gregg and Ambassador Co[r]r convincing me Felix Rodriguez was a good guy and both of our [redacted] and me who were working on derivative impressions were unjustly critical of Felix Rodriguez and, secondly, going into the fact that the people running the private benefactor operation were no-goodnicks of various ilk, Felix was a good guy. There was a confrontation between them, as I recall it, and a lot of this is reconstructed from reading things of that meeting. And don't you dare buy those airplanes or don't get involved with these people, says Don Gregg, and was pressing me for assurances that I would not buy those airplanes, and going into the corrupt nature of the people in a generic, broad sense behind that operation.

"Felix says they're awful, so on and so forth.

"Mr. Carome. You felt uncomfortable being at that meeting, didn't you?

"[C/CATF.] One second.

"(Witness conferring with counsel.)

"[C/CATF.] Yes, I did.

"Mr. Carome. Other than Rodriguez's name, was Clines' name mentioned at that meeting?

"[C/CATF.] I don't recall specifically if Clines' name was mentioned at that meeting, but unsavory characterization in and around the operation was the general impression I had. The people who were there were no good. You don't want to be involved with them. You don't want to be associated with them. It is possible Clines' name was mentioned, but I must tell you my attentive span or focus on that meeting was not very good. I didn't want to be at that meeting, I didn't like where I was. There were things being discussed there I didn't want to be a party to discussing, and it was really kind of PO'd I was there. [Sic.]

"Mr. Carome. Were you afraid you were going to learn something you didn't want to know?

"[C/CATF.] Be put in a situation I didn't want to be put in.

"Mr. Carome. Did you feel this was an inappropriate discussion altogether?

"[C/CATF.] I felt it was an inappropriate discussion for that group to be having, yes.

"Mr. Carome. Did you feel it was illegal for that group to be having that discussion?

"[C/CATF.] I don't think I've reflected on the law or not. I reflected more on the politics of it and the fact that it was -- once again, I was working on actively disengaging, trying to distance myself, and that was drawing me into something and I didn't like being there and I didn't like the ambiance. This is the first time I had met Don Gregg."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 40-42.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE
C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2:
[Continuing from preceding entry:]

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		"Mr. Carome. Did you learn anything at that meeting you didn't already know? "[C/CATF.] I think that it clarified in my mind the unsavory -- it reenforced in my mind the impressions that I had developed over time of the sort of unsavory nature of things out there, and it began to tie pieces together here and there that maybe I hadn't let my mind tie together. "Mr. Cohen. You aren't suggesting Don Gregg was part of the unsavory -- "[C/CATF.] No, no, not at all. I'm suggesting people over the horizon that I didn't see, and frankly didn't look for, were unsavory. "Mr. Carome. Wasn't it part of your job as the chief of the Central American Task Force to know these things? Why were you afraid of knowing these things? "[C/CATF.] That's an interesting question. I think people always have a fear of the unknown. I took the decision, and it's probably one of the more controversial decisions that I took, but it's rested on the foundation in my opening statement, I knew where I was and I knew I was caught in this giant nutcracker. And I took the decision as I said to support the Administration within the bounds of legality and to do so to the fullest of my ability. "I think I also said when the law changed in 1986 I let the rei[]ns out a bit and was a little bit more forward leaning. As '86 turned into the summer of '86 I developed an increasingly specific or increasingly detailed understanding as I have testified many times of what was going on, I	

didn't like what I saw, I felt uncomfortable where I was and I was trying to disengage. We as an agency, Clair George and I, Clair will follow me, took the decision we were not going to investigate the private benefactors, we were not going to try to recruit them. We saw problems with the Executive Order there. We saw it putting us in contact with and next to people and in situations which would bring nothing but grief. Maybe it's six to one, half a dozen to another at this point in time, but we felt it was going to bring grief so we made the decision not to get involved with it. I felt and feel now that these were American citizens and if there was a desire to investigate what was going on, it fell to the FBI, not the CIA. I think I testified to that matter in front of the House Intelligence Committee at one point in time in response sometime in 1985 to a question from Congressman Brown where he probed very deeply on this subject, he said what do you know about the money going to the FDN? And as I recall the conversation, I said I have been able to trace it back to the Cayman Islands and to maybe an offshore bank account, from there I think it comes back to the United States, and if it involves the United States it is a matter for the FBI to investigate, and I recall that conversation.

"I tried to look that up and get a transcript of that and I could not, but that's my recollection of that conversation. Maybe Members or staff recall that as well.

"I would like to see if my recollection is correct there. And we did investigate it. That was the decision we took. And it was the policy of the United States government, the Administration, to not impede the private benefactors. That was the policy that I followed, and that I did not investigate them as part of that policy.

"Critical, you can criticize the decision and say I'm wrong, but that's it. There it is on the table like it was."
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 42-45. See id. at 192-95 [meeting with Gregg].)

86/08/12-150
AUGUST 12,
1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE

WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 1:

[For Watson testimony preceding this entry, see 86/08/08-288.]

"Q. What did you do to check out Felix's assertions about North's involvement with the private network that was operating for the contras, the Secord-Wilson group?

"A. As I remember, we had an August 12th meeting with representatives from different agencies and departments of the government, and Don briefed them on the points which Felix had made and asked them to take information on board and consider it.

"Q. That was four days later, right, August 12, 1986?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. At that meeting -- and I believe your notes of it appear at [Watson Dep.] Exhibit 4 at page N-46662 -- do you recall whether Gregg told

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		the assembled group that North was involved with this Wilson gang down in Central America, and that he was directing their efforts vis a vis the contras? "A. I don't specifically recall that. "Q. Do you remember if Gregg mentioned anything like that at the meeting? "A. I don't recall that. "Q. Nobody else does, either. "Now, in light of that can you tell me how you checked out Felix's allegations that North was involved with this corrupt group? "A. I'm not sure we did. "Q. Do you have a recollection of checking it out? "A. No, I don't. "Q. Did you ever personally confront North about the allegations? "A. No, I did not. "Q. Did you confront Earl[] about the allegations? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. Do you know if Gregg confronted North or Earl[]? "A. No, I don't. "Q. Tell me what you recall -- and you may look at the notes if they help -- about what occurred at the August 12th, 1986 meeting? Who was there and what was said? "A. Well, my notes said that the meeting was at 1:30 on August 12, that Don, myself, Ray Bur[g]har[d]t, senior director of the National Security Council staff, Bill Walker from State, Ed	

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		Corr, the Ambassador, [redacted] from the Agency, Jim Steel[e] of the MIL group, and that Bob Earl[] came late. "And as I remember, Don went through his notes with the people or went through and talked them through the meeting with Felix. Mainly the focus was Secord, Clines, shoddy equipment, selling hand grenades; and that the aircraft operation was slipshod, an unsafe operation; and that would these people take the information on board and consider it as the government was setting up its resumed military assistance. "Q. And what do you recall others saying at the meeting? Let's start with [redacted.] Do you recall him saying anything? "A. As I remember, he was fairly quiet. I think most people were quiet. "Q. Do you remember whether [redacted] took notes of the meeting? "A. No, I don't. "Q. Did [redacted] make any statement about what the CIA's intentions were regarding this private group? "A. I don't recall any. "Q. Do you recall if [redacted] made any statement as to what, if anything, the Agency knew about this Clines-Wilson group? "A. I can imagine, if he said anything, what he probably said. But no, I don't. "Q. You don't recall him saying anything? "A. No, I don't recall him saying anything." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 91-94. Watson Dep. Ex. 4 [Watson's handwritten notes].)	

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86/08/12-151 AUGUST 12, 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. What about Ambassador Corr? "A. I remember Ed making some comments, but I just don't remember what he said. "Q. What about Bill Walker from the State Department? "A. I remember Bill was awfully quiet, too. "Q. Colonel Steel[e]? "A. I think he said that Felix was doing a good job on the helicopter kind of stuff, but I don't remember whether there was any discussion by Jim on the other thing. "Q. What about Colonel Earl[]? "A. He got to the meeting late and I don't remember whether he ever took a seat with us in the meeting or whether he stood back leaning against a bookcase. I remember, I vaguely remember him standing outside the sort of circle of people that were sitting. "Q. How long did the meeting last? "A. I don't think more than 20 minutes or 30 minutes. "Q. Did anyone take notes that you saw? "A. I don't remember anybody take notes. "Q. Did you? "A. Only afterwards, to write down who was there. "Q. So aside from what, did you make any memo of that meeting?	

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		"A. No, I didn't. "Q. What did you understand to be the result of the meeting when it ended? "A. That we were telling the people around the government what we had heard, that they ought to take that information as the government set up the military aid effort, they ought to take it into consideration and be warned by at least us and one person, Felix, that there were problems with these people, and that the Agency especially should think very hard before they became associated with these people or bought the resupply operation that Secord and Clines were running. "Q. What assurance did you have by the end of that meeting that the Agency would not pick up these people? "A. I'm not sure that we had a specific assurance. I think the only assurance we had was that everybody would take the information and think about it, compare it to what you knew. "Q. Did you ask any of these people to verify or to get back to you on whether they could verify the information that Felix had provided? "A. I think we probably did. "Q. Did you? Do you have a recollection of asking anybody to do that? "A. I think Don probably did ask them. "Q. Do you recall that he asked them to or are you just thinking he probably did? "A. I'm only thinking that he probably did. "Q. You don't have any recollection? "A. I don't have any.	

"Q. Do you recall hearing back after the meeting from any of these people?

"A. Don told me at some later point that [redacted] had come back and said that they were not going to associate with these people.

"Q. When did he tell you that?

"A. I don't remember when it was. I wish I could be more helpful.

"Q. Well, whatever you recall."
(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 94-96.)

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1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE

WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Question continues directly from comment ending preceding entry:]

"Q. . . . After the meeting, did you report to the Vice President on this information and what had been done with it?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did Don Gregg to your knowledge?

"A. I don't know.

"Q. Did you ever ask Gregg if he did?

"A. No, I didn't.

"Q. Has he ever told you whether he did or did not report this to the Vice President?

"A. Well, I think I have heard subsequently that he didn't. But I don't recall Don ever telling me that he did or did not.

"Q. From whom did you hear that Gregg did not report it to the Vice President?

"A. I think it was in the newspapers.

"Q. Did you have a view, after the August

12th meeting, on whether this information ought to go to the Vice President?

"A. No.

"Q. No view one way or the other?

"A. I thought that once we got the information together, once it coalesced, and if we heard something, that it probably should at some point.

"Q. When?

"A. Whenever the information comes back.

"Q. What information?

"A. Well, if somebody comes back and says that, yes, we know something about this, or that, no, we're not going to associate with him, that that would be an appropriate time, if somebody told me, that I would then prepare a memo to the VP summarizing it. But it never --

"Q. If [redacted] had gotten back to you and said, we the Agency are not going to associate with those people, you would have reported that to the Vice President and summarized what had led to it, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. . . . [D]id you do anything yourself to see if anybody was going to get back to you with information as a result of the August 12th meeting?

"A. No.

"Q. Were you concerned as of August 12 still that a member of the National Security Council staff was involved with this notorious group?

"A. Yes, I was concerned because Earl[] was being -- they didn't want to come to the meeting and all that, and it concerned me that they were trying to either avoid the information or avoid discussing it.

"Q. Absolutely. Now, two and two could equal four, right? This would explain why you were getting cryptic references from North and Earl[] about this, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. This would explain why Earl[] was not eager to come to the meeting, correct?

"A. It could.

"Q. This could also explain why North himself didn't appear at the meeting, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. It could possibly explain why you were being cut out from RIG meetings, correct? [See above at 85/07/01-610.]

"A. It could.

"Q. Therefore, this was highly significant information, was it not?

"A. All the individual pieces were.

"Q. And that means information that a National Security Advisor should get to his principal, correct?

"A. Should have. But I was derelict and didn't."

(Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 96-99.)

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THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: GREGG PASSES ALONG RODRIGUEZ' DISCLOSURE

WATSON ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. The information should have gone to the

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Vice President, correct?

"A. When it was mature information.

"Q. And certainly by some time in September it was mature, if not earlier?

"A. I couldn't say it was mature in September, because I didn't know whether he had any information.

"Q. How long would you have felt it prudent to wait to tell a principal of the National Security Council for whom you worked that a member of the National Security Council staff was the chairman of the board of an organization that was utilizing the good services of Tom Clines and company?

"A. I suspect I would have at some point, if I got another trigger event or some more information.

"Q. And if there was not a trigger event, would you have waited endlessly?

"A. No, I don't think so.

"Q. This was information that should have gone to the Vice President as promptly as possible; would you agree with that?

"A. No, I wouldn't.

"Q. Well, then when?

"A. I don't agree that it should have gone promptly, because it was not information that was mature enough or that was filled out enough to pass on to him.

"Q. What did you do to make it mature enough?

"A. We passed it out to those different people at the August 12 meeting and said: Take it on board, think about it, work on it.

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		"Q. Did you ask them to do it promptly? "A. I don't recall whether we did or not. "Q. Well, did you expect that it would have been done promptly? "A. Well, I would have epxected that it would be done before somebody started setting up an operation. "Q. And if you didn't hear anything back, you would have checked it out? "[A.] Yes. But remember what I said: At some point [redacted] got back to Don, but I don't recall when it was. "Q. But whenever it was, at that point at least you would have expected that a report should have been made to the Vice President, correct? "A. One could be made orally, one could be made verbally. "Q. Orally, verbally, in writing. I'm talking about a report to the Vice President. At least as of the time [redacted] reported back, the information should have gone to the Vice President in your opinion, correct? "A. Yes." (Watson, Senate Dep., 6/16/87, at 99-101.)	
86/08/25-100 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1986			BRUSSELS MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SECORD ACCOUNT: Meeting in Brussels among Secord, Hakim and "a relative of a high official of the Iranian Government." The parties discuss "the possibility of a long term relationship between the U.S. and Iran," as well as "hostages and weapons." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 99-100.)

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86/08/25-105 AUGUST 25, 1986			BRUSSELS MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the meeting in Brussels among Secord, Hakim, the Second Channel and other Iranians, see Iran-Contra Report, at 249; Tower, at B-149.
86/08/26-101 AUGUST 26, 1986		NAPIER'S MONEY DELIVERY NAPIER ACCOUNT: Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, volunteers to Robert Dutton, the STTGI staff director (when he cannot locate Bill Cooper), to fly to Miami to meet the controller of Southern Air Transport. Dutton tells her to pick up $16,000 in cash, then return to Washington and take it to North at the OEOB. When Napier's flight arrives in Miami, a man meets her at the gate wearing an SAT identification badge. In the crowded lounge he hands her a Federal Express envelope, opens it and shows her the money. Napier goes into a rest room and counts out $16,000 in $20 and smaller bills. She then boards a plane back to Washington. Napier heads for the OEOB, where she calls Fawn Hall on the house phone. Hall comes down and says to Napier "either, 'Did you go to Miami and get this?' or 'Did you go down there today?'" A few days later, Napier tells Richard Secord about the delivery. Secord "is a little upset that I had been asked to do it. . . . He . . . was concerned that I have been involved in it."	

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		Napier never finds out what the cash was for. (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 9-15, 111-14, 120-21. See Napier Dep. Ex. 4 [Napier summary of $16,000 delivery]; Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 215-17 [Fawn Hall testified she did not recall the incident with Napier, but she would not deny Napier's testimony]. See also Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 42-43 [the inscribed Bible].)	
86/08/26-102 SOMETIME AFTER MAY 2, 1986		NAPIER'S MONEY DELIVERY DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testifying on $16,000 in cash delivered by Shirley Napier to Oliver North at the White House: "Mr. DUTTON. General Secord called my office and spoke to me and said that he wanted to get Bill Olmste[a]d an airline ticket to fly down to Miami, pick up a package and bring it up to Colonel North and asked that I have Shirley Napier, our administrative assistant, get that take[n] care of. "He called later in the day and said he was unable to locate Mr. Olmste[a]d and, therefore, Shirley should cancel the ticket. Shirley was standing there and commented that she could fly to Miami as easily as anyone else and would be willing to do that. "I mentioned that to General Secord and he said, all right, let her fly down and pick up the package at Southern Air. She went down and I don't recall if she told me the next morning or that evening that she had signed a handwritten reciept for $16,000 cash and she had delivered it,	

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		I believe, to Fawn Hall, Colonel North's secretary. "Mr. BALLEN. Did you have discussions with General Secord or Colonel North afterwards as to the purchase [sic (purpose)] of this cash being delivered to Colonel North? "Mr. DUTTON. I can't remember the specific conversation but I seem to remember that Colonel North wasn't pleased that we had used Shirley, but General Secord said to do it and so we did it. "Mr. BALLEN. But you never discussed the purpose of the cash with anyone? "Mr. DUTTON. No. "Mr. BALLEN. So you don't know why Colonel North was receiving it? "Mr. DUTTON. No, I do not. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 61-63; see id., 5/27/87, at 125-26 ["I arranged for Ms. Napier to make a trip down to Southern Air Transport to pick up a package. It wasn't until after she got back that I found out it was money."], 198-200 [Dutton disputes Napier's deposition testimony on the incident], 206.)	
86/08/26-109 STARTING IN APRIL 1986		NAPIER'S DELIVERIES OF MONEY AND KL-43s NAPIER ACCOUNT: Starting in April 1986, Shirley Napier (staff assistant at STTGI) runs errands between the OEOB and STTGI offices: "At times I would take envelopes down there [sc. to the OEOB]. I have taken the encoding machines[] down there and received a new one to take its [sic] place. And at one time I took	

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		money down there, and I took a Bible down there." Napier's deliveries are received by Fawn Hall. (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 8-9. See id., at 20-24.)	
86/08/26-110 SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1986		NAPIER'S DELIVERIES OF MONEY AND KL-43s HALL ACCOUNT: Fawn Hall testified she delivered KL-43 tapes to Napier, and that Napier, in turn, delivered packages to Hall at the OEOB. (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 203-04, 214-17.)	
86/08/26-210 SOMETIME AFTER EARLY MAY THROUGH FALL 1986		NAPIER'S AND DUTTON'S KL-43 DELIVERIES DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testified that the KL-43 tapes for each month came from North's office: "[O]n one occasion I brought them out after the meeting we had with Felix [Rodriguez on June 25, 1986] . . . ." On three occasions "out of the four or five months," Shirley Napier met Fawn Hall "at the gate so she [sc. Napier] didn't have to sign in and out." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 205-06.)	
86/08/26-310 1985-86		KL-43 CLASSIFIED TAPES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. I understand there is software also. Is that classified? "Mr. NORTH. As I understand software, sir, it is the program that is put into the machine. "Mr. JENKINS. That is classified, is it not? "Mr. NORTH. The tapes used to enter, the encryption tapes, were classified, that is	

correct.

"Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Hakim had a machine with software?

"Mr. NORTH. I know that General Secord did and Mr. Hakim may have had one, too.

"Mr. JENKINS. Did either of those have security clearance?

"Mr. NORTH. General Secord certainly did.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. I believe he has testified that he did not have--

"Mr. NORTH. If that is the case, I misunderstood.

"Mr. JENKINS. Who provided the machines and the software to those people?

"Mr. NORTH. I did.

"Mr. JENKINS. At the direction of Admiral Poindexter--

"Mr. NORTH. When you say at the direction of Admiral Poindexter--

"Mr. JENKINS. The approval.

"Mr. NORTH. I am sure I told him that I was using these machines. I provided one at his office so I could communicate with him and I am sure I told him at some point who had them.

"Mr. JENKINS. There were seven or eight given out with software, including the airplane company down in Florida?

"Mr. NORTH. We passed out cassettes every month.

"Mr. JENKINS. Did anyone check to see whether any of these people had security clearances?

"Mr. NORTH. I was led to believe that the airplane company did have security clearances; they do classified government work, and that the people who had it[,] with the possible exception of Mr. Hakim, had security clearances.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. Just based on the facts, you assumed that they had security clearances; is that correct"

"Mr. NORTH. Yes."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 190-92.)

86/08/28-100
AUGUST 28,
1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEETING
NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY:

"-Armitage, Moellering, [redacted,] Michel Sanchez

"[Redacted]

"F-5's

"--Requires formal 30 day notif. to Cong. Informal not. to Cong. after bill is signed

"--A/C wd be avail for [redacted] in Feb. -- Sign LOA in Feb 87

"[Redacted]

"-Tell [redacted] that we will deploy in Feb 87 in time to cover increase in Contra activity

"[Redacted] Air Defense

"[Redacted]

"-Armitage

"Mgt. Tur.

"-[Redacted]

"-want to move [redacted] base camp to [redacted]

"-Carry-on w/non USG support:

"-UNO 60K/Qtr.

"-UNO U.S. Travel 30K/mo
"-[Redacted] 10K
"-[Redacted] 10K
"-Calero Food 500K/mo.
"-[Redacted] 20K
"-Hospital
"-Air Ops
    "2 C-7's -
    "2 C-123's -
    "3 Maules - 132 K/mo"

(North notebook entries, 8/28/86 [Committee Documents Q 2375-76].) For North testimony on the meeting, see above at 86/00/09-160.)

86/08/28-110
AUGUST 28,
1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: MEETING
NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:

"Mr. Nields. . . . Really here I would like to make certain the record is complete and I will check it against your public testimony, and if need be, we can supplement. I am not certain, first of all, let me step back -- I take it Exhibit [OLN] 98-A is the notation from your spiral notebook that you made reference to, that as a list of items that you wanted to know whether you should continue doing, notwithstanding congressional funding had been approved and was coming?

"Mr. North. Well, what is important, Mr. Nields, is that it had been voted and approved by both Houses, well before this, and yet, the bill had never come to the President. We somehow could not convince the Congress to bring both bills to conference, and get it up to the White House. And so months after both Houses have voted to approve the $100 million, we are still desperate for aid. What I was asking for is the guidance of what has come to be publicly known as the RIGS.

"The names are on the top of the preceding page -- is do you want these operations continued, and if so, somebody give me some guidance as to how long.

"Mr. Nields. Would you just put on the record the date of the meeting and the people who attended?

"Mr. North. The 28th of August. My list shows me it was attended by, obviously, Meese, Mr. Armitage, General Moellering, [redacted] Jim Mich[]el, Mr. Sanchez.

"Mr. Nields. But not to include Elliott Abrams?

"Mr. North. He is not on that list, and I think the record should be corrected to reflect that. I think I said he was there.

"Mr. Nields. At the time you didn't have the document, and I think now that I recollect it, I think the record is still silent when you did have the document, and event[ua]lly it will be part of the record, but I think we ought to clear that up, after tomorrow morning.

"Mr. North. I agree."
(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 40-42; JHICI Ex. OLN 98-A.)

86/08/28-120
AUGUST 28,
1986

NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: "BATTLE ROYAL"
MEETING
C/CATF RESPONSE TO NORTH, Part 1:

"Mr. Carome. During Oliver North's testimony before this committee, he was asked about the degree of knowledge of his full service, covert operation in Nicaragua and he was asked specifically about you, and I will read to you what his testimony was. [See 86/00/09-160.]

"Mr. Nields asked: 'How about the Chief of the Central American Task Force?'

"Mr. North: 'Oh, I am sure that he had a detailed grasp of -- well, I say a detailed grasp. I am sure he had an adequate sense of what I was doing.'

"Question: 'And what is the basis for that belief?'

"Answer: 'We used to have meetings with the [R]estricted [Inter]agency [G]roup, we used to have secure conference calls and on one occasion I can recall laying out for the group -- in fact, I think it was after the hundred million had been voted by both houses, hadn't been sent forward to the President, I can recall a meeting in an office in the Pentagon where I went down item by item by item the things that I was doing and asked them to,[ ]point blank, asked them point blank whether or not I had to continue to do them to keep the resistance alive because even though the money had been authorized and bills had been passed, we couldn't get it forwarded to the President.

"'And I went down item by item on my checklist of what I was having directed out each month or each quarter or each week to support the resistance and I asked them point blank whether this should continue.' He said that at this meeting w[ere] you, Mr. Abrams [but see 86/08/28-100, -110], Mr. Armitage, and perhaps Mr. Mich[]el and General Moe[l]lering. He also directed us to an exhibit or an item out of his notebook in which he went through item by item these various things that he was doing for the contras.

"And that is [C/CATF] Exhibit 37 in the book before us. And my question to you is: was Oliver North right in his testimony to us?

"Did you have that kind of very detailed knowledge of exactly what he was doing with this full-service, covert operation?

"[C/CATF.] Let me, once again, dissect your question into two answers. First off, I think the committee can judge for itself from my answers my level of knowledge on his full service covert operation. I think I have been forthcoming in telling you what I knew and didn't know, so you be the judge.

"Secondly, I recall that meeting. I don't recall it in exactly the same details Oliver North had. I recall it as one of I think a battle royal -- is what Secretary Shultz called it, about the tug and pull between the State Department and the agency and who was going to manage what. The focal point of that meeting was to try to figure out how the Administration was going to manage the upcoming program, and the reason it was at the Pentagon was that a neutral party literally was trying to chair the meeting to come to some resolution as to how an executive order should be written, how we were going to work equations, what

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		State's role was going to be, what the interagency group would like to manage this thing, whether there would be an executive order following by a NSDD and a whole raft of managerial questions." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 51-53; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 37.)	
86/08/28-121 AUGUST 28, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: "BATTLE ROYAL" MEETING C/CATF RESPONSE TO NORTH, Part 2: [C/CATF's response continues from preceding entry:] "[C/CATF.] At that meeting Oliver North did insert, once again, to the best of my recollection, the issue of the airplanes. He might have gotten into the issue of food money and the resistance incurring debt because we were talking about that. "I have looked at this exhibition and I do not recall him mentioning funding to UNO. It wasn't necessary, we were funding UNO. It wasn't necessary to fund [redacted] we were funding [redacted] I don't remember him talking about [redacted.] "I do remember him talking about the air ops. I don't remember him putting a budget on it. So my answer to your question is, I think that the presentation at the meeting that it took place -- let me start over again. "I think the meeting took place is accurate, that some of the things Oliver North said he mentioned he mentioned. I think there was another whole focal point that was not mentioned	

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		"My recollection of that meeting, and I will be honest with you, I have checked with other people to see if their recollection is the same, is he didn't raise his full service covert action program there in the context that this exhibit would appear that he laid it out. I want to make it pretty clear at that point in time, as the committee can see, there are things on here he was doing I knew about. I don't recall him having raised them there. "Mr. Carome. These items wouldn't come as a surprise to you? "[C/CATF.] One of them would have. Two of them would have. Let me look at them again. "The subsidy to UNO and UNO U.S. travel. UNO, the subsidy to UNO, would have come as a surprise to me. I didn't know he was subsidizing UNO, [redacted] I would have argued against it. UNO travel in the U.S. I didn't know about. [Redacted.] "That would have surprised me, and the funding [redacted.] I did not know that he had -- I did not know that he was actually funding [redacted.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 53-56; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 37.)	
86/09/02-100 SEPTEMBER 2, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE(S): NORTH'S REVIEW NORTH MEMO: North submits a memo to Poindexter reviewing the initiatives under way to free the hostages. Ghorbanifar, the relative of a high Iranian official, and some efforts by another country are all mentioned.

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			In his memo, North summarizes the terms proposed at the August meeting in London with Ghorbanifar (see 86/08/08-500): "-Deliver 500 TOWs and the 39 electron tubes for the HAWK system previously requested. "-[Hostage] released. "-Deliver 500 TOWs and one of the HAWK radars previously requested. "-[Hostage] released. "-Meeting in Tehran to discuss broadened relationship, Soviet intelligence, etc. "-Deliver remaining radar and 1000 TOWs while we are in Tehran. "-[Hostage] released and Buckley's body delivered." North states in the memo that he favors the plan, and asserts that others in the CIA have a similar view: "CIA concurs that the [Second Iranian; see 86/01/11-180]/Ghorbanifar connection is the only proven means by which we have been able to effect the release of any of the hostages." (North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps with Iran," 9/2/86 [Committee Documents J 5968 through 5970]; Iran-Contra Report, at 250.)
86/09/03-100 SEPTEMBER 3-4, 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE PROPOSAL: SEQUENTIAL RELEASE NORTH PROF: In a September 3 PROF to McFarlane, North writes: "We still have no response fm JMP re proceeding w/ the sequential release proposal outlined to you some time back. Have now

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			undertaken to have Casey raise same w/ JMP tomorrow at thr [sic] weekly mtg. The things one must do to get action. . . ." North's notebooks show a meeting with Poindexter occurs at 5:30 p.m. on September 4. The entry continues, "go/no go on sequential deliveries." The entry mentions "needs to talk to Joshua," North's code name for President Reagan. (North PROF to McFarlane, "Anything going on?," 9/3/86 [Committee Document N 12156]; North notebook entry, 9/4/86 [Committee Document Q 2388]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 250. On "Joshua" as North's code name for the President, see 86/01/15-150, -151. On North's 9/3/86 PROF to Poindexter, see also 86/09/10-100.)
86/09/03-400 SEPTEMBER 3 OR 4, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: SELLING THE CLOSED, COSTA RICAN-DEEDED AIRSTRIP TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testified that North told him on Setpember 3 or 4, 1986 at his office in the OEOB of the proposed sale of the airstrip in Costa Rica: "Mr. BELNICK. What do you recall that Colonel North said to you? "Mr. TAMBS. Colonel North at that time indicated to me the freedom fighters were out of money, the $100 million had not come in yet. . . . It was my understanding from Colonel North that he wanted to sell what he called 'the assets' and use -- give that money or something, somebody give the money to the armed democratic resistance so they could carry on.	

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. So he was talking about hoping to raise five million or so dollars from the sale of these assets to the CIA; correct?

"Mr. TAMBS. That is correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. Now, sir, you have told us that part of your agreement with the Costa Rican Government regarding the airfield was that it would be deeded to Costa Rica; correct?

"Mr. TAMBS. The airfield, yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. The airfield.

"Did you understand how Colonel North co[u]ld sell the airstrip to the CIA if it was deeded to the Costa Rican Government?

"Mr. TAMBS. By that time, by, say, September of 1986, . . . we had been forbidden use of it.

"Mr. BELNICK. All right, sir.

"Mr. TAMBS. And my query, of course, was how could you sell something which you couldn't use?

"Mr. BELNICK. What was his answer?

"Mr. TAMBS. He didn't reply, if I recall. As I recall."

(Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 170-72, 234.)

86/09/05-195
SEPTEMBER
5-6, 1986

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY:

On the proposed press conference in Costa Rica to reveal the airstrip at Santa Elena, including the activities of Tambs, Abrams and North to avert it, see Iran-Contra Report, at 142-43; Tower, at C-13.

86/09/05-200

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		TAMBS ACCOUNT: While Tambs is in West Virginia, he receives a message to call the White House switchboard on or about September 5, 1986. The message, he finds out, is from North. "[H]e said that he had received word . . . that the next morning the Minister of Public Security, Mr. Garron, was going to give a press conference relating to the airstrip at Santa Elena and that he did not believe that his was a good idea." North then asks Tambs to call President Arias to "dissuade him from this press conference." Tambs makes the call, and President Arias says he will see what he can do. The President later calls back to say he has spoken with the relevant minister and that the press conference is off. Tambs conveys the message to North and Abrams by conference call. He testified that to his knowledge North never called the Costa Rican President about the press conference. (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 172-76. See id., 5/28/87, at 236.) THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE TAMBS ACCOUNT (cont'd): Tambs testified further on the proposed press conference: "Chairman INOUYE. On this press conference that was considered by the Costa Rican Government to possibly expose the existence of this airstrip, you did call the President of Costa Rica? "Mr. TAMBS. That is correct, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. In receiving your	

instructions from Colonel North, did Colonel North provide you with any limits as to what you could do to get the Costa Rican Government to do your bidding?

"Mr. TAMBS. No. He just--he indicated that it was counterproductive and he asked me to talk to the President. And so I did.

"Chairman INOUYE. Was any quid pro quo provided or any threat or suggestion?

"Mr. TAMBS. No. No, sir.

"Chairman INOUYE. The President was just amenable?

"Mr. TAMBS. Yes. He is a very decent man.

"Chairman INOUYE. Where do you think your orders were coming from when you received direction from Colonel North?

"Mr. TAMBS. I believe that they -- and still do, sir, believe that they were coming from the RIG.

"Chairman INOUYE. And where did the RIG get its orders from?

"Mr. TAMBS. That, I can't say, sir.

"Chairman INOUYE. You are a Professor of Diplomatic Relations?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, I do teach the course.

. . .

"Chairman INOUYE. Do you believe that decisions of this stature and nature can originate and be implemented by a second-level bureaucrat?

"Mr. TAMBS. Well, you know, there is a hierarchy in this world, right? And I don't believe they could, but that would only be speculation on my part.

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		". . . . "Chairman INOUYE. And you were convinced that every action taken was legal. "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. And that it did come from higher authority? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 206-08.)	
86/09/05-201 SEPTEMBER 6, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: "-Conf. call to Elliott Abrams and Amb. Lew Tambs - . . . "-Tell Arias: "-Never set foot in W.H. "-Never get 5 cents of $80M promised by McPhearson." (North notebook entry, 9/6/86 [Committee Document Q 2392]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 76.)	
86/09/05-230 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testifying on the telephone call from North informing him of a press conference to be held the following day in Costa Rica about the airstrip: "Mr. BELNICK. Tell me what you remember about that call and what happened? "Mr. ABRAMS. As I recall, it was Friday night. It was late. It was about eleven o'clock. And he called and said do you remember that there was an airstrip and that this airstrip would at that point not have been in use because there was	

no contra military activity under way in Costa Rica really after May 8, after the inauguration of President Arias?

"Yes, I remember that?

"Well, the Minister of Public Security, he said, was going to give a press conference and he was going to talk about the airstrip and he was going to reveal all sorts of things about the airstrip, including apparently what role . . . the previous government of Costa Rica had had approving it or so forth. This was a very bad thing he said, and it would do no one any good and raise all sorts of awkward questions about the previous government and we ought to try to stop it.

"And I said I agree with that. And he said, well, what we need to do is, let me get Tambs on the line and would you instruct Tambs to call President Arias and tell him not to have this press conference?

"I said, I will. Sounds right to me. So he called back, I don't know, you know, half an hour later, something like that, with Ambassador Tambs on the line. . . .

"And we explained this to Tambs, that is, that there was going to be this press conference, it had nothing to do with the use of the airstrip. The airstrip, as far as I knew, was long since, since you are talking about September, so it is May to September, out of use.

"But there was no good going to come out of that press conference for the United States or for Costa Rica. Would you please call President

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		Arias, I said, call him up and ask him not to allow that--cancel the press conference? Tell your Minister of Public Security not to hold that press conference with an implied threat. "This was--well, this was before his official visit to the U.S. I don't recall whether at that moment we knew when he was coming, but the issue of his official visit was in the air. And I instructed Ambassador Tambs to advert to the visit in a way which made it clear to President Arias that his visit was at risk. That is to say, something like this is a needless, a gratuitous complication of U.S./Costa Rican relations, it is an exceedingly odd thing to do, gratuitiously, in the period when we are all contemplating an official visit. "It was supposed to be diplomatic, but the message was supposed to be clear. "Mr. BELNICK. Almost a contradicition in terms here? "Mr. ABRAMS. No, no, no. Be a good diplomat. Get the message through clearly. So he said, I will do that. And he--there was another conversation then an hour or two later, midnight, one o'clock, something like that, in which Ambassador Tambs reported he had done so and the press conference was cancelled. That was the end of that night's activities. "Mr. BELNICK. You are aware that Colonel North has written a PROF message in which he says that he spoke to the head of State in Costa Rica, had a conversation with him and conveyed the threat or at least the notion that the aid might	

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		be cut off if this press conference took place. "Do you have any knowledge as to whether Colonel North had such a conversation with the Chief of State of Costa Rica? "Mr. ABRAMS. Not--well, to my personal knowledge, no. I do know President Arias has flatly denied it and that Colonel North did not tell me that he had had such a conversation." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 61-64.)	
86/09/05-238 SEPTEMBER 5-6, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE NORTH PROF: North writes in a PROF to Poindexter: "Last night at 2330 our Project Democracy rep. in Costa Rica called to advise that the Arias Govt [redacted] was going to hold a press conference today (Saturday) announcing that an illegal support operation for the Contras had been taking place from an airfield in Costa Rica for over a year. The names of two Americans Secord and [redacted] were going to be predominantly mentioned. I called [redacted] to confirm the info and he returned call at 0030 verifying the info. I then had a conference call w/ Tambs, Abrams and [redacted] and we agreed on the following sequence: -- North to call Pres. Arias and tell him that if the press conference were held, Arias [redacted] wd never see a nickel of the $80M that McPhearson had promised him earlier on Friday. -- Tambs then called Arias from his leave location in W. Va. and confirmed what I had said and suggested that Arias talk to Elliott for further confirmation. -- Arias then got the same word	

from Elliott. [Redacted.] At 0300 Arias called back to advise that there wd be no press conference and no team of reporters sent to the airfield. As a precaution, the Project a/c were flown [redacted] last night and no project personnel remain in site at the field other than local guards (8). [Redacted] advises today that this operation was timed to coincide w/ the Conference on our $100M and was directed by the Cubans, [redacted.] I recognize that I was well beyond my charter in dealing w/ a head of state this way and in making threats/offers that may be impossible to deliver, but under the circumstances -- and w/ Elliott's concurrence -- it seemed like the only thing we could do. Best of all, it seems to have worked. I believe that it is important that you or [redacted] or both make a trip down there again as soon as the $100M is approved so that someone w/ more horsepower than I can look Arias [redacted] very aware of our resolve in making this project work. If [redacted] were to go it wd be a good opportunity for him to become familiar w/ some of the faces which will be critical to this effort if it is to succeed. V/R North"
(JHICI Ex. OLN 301 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 9/6/86].)

86/09/05-239
SEPTEMBER
5-7, 1986

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE
POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF:

Poindexter responds by PROF to North's earlier message about his actions to prevent the press conference in Costa Rica to expose the airstrip:

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		"Thanks, Ollie. You did the right thing, but let's try to keep it quiet. . . ." (Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran," 9/7/86 [Committee Document N 12159]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 76. See also 86/09/05-238 [text of North PROF to Poindexter on his actions to avert the press conference].)	
86/09/05-240 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Did you ever have occasion to call the President of Costa Rica to threaten to cut off foreign assistance in the event that he held a press conference revealing the airstrip in Costa Rica? "Mr. NORTH. I did not make the call. The PROF's note to which you refer was specifically cast the way it was to protect the other two parties engaged. "Mr. COHEN. So you never made the call yourself? "Mr. NORTH. I did not." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 149-50; JHICI Ex. OLN 301 [North PROF to Poindexter, 9/6/86: "I recognize that I was well beyond my charter in dealing w/ a head of state this way and making threats/offers that may be impossible to deliver"].)	
86/09/05-241 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Colonel North sent you a PROFS note in October, '86, indicating that he had	

called the President of Costa Rica to explain that if he went ahead and called a press conference disclosing the existence of the airstrip, there would be some retaliation taken against Costa Rica.

"You responded at that time that you did the right thing, but let's try to keep it quiet.

"The question I have is, do you believe it is the right thing for an NSC staff member to call the head of state of a friendly country and seek to intimidate or threaten political and economic retaliation in the event that he went forward and called a press conference?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I recall, from my preparations for these hearings, that PROFS note goes on and says several other things, that there had been conversations with Assistant Secretary Abrams and with Ambassador Tambs.

"Mr. COHEN. The question I have is, is it the right thing for someone on your staff to call the head of state of another country?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it depends on the circumstances, Senator. It depends upon the country. It depends upon who the leader is. It depends upon what sort of acquaintance the staff officer has. It depends on a lot of things.

"Mr. COHEN. In any event, you now know the call was never placed? Well, I will represent to you--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I don't know that.

"Mr. COHEN. --Colonel North represented that he did not place that call.

". . . ."

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		(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 70-71. See 86/09/05-239 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran," 9/7/86].)	
86/09/05-245 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. A PROFS note was written by Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter indicating the Colonel had called President Arias of Costa Rica threatening to cut off economic assistance in the event a press conference was held to disclose the existence of an air strip, and Admiral Poindexter wrote back on his PROFS computer system, 'Well done, but let's keep it a secret.' Or 'You did the right thing', I think, are the exact words, 'You did the right thing, but let's not talk about it.' "Do you think it is appropriate under any circumstances to have a staff member of the NSC to be calling the head of the State to engage in that kind of a threat? "Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly not. But I am not even sure that phone call was actually made. "Mr. COHEN. It wasn't. The fact is it was not made. The question I raise is under any circumstances, would it be warranted and should it be condoned if it had been placed? "Secretary SHULTZ. No." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 23-24.)	
86/09/05-247 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE: WHETHER NORTH CALLED PRESIDENT ARIAS C/CATF ACCOUNT:	

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		"C/CATF. [Redacted.] As the committee is aware, North was full of bombast. He met with a lot of people and did a lot of things, and I always wondered how he could do them because he didn't speak to Spanish speakers. Look at the famous call to Arias, I was sure he didn't do that. There were other people that he said that he spoke with from time to time and I always wondered how a non-Spanish speaker got through to Spanish-speaking people only. [Redacted.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 103.)	
86/09/05-250 SEPTEMBER 5, 1986		THE AIRSTRIP AND SOUTHERN FRONT OPERATIONS: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . Did you ever have a discussion about the Southern Front, the opening up of that, with Elliott Abrams, as you can recall? "Mr. NORTH. As I've testified the opening of a Southern Front was viewed as an absolute political and military necessity by everybody on the Restricted Interagency Group. There is no doubt I told members of the group that an air field was being built by a private benefactor organization or by Project Democracy or whatever. And it was being done with the assistance of people at the embassy. I do not recall if I specified it was Ambassador Tambs. "Mr. DEWINE. Do you recall . . . any specific conversation with Elliott Abrams about that? . . . "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall a specific	

conversation. There is no doubt that that subject came up at some length and there was after all a conference call among Ambassador Tambs, Mr. Abrams and myself one evening when the exposure of that air field became an issue.

"Mr. DEWINE. When it became an issue?

"Do you ever recall any conversation with Elliott Abrams about any other aspect of that prior to that date? Prior to when it became an issue?

"Mr. NORTH. No. But I would point out again when I called him or he called me or however it worked, neither of us [was] surprised.

"Mr. DEWINE. Neither was surprised?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, in other words, when that issue of exposure of a secret air field in that country came to be an issue, it was no great surprise to him or to the Ambassador or to anyone. I mean, we knew that we did not want it exposed. We did not want to jeopardize the previous Administration in that country that helped us build it nor jeopardize the personnel that were engaged in it."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 147-48.)

86/09/06-100
SEPTEMBER 6,
1986

THE COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP PRESS CONFERENCE: NOTICE TO SHULTZ

ABRAMS ACCOUNT:

Abrams notifies Shultz about the proposed Costa Rican press conference:

"Mr. BELNICK. Did you report to Secretary of State Shultz when North called you about the press conference that he feared would be held by the

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Costa Rican Government? "Mr. ABRAMS. I didn't report to him at midnight, I reported to him early the ensuing day, because it was necessary to tell him what had happened, that I had instructed Tambs. Because you see, actually we had raised the prospect of the state visit being involved in this (a). (b), Secretary Shultz was seeing Arias within about a week at the UN--well, maybe not within a week, but a couple of weeks--so yes." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 87-88.)	
86/09/08-100 SEPTEMBER 8, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: STATUS NORTH MEMO: In a memo to Poindexter, North writes of a telephone conversation in which the Second Iranian (see 86/01/11-180) told Cave that his boss had approved of the planned meeting between the Relative (see 86/01/11-180) of the high Iranian official and U.S. representatives. North adds that the Second Iranian's prompt transmission of the Prime Minister's approval was interpreted by the CIA as "confirmation that Rafsanjani may be moving to take control of the entire process of the U.S. relationship and the hostages." (North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps with Iran," Tab A: "Supplement Paper on Next Steps with Iran," 9/8/86 [Committee Document N 2807, at N 2808-09]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 250.)
86/09/08-120 SEPTEMBER 8, 1986			IRAN INITIATIVE: STATUS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. I will show you [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit

48, which is a memorandum dated September 8, 1986 from North to you. Again, it is a 'Next Steps' memo, and it has an approve with a check mark. I take it you cannot tell whether that is your check mark or not?

"A. I can't tell whether that is my check mark or not.

"Q. Did the President of the United States approve the opening of the second channel?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did the President of the United States approve the shipment of 500 TOWs to the second channel or through the second channel?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Were you aware, sir, that under the arrangements that were made with the second channel that you would not be receiving all of the hostages upon the delivery of the 500 TOWs?

"A. I believe so, but I would have to go back to review those documents.

"Q. As you sit here today, without reviewing a whole mass of documents, are you able to tell us how it happened that the President of the United States changed his position from insisting on release of all of the hostages before any more arms were delivered to Iran to accepting a sequential release of the hostages with deliveries of arms?

"(Witness consulting with counsel)

"THE WITNESS: I think, as with all of us, as the evolution wore on, the President was just simply, was unwilling to give up the possibility of at least getting some out, although that wasn't

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			our main objective. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. And did you recommend that to him? "A. Probably. I would have -- as you can tell from earlier PROFS notes, I felt pretty strongly that we ought to get them all. "Q. I can tell from earlier PROF notes that you appeared to be the tough guy. "A. Yes. "Q. Did it ultimately wear you away? "A. I can't recall whether I recommended that to the President or not. I didn't disagree with him, but I can't recall actually what he recommended. "Q. Was there anyone else in the White House group who was urging the President to take what he could get? "A. No, I don't think so. Although the Vice President and the Chief of Staff were usually there for meetings, I discussed things with the President. They pretty much left the discussion up to the President and me. I don't recall their voicing opinions one way or the other." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 44-46; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 48 [= JHICI Ex. OLN 302; North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps with Iran," 9/8/86].)
86/09/09-200 SEPTEMBER 9, 1986		NORTH'S AND DUTTON'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES DUTTON ACCOUNT: On September 8, 1986, Dutton travels again to Central America at the request of North and Secord. The following day, Dutton sends a message	

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		to North by KL-43 asking for North's help "both for weather and for location of the [Contra] troops" in the south for a drop. North tells Dutton "that the best weather information was available right there . . . through the local embassy and he said that he would talk to . . . [the chief of station] about locating the troops." That same day, because of the problems contacting the troops and in locating the drop, Dutton flies "a mission with our people into Nicaragua to attempt a delivery to the southern force. . . . We were unsuccessful after an hour of searching . . . . To me, two of the main problems that we ran into [were], once again, we did not have good weather information and we couldn't find the troops and we had made a sustained effort to do that." Later that night, Dutton calls North at home to tell him about the mission. "After he listened to me describing it a bit, he said, you went on the mission, didn't you? . . . And he told me never to do that again, that I knew too many of the people involved and too much of the operation, that that was the kind of exposure we didn't need. I agreed with that. But it was important that one time somebody who was making the kinds of decisions that I was being asked to make go in and see it first-hand." Dutton never flies another mission inside Nicaragua. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 69-74.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/09/09-300 MAY - SEPTEMBER 1986		THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: C/CATF AWARENESS C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. . . . [C/CATF] Exhibit 20 [is] a few pages out of the deposition of Mr. Dutton. . . . ". . . . "Mr. Carome. The last page of the exhibit, which is page 82. I would like to read a few questions and answers. "Colonel Dutton -- this is a question from counsel. 'Colonel Dutton, what was the role of the CIA in your September operation? 'Answer:' -- "[C/CATF.] September of '85 or '86? "Mr. Carome. This was September, '86, he was referring to. "'Answer: I think in September, I can't say that it was that much different than at any time. [Redacted'] -- that's [redacted] -- 'was critical to us throughout the operation and and [redacted] remained involved with us throughout the operation.' "And I skip down to the middle of the page. "The question: 'Let me ask you this question: Could your successful missions and air drops to the southern front in September, could those have been accomplished without [redacted] assistance? "'Answer: No way.' "My question to you: At what point did it become evident to you that your [redacted] was playing the role Mr. Dutton describes here? "[C/CATF.] Well, first off, I don't want to	

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		speak in definitive terms because I don't know the full range in my mind of what [redacted] exact involvement was. That's a very complicated question you have asked, and I think I have to go back to May of 1986 to answer that question, because of a sequence of events that took place. "In May of 19 -- we knew in May and even before, in late April, I believe, and I would have to check the traffic, there were attempts by the private benefactors from [redacted] to fly flights into the southern front. We were asked, and I think that you have and we have discussed many times, for information on vectors and flights to move things down there and that information was very clearly to provide to the southern front in the context of the law, which had now changed dramatically. The Boland Amendment had gone the wrong way; the indirect language was -- we were in a leaning posture now than we had in hard-core Boland, modified Boland, and we were providing intelligence that could be used for resupply flights and for the various resistance forces. "We were deriving similar intelligence for the FDN in the north as well. I knew that [redacted] was getting that information through the -- I thought through the resistance forces into the using element, and I knew the using element to be those people flying the flights out of [redacted]. "I did not know that he was directly involved in those flights at that point in time or dealing with the private benefactors at that point in time. Had I known that I would not have condoned that.	

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		"We had a meeting that was critical to this whole endeavor in March -- late May of 1986 in [redacted.]" (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 15-17; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 20. For C/CATF Testimony following shortly after this excerpt, see above at 86/03/15-100. See also 86/02/01-293, -294 [C/CATF awareness of Gadd's and Rodriguez' involvement in the resupply operation].)	
86/09/09-810 SEPTEMBER 9, 1986			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Frank Herbert Reed, Headmaster of the Lebanese International School, is kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3.)
86/09/10-100 SEPTEMBER 3-10, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: NIR UPDATE NORTH PROF AND MEMO: North tells McFarlane by PROF on September 3, 1986, that Nir is arriving the next week, and "will raise enough hell to move it [the Ghorbanifar sequential release proposal; see 86/08/08-500; 86/09/02-100; 86/09/03-100] if it hasn't all fallen apart by then." North prepares "Talking Points" for Poindexter's September 10 meeting with Nir. At the meeting, according to the "Talking Points," Poindexter is to tell Nir that the United States will continue to seek the release of the hostages held in Lebanon, that the United States has developed the Second Channel, that the Second Channel is connected with Iranian Speaker Rafsanjani, and that the President has approved proceeding with a meeting with the Rafsanjani

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			representative. (North PROF to McFarlane, "Anything going on?," 9/3/86 [Committee Document N 12156]; North memo to Poindexter, "Meeting with Amiram Nir," Tab I: "Talking Points," 9/9/86 [Committee Documents N 44513, at 44515-16]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 251.)
86/09/12-810 SEPTEMBER 12, 1986			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Joseph Cicippio, Deputy Comptroller of the American University in Beirut, is kidnapped in Lebanon. (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 3.)
86/09/12-900 SEPTEMBER 12, 1986		THE ISRAELIS OFFER SOVIET BLOC WEAPONS TO THE CONTRAS NORTH PROF: In a PROF note to Poindexter, North reports on a meeting with Defense Minister Rabin. Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for SovBloc weaps and ammo he could make avail." Rabin asked whether North's ship, the Erria (see entries starting at 86/05/15-390), had left the Mediterranean. When North responded that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested having it dock at Haifa and "hav[ing] it filled w/ whatever they cd have assembled" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." (North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 9/12/86 [Committee Document N 12163]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 75.)	
86/09/13-100 SEPTEMBER 13,		POINDEXTER APPROVES PRIVATE DEAL TO OBTAIN ISRAELI-CAPTURED ARMS FOR CONTRAS	

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1986		POINDEXTER AND NORTH PROFS: Poindexter responds to North's PROF describing an offer of arms to the Contras by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin (see 86/09/12-900): "I think you should go ahead and make it happen. It can be a private deal between Dick and Rabin that we bless. As I told you in the other note I talked to Casey this morning about Secord. Keep the pressure on Bill to make things right for Secord." North later responds that the Erria (see 86/05/15-390; and 86/09/12-900) will pick up the arms: "Re the Israeli arms. Orders were passed to the ship this morning to proceed to Haifa to pick up the arms. Loading will be accomplished during one night and the ship will be back at sea before dawn. Loading will be accomplished by Israeli military personnel." Poindexter, in reply, cautions North that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me. In fact I hope Nir doesn't even know about it." (JHICI Ex. JMP 60 [Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran," 9/13/86 (Committee Document N 12163); North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 9/15/86 (Committee Document N 18045); Poindexter PROF to North, "Iran," 9/15/86 (Committee Document N 18044)].)	
86/09/15-100 SEPTEMBER 15,		BRUNEI: MONEY ON THE WAY DoS CHRONOLOGY:	

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1986		"Brunei confirms that 'arrangements have been consummated.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/09/18-100.)	
86/09/15-400 SOMETIME IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1986		THE SOUTHERN FRONT OPERATION: ABRAMS' KNOWLEDGE TAMBS ACCOUNT: Tambs testifying further on his directive to open the southern front: "Chairman INOUYE. You got your marching orders on the opening of the southern front from Colonel North? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. You did not get this direction from the Secretary of State? "Mr. TAMBS. No, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. You were also instructed by the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Abrams, to effectuate the carrying out of the southern front? "Mr. TAMBS. The Assistant Secretary was abreast of all developments when I saw him on various occasions, and I assumed, consequently, that he and the other members of the RIG were directing this. This was confirmed as late as September 1986, when we had another chief of missions meeting at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, in which the three members of RIG, as well as other people, were present when the . . . Chief of the CIA Central American Task Force gave a presentation which reviewed the entire situation in the presence of some 30 to 35 people." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 202-03. See	

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		id., 5/28/87, at 158-61 [airstrip also discussed at chief of missions meeting in Sept. 1985], 233.)	
86/09/15-500 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION NORTH MEMO: North memo to Poindexter, "Follow-on Meeting with Amiram Nir": "You are scheduled to meet with Ami Nir again this afternoon at 1:30 p.m. for 10 minutes. Purpose of this meeting is to debrief Nir on his meetings with Peres over the weekend. You will then be able to brief the President on Peres' views [redacted]. "[Redacted.] "Recommendations[:] "1. That you privately discuss the papers at Tabs I and II with Director Casey and indicate next steps after the conversation." [Approve box initialed "JP" with hand-written words "See note on Tab II. I'll provide Tab to Casey."] "2. That you brief the President on the initiative outlined at Tab III." [Approve box initialed "JP" with "Done" beneath it] [3 pages wholly redacted] "[Tab III:] POSSIBLE PERES DISCUSSION ITEMS WITH THE PRESIDENT[:] "Amiram Nir, the Special Assistant to Prime Minister Peres on Counter-Terrorism, has indicated that during the 15 minute private discussion with

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			the President, Peres is likely to raise several sensitive issues: "[Redacted.] "Hostages: Several weeks ago, Peres expressed concern that the U.S. may be contemplating termination of current efforts with Iran. The Israelis view the hostage issue as a 'hurdle' which must be crossed enroute to a broadened strategic relationship with the Iranian government. It is likely that Peres will seek assurances that the U.S. will indeed continue with the current 'joint initiative' [redacted.] In that neither Weir nor Jenco would be free today without Israeli help (particularly in logistics), it would be helpful if the President would simply thank Peres for their discrete [sic] assistance. "[Redacted.]" (JHICI Ex. OLN 303 [= Ex. JMP 58].)
86/09/15-501 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986		ISRAELI OFFER OF ARMS FOR THE CONTRAS NORTH MEMO (cont'd): Despite a warning by Poindexter to keep quiet the news of an Israeli offer of arms for the Contras (see 86/09/12-900, 86/09/13-100), North recounted the offer in the same memo (see 86/09/15-500) for briefing the President for a visit from Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. North wrote that Prime Minister Peres was likely to raise certain sensitive issues, such as the transfer of Soviet bloc arms by the Israelis "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance." North recommended: "If Peres raises this	

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		issue, it would be helpful if the President thanked him since the Israelis hold considerable stores of bloc ordinance compatible with what the Nicaraguan resistance now uses." Next to this sentence, Poindexter penciled: "Rabin. Very tightly held." (Iran-Contra Report, at 75-76 [citing JHICI Ex. OLN 303 (North memo to Poindexter, "Follow-on Meeting with Amiram Nir," 9/15/86; Committee Documents N 2927-31)].)	
86/09/15-505 MAY 8 AND SEPTEMBER 15, 1986		ISRAELI PROPOSAL OF CONTRA TRAINERS, AND ISRAELI-SUPPLIED ARMS FOR THE CONTRAS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. I'll next mark as the next exhibits two PROF notes, each given a separate number, one dated 5/8/86 [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 29], one dated 9/15/86 [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 28]. Both of them are addressed to you from North. [Redacted.] ". . . . "[Q.] The other is a message that refers to a [redacted] offer to put some Spanish-speaking Israelis into Central America to assist in training. ". . . . "My question is whether you've seen these PROF notes before and whether this was a subject that was briefed to the President of the United States, just so you know when you read them what I'm looking for. "(Pause.) "Whenever you're ready, Admiral. "A. Okay.	

"Q. I'm talking about on Exhibit 28, I referred you only to the top note. Do you recall that note?

"A. I don't recall the note. I recall the issue.

"Q. The issue being?

"A. [Redacted.] I do recall that issue.

"Q. Was that ever reported to the President of the United States by you?

"A. [Redacted.]

"Q. [Redacted.]

"A. It's conceivable, but again --

"Q. It rings a bell?

"A. Yes, it rings a bell, but I don't have a firm recollection of it.

"Q. What about Rabin's offer to send some Spanish-speaking advisors to Central America?

"A. That's more vague. I don't remember the note that you have here that's Exhibit 29.

". . . .

"A. I'm not sure I fully answered your question on the Spanish-speaking trainers. I said I didn't recall the message. It's very vague. I do have a recollection that at various points the Israelis did talk in terms of offering some trainers. I don't remember this particular message.

"Q. Do you remember discussing that with the President of the United States?

"A. I don't remember that, because I don't think we ever did that or they ever agreed to do it."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 286-88, 291;

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		Poindexter Dep. Ex. 28 [North PROF to Poindexter, 9/15/86], Dep. Ex. 29 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Contra Project," 5/8/86].)	
86/09/15-510 FROM LATE DECEMBER 1985 THROUGH 1986	OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS SALES NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 1: "Mr. Liman. Colonel, you referred to certain operations that were going to be funded from the proceeds of the arms sale. I think you described them as TA-1 and TA-2. Would you describe to us what you were referring to. TH, I guess. "Mr. North. I do not recollect all of the different operations that were proposed, but there was a listing of them that I prepared for Admiral Poindexter. I believe two or three of them were approved for -- pursuing with [redacted.] "As I recall, of the five, I think it was -- and again I am working without my notes or recollection refreshed by them, but it was TA-1, TA-2, and I think TH-1, 2, and 3, and it may be the reverse order. "[Redacted.] "The initiative never came to actuality simply because I was terminated -- or I was -- bad expression, but I was reassigned before we could actually implement it. "Mr. Liman. Was that to be funded out of proceeds from this venture? "Mr. North. Yes. "Mr. Liman. Was there a finding that was prepared for it? "Mr. North. No.		OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS SALES NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 1.

"Mr. Liman. And who was aware of this?

"Mr. North. Admiral Poindexter had a memorandum from me on that, and it was -- and I'm not -- I don't want to leave a misimpression with the committee. When Director Casey and I talked about this, he was enthusiastic about it, [redacted] and I think if we had gotten to the point beyond discussing it with simply face to face with [redacted] that we would have taken it to the finding process.

"I can't say that we would have. I can't say that we wouldn't have, but it was never discussed far enough along the line other than the fact that we intended to use residuals from this transaction to support the activity.

"Mr. Liman. Was that discussed with the President of the United States?

"Mr. North. I do not know. It was not discussed in my presence with the President. I sent forward a paper which described the operation and that was in anticipation of a discussion between the President and [redacted.]

"Mr. Liman. Was that paper one of the papers that was shredded?

"Mr. North. I do not recall whether I actually got the original back on that one or not. I think a part of that paper is in the documents that you sent us for review and I must confess not to have had a chance to go through it, but I think you will see -- there's a document that I believe I saw today in preparing for my testimony earlier that has several attachments removed.

"I think what happened is you did not get the

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	attachment up here. The attachments may have been destroyed or they may have been withheld by the executive. "Mr. Liman. . . . Is that memorandum one of the five memos that you were describing? You described five memos? [See 86/04/00-100, -200 (North on number of diversion memos).] "Mr. North. No. No. The five memos I have described to you -- and I believe it is five, because there were five transactions -- the April one that you have a memo on was one of the five transactions that we thought was sufficiently solid identified to pursue [sic], and so -- there were three that actually transpired, and I recall one other one that was-- almost went to fruition. ". . . . "Mr. Liman. Did this come before the concept of funding for the contras or at the same time? "Mr. North. [Redacted] first raised these proposals with me during his visit to the United States -- and I say the end of December, 1985, early 1986." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 5-9.)		
86/09/15-511 LATE DECEMBER 1985 THROUGH 1986	OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS SALES NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 2: "[Redacted.] "Mr. Liman. Colonel, did this progress to the point where it became an actual plan and went into operation? "Mr. North. No. None of these operations		OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 1.

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	ever went to fruition. "Mr. Liman. And it never went to finding? "Mr. North. No. "Mr. Liman. And they were all subject of a memorandum or memoranda by you? "Mr. North. Yes. "Mr. Liman. And these were documents that were sent to Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. North. Yes, sir. "Mr. Liman. For his presenting them to the President? "Mr. [North.] That is correct. Well -- none of these ones that we have talked about went to fruition. So far." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 10. See id. at 11-18, 74-78 [further North testimony on the other covert operations and how they were funded].)		
86/09/15-513 FROM LATE 1985	OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: "Mr. Cheney. . . . Let me make sure I understand your testimony on these others operations contemplated or undertaken out of the residuals to be generated by the arms sales to Iran. "My impression of what you said is there were sort of two categories of activity, one category involved [redacted,] that is not an activity that ordinarily requires a finding, doesn't fall into the area of covert actions per se. "The other category had to do with these three		OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS FUNDED BY THE IRANIAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION: See col. 1.

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	programs you mentioned or proposals you mentioned in connection with [redacted] and so forth. Any funds ever expended on any of those activities? "Mr. North. Well, as I indicated, we spent a fairly significant amount of money on the DEA operation. "Mr. Cheney. I am aware of the DEA operation. Other than the DEA operation, were any funds ever expended? "Mr. Fascell. TH-1, TH-2. "Mr. North. I don't recall whether or not [redacted] got money for those operations or not, Congressman Cheney. I honestly don't know. "Mr. Cheney. It makes some difference obviously to the committee in terms of whether these were plans discussed and contemplated so that they were activities actually undertaken. "Mr. North. I understand. There may have been some let us call it seed money that would allow for meetings to take place in Europe, or something like that, to see if things could get going. I know we didn't spend the major expenditures that were anticipated. For example, on [redacted.] "Mr. Cheney. Other than the DEA -- "Mr. North. Other than the DEA one is the only major one I can recall off the top of my head." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 64-65.)		
86/09/15-514 FROM LATE	OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS: FUNDING NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:		OTHER COVERT OPERATIONS: FUNDING NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION:

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DECEMBER 1985 THROUGH 1986	"Mr. Courter. . . . The residuals, Colonel North, that were totalling up were earmarked for various purposes obviously. It wasn't just for the contras. It was for the DEA operation. Then as time went on, others as well. Do you . . . have any idea of the total amount of money that was obligated so to speak, or earmarked, or designated for a combination of those action programs? "Mr. North. No, I don't, Congressman. I guess I don't necessarily want it on the record, but that is one of the problems of destroying records. "Mr. Courter. Did [o]ther records reflect that? "Mr. North. I don't recall specifically, but as I indicated earlier, I had told General Secord on a number of occasions -- remember, we have to set aside money for this. Remember, we have to set aside money for that. On a couple of occasions. I do not believe I ever briefed General Secord in detail on what I have described here as TA-1, 2, and TH-1, 2 and 3. The [redacted] didn't want me to, and I didn't brief him, but I did ask the General to set aside monies for those purposes. "Mr. Courter. But you never totaled up or did you tell him not only to set aside monies but did you ask him or tell him how much you wanted to set aside for a particular program or did you just say that[,] set something aside? "Mr. North. No. On a couple of occasions -- for example, the $2 million entry that is in my		See col. 1.

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	book, my sense is that I specified $2 million. And there were other activities which I asked [redacted] to price out. I mean, I asked them to give me what is your estimate as to what it will cost. I think there is another entry you have referred to counsel that was a million dollars. My sense is that I would have asked -- I don't recall the specific conversation. We had a lot of them. But I would say look, I have another activity. You don't need to know about it right now. Set it aside. "Mr. Courter. Before you called up General Secord and told him to set aside a million dollars, or two million, did you ask one of your superiors whether that sum of money was reasonable, or did you conclude, based on your conversation with [redacted] or who[m]ever, that that was the appropriate amount? "Mr. North. I did not -- in fact, I never burdened my superiors with those kinds of details. Never." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 71-72.)		
86/09/15-520 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986	OTHER DIVERSIONS: AUTHORIZATION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 3.		THE IRAN INITIATIVE: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Look at . . . Exhibit [OLN] 303. "Again you have a recommendation. One is that he [Poindexter] discuss something with Director Casey relating to Mr. Nir and the Iran initiative. "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. The second is that you brief the

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			President on the initiative outlined on tab 3. "Mr. NORTH. Initiatives, plural. "Mr. LIMAN. Sorry. "Mr. NORTH. I believe these are the ones we talked about last night. [See entries starting at 86/09/15-510.] "Mr. LIMAN. There again there is approved, JP, correct? "Mr. NORTH. JP, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And these initiatives, these initiatives would be funded out of the residuals? "Mr. NORTH. Yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 70-71; JHICI Ex. OLN 303 [= Ex. JMP 58].)
86/09/15-560 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986	THE IRAN INITIATIVE: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.		THE IRAN INITIATIVE: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Before you start reading [Ex. JMP 58], so you will read it with some context in mind, my understanding of Colonel North's testimony is that he said that the project that's referred to there, and that's referred to in particular in the third page where it refers to a phase 1, is one that was to be paid for out of the proceeds of the Iranian arms sale. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . And the question that I'm going to put is whether you knew, whether you were told by Colonel North or otherwise knew that the funds for this project were to come out of the Iranian arms sale and, if so, whether you briefed the President on that. ". . . .

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			"Mr. LIMAN. . . . It's a memo from Oliver North to him that requests that he brief the President on the initiatives outlined in tab 3. "This is tab 3. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have not seen this unredacted version for a good period of time so it will take me just a second here. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. The first question is, did you know that the funds for this project were to come from the Iranian arms sale? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I honestly don't believe so, but I have a very dim memory of this memorandum. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you brief the President on the initiative that is referred to there? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is my problem. I think looking at the package that probably what I briefed the President on was what has your Bates No. 2931 on it, because that in a much more condensed fashion covers the same general points. "Also I have made some marginal notes on that page, which looks to me like what I often did for something that--it highlight [sic] for me when this was in front of me talking to the President about it, that is a further condensation of the main points that he should be prepared to talk to Prime Minister Peres about. "Mr. LIMAN. Those are your handwritten marks on that page? "Mr. POINDEXTER. On 2931, right. "Mr. LIMAN. As you sit here today, do you recall whether you knew that the funds for that project were to come from the Iranian arms sale?

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. I honestly do not know. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you know whether you discussed with the President how the project was to be funded? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember, but I would seriously doubt it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 160-64; JHICI Ex. JMP 58 [= Ex. OLN 303; Poindexter memo to North, "Subject: Follow-on Meeting with Amiram Nir," 9/15/86].)
86/09/15-570 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986	OTHER COVERT PROGRAMS: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.		THE IRAN INITIATIVE: FURTHER STAGES OF DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LEON. Now, there has been some discussion in these hearings with regard to a particular exhibit and with regard to the possibility of briefings by you of the President with regard to diverting money from the arms sales transactions to Iran for the purposes of other covert programs. "I believe you have testified that you were unaware of the existence or even the prospect of such programs that Director Casey had in mind? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I don't think I have testified quite that way. "Mr. LEON. Let's focus your attention on that. Let me ask you to look at Exhibit [JMP] 58, which is an unclassified version of the September 15, 1986 memorandum that has received so much attention recently . . . . ". . . This was Exhibit 303 in Colonel North's testimony. You are familiar with these exhibits, are you not, Admiral?

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I obviously saw them at one point because I have got some notes on them and I have read them. "Mr. LEON. . . . Starting with the first page of that exhibit, is there any reference that you can see on that page with respect to the prospect of diverting money from the arms sales transactions with Iran for any purpose? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. Neither in Exhibit 58 [n]or the classified version of it. "Mr. LEON. Why don't you turn to the second page of both copies that you have? "Now, the unclassified version obviously has nothing there, but if you would refer to the second page of the classified version, do you see any reference in there to the diverting of money from the Iranian arms sales for the purpose of other covert programs? ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. There is nothing to indicate the use of diversion or the use of residual funds to finance this. ". . . . "Mr. LEON. Is there any reference on [the third] page to the diverting of money from the Iranian arms sales for the purpose of funding any other kinds of covert programs? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, there are not. "Mr. LEON. Is it your testimony today that this exhibit does not establish the fact that the President was briefed as was indicated on here on the first page, that there was a briefing, with your initials and 'done', that there was any

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			briefing by you of the President of the United States with respect to the possibility of diverting funds from the Iranian arms sales transactions? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, there is absolutely no indication of that. The President was getting ready to meet with Prime Minister Peres and there were several items that they wanted him to discuss with Prime Minister Peres. "The unclassified issue was on the hostages, and essentially I wanted the President to thank Prime Minister Peres for the assistance that the Israeli Government was giving to the United States in this regard and the other aspects of the Iranian project. "The other issues are classified, but I can testify that there is nothing in those other issues that talks about the use of residual funds for any covert activity. "Mr. LEON. . . . [D]id you ever brief the President about the prospect of diverting funds from the Iranian arms sales for any other covert programs? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I did not. "The reason that I said a moment ago that I didn't believe I testified quite the way you phrased it is that we did--not the President, but Colonel North, others on my staff, and I--and I believe also I discussed it with Director Casey, the possibility of conducting some other operations with other third countries; but even in those discussions, there was no discussion of the source of funding that would be required for those

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			cooperative efforts. "Mr. LEON. So the notion that--circulating around in the media and other places--that the President had had proposed to him the possibility of getting money from the Iranian arms sales to fund other things has no basis as far as you know? "Mr. POINDEXTER. None whatsoever." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 84-88.)
86/09/15-575 SEPTEMBER 15, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: U.S. AND ISRAELI GOALS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. . . . First, in referencing Exhibit No. [JMP] 58, September 15, 1986 letter [sic; memorandum], I would like to read and then I will ask you a question on the third page about hostages. "It says, 'Several weeks ago, Peres expressed concern that the United States may be contemplating termination of current efforts with Iran. The Israelis view the hostage issue as a "hurdle" which must be crossed en route to a broadened strategic relationship with the Iranian Government. It is likely that Peres will seek assurances that the United States will indeed continue with the current "joint initiative" . . . In that neither Weir nor Jenco would be free today without Israeli help, particularly in logistics, it would be helpful if the President would simply thank Peres for their discre[et] assistance.' "It is obvious to me by reading that record of September what was on your mind, what was on Oliver North's mind--and possibly the President's--was the fact that he was concerned

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			with the stragegic initiative and not simply hostages for weapons. "I would like you to question [sic] whether that was on the Israeli minds as well as far as you know? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As far as I know, based on my discussions with Amiram Nir, who I believe is the only Israeli official that I talked to directly on the matter, the hostage issue was clearly a peripheral issue. Their main objective was to establish a better understanding and channel into the Iranian Government so that the west could have some influence in Iran in the future. That was the major objective." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 211-13; JHICI Ex. JMP 58 [North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps," 9/15/86].)
86/09/15-580 1985-86	U.S.-ISRAELI COVERT OPERATIONS SUMMARY: For a brief summary of projects involving Israel which North set in motion with the aid of Nir during the winter of 1985-86, see Iran-Contra Report, at 366-67.		
86/09/16-100 SEPTEMBER 16, 1986			LEDEEN REQUESTS A MEETING WITH SHULTZ DoS CHRONOLOGY: "LEDEEN asks HILL to arrange a meeting with GPS to discuss the Iran matter. HILL takes no action." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/10/21-100.)

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86/09/18-100 SEPTEMBER 18, 1986		BRUNEI: MONEY ON THE WAY DoS CHRONOLOGY: "NORTH advises ABRAMS that Brunei funds have not been received in account, query Brunei." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/09/23-100.)	
86/09/19-010 SEPTEMBER 19, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT THE OEOB SECORD ACCOUNT: Meeting in the OEOB, with North in charge, among Secord ("I was the note taker"), a CIA representative, and a "relative of a high Iranian official" plus two of his assistants. They discuss a long term relationship between the U.S. and Iran, as well as hostages and weapons. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 100.)
86/09/19-015 SEPTEMBER 19, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT THE OEOB: THE WHITE HOUSE TOUR AND THE NOBEL PRIZE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . One of my purposes for taking the second channel, who was also a brave young man and also a soldier in his country, through the White House was to show him the Nobel Prize that was won by Teddy Roosevelt. I took him into the Roosevelt Room and I showed him that prize and I said, 'This is a Nobel Peace Prize, in fact the first one ever given to an American, and it was given to a President who saw that it was [to] the advantage of our country and to world peace to sit down in Portsmouth and have a

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			conference with two adversaries, the Russians and the Japanese, who were fighting a war thousands of miles away from us that had no immediate impact on Americans, and we solved it.' And that is what I was talking to the young Iranian about and that is the kind of thing that I was proposing to help us get beyond arms as a liability or arms for hostages. "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, did you believe that when you were talking to that young man, it was the equivalent of talking to people like Chou En Lai, which Kissinger did? "Mr. NORTH. No." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 11-12.)
86/09/19-020 SEPTEMBER 19, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT THE OEOB HAKIM ACCOUNT: North, [Secord], George Cave, Hakim and Iranian representatives meet for discussions. Hakim attends in his "commercial role" and leaves at certain points in the discussion. Hakim testified about the end of the meeting: "Mr. HAKIM. Towards the end of the day, after we broke and arra[]nged to have the meeting next day at our offices, Colonel North and I took our guest for a tour of the White House, and we took him to every corner of the White House, and by then-- "Mr. NIELDS. Did that include the Oval Office? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. We went--also we did not actually walk into the Oval Office, the doors were open. There was a little barrier, rope barrier in

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			front there, but we showed him the rooms and Colonel North, by this time, was also impressed by this gentleman, and he was feeling, after many months of frustration, he was feeling upbeat. It is interesting to note while we were passing by one of the corridors, stepping down the stairs, we came across a picture that was hanging on the wall. It portrayed the table and like a conference table and there were dogs sitting around the table and I remember one of the dogs I think was taking a little nap, and Ollie was feeling very upbeat and he asked me to translate for our guest that this represented our Cabinet, and that was Mr. Casey taking nap. That broke the ice." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 32-33.)
86/09/19-025 DURING SEPTEMBER 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT THE OEOB COY ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you have any meetings with the second channel? "A. Personally? "Q. Yes, sir. "A. No. Well, I met him as he came into the office to meet with North and Secord and George -- I think it was George, George Cave -- and Hakim, and then they met behind closed doors. And then he came out at some point in the afternoon looking for a prayer rug or something to pray on. We didn't have anything, so I gave him my gym towel. "He went into Earl's office and sat down on the prayer towel and did his thing. "Q. And did he immediately turn into an

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			athlete? "A. No. I've become quite a good distance runner, though. "Q. Did you get your gym towel back? "A. I got my gym towel back. "Q. With an inscription? "A. No. "Q. No cake, no nothing? "A. No cake, no key, no Bible -- nothing -- just my gym towel back, although I have to confess it's been washed. "Q. Aside from that event, did you have any participation in negotiations with the second channel? "A. No." (Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 26-27.)
86/09/19-200 SEPTEMBER 19-20, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL WASHINGTON VISIT SUMMARY: For a summary of the visit of the Second Channel to Washington, including its position on release of the Dawa and removal of Saddam Hussein as President of Iraq, see Iran-Contra Report, at 251-53. See also Tower Report, at B-157 through -160.
86/09/20-050 SEPTEMBER 20, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: STATUS OF TALKS NORTH PROF: In a PROF to Poindexter, North reports on his meetings with the Relative of the high Iranian official (see 86/01/11-180): "Talks going extremely well. They and we want to move quickly beyond the 'obstacle' of the

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			hostages. Sincerely believe that RR can be instrumental in bringing about an end to Iran/Iraq war--a la Roosevelt w/ Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Anybody for RR getting the same prize? . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 183 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran", 9/20/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 253 [footnote should read "PROF Note, 9/20/86 12:04:15, N 12605"]; Tower, at B-157.)
86/09/20-100 SEPTEMBER 20, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT STTGI HAKIM ACCOUNT: The day after the Second Channel meeting at the OEOB, a second meeting is held at the STTGI offices. Hakim discusses privately with the Iranians establishing commercial contacts and the financial remuneration of both sides. He then raises the topic before the whole group. The parties agree to report back to their governments and to meet again later. (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 34-38.)
86/09/20-110 SEPTEMBER 20, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL MEETING AT STTGI NAPIER ACCOUNT: According to Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, the Saturday meeting in mid-September 1986 included North, Secord, Hakim, Sam O'Neil, and 3 Iranians. (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 55-59.)
86/09/20-200 SEPTEMBER 8-20, 1986		THE DUTTON PICTURE BOOK DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton visits Central America and returns with photos of drop zones. On his return, he gets a	

photo album from Shirley Napier, "and I put together sort of a photographic document that said here is the operation, here are the assets, here are the people, here is the kind of weather they are having to fly in, here are the loads actually on the drop zone, and then I had a session on the problems we ran into, pictures of the aircraft stuck in the mud and that sort of thing."

"Mr. BALLEN. Why did you prepare this photograph album?

"Mr. DUTTON. I thought it was direct evidence of what was there. I thought it might be beneficial if Colonel North wanted to show it to people he was working with to say, here is a set, and what it looks like, not just written messages.

"Mr. BALLEN. What did you do with the photograph album after you prepared it?

"Mr. DUTTON. I finished it on Friday or Saturday morning. Colonel North and General Secord were at our offices in Virginia. General Secord looked through it. He liked it. . . . I showed [Col. North] the album and he liked it and said he would like to take it and show it to his top boss.

"Mr. BALLEN. Who did you understand Colonel North to be referring to when he said he would like to take the photograph album to show it to his top boss?

"Mr. DUTTON. I understood that to be the President.

"Mr. BALLEN. Why did you understand that?

"Mr. DUTTON. I never heard him use the term talking about anybody else he was working with as a top boss. He didn't refer to Admiral Poindexter that way. It was my impression.

"Mr. BALLEN. Did he refer to Director Casey as the top boss?

"Mr. DUTTON. No.

"Mr. BALLEN. How did he refer to Director Casey to you?

"Mr. DUTTON. If he did refer to Mr. Casey, he called him Bill.

"Mr. BALLEN. After you returned from Central America and gave Colonel North the photograph album, did Colonel North say anything else to you?

"Mr. DUTTON. He was feeling very good about what we had done. As I recall, it was then he said, Bob, you will never get a medal for this, but someday the President will shake your hand and thank you for it.

"Mr. BALLEN. Did you, in fact, meet the President?

"Mr. DUTTON. No, I did not."

(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 84-89. See id., 5/27/87, at 22. See id., 5/27/87, at 22 ["In September, after what I consider we became successful and I came back from my trip to Central America, I met Colonel North out in our office and he said . . . , this has been a success, you will never get a medal for this but someday the President will shake your hand and thank you."], 84-89.)

86/09/20-250
ABOUT
SEPTEMBER 20,

THE DUTTON PICTURE BOOK
NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on Dutton's photo album of the

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1986		resupply operation: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you obtain from Mr. Dutton a book of photographs? "Mr. NORTH. From who[m]? Oh, yes, I did. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [T]his was, I take it, a book of photographs of various aspects of the resupply operation? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Planes -- "Mr. NORTH. And other things, too. I don't recall specifically what was in the book, but that's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell him that you wanted that book so that you would have something to show the President about the good work that they were doing? "Mr. NORTH. I am not sure that I put it that way. You know, I want to get away from this 'Ollie North wanted to get the credit' stuff, because I didn't. I think what I wanted to do was to -- if I said something to that effect, I think the President ought to see this and I think I made an effort to send it up to the President through the National Security Adviser, and I don't know whether it ever got to the President or not. But if the book is still around, somebody ought to send it to him, because the President ought to be aware of what a handful of people did to keep the Nicaraguan resistance alive at a time when nobody at this Congress seemed to care. And it is important that the President know that good men gave inordinate amounts of time and some gave their lives to support that activity, and some of	

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		them had been brutally treated by what has come about in these two parallel investigations, brutally treated. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. I would like to correct something I just said, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to those who did care, because there were many members of this body who cared a lot, and eventually a majority cared again and chose to appropriate $100 million to support that resistance. . . . I deperately believe that if nothing else comes of these hearings, that you will have sufficient reason to vote again to appropriate moneys to that cause. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 182-84.)	
86/09/20-260 AROUND SEPTEMBER 20, 1986		THE DUTTON PICTURE BOOK NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. You testified that Colonel Dutton gave you a photograph album of the resupply effort; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. Colonel Dutton gave me a photo album that contained photographs of the efforts being made to resupply particularly the Southern Front, but also the Northern Front, and to a certain extent the Atlantic Front, and those photos contained--or the album contained photographs, as I recall, taken at several different locations in Central America. "Mr. FOLEY. Illustrating the resupply effort? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. "Mr. FOLEY. And you told Colonel Dutton you would take it to the top boss, meaning the	

President?

"Mr. NORTH. I told him--after he had shown me the photograph album, I told him that I thought that was something the President ought to see because I believed then, as I believe now, that the President should see the heroism of the young men that were assisting in this effort.

"Mr. FOLEY. Do you know, in fact, whether the President ever saw the album or not?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not know.

"Mr. FOLEY. You sent it up the line, so to speak, and so as far as you know the President may have seen it or may not, you do not know?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not know, sir.

"Mr. FOLEY. Did Admiral Poindexter say anything to you when you gave him the photo album?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that he did. I probably just sent it over with the normal package, probably in an envelope.

"Mr. FOLEY. Do you know whether or not Admiral Poindexter ever got it? Did you ever discuss it with him.

"Mr. NORTH. As I recall, it was relatively close to the end of my tenure and we were very engaged with the Iranian initiative at that time. I don't remember talking to him about it again.

". . . .

"Mr. FOLEY. You don't recall any conversation with either Admiral Poindexter or the President about the album?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not.

"Mr. FOLEY. You told Colonel Dutton, while he wouldn't receive a medal for his work, one day the

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		President would shake his hand and thank him? "Mr. NORTH. I told Colonel Dutton that I deeply believed, first of all, that he certainly wouldn't receive any medals but if at some point in the future, all going well, the President would receive these people that had worked so hard and so long to support the Nicaraguan resistance. "I believe that that's something that could have been arranged, had it been successful. ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. You assumed the President knew about the resupply? "Mr. NORTH. Otherwise I wouldn't have made that kind of suggestion." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 133-36.)	
86/09/20-270 AROUND SEPTEMBER 20, 1986		THE DUTTON PICTURE BOOK POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. In September of 1986, did Colonel North give you a photo album prepared by Colonel Dutton to show to the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall seeing the photo album. I do recall being aware that it was available. My recollection is that Colonel North told me that he had a photo album if I wanted to show it to the President, and that point we were heavily involved in other issues, and I did not accept his offer to show it to the President. "In fact, I don't recall seeing it. The first time I recall seeing it was on television during one of your hearings. "Mr. FOLEY. So to your knowledge, the President never saw the album?	

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		"Mr. POINDEXTER. No." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 12.)	
86/09/22-050 SEPTEMBER 22, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: STATUS OF TALKS NORTH PROF: North reports in a PROF to Poindexter: ". . . You can brief RR that we seem to be headed in a vy positive direction on this matter and have hopes that the hostage resolution will lead to a significant role in ending the Iran/Iraq war." (North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 9/22/86 [Committee Documents N 18059 and 18060]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 253; Tower, at B-157, -158.)
86/09/23-100 SEPTEMBER 23, 1986		BRUNEI: MONEY ON THE WAY DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Brunei agrees to run tracer on funds." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/09/26-100.)	
86/09/25-095 SEPTEMBER 25-26, 1986		COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: EXPOSURE SUMMARY: On the announcement by the Costa Rican Interior Minister that the Costa Rican airstrip had been discovered and shut down, see Iran-Contra Report, at 143.	
86/09/25-100 SEPTEMBER 25, 1986		COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: EXPOSURE NORTH PROF: North informs Poindexter by PROF that the	

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		Costa Rican Airstrip has been disclosed and offers a "damage assessment": "Elliott Abrams has just called from New York, followed by an urgent call from [redacted.] Last night Costa Rican Interior Minister Garron held a press conference in San Jose and announced that Costa Rican authorities had discovered a secret airstrip in Costa Rica that was over a mile long and which had been built and used by a Co. called Udall Services for supporting the Contras. In the press conference the minister named one of Dick's agents (Olmstead) as the man who set up the field as a 'training base for U.S. military advisors.' Damage assessment: Udall Resources, Inc., S.A. is a proprietary of Project Democracy. It will cease to exist by noon today. There are no USG fingerprints on any of the operation and Olmstead is not the name of the agent -- Olmstead does not exist. "We have moved all Udall resources ($48K [sic? (document barely legible)]) to another account in Panama, where Udall maintained an answering service and cover offices. The office is now gone as are all files and paperwork. . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 203 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Public Affairs Campaign on Central America," 9/25/86].)	
86/09/25-200 SEPTEMBER 25, 1986, AND DURING 1986			IRAN ARMS SALE MONEY, HAKIM, AND BAKSHEESH NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 1: "Mr. Liman. Colonel, one more which I will mark as Exhibit [OLN] 501. It is a note of September 25, 1986 when you are dealing with the

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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			second channel and it says 'call from Abe', which is Hakim, 'deposited seven --' -- looks like seven million. Since the amount that was charged for the TOWS, for the second channel was considerably less, we really are curious as to what that means. What does that refer to? ". . . . "Mr. North. All I can assume is that at that point in time on that day I got a call from Hakim saying that he had deposited seven million probably in the -- in the Lake or one of those accounts from the Iranian second channel. That is the only assumption I can make. "I believe that that is what enabled us to then go out and buy the TOWs that we then used for the final shipment. I am sure that that is what that notification is. [Redacted.] ". . . . "Mr. Hyde. Colonel, was any of this money set aside for kickbacks to Iranians? "The old term 'baksheesh' has been used and it seems to me these guys were willing to pay premium prices. One of the inducements might have been a little return on their investment. Do you know if any set-asides were for some [redacted] politician? "Mr. North. [Redacted.] I don't know. But I was told right from the very start when I first met with the [redacted] in November of 1985 that monies were indeed set aside for Iranians who may have to come out because of it, in other words, resettlement costs, as we often do in the CIA, and Mr. Hakim went into some length at one point

describing the fact that monies from the last transaction were to be used for that purpose.

"Now, I don't know whether one calls that a kickback or a resettlement fee. I was off the project before all of that finally came true or through.

"It is also important to note that there are several of the [redacted] several of the documents of intelligence on the first channel that indicated that the principal Iranian with whom I met in February and who[m] we also met with in Tehran, first channel guy, Ghorbanifar's contact, several discussions that we observed dealing with this account.

"Now, I don't know whether the Israelis were handling that directly. I don't know whether Ghorbanifar was handling it. My sense is that at least some of the 1985 transactions were set aside for that purpose, monies that never came to the U.S. Government."

(North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 49-51. See 86/02/24-410, -420 [Baksheesh].)

86/09/25-201
DURING 1986

IRAN ARMS SALE MONEY, HAKIM, AND BAKSHEESH
NORTH EXECUTIVE SESSION, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. Hyde. Some of the eight million bucks that is in the bank in Switzerland that has been frozen and that Mr. Hakim is supposed to have control over and/or General Secord, I am just wondering if some of that eight million might have been held or is being held for this very purpose?

"Mr. North. Well, again -- and I am not

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			trying to justify anybody's eight million or five million or anything else. I didn't start this operation to make anybody rich and I didn't think anybody else was in it to get rich and, as I said before in my testimony, Congressman Hyde, my relationship with Dick Secord was based on trust and good faith between the two of us. "And to this day, I have seen nothing that would confirm to me that he was in any way deceptive. I have seen a lot of accusations about myself and I don't believe them either. "Mr. Hyde. Colonel, I am not charging the gentleman with anything. I am simply speculating that some of the unannounced purposes for this money that General Secord may not have wanted to announce because maybe Rafsanjani would lose his head, some of that is a set-aside as a little kickback or a big kickback, maybe for more. "Mr. North. Mr. Hakim made it very, very clear to me when we started the second channel that there were monies, whether he already had them, that he expected to go to Iranians. "Mr. Hyde. It was within contemplation? "Mr. North. No. No. It was very, very clear to me, and I don't know whether he talked about this or not, but he made it very clear to me that he was now using what he called a network of assets that had been his when he was an Iranian and working in Iran and even after -- apparently, the same one he used when he assisted the U.S. Government in the hostage recovery, and so I never inquired more deeply about it. I believe in compartmentization. In fact, I didn't know the

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			name of these [redacted] that came out to meet with us in the second channel. "I also know that I told at various points in time General Secord that monies needed to be set aside for various other projects. "I was appalled that there was that much money in the account, but I cannot tell you here today that if you added up all the things I told him to set money aside for that it wouldn't tally up to a certain amount of money." (North Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 7/9/87, at 51-52.)
86/09/26-100 SEPTEMBER 26, 1986		BRUNEI: MONEY ON THE WAY DoS CHRONOLOGY: "U.S. AMBASSADOR reports that Bruneian officials say they used procedures which would require U.S. to 'wait for a short while before the transaction is completed.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/10/16-100.)	
86/09/27-100 SEPTEMBER 27, 1986	BETSY NORTH'S PHILADELPHIA TRIP COHEN ACCOUNT: Harold G. Cohen, an attorney, meets with Zucker and Hakim several times immediately prior to September 27, 1986 in connection with Forway Industries, a company with which Hakim and Zucker are connected. At a meeting on September 27, 1986, after Hakim has gone, Zucker tells Cohen he must take time out of the meeting to meet with a woman from the Washington area.		

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	Zucker leaves and meets with her briefly in (Cohen believes) Philadelphia. Zucker tells Cohen the purpose of the meeting is to discuss a possible development with the woman, whose name Cohen does not learn. (JHICI, 6/4/87, at 5 [Liman summarizing Cohen deposition of of June 1, 1987].)		
86/09/30-100 SEPTEMBER 30, 1986		COSTA RICAN AIRSTRIP: EXPOSURE NORTH MEMO: In a memo to Poindexter, North discusses the airstrip revelation (see 86/09/25-100): ". . . . "Attached at Tab I is draft press guidance regarding the airstrip at Santa Elena, Costa Rica, which was divulged by the Costa Rican Security Minister at a press conference on Friday, September 26. This story has now been picked up by the New York Times (Tab II) and is generating press questions at State and Defense. ". . . . "The damage done by this revelation is considerable. As indicated in the CIA report at Tab III, the logistics support provided by Project Democracy has had a profound impact on the ability of the resistance to sustain itself in the field. [Redacted.] "The airfield at Santa Elena has been a vital element in supporting the resistance. Built by a Project Democracy proprietary (Udall Corporation, S.A. -- a Panamanian company), the field was initially used for direct resupply efforts (July 1985 - February 1986). Since early this year, the	

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		field has served as a primary abort base for aircraft damaged by Sandinista anti-aircraft fire. The photographs at Tab IV show the field in June 1986 and a damaged Project Democracy KC-135, which made an emergency landing on the field early this month. "The Arias Administration revelations regarding this facility have caused Project Democracy to permanently close Udall Corporation and dispose of its capital assets. It has also resulted in the loss of a facility important to keeping the resistance supplied and in the field against the Sandinistas. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 132 [North memo to Poindexter, "Press Guidance re Costa Rican Airstrip," 9/30/86].)	
86/09/30-300 SEPTEMBER 30, 1986		THE PRIVATE DONORS: O'BOYLE O'BOYLE ACCOUNT: O'Boyle's second contribution to the Channell group: Channell contacts O'Boyle to tell him "that even though Congress had authorized further payments to the Nicaraguans, the money was taking a long time to trickle down to the point where it could be used, and that they were still in very desperate shape and that th[]is would be the final request that NEPL would be making on behalf of the contras." O'Boyle then donates $30,000. O'Boyle has read in "the standard package of materials" sent by NEPL that it is "a tax deductible organization, as they say." (N.b.	

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		Since O'Boyle requested an extension on filing his 1986 taxes, he has not [yet?] listed his NEPL contributions as deductions.) (O'Boyle Testim., JHICI, 5/21/87, at 39. See id., 5/21/87, at 82 [O'Boyle: "Well, the principal activity of NEPL, as I understand it, was to sponsor and fund television commercials which were of an educational nature and that was, as far as I could see, a deductible kind of activity. Buying equipment or weapons left a question mark in my mind."].)	
86/10/00-340 SOMETIME BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986		COL. STEELE AND THE RESUPPLY OPERATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. Now, several witnesses who have testified made references to the assistance provided to the Secord contra arms resupply effort by Colonel James Steele, the then military assistance group commander in Country Seven. "Who in the Department of Defense had authorized Colonel Steele's participation in this operation? "Mr. NORTH. I don't know, sir. "Mr. BOLAND. Did you ever report to anyone in the Defense Department about the help Colonel Steele was providing to the Secord resupply effort? "Mr. NORTH. I'm trying to recall when Colonel Steele arrived in the country in which he was assigned. It is entirely possible that Admiral Moreau and I talked about it. It is possible that I talked about it with General Gorman or his replacement. But I don't recall those specific	

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		conversations. "Mr. BOLAND. Was Colonel Steele subject to the command of General Paul Gorman when General Gorman was the commander of the Southern Command? "Mr. NORTH. That is the point of my earlier statement, because I don't recall when he arrived down there, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 131-32. See Iran-Contra Report, at 65 and note 66.)	
86/10/02-090 OCTOBER 2, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: PREPARATIONS FOR FRANKFURT NORTH MEMO: North advises Poindexter in an October 2 memo that the Relative of the high Iranian official (see 86/01/11-180) has reported that there is now an "internal consensus on how to proceed with regard to the hostages 'obstacle.'" North reports that the Relative has asked for a "definitive sample of the intelligence" -- a request the Iranians have given "a higher priority . . . than any other assistance we could provide." North also reports that the Relative will bring a Koran to the Franfurt meeting for the President. North recommends in his memo: --that North be authorized to meet again with the Relative; --that the President inscribe a Bible with an appropriate inscription, Galatians 3:8, to be given to the Relative. North writes, "This particular excerpt is important in that it is a new testament reference to Abraham, who is viewed by Moslems, Jews, and Christians as the progenitor of all the world's nations. It would be most

effective if the President hand wrote the inscription and initialed/signed it without addressing the note to any particular person. Tab III of the memo sets out Galatians 3:8: "And the Scripture, forseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, saying, 'All the nations shall be blessed in you.'"

--that Poindexter prohibit anyone other than North, Cave, and Secord from having contact with Iranian intermediaries;

--that the United States provide intelligence to Iran. North explains, "In the Casey-[Redacted]-Cave-North meeting we had with you . . ., we all agreed that it was unlikely that providing such information would change the course of the war. Further, we all recognized that the information need not be accurate and that it was highly perishable given the dynamic nature of the conflict. In short, we believe that a mix of factual and bogus information can be provided at this meeting which will satisfy their concerns about 'good faith' . . . ."

In conclusion, North writes:

"A memo from you to the President has not been prepared for obvious reasons. It is hoped that between now and 3:00 p.m. Friday you will have an opportunity to privately discuss this with the President and obtain his approvals/signatures on the steps indicated above."

(JHICI Ex. OLN 311 [North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps with Iran," 10/2/86]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 253.)

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86/10/02-100
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THE IRAN INITIATIVE: THE INSCRIBED BIBLE AND OTHER APPROVED PROPOSALS

NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. And then we have Exhibit [OLN] 311, and that is another next-steps memo from Oliver North to . . . Admiral Poindexter?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And here again you are asking for travel authorization, you were asking for him to have the President inscribe the famous Bible and do a letter to Prime Minister Pere[s].

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it is fair to say that the Admiral indicated his initials where he approved.

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And on one of them where it says that you tell Director Casey to prepare an appropriate intelligence package, there was no notation of approval or disapproval.

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct. There was also a notation on the fourth point for talking points for use by Copp with Nir.

"Mr. LIMAN. That says JPC [sic; but see Ex. OLN 311: "JP see?"].

"Mr. NORTH. Right.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now--so it was not unusual for you, when you were dealing with the Iran initiative, to get back memoranda from Admiral Poindexter indicating that he had accepted the recommendation and had briefed the President?

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct. But it was also not unusual to have initiatives that were not sent

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			back, memoranda on initiatives that were not sent back, and I tried to make that clear yesterday. "Mr. LIMAN. As you sit here today, are you in a position to say that every single one of the five memoranda that you sent to Admiral Poindexter referring to the use of the residuals for the contras was not sent back? "Mr. NORTH. No, sir, I did not say that yesterday and I don't say that today." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 71-72. JHICI Ex. OLN 311.)
86/10/03-100 OCTOBER 3-4, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: STATUS POINDEXTER/McFARLANE PROFs: On October 3, 1986, Poindexter sends McFarlane a PROF message attributing much of the success with the Second Channel to McFarlane himself and saying that a "group release" of the hostages is still the objective: ". . . Your trip to Tehran paid off. You did get through to the top. They are playing our line back to us. They are worried about Soviets, Afghanistan and their economy. They realize the hostages are obstacle [sic] to any productive relationship with us. They want to remove the obstacle. [The Relative; see 86/01/11-180] has been in Beirut, says he has good news for Frankfort [sic]. We shall see. Still insisting on group release. If this comes off may ask you to do second round after hostages are back. Keep your fingers crossed." The next day, McFarlane tells Poindexter by PROF, ". . . If you think it would be of any

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			value, I might be able to take a couple of months off and work on the problem. . . ." (Poindexter PROF to McFarlane, "Hak & Zbig," 10/3/86 [Committee Document N 7503; reprinted in Iran-Contra Report, Appendix A, Vol. 1, at 1427]; McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Hak & Zbig," 10/4/86 [Committee Document N 12620; reprinted in Iran-Contra Report, Appendix A, Vol. 1, at 1428]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 254.)
86/10/05-090 OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: RODRIGUEZ ALERTS WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT: Col. Samuel Watson, the Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, recorded in his list of his contacts with Felix Rodriguez a late-night call on October 5, 1986: "Phone call from Felix Rodriguez to Sam Watson's Residence "11:00 p.m. "Subject: A C-123 is missing, possibly in Nicaragua." (Watson Dep. Ex. 1 [Watson's list of contacts with Rodriguez]. See 86/10/06-100.)	
86/10/05-100 OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH DUTTON ACCOUNT: A C-123 from the air resupply project, loaded (according to Dutton) with "[m]unitions and uniforms, and . . . some mountain leprosy medicine," is shot down over southern Nicaragua. Felix Rodriguez calls Vice President Bush's office with news of what has happened. Dutton testified, "Unfortunately, when he passed the crew names, he	

passed the wrong names."

Eugene Hasenfus survives the crash, but William Cooper (the captain), Wallace Sawyer, and a Nicaraguan die. Identification cards carried by the crew identify the plane as belonging to Southern Air Transport. (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 93-96; JHICI Ex. RCD 12 [KL-43 from Dutton to North (Goode): "Sorry Max got into this. . . . Cooper, Sawyer and Hasenfus with a talker onboard departed Ilopango 0950L. . . ."].)

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THE HASENFUS CRASH
RODRIGUEZ ACCOUNT:

Rodriguez testifying on the attack on the C-123 in which Cooper, Sawyer and a 17-year-old FDN guard were killed, and after which Hasenfus was captured in Nicaragua:

"Mr. BARBADORO. Where were you when the Hasenfus crash occurred?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I was in Miami, sir.

"Mr. BARBADORO. How did you get notice of the crash?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I got a call from my friend in Central America. He told me that the aircraft was overdue . . . . [W]e had to assume he was down somewhere. So I asked him if he could try to arrange a search . . . .

"Mr. BARBADORO. Did you let anybody in the United States Government know that the plane was missing?

"Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, []sir. I believed this was the beginning of a big problem. And I was not really at that time or talking terms with the

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		Colonel [North, apparently], so I decided to call Colonel Watson at his home and I told him that one aircraft was missing that was being worked in our area down there and the following day after we got confirmation by the Cuban radio that it was down and they had a prisoner and I also called and told him about it. "Mr. BARBADORO. After notifying Colonel Watson of the fact that the airplane was missing, did you have any further involvement with the resupply operation after that? "Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No[,] sir. (Rodriguez Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 285-86.)	
86/10/05-160 OCTOBER 5-6, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, notes how the Vice President's office learned of the Hasenfus crash: "On October 5 and 6, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez called Colonel Watson twice to say that he had received information that one of the Contra resupply aircraft was missing, possibly in Nicaragua. Following established practice, Colonel Watson advised the Situation Room and the NSC staff of this information. It was subsequently learned that the aircraft had crashed in Nicaragua." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see 86/08/12-100; chronology continues at 86/11/06-100].)	

86/10/05-180
OCTOBER 5,
1986

THE HASENFUS CRASH
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. And when the Hasenfus plane went down in Nicaragua, the United States Government told the American people that the United States Government had no connection whatsoever with that airplane.

"Is that also true?

"Mr. NORTH. When the Hasenfus airplane went down, I was in the air headed for Europe, so I do not know what the initial statements were and I couldn't comment on them.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. It was not true the United States Government had no connection with Mr. Hasenfus' airplane that went down in Nicaragua?

"Mr. NORTH. No, it was not true. I had an indirect connection at [sic; with that (?)] flight, and many others[,] I would point out.

"Mr. NIELDS. In certain communist countries, the government's activities are kept secret from the people, but that is not the way we do things in America, is it?

"Mr. NORTH. Counsel, I would like to go back to what I said just a few moments ago.

"I think it is very important for the American people to understand that this is a dangerous world, we live at risk and that this Nation is at risk in a dangerous world, and that they ought not be led to believe as a consequence of these hearings that this Nation cannot or should not conduct covert operations.

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		"By their very nature, covert operations or special activities are a lie. There is great deceit, deception practiced in the conduct of covert operations. "They are at essence a lie. "We make every effort to deceive the enemy as to our intent, our conduct, and to deny the association of the United States with those activities. "The intelligence committees hold hearings on all kinds of these activities conducted by our intelligence services. The American people ought not to be led to believe by the way you are asking that question that we intentionally deceived the American people or had that intent to begin with. "The effort to conduct these covert operations was made in such a way that our adversaries would not have knowledge of them or that we could deny American association with them or the association of this Government with those activities. "And that is not wrong." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 21-23.)	
86/10/05-181 AUGUST 8, 1987	THE NATURE OF COVERT OPERATIONS GEORGE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. Nunn. One other question, Mr. George. When Colonel North testified, he started his testimony by saying that covert operation is a lie itself [see 86/10/05-180]. The implication of that was that other lies that flow therefrom are natural and recurring events in covert operations. "Would you give us your own view since you have been involved in this business for a long		

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	time about how you deal with your fellow officers and agents in carrying out a covert operation? "Whether lies are necessary within the operation itself? "Mr. George. I disagree with Colonel North, as strongly as I can disagree with anyone. This is a business which you know, Senator Nunn, from your experience on the Senate Committee and many of you who have dealt with me and more importantly with my agency, this is a business of trust. This is a business that works outside the law, outside the United States. "It is a business that is very difficult to define by legal terms because we are not working inside the American legal system. It is, and I have been asking you, and you heard me say many times, it is a business of being able to trust and have complete confidence in the people that work with you. "And to think that because we deal in lies, and overseas we may lie and we may do other such things, that therefore that gives you some permission, some right or some particular reason to operate that way with your fellow employees, I would not only disagree with, I would say it would be the destruction of a secret service in a democracy. "And I also believe, and I would like particularly to say this to you, and I said it to Senator Cohen this morning. I want you to know, and I know we have recently had an agreement -- disagreement over -- that you may have thoughts otherwise, I deeply believe with the complexities		

of the oversight process and the relationship between a free legislative body and a secret spy service, that frankness is still the best and only way to make it work."
(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 173-75.)

86/10/05-182
AUGUST 5,
1987

THE NATURE OF COVERT OPERATIONS: "YOU HAVE GOT TO HAVE A MORAL COMPASS"

C/CATF RESPONSE TO NORTH:

"Mr. Nunn. Let me just ask you one closing question. In this business of covert activities you are involved in it, we are in a different world, we see part of your world, not all of it, and I sometimes have great sympathy for the position I know you all find yourselves in dealing with covert activities, but how important is it [sc. truth] in dealing with colleagues in covert areas -- I am speaking of people in covert areas in the Executive Branch -- how important is it to them?

"[C/CATF.] You can't lie. You have got to believe each other. Believe me, in the world in which I live and work, you have got to have a moral compass, a moral anchor. It keeps you clearly defined on where you are going, what you are, and what is truth and what is lie. If you don't, you will go virtually go and crash. We live in a schizophrenic world, a world where we deal with the lie as a tool of the trade. We deal with deceit, deception and manipulation in a positive and negative sense. You can't lose sight of your moral compass, or you will end up like Terpil, Wilson, Cline[s] or those people who did

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	lose sight of their moral compass. "Mr. Nunn. Colonel Nortn started his testimony before revealing he had misled people to the point, some would call it like that, covert activity is a lie in itself and the clear implication from that was once you undertake covert activity being a lie in itself, everything that flows from that it seems by implication is excusable. [Sic.] Do you agree with that philosophy? "[C/CATF.] I don't think covert activity is a lie, I think covert activity is a range; it is an operation undertaken to influence an event. You may deal in truth, in lie, coloration, wherever possible. As a standard operating procedure, we try to deal with truth. Truth is an easier thing to defend. We don't like to deal in lies even disinformation because you get caught up in it. That doesn't mean we won't. But by and large our preference is to deal with truth. It is a deception. It is something that is designed to deceive, and frequently the recipient of the action or the viewer of the action, but to call it a lie in itself is only true in some regard -- with regard to its deniability. [Sic.] "Mr. Nunn. Well, is it fair to say, and I know my time has expired, this is the last question, Mr. Chairman: is it fair to say that those who deal with covert activities in the world of deception, in the world of secrets have to trust each other? Is that a fair assessment? "[C/CATF.] Absolutely. If you can't trust each other, you are dead in this world."		

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	(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 208-09.)		
86/10/05-190 OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified that Abrams was aware of North's involvement in the "full-service" covert operation. North stated he was contacted by Abrams to retrieve the bodies of Cooper and Sawyer after the Hasenfus crash: "Mr. NORTH. . . . I honestly believe that there were many, many people within the Executive Branch who had a grasp, if not in specific detail but in sufficient detail, that they knew who to turn to when they wanted something done. And so when the airplane being flown by Captain Bill Cooper and co-piloted by Buzz Sawyer, two of the braver people I have met on this planet, was shot down out of the skies over Nicaragua by a surface-to-air missile, I was the person called to raise the money to pay for the counselor services to retrieve their bodies. "Mr. NIELDS. Who called you? "Mr. NORTH. Mr. Abrams. Why would he turn to me if he didn't know I was doing it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 167-68.)	
86/10/05-200 OCTOBER 5-8, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH NORTH ACCOUNT: PROF note from Vincent Cannistraro, dated October 8, 1986, on press guidance after the Hasenfus crash: "Mr. NIELDS. And the statement is, press guidance was prepared which states, not USG	

involvement or connection but that we are generally aware of such support contracted by the contras.

"Were you aware at the time that this was the press guidance for the Hasenfus plane?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe I was aware at that immediate moment, because, as I testified earlier, I believe I was overseas at that point. My recollection is that I was. But that is not inconsistent with what we had prepared as the press line if such, if such an eventuality occurred.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then the next paragraph says, 'UNO to be asked to assume responsibility for flight.'

"Mr. NORTH. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then it says, Elliott will follow up with Ollie to facilitate this.

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was Mr. Abrams aware that UNO was not responsible for the flight?

"Mr. NORTH. I think that the flight was certainly coordinated with people within UNO, UNO did indeed know about the flight. The flight happened to have been paid for by General Secord's operation, the airplane was paid for by his operation. The pilots were paid for by his operation. Those were not U.S. Government moneys, but those were certainly his activities, and I was the U.S. Government connection.

"Mr. NIELDS. And was Elliott Abrams aware of the fact that you were the U.S. Government connection?

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		"Mr. NORTH. You would have to ask Elliott Abrams exactly what he did know. But he called me to take care of getting the bodies home. "Mr. NIELDS. Did he ask you whether you or the NSC had any connection with the airplane? "Mr. NORTH. Counsel, he didn't have to ask me. "Mr. NIELDS. Because -- "Mr. NORTH. Any more than a Congressman who called me up at one point and asked me to get an airdrop to the Indians had to ask me. He knew. I didn't have to tell him. I didn't have to write a memo to him. It was known. "I would guess that that is probably why Chairman Hamilton convened his group in the situation room. I have no doubt about that. And what I want you to know is I still don't think that what we did was illegal." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 232-34; JHICI Ex. OLN 133 [Cannistraro PROF].)	
86/10/05-210 FROM 1984		LIES FOR LIVES NORTH ACCOUNT: North concluded his account by balancing lies and lives: "Mr. NIELDS. So you -- "Mr. NORTH. Please. It was not right. It does not leave me with a good taste in my mouth. I want you to know lying does not come easy to me. I want you to know that it doesn't come easy to anybody, but I think we all had to weigh in the balance the difference between lives and lies. I had to do so that on a number of occasions in both	

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		these operations, and it is not an easy thing to do." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 234. See generally id., 7/9/87, at 64 [North on lying to Congress: "I do not believe that there ought to be circumstances in which people like myself have to make judgments over lives or lies. . . . I am not justifying what I did except to say to you if I had divulged what I was doing, if Mr. McFarlane had divulged what I was doing, many, many lives were at stake."].) North elaborated: ". . . I guess my problem is, Counsel, that while I well recognize that there may well be a lot of American people who want to know, I was trying to weigh, and I am sure that others like Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter and Director Casey and Elliott Abrams and the Chief of the Central American Task Force and others were trying to weigh in their souls what would happen to those, for example, whom I had sent money to or enticed into this activity or published pamphlets in Managua, or [who (?)] ran radio broadcasts or blew things up or flew airplanes if the American Government stood up and announced it and that is, after all, the essence of deniability and I was that deniable link and I was supposed to be dropped like a hot rock when it all came down. "And I was willing to serve in that capacity. I was not willing to become the victim of a criminal prosecution." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 236-37.)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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86/10/05-220 OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: OFFICIAL STATEMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it there came a time when a plane was shot down in Nicaragua and Mr. Hasenfus parachuted down to safety and there were press accounts of it. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, in early October 1986, I believe. "Mr. NIELDS. And statements were then put out by Administration spokesmen denying any U.S. Government connection to that airplane? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall all of the statements. I do recall at one point my Public Affairs Officer coming in to me with some guidance that had been prepared in the State Department that I thought was too broad, and I asked--or told him to pass to the State Department that they should delete that particular answer. "We were being very cautious, I thought, in answering those questions. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, I guess my first question is, just so the record is clear, this was one of the planes that was being run by the contra resupply operation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, a private operation, not U.S. Government. "Mr. NIELDS. But it would be quite untrue, would it not, to say that there was no connection with the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. There was obviously knowledge about the NSC as to what the private organization was doing. There was coordination.	

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		"Mr. NIELDS. It was Secord's organization? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And Colonel North has testified that every single dollar that went into the Swiss bank accounts that funded that organization went there because of him. "Mr. BECKLER. Because of whom? "Mr. NIELDS. Colonel North. We went through each item of financing, there was the Spitz Channell group and money was routed that way, there was country three, and there was Mr. Coors, and there were the proceeds from the Iranian arms sales. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I would be surprised that if every penny that went into that went there because of Colonel North. I think he was absolutely essential in keeping the contras alive during this period of time that we were restricted from using appropriated funds, and he was certainly instrumental, but--well, I think some of the private contributions and third-country contributions might have been more spontaneous than-- "Mr. NIELDS. Well, perhaps I have overstated it, but I think that the record is fairly clear on the connection and relationship between Colonel North and the Secord operation. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Colonel North clearly understood what was happening and there was close coordination between Colonel North and General Secord. "MR. NIELDS. There were, for example, statements such as the following, and you might	

want to turn to Exhibit [JMP] 92, again, with respect to this Hasenfus airplane. Exhibit 92 is an article in the Washington Post, October 8, 1986, and the first paragraph reads, 'Top Reagan Administration officials yesterday flatly denied any U.S. Government connection with a transport plane that the Sandinista Government said it shot down in Nicaragua with three Americans and a man of Latin origin aboard.'

"And then at Exhibit [JMP] 94, there is a transcript of a briefing given by Elliott Abrams of the State Department . . . .

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . My question was who, if you know, in the U.S. Government is responsible for the decision to make these statements to the public?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know the answer. I don't know that there was a conscious decision by anybody except the people that made them.

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Did you take any steps during this period of time to correct statements like this made to the public?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I just said that the one instance I can recall--and I believe it was shortly after we returned from Reykjavik, Commander Han[]ley, my public affairs officer on the NSC staff came to me with some guidance the State Department had prepared which I thought was too broad and too all encompassing.

"I asked him to make sure they didn't abuse them.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you make any suggestion or

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JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

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		request that the statements previously made be corrected? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think I ever saw the previous statements." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 52-57.)	
86/10/05-225 AFTER OCTOBER 5, 1985		THE HASENFUS CRASH: DIVERSION LINK POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LEON. How about when the Hasenfus plane went down in October of '86 and it was reported that Southern Air Transport Company was involved in that; and, of course, that was the same airline that was involved in the Iranian initiative. There were connections in there and there were all these statements out there on the record about no U.S. Government involvement. "Did you consider the possibility at that time that Colonel North might be questioned or you might be questioned about a diversion link between the two? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think at that time the diversion link crossed my mind. We were concerned, though, because Southern Air Transport was involved in the private effort to support the contras. They were also--I was informed, I don't think I realized it until the time, when Colonel North reported to me that Southern Air Transport was involved in the Iranian project. "As a result of that, I did make a call to Ed Meese and asked him to hold up either--either hold up on the investigation of Southern Air Transport or just make sure that the investigators understand that there may be some other very	THE HASENFUS CRASH: DIVERSION LINK POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		sensitive information that they could come upon and he should take the necessary steps to make them aware of that possibility. "As I recall, I left it up to him as to how he handled it. I just alerted him to the fact. Of course, he was aware of the Iranian project and I felt comfortable in talking to him about it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 88-91.)	
86/10/05-250 OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the Hasenfus crash, and the investigation following it, see Iran-Contra Report, at 287-88.	
86/10/05-300 AFTER OCTOBER 5, 1986		DeGRAFFENREID DISCUSSES PROBLEM MEMOS WITH POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Do you remember that after the Hasenfus plane went down that Mr. DeGraffenreid of the NSC came to you with some documents or talked to you about some documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. As I testified to you before-- "Mr. LIMAN. That is privately. You are talking about when you testified before, not yesterday? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's right. It was on the 2nd of May. "In trying to recall what I knew about any destruction of documents, I did recall that sometime--and I believe it was in October--Mr.	

DeGraffenreid, who was the Special Assistant to the President for Intelligence Affairs, came to me and indicated his concern about Colonel North's exposure as alleged in the newspapers at that time; primarily, as I recall, it was connected with various allegations about the Hasenfus aircraft.

"Mr. DeGraffenreid asked me if I recalled that there were some memoranda in System IV, which this committee has had explained to it before, I think, that talked about some of Colonel North's activities; and I told Mr. DeGraffenreid that I had a vague recollection of some memos in System IV from back in '84, '85, that I could recall that Colonel North had prepared to give Mr. McFarlane, updates on the logistics and supply situation for the contras and the financing status, but I couldn't remember much about memos.

"Mr. DeGraffenreid indicated his concern about the existence of those. I told him that I frankly couldn't remember the memos very well, that they probably did reveal too much, and that he should go talk to Colonel North about them.

"The clear implication both from my end of it and from Mr. DeGraffenreid's end of it was that we probably would be better off without the memos.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you ever tell Mr. DeGraffenreid--well, you've already said what you told him. The intent of your remarks was that those memos should be gotten rid of?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall the exact wording I used, but that was the clear intent of his question and my answer.

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		". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. And who[m] were you trying to protect when you made the remarks the clear intent of which was to get rid of these System IV documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have said all along, we were trying to protect the contra support activity that the NSC staff was involved with. We didn't want that public." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 52-54. See entries starting at 85/08/16-200 [McFarlane testimony on Poindexter's role in 8/85 in collecting documents related to North's Contra activities].)	
86/10/05-305 AFTER OCTOBER 5, 1986		AFTERMATH OF THE HASENFUS CRASH: PAPERWORK ON NSC CONTRA ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did you ever destroy any papers reflecting the use of any of the proceeds of the arms sale for the contras? "A. As I said, Mr. Liman, earlier, you know, I did not recall seeing this memo [Diversion Memo; Exx. JMP 34-38; see 86/04/04-010, -011]. To my knowledge, there wasn't anything in writing on this. "Q. Did you destroy any paper reflecting the use of proceeds for the contras? "A. I did not. Not knowingly. "Q. Do you recall any piece of paper other than the ones we have talked about, the $6 million one [see 86/05/16-440] and this memorandum that refer[s] to that subject?	DOCUMENTATION ON THE DIVERSION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. Sometime in October of 1986, it was after the aircraft with Hasenfus aboard was shot down, I recall having a couple of conversations that may or may not be pertinent. One was with Colonel North in which he came into my office to report on the details of the shoot-down of the aircraft. He reported to me there had been a lot of identifying information aboard the aircraft. I told him I was very displeased with that. I didn't think it was very professional, that these guys needed to shape up in terms of maintaining deniability of the operation and carrying identifying information aboard the aircraft was just not acceptable.

"I don't recall the conversation precisely, but I conceivably could have said something to him about his records.

"Then later, by my best recollection --

"Q. Said something to him about getting rid of his records?

"A. I could have. I don't recall specifically doing that, but my mood at the time was one of annoyance, and I do specifically recall talking to him about the information that was aboard the aircraft.

"But, you know, Colonel North would have had a clear view that I didn't want anything in writing on the support to the contras.

"Later -- and I believe it was the same month -- Mr. DeGraffenreid, the special assistant to the President for intelligence affairs, came in to see me and to indicate his concern for Colonel North's exposure on Central America. At that time there were a lot of stories in the newspaper. He wanted to know if I recalled that there were several memorand[a] in System 4, which was our paperwork system, to keep track of intelligence matters and other sensitive issues on Central America that would be very damaging to the administration, that talked about details of supporting the contras.

"I told him I didn't recall the memos specifically, but I did recall back in early '84 or '85 that Colonel North had sent some memos to Mr. McFarlane and laid out the status of funding for the contras and the status of logistics, but it had been months or maybe even years since I had seen those memos and I didn't really recall exactly what was in them.

"The clear intent of Mr. DeGraffenreid's visit was to figure out a way to get rid of those memos, and I told him that I couldn't -- as I said, I couldn't remember what was in them, but go talk to Colonel North and see what you could work out, or words to that effect.

"Q. When was that?

"A. That was probably sometime in October, as near as I can tell.

"Q. Before the Iranian thing became public?

"A. Yes.

"Q. After Hasenfus?

"A. After Hasenfus was shot down. As near as I can place it.

"What I assumed had set Mr. DeGraffenreid off were all the stories appearing in the paper at the time.

"Q. Do you recall -- I am sorry. Go ahead.

"A. I guess that's really the end. I think I

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		have answered your question. "Q. Yes." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 188-91. See entries starting at 85/08/16-200 [McFarlane testimony on Poindexter's role in 8/85 in collecting the documents relating to North's Contra activities]. For Poindexter testimony preceding this entry, see 86/04/07-309.)	
86/10/06-100 OCTOBER 6, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: RODRIGUEZ AGAIN ALERTS WATSON WATSON ACCOUNT: Col. Samuel Watson, the Vice President's deputy National Security Adviser, recorded his contacts with Rodriguez about the Hasenfus crash following Rodriguez' alerting him at 11 p.m. on October 5, 1986 that a C-123 was missing (see 86/10/05-090): "morning "Phone call from Felix Rodriguez to Sam Watson "Content: A C-123 is missing. Three Americans and one Nicaraguan on board. Don't know where. Sam Watson relayed information to Bob Earl (NSC). "Phone call from Sam Watson to Felix Rodriguez "Content: Craig Coy of NSC asked Sam to call to express concern for operational security by using open phones." (Watson Dep. Ex. 1 [Watson's list of contacts Rodriguez].)	
86/10/06-140 OCTOBER 5-6,		THE HASENFUS CRASH COY ACCOUNT:	

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1986		[Coy's testimony continues from 86/07/15-250:] "Q. So that when the Hasenfus plane went down you knew that that was a flight that North had been involved with in some way? "A. I didn't know initially. "Q. Well, it went down on the 5th, and this note is dated the 6th. "A. Yeah. But I didn't know how many different airlifts there were and I didn't know if Secord or Singlaub -- you know, it could have been somebody else. I didn't know exactly who it was and when it was. Subsequently I found out that it was Southern Air Transport and Secord and Hasenfus worked for them. "Q. Let me just understand what you understood when you got a note on October 6 that said 'yesterday one of the Democracy, Inc. aircraft apparently went down.' At least you took that to be a reference to a mission in which North was involved in some way? "A. Yes. "Q. Now discounting for the exaggeration that you say you believe North engaged in, you have told us that you knew he had some involvement with this military airlift going back several months, correct, to the contras? "A. Yes." (Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 33-34. See Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 69-71, 128-29 [Coy on the Hasenfus crash].)	
86/10/07-090 AFTER OCTOBER		THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION SUMMARY:	THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION SUMMARY:

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5, 1986		For a narrative account of the U.S. Customs Service and FBI investigations of Southern Air Transport following the Hasenfus crash, and North's, Poindexter's, and Meese's roles in delaying the investigations, see Iran-Contra Report, at 287-88.	See col. 2.
86/10/07-100 SOMETIME AFTER OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION DUTTON ACCOUNT: Robert Dutton describes events following the downing of the C-123 inside Nicaragua and the capture of Eugene Hasenfus: "[T]he FAA and Customs had arrived at Southern Air Transport and said they wanted to look at the financial records and the maintenance records for Southern Air Transport . . . ." The President of Southern Air, Langton, then calls Dutton: "Mr. Langton called me [sc. Dutton] and said he didn't have any trouble passing that information to them. However, if they got into accounting records -- as they got into the account, they would come across other operations that Southern Air had been supporting." Dutton calls North to pass on Langton's message. North replies (according to Dutton), "Call him back and tell him I will take care of it." But Langton calls again the next day to say "that FAA and Customs were back, and that they were pressing for the information." Dutton again calls North. Dutton testified that North "said that he had spoken to Mr. Meese, and that it would be taken care of. I called Mr. Langton back and	

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		informed him of that, and the Customs and FAA people went away. . . . Additionally, the FBI had launched an investigation down there and Mr. Langton called me again. I advised Colonel North and he said he would take care of that. . . . As I recall, that investigation was delayed, but I don't think it was called off." (Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 96-99. See id., 5/27/87, at 203-04 [Dutton testifying on what North said about his contact with AG Meese: "As I recall the statement, he [sc. North] said it was taken care of, and that he didn't use the term that he had gotten them to pull back, but the problem was taken care of for the time being."].)	
86/10/07-110 SOMETIME AFTER OCTOBER 5, 1986		THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . [T]here was an investigation of an airline and . . . we had asked the Attorney General to delay an investigation on that airline because that airline had not only provided support to the Nicaraguan resistance, that was the matter that they were being investigated for, and that airline had provided support to the transfer of U.S. weapons from the United States to Israel, and then from Israel to Iran. "And my concern was that in trying to answer the legitimate and I think straightforward answers that were being asked--or trying to answer the questions that were being asked about that airline's role in support for the resistance, that that investigation was going to uncover that airline's support for the transfers to Iran. And	THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		our concern, at least my concern--I don't want to speak to everybody's--but certainly my concern, certainly Director Casey's concern and I believe Admiral Poindexter's concern was that pursuing that investigation was going to disrupt ongoing efforts to achieve the release of another hostage as well as potentially compromise the second channel and cause people to die. "So what we were anxious to do was to postpone that investigation, not interfere with it from a criminal investigation perspective, but to ensure that we had done all we could to, one, get people out of Iran if they needed to get out, and to ensure that any hostages we could get out were released . . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 138-39.)	
86/10/07-120 OCTOBER 7-30, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Moving on to a matter that the House Judiciary Committee was concerned with. As you will recall, the House Judiciary Committee on October 17th sent you a request that you apply for an independent counsel, and this was after the Hasenfus crash, and you received a letter which was signed by . . . 17 [sic (11?)] members, a majority of the committee--a majority of the majority. And the officials named in that letter were Oliver North, John Poindexter and William Casey, and this is Exhibit [EM] 13 if you want to see that letter just to call it to your attention. . . .	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		"And then the C-130 which crashed was linked to Southern Air Transport and that is reflect in exhibit--I think it is Exhibit [EM] 12. And what I want to call to your attention is that on or about October 30th, 1986, you received a call from Admiral Poindexter to delay the investigation because Southern Air Transport was involved in the Iran arms sales, and John Poindexter made that request to delay that investigation. "I'm a little puzzled, because Poindexter was named in that letter, and possibly a subject of any investigation that you might conduct, and I understand that there was a delay, and of course some reasons were recited. "My question is, is this something that would be done under ordinary circumstances? An individual is named in a letter, could be the subject of a possible investigation, and yet a request is made to you and you delay the investigation for a period of days. You did resume it later on. "Attorney General MEESE. He was not a subject of the investigation at that time. "Mr. RODINO. No, he was the subject of the letter which was written to you, which could have, if there had been any basis, which could have led to an application for independent counsel. That was the request. "Attorney General MEESE. Possibly. I mean that was the request. But at that time we had looked into the letter and the letter contained no real evidence and at that time we had requested from Mr. Conyers any evidence they might have that	

would enable us to even conduct the initial—investigation.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, had you, Mr. Attorney General--I am not clear on this. Had you delayed the investigation before you received that, because I am not aware of that exchange between you and Chairman Conyers.

"Attorney General MEESE. It was an exchange between the head of our Legislative Affairs Office and Mr. Conyers saying that we would request that whatever information they have that might be helpful be provided to us, but beyond that, to add my knowledge at that time and in fact the fact was that Admiral Poindexter was not the subject of any investigation.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, what you are saying is that you requested that Mr. Conyers and the committee furnish you with whatever information there might be; but the request was to the Attorney General, the Department of Justice to inquire into this matter.

"Wasn't it your responsibility to do so?

"Attorney General MEESE. And indeed our people did, and they were inquiring into the matter, but anytime we get something like this, we want to know what the basis is, and I think it was the feeling of our people who were looking into it that there was inadequate basis in the letter--

"Mr. RODINO. Was that the reason for the delay, was that the reason for your ordering the--

"Attorney General MEESE. No, no. That had nothing to do with it. What I am saying is there was no active investigation in which Admiral

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		Poindexter was the subject at the time he called me." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 292-96; JHICI Exx. EM 12 [FBI Memo: "Unknown Subjects; Possible Neutrality Violation Concerning a C-123 Aircraft Shot down by Nicaraguan Military Forces, October 7, 1986; Neutrality Act - Nicaragua"], EM 13 [Letter to the Attorney General signed by 11 Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee, 10/17/86].)	
86/10/07-125 1985-86		INTERRUPTION OF FBI OR DoJ INVESTIGATIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. McCOLLUM. Did you ever ask Attorney General Meese to hold up an FBI or Justice Department investigation during the time you were NSC Adviser? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I testified to that before. "In October, the aircraft carrying Mr. Hasenfus was shot down. Colonel North advised me that there was some sort of investigation and I can't recall specifically--I think it was the FBI and maybe Customs. "Mr. McCOLLUM. I want to call you to a halt on that. You have testified to that. I should have said other than that. I am in the question that's been raised a lot in the press about somebody asking the Justice Department to stop an investigation going on into drug smuggling and arms shipments down into Costa Rica and that sort of thing? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not.	

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		"Mr. McCOLLUM. Nothing other than the Hasenfus incident you described? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. That's correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 23.)	
86/10/07-500 OCTOBER 7, 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the conversation between Roy Furmark and William Casey and events related to it, see Iran-Contra Report, at 288-90. (See also entries starting at 86/10/11-100. See also Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/22/87, at 143-46 [Ledeen's contact with Furmark in 10/86]; Ledeen, House Dep., 3/11/87, at 104-09 [Ghorbanifar's notice to Ledeen about the problems of the Canadian investors, and Ledeen's contact with Casey.])	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION SUMMARY: See col. 2.
86/10/08-150 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			FRANKFURT MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SUMMARY: For a summary of the meetings of North, Secord, Cave, and Hakim with the Second Channel in Frankfurt between October 6 and 8, 1986, see Iran-Contra Report, at 254-58; Tower Report, at B-160 through -167.
86/10/08-200 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			FRANKFURT MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SECORD ACCOUNT: A third meeting is held with the "relative of the Iranian official," this time in Frankfurt, West Germany. North, Secord and a CIA official attend. Again they discuss "long-term relationships between the two countries and also

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			discuss arms and hostages." North leaves and authorizes Secord to speak in his place. The parties "eventually agree on a nine point plan, part of which was that the U.S. Government would ship 500 TOWs to Iran and the Iranians would obtain the release of at least one hostage." The agreement is sent "to the White House via K.L.-43, and it was subsequently approved." The sale eventually takes place on October 30, 1986, with the Iranians paying $3.6 million for the TOWs. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 101-02.)
86/10/08-300 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986		CALERO-CASEY MEETINGS CALERO ACCOUNT: Calero testifying on his contacts with Casey: "Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever meet or talk with William Casey, the Director of the CIA . . .? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. Many a time. As a matter of fact, I developed an affection for Mr. Casey. I used to refer to him as Uncle Bill . . . . "Mr. MITCHELL. Can you estimate for us on how many occasions you met with Mr. Casey over the past few years? "Mr. CALERO. Well, maybe five or six times. I remember one time that he was in the Old Executive--that was the last time, probably, that I saw him--he was in the Old Executive Office Building, and I realized Colonel North was very much attached to him, and so was I, and I came to visit Colonel North, and Colonel North took me over to visit with Mr. Casey in the Old Executive Office Building.	FRANKFURT MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL HAKIM ACCOUNT: Present: North, Secord, Hakim, George Cave, the Second Channel Iranians, plus Iranian Government officials. Topic: Normalizing relations between the U.S. and Iran, providing U.S. military equipment to Iran, release of the hostages. North presents a seven-point plan to the Iranians: "Mr. NIELDS. [The plan] provides for the provision of 500 TOWs and HAWK spare parts and it provides for the release of hostages, among other things? "Mr. HAKIM. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Did the Iranians agree to this seven-point plan? "Mr. HAKIM. The bottom line was that they did not, and the meeting was not successful. It broke off with disappointment on the part of both

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		". . . . "Mr. MITCHELL. Apart from the social political functions, can you tell us approximately when, if you recall, when the meetings occurred, who else was present, and what was said? "Mr. CALERO. I cannot give precise dates, but the last time I saw him was maybe in October of 1986, and then I had visited him previously, one time with Mr. Robelo in his office, and another time with Mr. Bermudez in his office, the time that I referred to in the Old Executive Office Building. "Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember when the meetings that you attended with Mr. Robelo and Mr. Bermudez occurred? "Mr. CALERO. Maybe the one with Mr. Bermudez in 1983, and maybe the one with Mr. Robelo in 1984, sometime in 1984, or maybe 1985. And then, the other meetings were occasional. "Mr. MITCHELL. Can you tell us what was said at these meetings? "Mr. CALERO. We put him up to date on what was going on, and he listened very attentively to everything we said, and he returned--showed not distrust, but he felt sorry for the fact that they couldn't do anything for us-- "Mr. MITCHELL. To your knowledge, was Mr. Casey aware of the assistance you were receiving from Colonel North and from Mr. Secord? "Mr. CALERO. Yes. I told him about our acquisitions, of how we were acquiring more weapons, and he was hoping that this support would be forthcoming."	parties. Colonel North got ready to leave for the United States to report back that there would not be any success dealing with the second channel. "I urged him to be more patient. He was very specific. He told me, Albert, it will take me six hours . . . to get to Washington and he was going to have a meeting at about six o'clock that day with the President, that is what he told me, and unless I come up with something prior to him going to the President, he has to report to the President that the meeting was not successful. "So I was left behind to see what I can do to turn this thing around." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 38-42; JHICI Ex. AH 22 [the seven-point plan].)

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		(Calero Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 119-21.)	
86/10/08-302 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 7-POINT PLAN: COLLAPSE HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testifying on the breakdown of the negotiations: "Mr. NIELDS. Can you describe what the major objections or problems were with the seven-point plan? "Mr. HAKIM. I believe the basic problem--there were basically two problems: one, I would say, cultural and lack of basic communication--I'm not saying the same type of communication that did not exist during the first channel--and lack of patience on the part of our delegation. "We were very impatient. We were expecting to--I told our group that we would want to establish a relationship as if we are preparing stew in a pressure cooker. That is not possible. You have to be patient, spend a lot of time, try to understand each other. "So because of those two reasons, they could not allocate enough time to understand each other, which I succeeded to do after they left. "Mr. NIELDS. So you did continue the negotiations? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you and the second channel then reach an agreement? "Mr. HAKIM. Well, we agreed on what I referred to, a nine-point proposal which later on was communicated to Colonel North, as well as

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			General Secord, and then it was agreed upon and later that became a nine-point agreement." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 43-44; JHICI Ex. AJ 22 [the nine-point plan]. See id., 6/4/87, at 44-50 [negotiations on the nine-point plan]; id., 6/5/87, at 67-71 [Hakim Accords].)
86/10/08-304 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testifying on the continued negotiations of Hakim in the absence of North, Cave and Secord, on the Nine-Point Plan: "Mr. LIMAN. But the point I am making is, is it a fact you were left alone to try to work out something that would be acceptable with the second channel? "Mr. HAKIM. I was the only one who had the competence, sir." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 166-167. See id., 6/4/87, at 168-169.)
86/10/08-305 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 7-POINT PLAN: TEXT NORTH'S LIST: At the October 6-8 meetings with the Second Channel, North presents a handwritten list of seven points that he says the President has authorized: "U.S. PROPOSAL "(1) Iran provides funds for 500 TOWs and remainder of HAWK parts. "(2) Within 9 days we deliver [HAWK] parts and TOWs (500) plus medical supplies. "(3) All American hostages released.

"(4) Iran provides funds for 1500 TOWs.

"(5) Within 9 days we will deliver:

"- 1500 TOWs

"- Technical support for HAWKs

"- Updated intelligence on Iraq

"- Communications team

"(6) Iran will then:

"- Release [John] Pattis

"- Provide body of [William] Buckley

"- Provide copy of Buckley debrief

"(7) United States will then:

"- Identify sources for other items on [the Relative's arms] list. . . .

"- Iran will then work to release other hostages."

At the top of the page, Secord writes in:

"We understand S. Hussein must go --

"--believe we can help (after obstacles go) with diplomacy in Arab world . . .

"--continued military pressure OK"

(JHICI Exx. OLN 308 [=AH 22, 40], 309 [7-Point Plan]. For identification of the handwriting, see Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 158 [North's handwriting], 22-25 [Secord's writing appears on third page of Ex. AH 40; Secord wrote clause on cooperating to depose Saddam Hussein]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 255-57.)

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SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: IRANIAN PLAN
SECOND CHANNEL LIST:

On the second day of negotiations, the Second Channel member called the Engine (see Iran-Contra Report, at 254; 86/01/11-180) presented his own

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			list: 1. The United States would establish a timetable for the delivery of the arms on the Relative's list, thus committing itself to providing offensive and defensive arms. 2. One hostage would then be released. 3. A timetable and a location would be established for the exchange of intelligence; and the United States and Iran would evaluate the Russian, Afghanistan, and Iraq situation. 4. Iran would "only promise" to gain the release of the remaining two American hostages but this was to be linked to American progress on the Dawa prisoners. The Engine made clear that the release of the Americans and the Dawas would have to "wash." "They would have to coincide or have some other logical correlation." 5. Shipment of the eight items on the Relative's list would proceed based upon mutually agreed-upon priorities and quantities. Iran would try--but not promise--to locate and arrange the release of the other two hostages. 6. The United States would contact Kuwait to make sure that there are no problems with the release of the Da'wa prisoners. 7. The United States and Iran would agree to work within the framework of the Hague settlement process to provide Iran with military items, such as F-14 spare parts, that Iran had paid for under the Shah's rule but that had been embargoed after the Embassy seizure. By way of "clarification," the Engine adds two other points to his list: John Pattis, a United

States citizen, who had been arrested in Tehran as an alleged spy, would not be considered in this round of discussions, and the status of the Shiite prisoners held by the South Lebanese Army in Lebanon would be left to the Lebanese themselves to resolve.

Despite the differences between North's and the Iranians' proposals, North suggests, "[W]hy don't you guys hold this discussion after I'm gone, OK?" He leaves his 7-point proposal behind, saying, "This list was given to me by the President of the United States of America. And there's no way on God's green earth that I'm going to violate my instructions. . . . That's the President's authorized list. That's all he authorized. . . . In fact, he told me, he said, you know, 'don't give away more than you have to[.]' That is everything he authorized me to talk about."

(Transcript of Frankfurt meeting [Committee Documents C 409-10, C 10423-33; reprinted in Iran-Contra Report, Appendix A, Vol. 1, at 1529 through 1539]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 256. For North's 7-Part Plan, see preceding entry.)

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THE 9-POINT PLAN/HAKIM ACCORDS

TEXT:

As translated from Farsi by Albert Hakim, the text of the 9-Point Plan produced by Hakim under his grant of immunity provides:

"Summation of Us and Hakim

"1. Iran provides funds to Mr. Hakim for 500 TOWs and, if willing, Iranians will provide for

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the Hawk spare parts which remain from the previous agreement.

"2. Nine working days from now the 500 TOWs and the Hawk spare parts (if accepted by Iran) and the gifted medicines will be delivered to Iran.

"3. Before executing Item 4 below, Albert will provide the plan for the release of the Kuwaitis (17 persons).

"4. 1-1/2 (1 definitely and the 2nd with all effective possible effort) American hostages in Lebanon, through the effort of Iran, will be released by the Lebanese.

"*5. Using the Letter of Credit method, (three to four days after delivery of shipment stipulated in Item 2) additional 500 TOWs (together with a maximum of 100 launchers), within four days after the execution of Item 4 above, will be delivered to Iran. The method of Letter of Credit will be reviewed between Albert and [handwritten in a blank space: "Oliver [redacted]"] by tomorrow night. Iran will pay the funds for 1500 TOWs (the 500 TOWs mentioned above plus an additional 1000 TOWs) and the 1000 TOWs will be delivered to Iran within nine days.

"6. The United States will start with the technical support of the Hawks (material and know-how), update of the military intelligence and maps, establishment and commissioning of the special communication link, and will prepare the chart related to the items (provided by Mr.____ [sic]) indicating price and delivery to Iran.

"**7. Before the return of Mr. [handwritten in blank space: "NO NAME"] to Tehran, the subject

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			of the Moslem prisoners (Shia) in Lebanon and the manner of their release by the involved parties will be reviewed by Mr. Secord. "8. Iran will continue its effort for creating the grounds for the release of the rest of the hostages. "9. The steps for delivery of items referred to in the second part of Item 6 above will start. "*The Letter of Credit will be opened in favor of Mr. [handwritten note in blank space redacted] and he will make the money for the 500 TOWs available by using 80% of the Letter of Credit. "**After discussion between Mr. Secord and Mr. [handwritten note in blank space redacted], it was agreed regarding regarding [sic] the Moslem prisoners that the sentence (text) will be written in the following manner:" [Typed text ends. Several handwritten messages and symbols (e.g. circles and arrows) are also on the page.] (JHICI Ex. OLN 310 [= Exx. AH 22; JMP 62]. See Iran-Contra Report, at 257 [note that while Ex. OLN 310 also provides the Library of Congress translation, the text quoted was translated by Hakim and is titled, "Translation by Albert Hakim of the Farse Original of the '9 Points'"]. For North's 10/10/86 PROF relaying to Poindexter a revised 9 Points, see below at 86/10/10-300.)
86/10/08-310 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: HAKIM'S NEGOTIATIONS HAKIM ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. There were seven points that were on the table that had been rejected by the

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			Iranians? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. You were left alone to try to work out with the Iranians a proposal that might be acceptable to the United States? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. And the Iranians were representing their interest? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you, a private citizen and a businessman, all of a sudden found yourself in the role of trying to work out an agreement for the United States that would be acceptable; is that really what it comes down to? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you indeed did work out these nine points--you, Albert Hakim, private citizen, businessman, seeking not just to advance the United States interests, but profit. And I'm not saying that to decry profit. You are the one who worked out the nine points? "Mr. HAKIM. Mr. Liman, our Secretary of State comes also from the business end of our structure. At the time that I was negotiating, I was not discussing my own personal benefit. In my opening statement, I told the American people that it was a unique opportunity. I was serving a number of motivations. "At no time did I say that my only motivation was financial benefit. When I was left behind to deal with it, the only thing that did not cross my mind was financial benefit, and the only thing that I was working on was the interests of the

United States, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that is the way you saw your role?

"Mr. HAKIM. At that moment.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, there were some rather significant changes made between the seven points and the nine points; is that fair to say?

"Mr. HAKIM. I slowed down the pace of Colonel North. The answer is yes.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . But in the proposal which Colonel North conveyed on behalf of the United States, it provided, in item three, all American hostages to be released, correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. In the proposal that you worked out, it provided for the one and best efforts to get the second, correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. That's correct. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And in your proposal you had provisions . . . for Albert -- that is you, Albert Hakim [--] will provide the plan for the release of the seventeen prisoners being held by the Kuwaitis?

"Mr. HAKIM. That was the spirit of the Iranians toward me, indicating their dissatisfaction with the meeting.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Colonel North's proposal did not have that provision?

"Mr. HAKIM. No, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And, indeed, in the agreement that is written out in Farsi by the Iranians, it provided that Albert--meaning Albert Hakim--is the

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			one who will provide the plan for the release, correct? "Mr. HAKIM. That indicates, Mr. Liman, the spirit of the Iranians at that time. It would be unfair to take it as only the agreement itself. This is an indication that they were disappointed with the approach of the American delegation and they were looking to me to sort this thing out. "I had promised that I personally would try to fill in the gap that existed between them, and it is very customary among Iranians to say[,] 'I trust you. I don't want to deal with the rest. You--I keep you responsible.' "That was the reason those words were used there. They even said that they will pay me the money, they will pay the money for the 500 TOWs to Hakim. On top it says the summation between our discussions between us and Hakim. "This is their way of indicating, showing disappointment in the way that the discussions went with the American delegation, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. Were they not looking upon you at that point as a representative of the American side? "Mr. HAKIM. No, sir. If you look further down, you see that I had to refer to General Secord to get understanding of the Kuwaiti situation and so on. No. They did not understand that. That was not their impression. "Mr. LIMAN. Were they looking at General Secord as if he were the representative of the American delegation? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. Did they know at that point that you were not the personal interpreter to the President? "Mr. HAKIM. I am not sure what they knew. They saw me as a sincere person. They started to trust me. "I started to trust them. "Mr. LIMAN. They also saw you as a person who could go with them to the White House with Colonel North? That happened before this? "Mr. HAKIM. They did not think that I was just a man with a grocery around the corner, sir." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 168-72.)
86/10/08-350 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: AGREEMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . [E]ventually I got the nine points. "Mr. JENKINS. And your superior approved those and you sent the message back to General Secord and Hakim that-- "Mr. NORTH. I believe that is the way it went. "Mr. JENKINS. --that we had agreed to the nine-point agreement. ". . . . "Mr. JENKINS. . . . [Y]ou signaled that we had accepted that agreement based upon the approval of Secord [sic]? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did. "Mr. JENKINS. Later, did you stop to think at all--and I know that you sought approval from your superior--that the only person negotiating for the

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			United States of America with Iran, that ultimately obtained the agreement, was a private citizen who had a substantial financial interest in the outcome of those negotiations? "Mr. NORTH. I don't believe that I communicated that to Admiral Poindexter, no, sir. "Mr. JENKINS. And that never concerned Admiral Poindexter or yourself? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I may be--it may well be, Congressman Jenkins, that I was not unjudicious. I have certainly difficult though it has been, and painful some of it has been, told the committee of things that I have done. I quite honestly considered that to be motivation to make it succeed, that he had interests that went beyond just his next promotion or going back and getting an accolade from his boss; that in fact it offered a greater chance for ultimate success. "Mr. JENKINS. The fact that he had a financial interest? "Mr. NORTH. The fact that he saw long term the potential for a financial interest." (North Testim., JHICT, 7/10/87, at 164-65.)
86/10/08-360 DURING 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: HAKIM'S MOTIVATIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. And you later learned [after February 1986], I am sure, that Mr. Hakim was obviously into the enterprise, as he has testified to this committee, entirely for the money? "Mr. NORTH. I am not too sure how he testified to the committee, Congressman Jenkins,

and I am not here to impugn anyone else or to defend anyone else. My understanding throughout was that the people who were engaged on our side in both this activity and the support for the Nicaraguan resistance were in it for reasons that served our security interests.

"I had made it clear to General Secord as I indicated a few moments ago that fair, just, reasonable compensation was deserved, that these were commercial entities, and I don't recall at any point Mr. Hakim saying to me or to others in my presence that I am in this only for the money.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . He . . . testified to this committee that he not only informed you, and of course General Secord already knew, but that he also informed the Iranians in channel two, now, where he did most of the negotiating, that his interest was a financial interest.

"Mr. NORTH. He certainly did indicate that he had a financial interest.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . [H]e also testified that one of his primary interests was to open up the channel, channel two, get stable relations back, because with $15 billion in trade--

"Mr. NORTH. I remember the number. He mentioned that to me.

"Mr. JENKINS. --that he hoped to get two percent of it.

"Mr. NORTH. I don't remember the two percent. I remember the $15 billion.

"Mr. JENKINS. And that he was very much

interested, from a financial standpoint, in making this succeed, is my question; isn't that correct?

"Mr. NORTH. He did express that to me, yes, sir.

"Mr. JENKINS. You commenced at the second channel, as you have told Mr. Liman, and the seven-point plan has been introduced--you were unable together with our other representatives at the second channel to consummate an agreement at that time; is that correct?

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct.

". . . .

"Mr. JENKINS. So you had to leave?

"Mr. NORTH. That's right.

"Mr. JENKINS. And General Secord left, as he has testified to this committee?

"Mr. NORTH. I believe he did. I think he was working on the same problem.

"Mr. JENKINS. And Hakim at that point was left as the only U.S. negotiator for the agreement that was ultimately agreed upon by the Iranians and the U.S.; is that correct?

"Mr. NORTH. That is my recollection, yes, sir."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 159-63.)

86/10/08-370
DURING
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SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: NORTH'S MOTIVATIONS

HAKIM ACCOUNT:

Hakim testifying further on negotiations with the Second Channel for the seven-point plan:

"Mr. LIMAN. But even at this late date, which is October, after you had been working on this second channel since July, Colonel North still was contemplating that all of the hostages would be released; correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. Colonel North not only had the desire of reestablishing the relationship with Iran, it did not for a moment leave his mind the American hostages being kept in Lebanon. That was in his mind at all times.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you that he was under political pressure to get them released?

"Mr. HAKIM. He did not have such a discussion with me, but that was my definite impression and understanding, that that was the case.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, what gave you that impression?

"Mr. HAKIM. When we got closer to the time for the elections, my understanding was that Colonel North wanted to remove this obstacle for the purpose of enhancing the President's position.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. [Quoting Hakim Dep., 5/31/87, at 202:] 'Question: Let me ask you to focus on this particular period of time. What was your perception of how the hostage problem should be resolved?'

"Is that the question? You see that question there?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And your answer was, 'Answer: I did not approve of Colonel North's focusing on hostages. My suggestion was that, "You should low key that. You should not show any interest or hunger in getting the hostages back," because his

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			prime objective at that time was to support the President in connection with the [R]epublicans for the elections, and I found that to be counterproductive. And, like I said, this is not a good negotiating tactic. "You should low key that. And then, to the contrary, tell them you are not interested in that."' "Is that what you testified? "Mr. HAKIM. That testimony is correct, sir." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 159, 162.)
86/10/08-380 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: HAKIM ON HIS NEGOTIATIONS AND ON HAVING IT BETTER THAN THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAKIM ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. You were told that [the Nine Point Plan] was approved? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Indeed, didn't North invoke the name of the President? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. He dropped the name of the President all the time, didn't he? "Mr. HAKIM. When I was present. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you consider him to be a name dropper? That it was puffing? "Mr. HAKIM. I found Colonel North to be a devoted American. He will do anything to obtain his objectives, sir. Including giving his life. "Mr. LIMAN. I have a question about this. You can get an impression here that North is hustling you, that you are hustling North, that the Iranians are hustling you, that you are

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			hustling the Iranians and that it really is, as you said before, a commercial type of environment, is that an unfair impression that I have? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes. That is accurate. "Mr. LIMAN. When you were told that this agreement that you had negotiated had been approved by the President of the United States, you must have felt very proud? "Mr. HAKIM. I felt proud throughout, sir. I felt proud being part of the time. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you feel like you had been the Secretary of State for a day? "Mr. HAKIM. I would not accept the position for any money in the world, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, you had it better than the Secretary of State in some sense. You didn't have to get confirmed; correct? "Mr. HAKIM. I still believe that I have it better than the Secretary. "Mr. LIMAN. And-- "Mr. HAKIM. I can achieve more, too. "Mr. LIMAN. And if this initiative had succeeded, did you ever make any calculation as to how much you and General Secord would make? "Mr. HAKIM. In what period of time, sir? "Mr. LIMAN. People tend to think in terms of three-to-five year plans. "Mr. HAKIM. Many millions. "Mr. LIMAN. Did it bother you at all that here you--and I say it respectfully--a private citizen [were] left with this kind of task of negotiating an agreement in which[,] if it succeeded, you stood to benefit very

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			substantially? "Mr. HAKIM. Mr. Liman, what bothered me was that we didn't have the competence within the government to do what I could do. That still bothers me. "Mr. LIMAN. So because you felt that the State Department wasn't competent to negotiate with Iran, that that made it appropriate and comfortable for you to do this? "Mr. HAKIM. No, sir. My understanding is very different than that. My understanding is that we here wrongfully in the United States have created a shield and the name of that shield is called terrorism. We say Moslem plus Middle East equals terrorism and we are hiding behind this excuse and we are not doing the right things to approach the Iranians, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. And you felt that you knew better than the Secretary of State? Is that fair? "Mr. HAKIM. What I am saying, that I knew and I know now better as to how to communicate with the Iranians." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 173-77.)
86/10/08-390 DURING OCTOBER 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: NORTH'S MOTIVATIONS NORTH RESPONSE TO HAKIM: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Mr. Hakim testified under oath here that you told him that the President was exerting pressure on you to get the hostages back . . . in time for the elections in November of 1986. "Mr. NORTH. The President of the United States never told me that, nor did any other

person. I may have said that to Mr. Hakim to entice him to greater effort. But I certainly didn't hear that from the President.

"Mr. LIMAN. That was your idea?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And no one in the Administration gave you that idea?

"Mr. NORTH. No one ever. I can assure you, counsel, that the President's concerns for the hostages outweighed his political ambitions or political concerns. They were truly humanitarian, and I don't think it would be right to leave any doubt about that.

"In fact, the President was willing to take great political risk in pursuing this initiative.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you, when you told Hakim this, think it was right to attribute that to the President?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, as you have in the tape recordings I made with every meeting I had with the Iranians, I said a lot of things that weren't true. Again, I would have told them they could have free tickets to Disney World or a trip on the Space Shuttle if it would have gotten Americans home.

"Mr. LIMAN. Whose side did you think Hakim was on, the Iranians or ours?

"Mr. NORTH. Oh, he is on our side.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you think that he needed inducement in order to get the deal done?

"Mr. NORTH. I think exhausted men who are working very, very hard sometimes need all kinds of inducements.

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			"Mr. LIMAN. And the inducement that you thought would help him was to say that the President of the United States-- "Mr. NORTH. Trying to put a date certain and get them out by then." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 21-23.)
86/10/08-400 DURING OCTOBER 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: NORTH'S LIES NORTH ACCOUNT: North testifying on the negotiations with the Second Channel in Frankfurt: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . My question is simple. Did you tell the Iranians with whom you were negotiating on October 8 and 9 that the Secretary of Defense had told the President at his most recent meeting, 'When the American people find out that this has happened, they will impeach you'? "That is the entire question. Did you say that to the Iranians? ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. Mr. Nields, this is apparently one of the transcripts of tape recordings that I cause to be made of my discussions with the Iranians. I would like to note that for every conversation, whenever it was possible, I asked for the assistance of our intelligence services . . . to tape record and transcribe every single session so that when I returned there would be no doubt as to what I said. ". . . . That is a bald-faced lie told to the Iranians. And I will tell you right now, I'd have offered the Iranians a free trip to Disneyland if we could have gotten Americans home for it.

"Mr. NIELDS. The question was, did you say it?

"Mr. NORTH. I absolutely said it. I said a lot of other things to the Iranians."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 19-21. See id., 7/10/87, at 22 [North: ". . . I said a lot of things that weren't true. Again, I would have told them they could have free tickets to Disney World or a trip on the Space Shuttle if it would have gotten Americans home."]. See also id., 7/9/87, at 121 [North: "I lied every time I met the Iranians."].)

86/10/08-405
DURING
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SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: NORTH'S LIES
NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . I am assuming that in your discussions with Admiral Poindexter, that he had authorized you to make any type of statement that you might desire at that particular meeting.

"Mr. NORTH. Admiral Poindexter gave me certain basic parameters and I tried to follow those in the midst of very difficult and sometimes very protracted negotiations, and I tried to keep him apprised when I was overseas, through difficult communication methods, but nonetheless I tried to live within the boundaries that had been established for me and yet make progress on a very difficult issue.

"Mr. JENKINS. And you felt you had the parameters at that time to make excessive statements or some outright misrepresentations to the Iranians because it was in our interest to try to get the hostages back at that time?

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			"Mr. NORTH. And foster the hope of a further meeting with senior-level officials." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 167-68.)
86/10/08-421 DURING 1986			NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS: THE DAWA PRISONERS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. SMILJANICH. The committee has also learned . . . that the Iranians were told that we might be able to help with the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait, and we might be able to help with the overthrow of the Iraqi Government. Was that ever discussed by Admiral Poindexter in your presence? "Mr. REGAN. Whenever that subject came up to the President, he was insistent he would never deal for those Dawa prisoners, never. He said, 'I will never go to the Emir of Kuwait, and ask him to release any of those, those people are criminals, they are in jail properly, I will never ask him to release those.' "As far as overthrowing the Government of Iraq, that was not our President, and I never heard it being brought up to the President. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It also was not our policy to be selling arms to Iran, but this was never discussed in the President's-- "Mr. REGAN. Again, you got to remember the circumstances under which we did this. This was the exception proving the rule. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Had anybody ever indicated to the President in your presence, or had the President ever stated that it would be all right to at least talk about these matters with the

Iranians even if we didn't intend to do anything about it?

"Mr. REGAN. Not about the Dawa prisoners, absolutely not, nor the overthrow of Saddam--you know who I mean--in Iraq.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. That would be, those types of promises that were not going to be kept would not be consistent with the idea of a new vision of a new bilateral relationship with Iran, would they?

"Mr. REGAN. That is right."
(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 53-54.)

86/10/08-422
OCTOBER 1986

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS: THE DAWA PRISONERS
REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . Admiral Poindexter testified that he took [the Hakim] agreement in to the President to get his approval and later relayed that approval back to the people in Iran.

"Now, the nine points of the agreement, some of which were carried out, as a matter of fact later, and the translation of item three, which says, and this is the item that concerned you, and you indicated concerned the President later--before executing item 4 below, Albert--Hakim--will provide the plan for the release of the Kuwaitis, the 17 people.

"You indicated that when the President first learned of this he was shocked.

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. JENKINS. Is that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. That is correct.

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			"Mr. JENKINS. So your interpretation is that if the Admiral mentioned this to him, he must have-- "Mr. REGAN. I don't know when the Admiral actually did mention this to the President. I cannot envisage the President, as adamant as he was about not wanting to do anything to secure the release of any of those Dawa prisoners, that he would have agreed to this, and I am sure that the President would never have agreed to having one Albert Hakim, unknown to him, out making agreements with the Government of Iran. "Mr. JENKINS. So if, in fact, Admiral Poindexter showed these nine points to the President back in May of 1986, he must have skipped over this or-- "Mr. REGAN. Well, it certainly would not have been presented in the way that you just presented it, definitely not. "Mr. JENKINS. He would not have read it out like I read it out from the agreement? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct. "Mr. JENKINS. I wanted to make sure that I understand I was reading Mr. Hakim's agreement. [Sic.] "Mr. REGAN. I understand. I find that hard to believe, Mr. Hakim's testimony on that. "Mr. JENKINS. Well, I think that the Admiral also testified that he did get the approval of the President on this, but you would find that hard to believe also, would you not? "Mr. REGAN. Yes." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 54-56.)

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86/10/08-500 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: THE DAWA PRISONERS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. When you were present at the negotiations, who headed the American negotiating team? "Mr. NORTH. Are we talking first or second channel? "Mr. LIMAN. Second. "Mr. NORTH. I guess I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you present to the second channel the so-called seven-point plan? "Mr. NORTH. I guess--if that is what you are calling it. I suppose I wrote down seven or six or eight or whatever number of points on a piece of paper. I didn't refer to it at the time, I don't think, as the seven-point plan. "Mr. LIMAN. Can you look at Exhibit [OLN] 208. Is that your writing on the-- "Mr. NORTH. That is my writing. "Mr. LIMAN. And it is headed, 'United States Proposal'? "Mr. NORTH. That is what it says. "Mr. LIMAN. Is that a proposal that you presented to the second channel? "Mr. NORTH. I am sure it was. I don't recall whether it was done at the meeting in Washington or at the meeting in Europe, but I am sure that that is one of many proposals, all of which I had tape recorded by the Central Intelligence Agency equipment so that there would never be any doubt as to what I was saying or obligating or

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			committing to. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Colonel, before you made your promise to them, did you get authority from anyone as to what you would, as you just said, commit to present to them? "Mr. NORTH. In general terms, yes. And as you can see, one of them was all American hostages released, right up at the top. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Did you have any conversations with State Department representatives before you made the various proposals that you were making during these negotiations? "Mr. NORTH. No. "Mr. LIMAN. You have already testified that in these negotiations it was necessary for you to make representations that weren't accurate-- "Mr. NORTH. They are blatantly false. "Mr. LIMAN. Among other things that you would describe as blatantly false were the statements that the Head of State of Iraq had to go, that the President of the United States regarded him in an unfavorable way, deleted expletive-- "Mr. NORTH. And lots of others, all on tape. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you discuss with your superiors, in particular Mr. Casey or Admiral Poindexter, before you went into the negotiations, that you would be saying to an official of the Iranian government that the United States supported the removal of the Head of State of Iraq, that the United States would give some assistance on the Dawa prisoners, et cetera? "Mr. NORTH. I did not discuss those

specifics, no. Many of these were ideas that came up in the course of the earlier parts of the negotiations, seemingly important to those with whom I was dealing, and we were trying to appear responsive.

"There was no effort whatsoever to deceive anybody in our Government from that, that I was reporting to. I had with me one of Casey's finest officers, I had with me CIA communications intelligence support, CIA personnel who were recording these meetings through surreptitious means, and I made no bones about the fact that these were available to my superiors.

"If anybody had any doubt as to what I was saying, they could have stopped me, and they didn't.

"Mr. LIMAN. I can say for the record that we do have recordings and they do reflect those statements."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 127-31. For McFarlane on the discussion of the Dawa during the May 1986 Tehran trip, see above at 86/05/27-400.)

86/10/08-520
OCTOBER 6-8,
1986

SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: DEFENSE OF IRAN,
AID FOR ITS HOMELESS MILLIONS, AND
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL

NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . You are making a statement about removal of a head of state, about the United States committing to defend Iran. Those are things you remember without looking at the tapes, right?

"Mr. NORTH. Let me make one observation about the United States committing to defend Iran. That is not the way it was portrayed.

"The specific statement, reinforced by me after General Secord had said it, dealt with the fact that we had built a U.S. central command for that specific purpose and it wasn't something that was a deep, dark secret. The fact is that's why it exists, that's why the Congress spent literally billions of dollars building that command.

"It is in every defense and foreign affairs journal in the country.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it was because of that that you felt comfortable in stating that the United States would defend Iran?

"Mr. NORTH. The United States would contend that the Soviets should not occupy Iran, and the fact is whether we had or had not gotten Iranian support, we were not about to relinquish control of Iran to the Soviet Union, and that's why the Senators in the back row voted for a U.S. central command and the United States Armed Forces organized one.

"That is no deep, dark secret, not even to the Iranians.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, before you made those statements, you have already said you didn't talk to Admiral Poindexter about it--

"Mr. NORTH. About that specific point, nor these specific points in the midst of a negotiation that went on over several days, no.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you also talk about the fact that there were two million homeless people in Iran?

"Mr. NORTH. Which also happens to be a fact.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you talk about the fact that the United States would supply aid like a Marshall Plan for them?

"Mr. NORTH. I talked about the fact that they ought to get beyond the issue of trading a few weapons for a few live bodies and that what our initiative was all about was a reopening with Iran, and that the President of the United States shared those concerns.

"The fact that I exaggerated my connection with the President of the United States in order to further this initiative I have already admitted to. The fact is we in this country have always expressed concern for those kinds of matters, and the fact is if we could have gotten beyond where we were and established a relationship with Iran, that we would be doing something for the millions of homeless in Iran and the hundreds of partial paraplegics and those who need prosthetic limbs on both sides of that war.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you say words to that effect that you have just expressed?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, and they are on the tape." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 131-33.)

86/10/08-524
DURING
OCTOBER 1986

THE 7- AND 9-POINT PLANS: NORTH'S AUTHORIZATION TO NEGOTIATE

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"MR. LIMAN: I will show a document we have marked as Poindexter [Dep.] Exhibit 49, which is a memo dated October 2, 1986, from, of all people, Oliver North, to you. The only question I have

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			for you on that is: Are these your initials on the page that has a place for approving? "THE WITNESS: They are. I haven't read the document. "BY MR. LIMAN: Well, you have a copy of the document. We are in the process of declassifying it, and it is the document in which the President described [sic (inscribed)] the Bible, among other things, and approved talking points with the campania [sic (Copp and Nir?)]. And then -- did Colonel North ever describe his seven point proposal with the Iranians with you? "A. He probably did. I am a little vague now what the seven points are. "Q. We have marked as Exhibit 50 the copy that we have of the seven point proposal. . . . ". . . . "Q. Did he ever describe the seven points to you? "A. Well, I don't recall seeing this particular document before. These points are familiar to me. I would have to know more about time frame. These points are generally consistent with various components of various plans that existed over the period of time that we were working the Iranian project. "Q. Did Oliver North obtain approval from you for various plans presented to the Iranians? "A. At various times, yes, and the President. "Q. And did he ever come back to you and tell you that the Iranians had come up with something called the nine points? "A. What time frame is this?

"Q. The nine points would have been October 1986.

"A. I am reasonably sure he did.

"Q. I am going to provide you with a copy marked as Exhibit 51. I am not going to review them at this point other than to ask you whether you have any recollection of Colonel North asking you for approval of something called the nine points?

"A. I vaguely remember at some point in October the Iranians coming back. The nine points doesn't ring a big bell. I can't remember the exact sequence of events, but I believe he did report those to me, and they were points with which we agreed.

"Q. Following the presentation of these points, 500 TOWs were shipping to the second channel?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. And was that approved by the President?

"A. It was."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 53-55; Poindexter Dep. Exx. 49 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 59; North memo to Poindexter, "Next Steps with Iran," 10/2/86], 50 [= JHICI Exx. JMP 61, OLN 308, AH 22, AH 40; 7-Point Plan], 51 [= JHICI Exx. JMP 62, OLN 310, AH 22; 9-Point Plan].)

86/10/08-525
FROM SUMMER
1986

SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: AUTHORIZATION
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Now, do you recall Colonel North ever reporting to you that the second channel and he had agreed to establishing a committee consisting

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			of Iranians and Americans? "A. I remember that. "Q. Did you approve that? "A. Yes, I did. "Q. Did you elevate that to the President of the United States? "A. I probably did. "Q. Did he tell you who was going to serve on the committee for the United States? "A. Did who tell me? "Q. Colonel North. "A. I can't recall discussing that in great detail. "Q. Do you remember it was Oliver North, Mr. Secord, and Mr. Cave? "A. I don't -- that would be consistent. I mean, I am not surprised. "Q. Did you approve that? "A. In effect, I would have. "Q. What does in effect mean? "A. Well, in effect, the whole point of the committee was eventually to recognize this, but we had to get it started first, and the plan all along was once we could get it regulated we would bring in other departments of government. "I guess the reason why I am hesitating there a little bit, when you say those were the three members from the U.S. side, it would have been a temporary sort of thing. In order to get started, those three would have been involved. "Q. Did you receive any transcripts of conversations between Oliver North and the Iranians?

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			"MR. BECKLER: At what point in time? "MR. LIMAN: Second channel. "THE WITNESS: You mean actually typed out? "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Typed out. "A. Verbatim? "Q. Let's start out with verbatim. "A. No. "Q. Did you ever receive any tape recordings themselves? "A. No, I did not. "Q. Did you ever receive any memoranda of his discussions back and forth with the second channel? "A. Yes, I did. "Q. Did you ever share those memoranda with the President of the United States? "A. I probably read to the President summaries of the discussions. "But, again, the 930 file might help. "Q. I appreciate that, Admiral." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 46-48.)
86/10/08-526 DURING OCTOBER 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: THE DAWA PRISONERS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Question continues from comment at the end of the preceding entry:] "[Q.] Did Oliver North ever tell you that he ever communicated to the Iranians that the President had a low opinion of the Chief of State of Iraq? "A. What is the question again?

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			"Q. Did Oliver North ever tell you that he had told the second channel Iranians that the President of the United States had a low opinion of the President of Iraq? "A. He may have. That doesn't stand out in my mind. "Q. Did you authorize him to tell the second channel Iranians the United States would cooperate in deposing the President of Iraq? "A. No, I didn't. "Q. Did you ever see any summaries of meetings that indicated that he and others in this American delegation were saying things like that to the Iraqis? "A. To the Iraqis? "Q. To the Iranians. "A. I may have. I can't remember that. "Q. Do you recall seeing any kind of summary of a transcript [in] which he attributed to the President, a profanity directed at the President of Iraq? "A. I am not sure about that. I am having trouble keeping separated what I have seen in preparations for these hearings and what I saw before. I am not sure about that. "Q. Did you authorize North or other members of the American delegation to the second channel Iranians condemnation of the Iraqis? [Sic.] "A. I don't believe I ever did that. "Q. Was it United States policy at that time to try to bring about the deposing of the President of Iraq? "A. The U.S. policy was to bring an end to

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			the war between Iran and Iraq. "Q. So the answer to that question is no? "A. It would be no. "Q. Did you ever authorize Oliver North or other members of the American delegation to say that they would use their good offices to try to persuade the Kuwaitis to release the Dawa prisoners? "Let the record reflect there has been a consultation. "A. I am sorry, what was your specific question again? "Q. Did you ever authorize Oliver North to tell the s[e]cond channel Iranians that the United States [would] use its good offices to try to persuade the Kuwaitis to release the Dawa prisoners? "A. No, I didn't. The President's policy on that was we shouldn't put any pressure of any kind from the U.S. Government on Kuwait. I told Colonel North that. My understanding of what they discussed though, was not inconsistent with that. "Q. What did you understand they were discussing? "A. I understood they were discussing that General Secord on his own, privately, would come up with a plan that the Iranians could then use in order to try to convince the Kuwaitis to make some concessions on the Dawa prisoners." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 48-51. See Transcript of Frankfurt Meeting, Tape 12 [Committee Document C 382; reprinted in Iran-Contra Report, Appendix A, Vol. 1, at 1483]

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			for North's attribution of an expletive to President Reagan about President Saddam Hussein.)
86/10/08-527 DURING OCTOBER 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: THE DAWA PRISONERS AND DEFENSE OF IRAN POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did you clear that with the President? "A. What with the President? "Q. That consistent with his policy, General Secord would be permitted to do this? "A. This was not cleared with the President ahead of time because I did not know that they were going to raise that issue. But you misunderstood that in all of these discussions that were going on in the second channel, Colonel North and George Cave had wide lat[]itude in discussing various matters with the Iranians. "Q. Did their wide latitude include making representations that if the Soviet Union were to invade Iran that we would fight the Soviets whether or not the Iranians liked it? "A. The U.S.-Soviet relationship as it applies to Iran, the guidance on that was contained in terms of reference that the President approved. I don't recall knowing, before the preparation for these hearings, knowing of discussions that have been described, and I would have to go back and analyze what has been said here to see if -- my impression at this point is that what has been said in the hearings by various parties, both on the congressional side and on the witness side, there seems to me to be some

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misinterpretation.

"Q. The person who translated it to the Iranians is the one who testified to this. You realize that.

"A. But the policy of the United States is to keep the Soviet Union out of Iran.

"Q. And was Colonel North authorized to commit the United States to war with the Soviet Union?

"A. He was not.

"MR. BECKLER: Don't answer that. Objection. . . ."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 51-52.)

86/10/08-530
OCTOBER 1986

THE 9-POINT PLAN: NORTH'S AUTHORIZATION
TO NEGOTIATE, DAWA PRISONERS, AND
PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . Now, among the mandates that you gave Colonel North was the mandate to conduct the negotiations with the second channel once the Tehran mission had failed; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. When he was in negotiations with the second channel, did he tell you that he had, with his advisers and assistants, with General Secord and Hakim, negotiated the nine-point plan with the Iranian second channel?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe he did. I don't have a strong recollection of this, but I believe he did.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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			"Mr. LIMAN. Is your best recollection, and that is all we can talk about, that you approved it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it your best recollection that you obtained the approval of the President of the United States? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it is. "Mr. LIMAN. You are aware of the plan because we have shown it to you as well as Colonel North's testimony about the part of the plan that dealt with the Dawa, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And you were a subscriber to the policy of the United States, that the United States should not lean on the Kuwaitis to release these prisoners? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. These were terrorists? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct, and the President felt very strongly about the issue. "Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. We had discussed that numerous times. "Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North report to you that part of the plan was for General Secord or Hakim to come up with a plan that the Iranians could use to attempt to convince the Kuwaitis to release the Dawa prisoners? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe he did. That was my understanding, that it was not something that General Secord--I don't, I can't say that I really remember Albert Hakim's role in this, but my

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			recollection would be that General Secord was to come up with a plan which he could give the Iranians that the Iranians could execute, not that the U.S. Government would do it or not even that General Secord would actually do anything. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you clear that with the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. My best recollection is I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you understand that General Secord was acting in this venture at the request of the United States, namely the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 171-73.)
86/10/08-531 OCTOBER 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: SECORD'S ROLE, DAWA PRISONERS, AND PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. And did you discuss with the President that General Secord was in fact being asked to act for the United States in this venture? "Did he know, in other words, that Secord was not in this just on his own but had been brought in it by the CIA and by the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe so. I can recall--and as I told you in the closed testimony, I want to obviously be very careful as to what I attribute to the President and what I don't. "It is obviously an important issue, so unless I can remember something very specific, I'm reluctant to attribute things to the President,

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			either things he said or things that I think he knows. "Mr. LIMAN. And I don't argue that I think it is essential that it is only where you have an actual recollection that you should do that. "Mr. POINDEXTER. But I do have a recollection of talking to the President at one point during the Iranian project, that General Secord was involved as a private individual, and that he indeed was a true patriot. "I don't recall going into great detail about the mechanics of how the discussions were going on, but I always briefed the President on the results of the discussions, and discussed the possibilities for next steps and got his approval for the major next steps that we took at various times. "Mr. LIMAN. So, as I understand it, you got the President's approval for the next steps in the venture excluding, for the reasons you have stated, the use of the proceeds for the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, do you recall the President's reaction--and it is only if you recall it--do you recall the President's reaction to the notion that General Secord would be coming up with a plan that might help the Iranians get the release of the Dawa terrorists? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall that, Mr. Liman. This again happened--we were probably on the road. We spent much of the month of October on the road in the campaign. I traveled with the President on all those trips, although I wasn't

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			involved in the partisan political activity, but I was there as his National Security Adviser. This probably happened on the road, and was probably a brief exchange, and I frankly don't remember it very well." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 173-75.)
86/10/08-533 OCTOBER 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN, U.S. DEFENSE OF IRAN, AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. Were you aware that negotiators representing the U.S. Government on the Iran arms transactions had indicated to their Iranian counterparts that the U.S. was prepared to go to war with the Soviet Union in the event of a Russian invasion of Iran and that the U.S. would assist in deposing a head of state in the Middle East? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Boland-- "Mr. BOLAND. Were you aware that negotiators made this representation to the Iranians? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Boland, the business about the Soviet Union, I think, is clear to everybody since President Carter was President, in which the U.S. policy had been that we are not going to stand by while the Soviet Union moves into the Persian Gulf. That is not news to anybody. All that General Secord was doing, as I understand it, after hearing his testimony, was simply making that point to the Iranians. That is not news. "Mr. BOLAND. Well-- "Mr. BECKLER. I think there is more of an

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			answer, Mr. Boland. "Mr. BOLAND. Fine. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Now the business about Saddam Husayn, contrary to what is carried in the papers, I don't believe is in those nine points. That was a separate discussion that Mr. Hakim as a private individual had. That was not the U.S. position and is not the U.S. position. "Mr. BOLAND. Well, isn't it so that General Secord and Albert Hakim were negotiating in behalf of the U.S. with respect to the release of the hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. All of their meetings and discussions were what we call ad referendum. They were not authorized to reach any agreement. Anything that they discussed as a possible future agreement had to be referred back to Washington. "Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask whether or not the President was made aware of their representation-- "Mr. BECKLER. Once again I would like the witness allowed the opportunity to answer Mr. Boland's questions. "Mr. BOLAND. I would be delighted to have the witness answer fully but I don't want the 15 minutes used. "Mr. BECKLER. I will stipulate we will stay an extra 10 minutes, but it is important to have the answers in full. "Mr. BOLAND. I think it is, too. "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is exactly the same position that most negotiators for the U.S. government, whether they be private individuals, assistant secretaries of state, assistant

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			secretaries of defense, the arms control people in Geneva, the same guidance exists. Their instructions are essentially ad referendum, in other words, they have got to refer back to Washington for final approval. They have negotiating guidelines just as Colonel North, General Secord, Mr. McFarlane had guidelines." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 46-48 [N.b. Rep. Boland's unfinished question -- "Let me ask whether or not the President was made aware of their representation --" -- was not asked again, or answered, during Adm. Poindexter's testimony. But see, on the President's awareness of the 9-Point Plan, 86/10/08-530, -531, -870; and on the President's policy with regard to Kuwait and the Dawa prisoners, 86/10/08-526. See generally Poindexter Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 8/6/87, at 34-44 [Charles Dunbar's memo of 12/14/86 (see 86/12/13-100, 86/12/14-100), and Poindexter's intercession with the Kuwaitis on the Dawa release].)
86/10/08-535 DURING 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: PRESIDENT'S AWARENESS, AND HOSTAGE RELEASE, GENERALLY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. . . . [Y]ou testified, I believe, that the President approved in general the so-called nine points that were discussed with the Iranians in Tehran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. FOLEY. And was he given point-by-point explanation of what those nine points were?

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall the actual conversation with the President. It would have been during the campaign. We were very likely on the road. It was probably a very short briefing. "Mr. FOLEY. I think this is Exhibit [JMP] 62, the reference. Were these nine points for discussion with the Iranians serious proposals, or were they designed to merely open up possibilities for discussion? "Mr. BECKLER. May we have a minute to look at the exhibit? "Mr. FOLEY. Yes. "Mr. BECKLER. Thank you. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Those nine points and the whole effort with the second channel, which we felt, and not only--by 'we,' I'll define it this time, Mr. Foley, it was me, Bill Casey, Bill Casey's people at the Agency, and Colonel North felt that the second channel was a very credible channel that went to an official within the Iranian government in a very high position, and we thought the channel showed a great deal of promise. "The nine points were designed to get over the first hurdle, which we have always described was getting our hostages back, and after that, setting up a mechanism through which we could carry on a more strategic dialogue with the--what we considered to be the pragmatic elements within the Iranian government. "Mr. FOLEY. Without the American hostages, though, no such undertakings as these would be made to the Iranians, is that true?

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LONG-FORM VERSION

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"Mr. POINDEXTER. Say that again.

"Mr. FOLEY. Without the existence of American hostages and the desire to have them released, no such undertakings as these would ever be made to the Iranians, isn't that true?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that I would make such a statement.

"Mr. FOLEY. Let me put it another way, then. Could you conceive of the United States authorizing the sale of Hawk missiles and Hawk missile parts and TOW missiles in substantial numbers in order just to begin a geopolitical dialogue with the Iranians?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is a hypothetical question.

"Mr. FOLEY. You answered a hypothetical question last Friday in these terms.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, sometimes maybe I don't want to answer a hypothetical question.

"Mr. FOLEY. So you don't prefer to answer this one?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No. Let me give you an answer.

"The problem that we have tried to discuss earlier in these hearings was that Iran is in a very strategic location that is critical to the security of the free world. It is important that we simply--that we not simply ignore Iran and the coming succession to power in that country. It is important that we have a better understanding of--through intelligence, as to what is happening in the country, what people are thinking, what their hopes and desires are for the future.

"I think there is a recognition amongst many Iranian officials that things can't go on the way they have been going on. The economy is in a shambles. They are in a no-win war that Iraq started, and they are grasping for help, and whether or not there had been hostages in Lebanon which we thought the Iranians might have some influence on, I don't know. We might very likely have decided that we needed to open up a channel into the Iranian government.

"In fact, the NSDD, that was the draft that was prepared by the NSC staff in early '85, was specifically oriented toward the strategic objectives on Iran before there was any connection whatsoever with the hostages.

"Mr. FOLEY. When was that NSDD issued, do you recall?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It was not issued. That is what I said. A draft NSDD was prepared and distributed to the various--

"Mr. FOLEY. When was that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It was in June of '85. The first approach, I believe, to Mr. McFarlane by the Israelis was in July of '85."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 25-28; JHICI Ex. JMP 62 [9-Point Plan].)

86/10/08-536
DURING 1986

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: GOALS, AND
HOSTAGE RELEASE, GENERALLY
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. FOLEY. But it was four years into the administration before you suddenly decided that

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			there was a need to open up a channel? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That isn't true, Mr. Foley. "Mr. FOLEY. Was there an earlier draft or earlier discussions? "Mr. POINDEXTER. There were many, many earlier discussions within the NSC staff and with Director Casey and Cabinet officials about the problem, that we didn't know what was happening in Iran. Iran was important to the United States and it was high time we figured out a way, and there were a lot of efforts that are not directly related to this hearing that were made. "Mr. FOLEY. But it was not until the hostages were taken and the proposal that Iran needed arms made it possible to suggest that sale of arms to Iran might facilitate the release of hostages and the broader purposes you have described? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm sorry, Mr. Foley. Would you repeat your question? "Mr. FOLEY. But it was not until the American hostages were taken and Iran was said to be in desperate need of military supplies to continue its military operations against Iraq that there was a connection between the sale of arms to Iran and the removal of this first obstacle to improve relations for release of hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that is an accurate and fair description of our thinking or our objectives. As I have testified before, many times now, the problem was that we saw a strategic problem with Iran, an opportunity presented itself to us to open up a channel into the Iranian

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			government. "The problem, though, in any sort of endeavor like this, especially after the animosity and damaging relationship that the United States has had with Iran, certainly not due to actions we have taken, but actions that the Iranian government has taken, there is a lack of confidence on both sides to begin such a dialogue. The confidence-building measure that the United States thought would be effective, and also we believed that the Iranians thought it would be effective, was to sell them a small quantity of defensive--essentially defensive arms. The confidence-building measure on their part was to put pressure on the Hizballah, the Shiah fundamentalist group in Lebanon that actually had the hostages. The Iranian government was to put pressure on those groups to release the hostages. That would have been their good-faith step. "Mr. FOLEY. So our good faith step was the sale of arms, their good faith step was the release of hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct--no, putting pressure on the Hizballah for them to release the hostages. "Mr. FOLEY. Arranging for release of hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As it turned out, I don't believe that they had the control over the Hizballah that we thought they did in the beginning. "Mr. FOLEY. But we were willing to have the two confidence-building first steps to be exchange

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			or release of hostages for the sale of defense arms? "[Witness conferring with counsel.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. The tenor of your question would mean that the only thing[s] that we were really interested in were the hostages, and that is simply not the case. "Mr. FOLEY. No. You testified that the confidence-building action on our part was the sale of a small quantity of defensive arms, quote, unquote, and that the confidence-building action on their part was the intervention with the Hizballah to release American hostages; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. "Mr. FOLEY. My question is, we were willing to have the confidence-building mechanisms for the two sides consist of our sale of defensive arms to them and their intercession to release the hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. In effect, if you exclude all other aspects of the initiative, it does come down to that. And I think the discussions that have taken place in the press, in the media and in these hearings ha[ve] tended to ignore the other aspects of the initiative. "You can't just look at a part of a problem in isolation from the rest of it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 29-32.)
86/10/08-537 DURING 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: GOALS, HOSTAGE RELEASE, AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

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			[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. FOLEY. But at that point, in 1986, the initial steps were confidence-building exchanges of arms for hostages; isn't that fair? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have always said that the first hurdle that we had to get over in carrying on a strategic dialog with the Iranians was to get the hostages back. Otherwise, we wouldn't have any reason to believe that they were operating in good faith. "Mr. FOLEY. You believe that the violation of our stated policy around the world through Operation Staunch and other activities was not seriously damaged by this undertaking? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not, Mr. Foley. First of all, our policy was not an arms embargo against Iran. We don't just all of a sudden, out of the blue, decide to embargo arms to Iran. "The policy objective there was an end to the Iran-Iraq war. One of the methods to achieve that policy objective was to try to reduce the flow of arms into Iran. We weren't very successful. "As it turns out, Bill Casey and I--before he died--firmly believed that the actions that we had taken with the Iranians, the talks that we had had with them, were responsible for preventing or postponing a major Iranian attack across the border against Iraq. "That doesn't have anything to do with the fact that we provided arms; it had to do with our discussions with the Iranians, explaining to them that we didn't think the Soviets would ever allow them to defeat Iraq and they better rethink their

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			situation. "Now, that is a step toward our objective of ending the Iran-Iraq war. The provision of the small amount of defensive arms was important to get them to listen to us, and listen to our reasoning. "Mr. FOLEY. So if you had it to do over again, you would not have stopped the process of this kind of exchange; is that fair? "Mr. POINDEXTER. If it had not been exposed, the next step was to bring in officials within the State Department in the actual discussions with the Iranians, and who knows where it would have led. "As I testified the other day, I think there is still a possibility. "Mr. FOLEY. The problem was in the exposure, not in the policy? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 32-34.)
86/10/08-570 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: THE DAWA PRISONERS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you communicate to [Hakim] approval of these [nine] points? "Mr. NORTH. If we proceeded in this direction--and I would guess maybe we did--then I did seek approval, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you include in the approval that you sought the item about his presenting a plan for the release of the Dawa? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you get that approval?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And at the time that you got that approval, did the NSC have an official position against the United States asking for that?

"Mr. NORTH. That plan did not involve the United States asking for that. The plan that we presented to the Iranians--which we probably ought to take up in executive session if you want the details--did not involve the United States, and that is an important thing to understand.

"I knew well what our position was on the Dawa. I had written it with the concurrence of the Department of State. Of course, that was always one of the demands of the Hizballah that hold the Americans hostage, because one or two or maybe three of the members of the Dawa are related to family members of the Hizballah.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, I don't want to get into matters that ought to be in executive session.

"Mr. NORTH. Let's leave it at this, that it did not involve the sacrifice of our position or the compromise of our position on the Dawa. It was a straightforward proposal to the Iranians as to how they could solve the problem.

"Mr. LIMAN. You drew a distinction between Hakim and the United States Government; is that fair to say?

"Mr. NORTH. Absolutely.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you think that the Iranians who were dealing with him drew that distinction?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know. You are asking me to put myself in the minds of the Iranians.

". . . .

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			"Mr. LIMAN. What you are saying is that these were not decisions of Lieutenant Colonel North, they were decisions that were fully authorized. "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. I wasn't questioning the fact that you had authority from Mr. Poindexter or Casey or that you had made tape recordings of it. We have the tape recording. "Mr. NORTH. I understand, Counsel, I just didn't want anybody left with the misapprehension after all the paper you have gone nearly blind reading and I wore my fingers to the bone typing or my secretary did or typed myself on my PROF, that I left anybody uninformed who needed to be informed in the conduct of these operations." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 136-40.)
86/10/08-580 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN: THE DAWA PRISONERS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I want to talk about the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait. . . . How in the world could the United States either directly, tangentially, or any other way--not your policy, NSC policy--that's Poindexter, how could we possibly be advocating in some way that they be released? "Mr. NORTH. I don't believe that what I was talking about was an advocacy for release. It is a simple fact of reality that there will come a time when those 17 will be released. It is not unusual in that part of the world to see those kinds of transactions work. We have seen it with our friends, with our allies, and quite simply, we

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			have seen it with our adversaries. There will come a time when those people will walk free. "Mr. RUDMAN. I hope not, Colonel North. "Mr. NORTH. I am simply making a bald statement of fact. We have seen it happen countless times. We have seen Americans who have been convicted of the most heinous crimes possible turned loose to walk free in American cities. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . The fact is if those people were going to come to be released anyway--and I believe they will, because history is a precedent in that particular part of the world, and with those kinds of groups--then there ought to be some benefit derived from that for us, not just for the two parties transacting that kind of release, and it will happen just as sure as I'm sitting here." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 244-47.)
86/10/08-700 DECEMBER 13, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE 9-POINT PLAN: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE, AND THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL ABOUT THE DAWA PRISONERS SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, when were you first informed that United States negotiations with the second channel in the early autumn of 1986 had produced an agreement on a so-called nine-point agenda which provided for additional arms sales to Iran in exchange for hostages and which contained provisions also with respect to actions directed at the Government of Iraq? "Secretary SHULTZ. On December 13th of 1986;

but if I may interrupt your questioning, I would like to expand on that.

"Mr. BELNICK. Please.

"Secretary SHULTZ. In the course of the effort to come to grips with what was taking place, the President put the management of Iran matters into my hands by that time. This--we are talking in December; sort of at first a little bit, but then for sure.

"And I discovered the CIA had a meeting scheduled with an Iranian for that date; and so we considered what to do, and we decided that we should go ahead with that meeting, that the CIA representative, who was scheduled to be the representative there, Mr. Cave, should go, but we would have accompanying him Mr. Charles Dunbar, who is a[] Foreign Service officer and Farsi speaker. And we would have instructions carefully written designed to use [in] the meeting as a means to tell that channel that there would be no more arms sales discussed in that channel or anywhere else; but we wanted to get it through that way as well as other ways.

"At the meeting, the message was delivered, but also as our representative listened, there were--it was back and forth discussion about this agenda, nine-point agenda; and so gradually then and in discussion with Mr. Cave, Mr. Dunbar got a reasonable idea of what was on this agenda. And then he called that back on December 13th, which was a Saturday, to the Department, and I saw it on Saturday afternoon, and it was astonishing.

"So I called the President, or I called the

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			White House to get an appointment with the President, and there was a lot of back and forth, what did I want to see him about, and so on, and I didn't seem to be getting an appointment right away. So I picked up the phone Sunday morning, and I called the President. I said, 'Mr. President, I have something happening I want to come over and tell you about right now.' So he said, 'Fine, come over.' He happened to be in Washington. "I went up to the family quarters, and Al Keel, who was then Acting National Security Advisor, went with me at my request. And I told the President the items on this agenda, including such things as doing something about the Dawa prisoners, which made me sick to my stomach that anybody would talk about that as something we could consider doing. And the President was astonished, and I have never seen him so mad. He is a very genial, pleasant man and doesn't--very easy going. But his jaws set and his eyes flashed, and both of us, I think, felt the same way ab[o]ut it, and I think in that meeting I finally felt that the President deeply understands that something is radically wrong here. "There's more to all this than that, but I thought it was important to expand on that, because that was not just another event in chronology that you are going through." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 9-11.)
86/10/08-701 AFTER OCTOBER			THE DAWA PRISONERS: THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1:

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1986			"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . So that everyone understands about the Dawa prisoners and why the President has the intensity of feeling that he expressed to you privately, and that he has expressed publicly, and to others privately, they are the 17 terrorists who were tried and convicted . . . by Kuwait for the involvement in bombings of U.S. and French facilities in December of '83. That was shortly after the bombing of the Marine compound. "Intelligence, without disclosing it specifically, indicates there was a close tie between those Dawa terrorists and those responsible for the two bombings in Lebanon, including the embassy and the bombing of the Marine compound, with the terrible loss of life. There was an involvement in connection with those people with the TWA hijacking, and I might add, with the kidnapping and brutal murder of Mr. Buckley. "I want to refer to the testimony broadly. The testimony is, from Colonel North, that he had permission to discuss these nine points from Admiral Poindexter. "Admiral Poindexter was questioned as follows by Mr. Liman: 'Did Colonel North report to you that part of the plan was for General Secord or Hakim to come up with a plan that the Iranians could use to attempt to convince the Kuwaitis to release the Dawa prisoners?' "The Admiral replied: 'I believe he did. That was my understanding.['] "'Then it was not something that General

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			Secord--['] "'I don't--I can't say that I really remember Albert Hakim's role, but my recollection would be that General Secord was to come up with a plan which he could give the Iranians, that the Iranians could execute, not that the United States Government would do it or not even that General Secord would do anything.' "Mr. Liman's question: 'Did you clear that with the President?['] "'Mr. Poindexter: My best recollection is I did.' [See 86/10/08-530.] "And I think we have become fairly attuned on this panel to determine absolute answers from what I consider to be equivocal answers. I would say that 'my best recollection is I did' falls somewhere in the middle. "Now, I've heard you testify this morning, and I've been aware of the President's reaction to your disclosure to him in December. I want to refer now to Colonel North's contemporaneous notes that had part of the so-called Hakim accords. "Let me be clear that Admiral Poindexter did not represent that these were binding representations of the United States Government. What he represented was that these were negotiating positions and that they would have to be approved. I'm not sure after what I've heard here by whom, but he said they would have to be approved. "And Colonel North's notes read as follows. "Secretary SHULTZ. I could bring them to you, Senator, and you could vote whether to ratify them

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			or not. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think I know how that would come out, Mr. Secretary." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 155-57.)
86/10/08-702 AFTER OCTOBER 1986			THE DAWA PRISONERS: THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Question continuing from preceding entry:] "[Mr. RUDMAN. North's] notes say, 'What must be done for us to achieve an honorable peace and an honorable peace means that Saddam Husayn must go.' He, of course, is the President of Iraq. [']Then the two parties will establish a well-defined plan and timetable for the exchange of official intelligence. The United States Government will provide maps and information, deliver 1500 TOWs, paid for by the IRG,['] which, of course, is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which, I might say parenthetically, if they are the moderates, I don't know the meaning of the word moderate. They are Khomeini's loyalists, am I correct, Mr. Secretary? "Secretary SHULTZ. To my understanding. "Mr. RUDMAN. Now, my question . . . is simply this: Did you have any indication from the President of the United States, when you discussed the Dawa matter with him, that you learned about for the first time that he had any knowledge whatsoever that any government officials were talking about it as representations, as inducements, whatever? "Secretary SHULTZ. I am positive from the way the President reacted to what I told him that he

was totally surprised, astonished, furious, just no question about it. I don't have any knowledge, I don't know about his discussions with Admiral Poindexter, but the President certainly was surprised by what I told him.

"Mr. RUDMAN. As a matter of fact--

"Secretary SHULTZ. And he was, and he reacted like he had been kicked in the belly. So I didn't have to tell him what the Dawa prisoners were, he knew very well what they were, and he knew what that stood for. That stood for the fact that here is a small country in a very vulnerable place, right there next to Iran, and it isn't only that the Dawa prisoners, what they did and why they are in jail, but in an effort to intimidate Kuwait, there have been more than one effort at their government to force them to change their stance, and they have always stood up to it.

"And in our efforts, our government's efforts to work on the subject of terrorism, we have well recognized that you can only fight this if you fight it as an international effort, and we have to stand up to it ourselves, and we have to persuade others to stand up to it.

"And here was little Kuwait, very vulnerable, standing up to it. So we have to support them. They are much more vulnerable than we are. If they can stand up for it, doggone it, so should we.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, based on your description, which I think even though you used terms like 'made you sick' and 'looks like the President got kicked in the stomach', the fact

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			is that may be understating, as I understand it, the President['s] reaction. The President was outraged, am I correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. RUDMAN. So I think we could fairly observe that since Admiral Poindexter said it was his recollection that if you had to make, if you don't know, you weren't there, but your view on all of your dealings with the President and that incident would be that as to that event in the so-called Hakim accords, that his recollection, based on all that you have seen, is probably incorrect concerning the President. "Secretary SHULTZ. I am sure of it. I have known Ronald Reagan for almost 20 years, and I have worked closely with him before he was President and during his Presidency. And we have our mostly agreements, sometimes disagreements, we have had plenty of discussions, and I think I know him as a human being pretty well. And I know that I have not misjudged his reaction." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 157-61.)
86/10/08-703 JULY 24, 1987			THE DAWA PRISONERS McCLURE CLARIFICATION AND SHULTZ RESPONSE: "Mr. MCCLURE. . . . I want to touch back on a couple of comments made [about] the Dawa prisoner release because I am afraid the last two days may have left the American people with the wrong impression about what was proposed, who proposed it and what it meant and recognizing that in this instance, those facts that we have are subject to interpretation and therefore interpretations may

differ and honest people may come to different conclusions.

"It was characterized yesterday in bringing the subject up that the nine point--the Hakim Nine Point Program included a promise to get the Dawa prisoners released. I don't read the record that way. That is not the way I heard it, that is not what I read in the nine points. I might also point out that the nine points were the product of Mr. Hakim given to us in a corrupted version of Farsi that caused a little bit of difficulty to the translators, even to write it out for us in English, and to check his translation into English from what was originally written in Farsi.

"I think it is important to remember what Mr. Hakim said about it, the Iranians needed something. It was suggested to us by the Iranians and the Israelis that this was an important emotional issue to them and if we just give them a little something to lead them on we could let them down later or words to that effect. I think to extrapolate that into somehow a United States government representative position that we were going to promise to get the prisoners released is a tremendous extrapolation from the known facts into the speculative, and I for one don't follow that.

"I noted also, and I don't think Senator Rudman intended to mislead anyone, but his remarks might have left the wrong impression with some who don't know the record as well as some of us who have been living with it for some time, because in his comments about the nine points and the Dawa

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			prisoner release he also referred to that other document that has a discussion about Saddam Husayn must go. It is important for us to recognize that that is not a part of the nine points, and it was not included in the Hakim proposal and as far as I know, was not at any time even represented to this committee that it had been approved by Admiral Poindexter or presented to the President and approved by the President. ". . . . "Secretary SHULTZ. . . . [W]ith respect to the Dawa prisoners, I didn't know at the time that I was so upset that there had been apparently some contacts with the Government of Kuwait, so I have heard here, by Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North, and Admiral Poindexter I understood testified to this committee that he had approved of this nine-point agenda. "So, I don't think it can fairly be described as a flight of Mr. Hakim's fancy. "Mr. MCCLURE. Did you hear Mr. Hakim's testimony? "Secretary SHULTZ. No--well, I heard bits and pieces. "Mr. MCCLURE. I think you are not being quite accurate to characterize the nine points which he wrote, which were his product, and to understand them unless you had also heard his description of them. "Secretary SHULTZ. Let me withdraw from an effort to try to interpret the information that you have been gathering, which I am not a primary source for. I am really here to testify as a

primary source.

"The only comment that bothered me in that respect of yours [sic] was that maybe since they were so interested in the Dawa prisoners, we should just kind of give them a little something, and I think that is a problem, when you break over from your principle into the little something. I remember one of my favorite Senators, maybe because he was a University of Chicago professor beforehand, was Senator Paul Douglas, and he used to have a statement about corruption, and his statement was, it all starts with a cigar.

"And I think you have to watch it--

"Mr. MCCLURE. With all due respect to Mr. Hakim, he didn't have a cigar.

"Mr. HYDE. You are right, Mr. Secretary." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 225-26, 233-34.)

86/10/08-704
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THE DAWA PRISONERS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL
RUDMAN-McCLURE EXCHANGE:

Sen. Rudman, responding to Sen. McClure's clarification [see 86/10/08-703] of the negotiations for release of the Dawa prisoners, stated:

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . On examination of the transcript, it would indicate that I was discussing with the Secretary the risks that we run when people who purportedly represent the U.S. put forth ideas. Let me point out to my good friend from Idaho that in a transcript that has been declassified that is part of this committee's record, Colonel North--and he testified with

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			authority--represented to the second channel representing the Iranian Government that the President's attitude was that Suddam Husayn must go. That is a transcript from a tape recording of that meeting. "I would make the suggestion--I am addressing this generally to the Secretary of State--that I would have to assume that if Iraqi intelligence had come onto that piece of information, hearing that it was represented to an official of the Iranian Government by an official purportedly representing the President, and not unlikely the official was residing in his work in the White House, that that could cause, I would expect, some problems. "So that was the point on which Senator McClure didn't comment. "Mr. MCCLURE. Would the gentleman yield? "Mr. RUDMAN. I would rather not yield, I would rather finish what I have to say. "Secondly, since there is some misunderstanding about the nine points, let the record show what the evidence states regardless of what Mr. Hakim states. The record states Colonel North states under oath, and I believe him, that he had authority to work with those nine points. Admiral Poindexter testifies, and I have reservations about that part of his testimony, that the President approved the nine points. "[] That's the record. Now, whether that was an official United States Government policy or not, we know it wasn't. We know it from the Secretary of State. We [k]now it from our own

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			instinct. But unfortunately those listening to it thought it might have been and that is the kind of mischief I was discussing with the Secretary of State. "Certainly I would say to my friend from Idaho if I had misstated its context, I had no intent to do so, but I think that is the meaning of the element. "So I will yield. "Mr. MCCLURE. I only want to affirm what I said earlier, that I did not think the Senator from New Hampshire had intended to mislead, but I was afraid the American public might have gotten the wrong inference because the conversation with respect to Sadan [sic] Hussein was not a part of the nine points, but was brought into the conversation by the Senator from New Hampshire in connection with the nine points, I was afraid a misimpression had been left. "Mr. RUDMAN. I appreciate that. My main point was to illustrate in my examination of the Secretary of State that there were people running around the world representing themselves as official representatives of this Government making, I believe, incredible representati[on]s which if the Secretary had known at the time probably [he] would have lost what remaining hair he now has." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 237-40.)
86/10/08-710 DURING 1986			THE DAWA PRISONERS AND U.S. EFFORTS FOR HOSTAGE RELEASE, GENERALLY SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

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"Well, there are alternatives. Of course, we work on the hostage problem constantly. We have a unit in the Department of State that is in touch with the hostage families constantly to pass them information, hear any information they have, give them reassurance, telephone number that will answer at any time.

"We are in touch with intelligence services, with other countries, and we have our own trying to find out where the hostages are and to persuade, try to see if there is any way that we can reach those who are holding them. We are ready to talk with anybody about the subject; but, of course, we have our policies. We are not going to pay ransom or do other things that are against our policy.

"Now, we know, for example, that those holding the hostages have said in various ways, such as when they released Father Jenco, at least I thought, and it seemed at the time he was released so that he could give a message. Namely, that if you don't get the Dawa prisoners out, the hostages are going to get killed. So we know what they are after.

"Now, to think it is a great idea and shows the innovative capacities of the NSC staff to think of the notion that you could trade the Dawa prisoners for the hostages, that's nutty. That kind of great idea I'd like to be saved from.

". . . ."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 216-17.)

86/10/08-715			THE DAWA PRISONERS: POINDEXTER'S ROLE

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OCTOBER 1986			SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Colonel North said he obtained Admiral Poindexter's approval of the [nine-point] plan, Admiral Poindexter said to the best of his recollection he obtained the President's approval. "Under that plan, one American hostage would be released definitely and an effort would be made to get one other. That is why it was called one and a half in the plan. "In exchange, the United States agreed to provide 500 TOW missiles to Iran, some Hawk spare parts, and certain intelligence information. "And in addition, before the American hostage was to be released, Mr. Hakim was to provide to the Iranians a plan for the release of 17 terrorists held in jail in Kuwait. "Those are the so-called Dawa terrorists who had been convicted of bombing the United States and the French Embassies in Kuwait, killing 4 people and injuring 87 more. "Yesterday you said that it was that part of the plan that made you sick to your stomach and when you told the President about it, it made him madder than you had ever seen him before. "Now, Colonel North defended this provision in the plans. When Senator Rudman asked him how could we possibly be advocating in some way that they be released, Colonel North replied: 'I don't believe that what I was talking about was an advocacy for release.' "And he went on to say, 'The fact is that those people were going to come to be released

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			anyway, and I believe they will because history is a precedent in that particular part of the world and with those kinds of groups and there ought to be some benefit derived from that for us.' "Now, when Mr. Dunbar reported to you on his meeting with the Iranians on December 13 of 1986, he wrote a memorandum, and I quote a part of it now, it is Exhibit [GPS] 50 in your book. I will read one paragraph from it. "On the U.S. role regarding the Dawa prisoners, Mr. Dunbar wrote, 'Poindexter told Cave that he personally had asked the Kuwait[i]s to do something about the Dawa prisoners. Cave believes that Poindexter met with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister here in the fall and may have seen him in the region at some point as well. North also met with the Kuwaiti Ambassador and perhaps with other foreign ministry officials as well.' "Now, of course, if Poindexter or North or both met with the Kuwaitis and asked them to do something about the Dawa terrorists, that would be an advocacy for release. "So my question to you is: Do you have any information, other than Mr. Dunbar's memorandum to you, on whether Admiral Poindexter did personally ask the Kuwait[i]s to do something about the Dawa terrorists? "Secretary SHULTZ. What I know is what Mr. Dunbar reported and the information I received from Mr. Gates at the CIA when I brought it up and asked if they had possession of a piece of paper on this that I should look at, he found one and sent it to me. And what contacts had actually

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			been made, I didn't know, but after my meeting with the President and after finding out what additionally I could, I felt that whether there was, had been a contact or not, I wanted to give reassurance to the Government of Kuwait that whatever anybody might have said to them, the policy of the United States remained as it had been and so I sent a cable to him saying that." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 128-31; JHICI Ex. GPS 50 [Dunbar Memorandum for the Record, "Cave /Dunbar Meeting with [redacted] of the Iranian Government; Frankfurt, December 13, 1986," 12/14/86].)
86/10/08-716 OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1986			THE DAWA PRISONERS: POINDEXTER'S ROLE AND THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Now, your meeting with the President occurred just two months after the plan was negotiated, and according to Admiral Poindexter, after it was approved by the President. You have said you told the President about it on a Sunday morning, and he reacted very negatively. "My next question is: Based upon your knowledge of the President and your personal observation of him during that meeting, are you convinced that the President could not have approved that plan in October, just two months before that? "Secretary SHULTZ. Absolutely. "Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you talked yesterday-- "Secretary SHULTZ. And I would say, Senator,

that any self-respecting person working for a President, if he were going to make such a proposal to the President has a responsibility to point it up to the President what is involved, because it clearly would be a gross violation of everything that we had said and stood for.

"So, if--and I have no idea what Admiral Poindexter did or didn't do, but if he were to have undertaken that at all, that sense of responsibility, he had an obligation to make sure that the President understood fully what he was talking about, and I know that that couldn't possibly have happened."
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 132.)

86/10/08-750
OCTOBER 1986

SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: DoS AWARENESS
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you ever discuss with the State Department the nine points that had been agreed upon?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe so, although clearly part of the--I did discuss with Secretary Shultz that we were working on a second channel. He was aware of that, and he was also traveling during this time period and I told him at least two or three times that we needed to sit down and talk about it in more detail, but because we were both going in different directions, we didn't have that opportunity before things began to fall apart in November.

"But he was aware that we were working on a second channel. I think he may have been aware of the identity of the second channel, and in

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			November of 1986, even after things began to fall apart, one of our objectives was to try to sustain the second channel, and I recall, because you have it as an exhibit, a cable that I sent Secretary Shultz in which I told him that I wanted to set up two compartments, one an operational compartment which I was willing to brief one of his people into and a strategic compartment. "The purpose of that compartment would have been to discuss these nine points. And other than the hostage aspect, the only other really significant part of the nine points was setting up a mechanism for conducting future discussions, which obviously would have had to involve a State Department presence." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 176-77.)
86/10/08-800 DURING 1986			SECOND CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS: "OUR GUYS, . . . THEY GOT TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS" SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. So we were in the position of sending arms to a country that had supported the elements and, as you have just indicated, had extensive control that [sic] were responsible for the bombing of the Marine compound and the loss of 241 American lives and, also according to the Hakim accord, we were going to put on the table the possibility of freeing the Dawa terrorists who had been imprisoned by the Kuwaitis for their terrorist attacks on Americans and Frenchmen in Kuwait; is that correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. But I don't want to sit here with any implication at all

that whatever Mr. Hakim may have thought, whatever Colonel North may have told him, that this was in any way U.S. Government policy.

"Mr. SARBANES. I understand that.

"Secretary SHULTZ. It was not, and it could not have been cleared with the President and was misrepresented.

"Mr. SARBANES. I understand that, but that it could happen is itself an important comment on how policy was being made, or perhaps, more accurately put, how policy was not being made or not being implemented?

"Secretary SHULTZ. It's an example of how something got off the rails when it was being administered by a staff that was not supervisable in the normal, accountable sense. That gets back to a point I was making earlier.

"Mr. SARBANES. Let me ask you about the ambassadors. How many--

"Secretary SHULTZ. Let me just say that a minor aspect of all this that galls me, as you look at almost any part--this is minor, but it nevertheless, it galls me. Our guys, to the extent that the staff people who were doing this, they got taken to the cleaners. You look at the structure of this deal. It's pathetic that anybody would agree to anything like that. It's so lopsided. It's crazy.

"People say you can't trust the State Department to negotiate a tough deal. Well, I'll tell you."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 183-84.)

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86/10/08-801 1986-87			THE DAWA PRISONERS: RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. . . . I would ask you whether the word getting out that we indeed had conversations and perhaps even extensive conversations about helping free the Dawa prisoners who had been convicted of terrorism in Kuwait has had any effect on our efforts to extradite terrorists who have perpetrated crimes against American citizens? "Secretary SHULTZ. I think that the effort to control and to win the war against terrorism is very widely supported, people see its importance. They see the rule of law for doing so, and extradition treaties are an essential ingredient in connecting countries in that regard, and people understand that. "And as I mentioned earlier, at the Venice Summit, I think the President made further steps in cementing this philosophy. So, if there w[as] any setback to all of this to our problems, our policy on terrorism and the convictions behind it, and so on, it has been temporary and I think it is behind us." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 168-69.)
86/10/08-870 OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. Going to the final meeting of Colonel North with the second channel of Iranians, that occurred in November of 1986, is that correct?

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			"Mr. POINDEXTER. I frankly don't recall when the last meeting was. I would have said October. It may have been--there was contact in November by telephone. I frankly don't recall if there was an actual meeting. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you discuss with Colonel North the October meeting? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. FOLEY. What was the purpose of that meeting, to continue the contact? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes[.] We--in August, as I recall, was when we first identified the second channel, and there was a lot of material to go over with the second channel and the second channel eventually came to the United States, and I've lost track of the exact sequence. "Mr. FOLEY. Did you remember authorizing a telephone contact by Colonel North in November? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, absolutely. In fact, one of our concerns, both mine and the President's, in early November, was to preserve the possibility of getting out more hostages and to preserve the contact through the second channel, that there were telephone conversations with the second channel before and after the President's speech to the country, and before and after the press conference. "Mr. FOLEY. Was the Department of State aware of that, do you know? "Mr. POINDEXTER. At some point in early November, I think you have it as an exhibit, I sent a cable to Secretary Shultz that talked in general terms, and I told him that I was going to

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			set up two compartments, one an operational compartment and one a strategic compartment, to discuss the issues, and asked him to identify people to participate in that. "Secretary Shultz was aware that we were trying to establish a second channel, and I can recall trying to get in touch with him several times during the month of October to discuss with him progress. Unfortunately, I was traveling with the President on the campaign. Secretary Shultz was traveling and our schedules just didn't permit an adequate number of meetings. "Mr. FOLEY. Were the so-called Hakim accords, as we have come to know them, still operative at that point as a basis of reference for discussions? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that it is fair to describe those as Hakim accords. "Mr. FOLEY. It is a shorthand. Whatever term you would like to use, are those the nine points of discussion that were the subject of earlier ad referendum discussions that you mentioned-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. I believe that was in October, and my recollection was that that was probably the last meeting that Colonel North had with the second channel. "Mr. FOLEY. They were still matters of discussion at that point? "Mr. POINDEXTER. In his last meeting and when he came back and we got the nine points, I discussed those with the President, and he approved the ones that applied to the U.S. Government.

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			"You know, I contended that one of the points about the Kuwaitis was a private arrangement in which General Secord and Mr. Hakim would give the Iranians a plan that they thought might be useful in talking--in the Iranians talking to the Kuwaitis. "Mr. FOLEY. Let me turn to another subject. "Mr. POINDEXTER. One other point on that. It has been reported that one of the nine points involved the president of Iraq. I did not remember that at the time, and looking over the nine points that are in the exhibit, I don't find that that is one of the nine points at all. "Mr. FOLEY. There was some indication that that was listed on a--Colonel North's copy. You are saying that it was not approved by the President or-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was not one of the nine points as far as I was concerned, and in looking at the exhibits, I have not been able to find any reference to that. "Mr. FOLEY. There was no-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is my understanding from the testimony of Mr. Hakim at least that this item was discussed with the Iranians, but I don't think it ever wound up-- "Mr. FOLEY. Was there any point at which these nine points were withdrawn from consideration? Were they operative up until the last contacts? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As far as I was concerned, they were operative up until the time I left the White House.

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			"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, is there any end to the questioning in sight? Basic question. "Mr. FOLEY. I think it is five or ten minutes, Mr. Chairman." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 142-45. For Poindexter testimony immediately following this excerpt, see 86/10/11-118. For text of the 9-Point Plan, see 86/10/08-307.)
86/10/08-900 OCTOBER 6-8, 1986			THE TEHRAN TRIP: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE NORTH ACCOUNT: North on the first notice he received that the Iranian Initiative was about to be uncovered: "The very first revelations we had concern about, as I recall, came about as a consequence, and I am sure you have them in one of the transcripts I haven't yet had a chance to review, when the Second Channel in Europe at a meeting told us that pamphlets had been distributed in Iran exposing the McFarlane trip in May of that year. "And as I recall, we came back, had a discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence. This further confirmed his assessment, that this thing was going to unravel very quickly. That was before the Al Shiraa publication in Beirut, the first days of November." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 40.)
86/10/09-100 OCTOBER 9, 1986		THE CIA AND THE CONTRAS: INSULATING THE AGENCY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOREN. . . . I have had a theory, and I	

shared it with you briefly in executive session for some time, Mr. Casey as an individual was willing to get involved in things and take risks, but he had a great love for the Central Intelligence Agency. He was determined to make sure that that institution not involve itself in anything that might place it in jeopardy, and that he went to great lengths to try to insulate the CIA as an institution from doing anything that might be improper or questionable as far as the law was concerned.

"In fact, Mr. Gates, in testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee, indicated during our hearings that on October 9, 1986, he had lunch at the CIA with you and with Director Casey, so it was Mr. Gates, yourself and Director Casey, and that at that lunch Mr. Gates asked you whether the CIA was involved in your private supply operation and private fund-raising operation for the contras during any period of time in which that was banned by law, and he indicated that you answered that the CIA was completely clean, speaking about it as an institution, and that you had worked very hard to keep it that way.

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct sir.

"Mr. BOREN. Was that on orders or direction from Director Casey that he wanted to keep the CIA as an institution totally insulated and apart from this operation?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, yes. There was no contact I had with any CIA officer that Director Casey was unaware of.

"Mr. BOREN. Did anyone at the CIA assist in obtaining money for the contras from any third countries?

"Mr. NORTH. Not to my knowledge, sir.

"Mr. BOREN. Did any of the CIA officials ever send you names of countries or make any suggestions to you about countries to contact?

"Mr. NORTH. Other than in the discussions within the restricted interagency group chaired by the State Department after the law was passed authorizing State Department contact, other than that, no, sir.

"Mr. BOREN. [Did] Mr. George ever make any contacts or was that after this time?

"Mr. NORTH. As I indicated earlier, the Director of Operations and I had a number of discussions that dealt along the periphery of these things. I have turned over to you my notes on those.

"Mr. BOREN. Did you ever tell anyone at the CIA other than Director Casey about the residuals being the source of funding for any of the contra operations?

"Mr. NORTH. Not specifically or directly, no. But as I indicated in my earlier testimony, there are no doubt people who had suspicions relatively early on, even before Mr. Furmark's approach. That is as a consequence of the intelligence that we talked about the other night.

"Mr. BOREN. But you did not explicitly inform any other individual at the CIA?

"Mr. NORTH. I explicitly tried to deceive a number of people at the CIA as to the actual source of those. I do not recall specifically

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		addressing those matters to anybody. "Mr. BOREN. So, my view that Director Casey intentionally set up Mr. Gates, for example, to be the deputy in charge of day-to-day operations of the agency, and to keep him more or less insulated from this other operation, you would say is an accurate description of the way Director Casey was trying to operate? "Mr. NORTH. I would." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 221-24.)	
86/10/10-100 OCTOBER 10, 1986	ZUCKER'S NON-REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION LEWIS ACCOUNT: David Lewis, a Washington attorney, is contacted in early 1986 by Willard Zucker (owner and administrator of CSF, a Swiss fiduciary company; see Iran-Contra Report, at 332), with whom he has done business in the past. Zucker asks, in connection with some Maryland property, "whether someone could receive a real estate commission if they were not licensed as a real estate agent." Lewis tells Zucker he might look into it, but he does not recall later whether he gets back to him. In late September 1986, Zucker asks Lewis whether he knows a real estate broker who would take on an agent to transfer a commission for an already-completed transaction. Lewis tells Zucker "that I am sure it would not be too difficult to find someone willing to do that." Early on October 10, 1986, Lewis, in Geneva on business, meets with Zucker. They have lunch with a group, and discuss real estate privately when		

the others leave. Zucker "indicated to me [sc. Lewis] that there wasn't a specific property involved. . . . I got the impression . . . he had a wealthy client who wanted to, in a sense, get money to or award someone here in the U.S. and was looking for a business transaction to do it in. . . . [B]ut then as we went on, he began to indicate to me that, in fact, it was not necessary that there even be a real business transaction.

"He essentially was looking for a cover for someone to merely pay money to a certain person here in the U.S."

The transaction is to involve money paid "to the designated person here, and at the same time a similar sum of money would be deposited in the payer's [the real estate broker's] bank account in Switzerland or anywhere else in the world the payer wanted." The money is in the range of $70,000.

The person, Zucker says, is "the wife of someone in the White House," and the money involved "was earned by the person in the White House in some unrelated matter, but they did not want to pay the money to the person in the White House because of his sensitive position." The person in the White House, Zucker says ("to the best of [Lewis'] recollection") is North.

After this 3-4 minute conversation, Lewis does not pursue the issue and he knows of nothing which came of it. (Lewis Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 9-20. See id., 6/4/87, at 19 ["The reference to the White House and to someone's wife is a certainty. The reference to the name is less

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	certain. . . . The fact the person was a military person is somewhat certain."]. See also Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 2 [Secord on his relationship with Willard Zucker].)		
86/10/10-130 OCTOBER 10, 1986	ZUCKER'S NON-REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testifying on Zucker's contact with David Lewis in Geneva: "Mr. NIELDS. Can you give the committee any information that would shed light on why Mr. Zucker was meeting with a lawyer in Switzerland in October of '86 seeking to find a way of routing a substantial sum of money to you through your wife? "Mr. NORTH. No, I can give you absolutely no insight to that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 120.)		
86/10/10-300 OCTOBER 10, 1986			THE 9-POINT PLAN NORTH PROF: In a PROF to Poindexter on October 10, North recounts a 9-Point Plan slightly different from Hakim's version (see 86/10/08-307). The PROF plan includes Hakim's price for the TOWs and provides that "some," not all, of the Dawa prisoners would be released: "[1.] They [the Iranians] pay $3.6m next week. "[2.] We deliver 500 TOWs (No Hawk parts) 9 daysafter [sic] payment. "[3.] Copp & Sam help prepare a plan for approaching the Kuwaitis to guarantee no more terrorism against the Amir and by which the Amir

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			will use a religious occasion to release some of the Dawa. They will take this plan to the Hizballah as their idea (face saving gesture w/the Hizb.) "[4.] Two hostages (if possible, but no less than one) released w/in 4 days of TOW delivery. If only one hostage released, whole process stops and we meet again. "[5.] Repeat funding and Delivery cycle as in steps 1 & 2 above. "[6.] We send Tech support for HAWKs, update on intel and secure comm team to Tehran and provide location/availability of artillery items noted on the original list provided by [the Relative] in Washington mtg. "[7.] Iran does utmost to secure release of remaining hostage(s)." (Iran-Contra Report, at 257-58; JHICI Ex. OLN 312 [North PROF to Poindexter, "Iran," 10/10/86]. For text of the Hakim Accords [Hakim's 9-Point Plan], see above at 86/10/08-307.)
86/10/11-100 EARLY OCTOBER, AFTER OCTOBER 10, 1986	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: 10/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified he began shredding documents in October, prompted by a series of events: "[W]e saw these operations unraveling as early as the mid part of October: We lost the Hasenfus airplane, and the discussion the Director of Central Intelligence had had with a private citizen about what he knew of a contra diversion, as you put it, and at that point I began to, one, recognize I would be leaving the NSC, because that	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: DIVERSION DISCLOSED NORTH ACCOUNT: Roy Furmark and Casey specifically discussed the diversion to the Contras, according to North: ". . . I started shredding documents in earnest after a discussion with Director Casey in early October, when he told me that Mr. Furmark had come to him and talked to him about the use of Iran arms sales money to support the resistance. "That . . . was preceded shortly by the crash	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: DIVERSION DISCLOSED NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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	was a purpose for my departure, to offer the scapegoat, if you will, and second of all, recognizing what was coming down, I didn't want some new person walking in there opening files that would possibly expose people at risk." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 39.)	or shootdown of the aircraft Mr. Hasenfus was on. And Director Casey and I had a lengthy discussion about the fact that this whole thing was coming unraveled and that things ought to be 'cleaned up,' and I started cleaning up." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 48. See id., 7/7/87, at 49 [North answered, "Yes," when asked if he had "shredded documents shortly after [he] heard from Director Casey that Furmark had said monies had been used from the Iranian arms sales for the benefit of the contras."]; id., 7/8/87, at 110 [North quoting Furmark: "'Oh, by the way, a lot of people happen to know that Ollie North has been using money from the Iranian arms transactions to support the contras', or words to that effect."]. See generally id., 7/10/87, at 115-17.)	
86/10/11-110 BETWEEN OCTOBER 5 AND NOVEMBER 25, 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: CASEY TELLS NORTH TO CLEAN FILES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And you have testified about the fact that as a result of Furmark's statements to the Director, the Director asked you to clean up your files? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And-- "Mr. NORTH. It was not that one singular event, things were, I think as I indicated earlier, unraveling rather quickly. We had the aircraft shot down in Honduras; the investigation of Southern Air Transport, which as far as I can determine is innocent in that transaction; General	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: CASEY TELLS NORTH TO CLEAN FILES NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		Secord's role being revealed; and then Furmark walking in. And, of course, that was followed by the revelations in the pamphlets in Iran and the newspaper in Syria--or Beirut." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 163.)	
86/10/11-112 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER INFORMED; DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. The Iranian initiative was important to the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it was. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that there came a time when you were told by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Iranians were complaining about being overcharged and that some of the financiers of the transaction were threatening to go public? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That would have been in October, as I recall, of 1986. "Mr. LIMAN. And the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Casey, showed you a memo then which revealed that Mr. Ghorbanifar or his financiers were saying that their money went down to Central America--remember that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The memo contained in one or two sentences as I recall that speculation. "As it happens, I did not discuss that particular aspect of the memo with Director Casey at that time. I read it and I recognized that he had seen it. "It was pure speculation and I didn't really	THE IRAN INITIATIVE: EXPOSURE THREATENED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. But you realized when you read that [memo of the Casey-Furmark discussion] that the financiers or Mr. Ghorbanifar w[as] threatening to blow this whole initiative? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, it was bothersome. I can't say that at that point I was overly concerned about it, because I was generally aware that all arms transactions like this get very complex, and there could be all sorts of allegations with very little proof. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. You said this was bothersome. Was this bothersome enough for you to bring to the attention of the President of the United States then in October of 1986, that the Iranian venture might be blown by Ghorbanifar charging that the money was being used for the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I was not that concerned about it based on the particular report that Director Casey had. I might put this in context, that we were very busy during the month of October 1986 with the preparations for the Reykjavik summit going up to Reykjavik and the closing days of the campaign. "Mr. LIMAN. You would agree with me that no

comment on that particular speculation one way or the other.

"Mr. LIMAN. You consciously avoided discussing that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. And he did not discuss it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. But you realized when you read that that the financiers or Mr. Ghorbanifar w[as] threatening to blow this whole initiative?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, it was bothersome. I can't say that at that point I was overly concerned about it, because I was generally aware that all arms transactions like this get very complex, and there could be all sorts of allegations with very little proof.

"Mr. LIMAN. In case it turned out to be true that money was being sent to Central America, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. It is not clear in my mind that the exact connection that Furmark or his colleagues had made was accurate. I still don't know that.

"Mr. LIMAN. You said this was bothersome. Was this bothersome enough for you to bring to the attention of the President of the United States then in October of 1986, that the Iranian venture might be blown by Ghorbanifar charging that the money was being used for the contras?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I was not that concerned about it based on the particular report that Director Casey had. I might put this in context, that we were very busy during the month of October

matter how slowly anyone would speak on this subject that it wouldn't take more than a few minutes to tell the President of the United States that some money had been used for the contras and that there was a threat to expose it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. What I am saying is that I had a lot of things on my mind and my recollection of that time frame is that I frankly did not put a great deal of emphasis on the memo that Director Casey had shown me.

"I was thinking about his recommendation, which we were still thinking about after the election, and that was developing a damage control plan if indeed it did leak out, but we were overtaken by events and one of the regrets that I have from the Iranian project is that we did not develop an adequate damage control plan." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 139-41.)

See col. 2.

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		1986 with the preparations for the Reykjavik summit going up to Reykjavik and the closing days of the campaign. "Mr. LIMAN. You would agree with me that no matter how slowly anyone would speak on this subject that it wouldn't take more than a few minutes to tell the President of the United States that some money had been used for the contras and that there was a threat to expose it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. What I am saying is that I had a lot of things on my mind and my recollection of that time frame is that I frankly did not put a great deal of emphasis on the memo that Director Casey had shown me. "I was thinking about his recommendation, which we were still thinking about after the election, and that was developing a damage control plan if indeed it did leak out, but we were overtaken by events and one of the regrets that I have from the Iranian project is that we did not develop an adequate damage control plan." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 139-41.)	
86/10/11-113 SOMETIME IN OCTOBER 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER INFORMED; DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Was one of the reasons that you chose not to brief the President about it at that time because you were still trying to protect him by keeping this knowledge from him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I frankly, Mr. Liman, don't	THE IRAN INITIATIVE: EXPOSURE THREATENED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

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		recall, you know, thinking about it in those terms. "Mr. LIMAN. And was one of the reasons that you didn't discuss it with Mr. Casey at that time was that it was just the type of topic that was best not discussed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, there were two reasons--well, maybe there were at least three reasons why I didn't discuss it with him. "One, there was somebody else in the room. It was not a one-on-one meeting. "Number two, I was very pressed for time. I was late for another meeting and just didn't want to get into it. "And three, I wanted to think about and evaluate how much Director Casey might or might not know about this without raising it blindly. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember Mr. Casey or Mr. Gates recommending that you speak to the President's counsel about it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember Mr. Wallison's name coming up in that discussion." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 141-43. For further Poindexter testimony on his contact with Casey about Furmark, see 86/11/22-508.)	
86/10/11-115 DURING 1986		DAMAGE CONTROL PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DAMAGE CONTROL PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. You said, in I believe the first or second day of your testimony that one of the regrets you had is that you did not have time to develop an adequate, I believe the word was,

adequate damage control plan [see 86/10/11-112]. That intrigued me. What kind of a plan would you have developed if you had time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, my point there--and frankly, I am glad you came back to it. I realized after I said it it was open to interpretation.

"Mr. DEWINE. I didn't interpret it any[ ]way. I just didn't know what you meant.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Okay. But to close the door on the interpretation, let me tell you what I meant.

"We should have anticipated the factional in-fighting within Iran and addressed the question as to how to minimize that and what to do in terms of continuing a dialogue with the Iranians if it began to leak out. We didn't address that, and I think that we should have. I did not mean to imply any sort of damage control plan with respect to domestic media or congressional reactions to it. What my concern was, frankly, the more substantive problem of how we could have controlled the damage to the U.S.-Iranian budding relationship so that if indeed it did begin to leak out, as it did, we could have anticipated and taken some actions earlier.

"And we should have discussed openly with the second channel how to handle it. As it turned out, we hadn't discussed that, or at least to my knowledge; and so we had to carry on discussions with the second channel in November over the telephone and in trying to manage an issue as complex as that, you simply can't do it that way.

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			We should have set [sic (sat)] down with the second channel earlier and discussed the problems and the dangers of it leaking out, one way or the other. "Mr. DEWINE. So it is not a domestic control, political control? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. "Mr. DEWINE. We are talking about major foreign policy initiative, what happens, how do we control it if things go bad? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. That is what I meant." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 86-88.)
86/10/11-116 OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER INFORMED; DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Do you recall having any discussion with Director Casey or his staff in or around October of 1986? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you recall that at that time they had heard some rumors that there had been some diversion of funds? "A. Yes. "Q. Tell us about that. "A. Okay. At some point in October, Director Casey called and wanted me to stop by his EOB office for a few minutes. I agreed. Went over. "Bob Gates was either in the room or came in shortly after I got there. Director Casey showed me a memorandum that had been prepared by Mr.	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER INFORMED; DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

Charlie Allen, which, as I recall it, it was a -- essentially a review of the Iranian project, and reported a conversation with a Mr. Furmark, and that was probably the first time that Furmark came to my attention. I conceivably could have heard about it before. And Mr. Furmark -- and I believe these were conversations between Mr. Allen and Mr. Furmark, my best recollection. And Furmark indicated -- and I think this was also the first indication that I had that Khashoggi was involved in the bridge financing for Ghorbanifar, or at least that was what Furmark was alleging.

"He was saying that there had been -- there were some Canadian investors also involved and that they had not gotten all of the money that they thought was due them from a prior financial dealing with Mr. Ghorbanifar, and then there was one paragraph in which Allen reported on Furmark's speculation that some of the money had been diverted to the contras.

"The memorand[um] went on, as I recall, to recommend that we form a -- essentially a wiseman's group to develop a -- primarily to develop a public affairs plan to be used if our Iranian operation were exposed. I don't recall that Director Casey called my attention to that paragraph. I read the whole memo.

"I purposely did not raise it with Director Casey. I simply didn't want to talk to him about it. And with regard to Mr. Allen's recommendation, the Director endorsed that, and I told him I would think about it, and I believe that was the end of the meeting.

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		"Q. Is that the only time you ever . . . had any discussion with Director Casey at which there was either a document or discussion of diversion? "A. To the best of my knowledge, there wasn't any other paper that I can recall; and I -- "Q. And this just wasn't mentioned? "A. This wasn't mentioned. I don't recall any conversation about it either. "Q. Did you ever have any discussion with anybody else at the CIA about diversion? "A. I don't think so, Mr. Liman. As I said, my best recollection -- and certainly my intent -- was not to talk to anybody. I don't believe I did." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 195-97. See JHICI EX. OLN 314 [Allen memo to the DCI and DDCI, "Ghobanifar [sic] [Redacted] Channel," 10/17/86; quoted above at 86/10/17-100 through -102].)	
86/10/11-117 OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1986		THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF DIVERSION, DOESN'T SEEK LEGAL ADVICE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Did Director Casey or anyone else at the CIA suggest that you speak to White House counsel about the subject of diversion? "A. There was something about White House counsel mentioned, but I don't think it was about diversion. "Q. What do you recall it being about? "A. Well, I am trying to think. "Q. Do you recall telling them -- maybe this	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF DIVERSION, DOESN'T SEEK LEGAL ADVICE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

will help -- do you recall telling them that you didn't trust Fielding and that you preferred to speak to Commander Thompson?

"A. No. I have since read or seen that someplace. Fielding wasn't even there. That comment doesn't make any sense.

"Q. Fielding wasn't there, but -- you mean Fielding wasn't in the White House at the time?

"A. Wasn't in the White House.

"Q. What about Wallison?

"A. Well, I would associate myself with that comment, but I frankly can't remember making it.

"Q. You would associate yourself with it in what sense?

"A. Well, I did not want to bring Mr. Wallison into it. I really think that it was, my best recollection -- and I can't remember who[m] the conversation was with -- but I had a conversation with somebody about whether to bring Mr. Wallison early on into the Iranian finding. In fact, he came down to see me one day in November and wanted to be briefed on the whole thing. I refused to do it; and I conceivably could have commented to somebody after that that I didn't really trust Mr. Wallison.

"MR. BECKLER: This is November 6, what year?

"THE WITNESS: This would be November of 1986.

"But I don't recall Mr. Fielding's name coming up. I suppose in the meeting with Director Casey over in his office when he showed me that memo, there could have been some reference by him to the diversion paragraph, but I really don't remember it. I certainly would not have wanted to talk

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		about it. So I would be surprised if I said anything about it." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 197-99.)	
86/10/11-118 DURING OCTOBER 1986		CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. Were you told that Roy Furmark had visited Director Casey and mentioned to him that there had been a diversion of funds to the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. In fact you have an exhibit, and we have talked about it in previous testimony, that maybe you missed, Mr. Foley, but a memo was prepared for Mr. Casey that addressed that and he showed that to me some time in October. "Mr. FOLEY. So he told you himself-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, in fact in the meeting he showed me the memo, in the meeting that I had with him in his office I don't recall his saying about that paragraph. I read it, obviously realized that he had read it, but we really didn't discuss it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 146.)	CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: DIVERSION MENTIONED BUT NOT DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/10/11-120 AFTER OCTOBER 10, 1986	THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE: NORTH'S FAMILIARITY NORTH ACCOUNT: North, viewing a blow-up of the Boland Amendment, testified he knew the President's signature when he saw it: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [A]nd the third signature is one that you recognize, isn't it?	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: CASEY TELLS NORTH TO CLEAN FILES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . Is the reason that Director Casey asked you after the Furmark incident to get rid of the memoranda because of that one paragraph or two that referred to	THE CASEY-FURMARK DISCUSSION: CASEY TELLS NORTH TO CLEAN FILES NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. NORTH. It certainly is, and I hope all Americans do.

"Mr. LIMAN. And that's the President of the United States[']?

"Mr. NORTH. That's right."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 203.)

diversion?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't know that that was solely on his mind. I think what the Director was concerned about--and I'm quite sure the Director was concerned that you have a--and this was the mistake that I made, among others perhaps, depending on your perspective--but the operational mistake was to cross the two operations in the person of perhaps this guy here and the others who are having to carry it out.

"Operationally, if you have other alternatives, you don't do that. And I didn't at the time have other alternatives.

"Second, I think what Director Casey saw was that there was going to be a major unraveling of the activities. Furmark was part of it, the aircraft shoot-down over Nicaragua was part of it, and that was further compounded by early November when we knew that leaflets were being handed out by another faction within the Government of Iran revealing the May trip by Mr. McFarlane and his party.

"Mr. LIMAN. But, Colonel, the Hasenfus shoot-down involved contra support, correct?

"Mr. NORTH. True.

"Mr. LIMAN. And Furmark was complaining about the fact that investors hadn't gotten paid out of the proceeds of the sale, correct?

"Mr. NORTH. No. The problem with the Furmark revelation was that Furmark told him, as I remember it, that Ghorbanifar had already told two members of Congress that monies from the sale of weapons to Iran had been diverted to use of the

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		contras, and those names are in the notebooks that I gave you, sir. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. But the Director was talking about diversion in terms of Furmark. "Mr. NORTH. The concerns that the Director addressed to me [were] that, 'Look, you have had the shootdown of the Hasenfus airplane, that operation is in trouble, Furmark has now come and told me that other people are very aware of the fact that the arms sales to Iran have generated funds that have gone to support the contras, and it is getting out.' "Mr. LIMAN. And did he say that this had been called to Members of Congress that might start an investigation? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that part of it. But apparently Ghorbanifar had claimed to Furmark that Members of Congress were being made aware, or had been. "Mr. LIMAN. And you therefore were told to get rid of memoranda that reflected that? "Mr. NORTH. I was told to clean up the files. "Mr. LIMAN. And that meant to you to get rid of memoranda that reflected that, right? "Mr. NORTH. Anything to do with residuals or, as you call, diversion, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And that meant that you went through your files to make sure that you found the memoranda that referred to the residuals, as you call them? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And when you went through the	

files, do you recall how many you found?

"Mr. NORTH. The specific memorandum [sic] seeking approval?

"Mr. LIMAN. Yes, sir.

"Mr. NORTH. No, I don't. And what I probably found were dozens and dozens of memoranda relating to the residuals and the application to the contras, among other things. And so, what I am saying--and probably several copies of even the April [one], which I thought I had gotten all of them.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, when you say there were dozens--

"Mr. NORTH. All within the five that I sought approval for.

"Mr. LIMAN. So, there were copies of the five?

"Mr. NORTH. Exactly.

"Mr. LIMAN. And did you look over them to see whose names were written on them?

"Mr. NORTH. I think we have already been through this one, counsel.

"Mr. LIMAN. You said you don't recall, and I am asking you whether you looked.

"Mr. NORTH. I don't even remember looking. I remember, if--

"Mr. LIMAN. You have answered it, then, you said you did not look. Is that right? [Sic:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you look to see whose names were written on those memos?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not recall looking to see whose names were written on the memos.

"Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall looking to see

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		whether they had check marks or initials? "Mr. NORTH. I do not." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 174-79. See id., 7/14/87, at 131 [North: "On the number of occasions I walked into the Director's office or when meeting with the Director and he would tell me to put away the notebook, that if I couldn't remember it, I didn't belong in the business."].)	
86/10/11-200 AFTER OCTOBER 10, 1986	NORTH'S DEPARTURE FROM THE NSC: EARLY WARNING NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his awareness he had to leave the NSC: ". . . I knew as early as mid October that my tenure at the NSC was coming to a close. I had had lengthy discussions about this with Director Casey. I had talked to Admiral Poindexter about it. I believe I had talked to Mr. McFarlane about it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 56.)		
86/10/14-100 OCTOBER 14-15, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: REPORT OF NO U.S. INVOLVEMENT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams tells Shultz on October 14, 1986 about the Hasenfus plane, just as he tells the HFAC the next day, that no USG official "was engaged in facilitating this flight or paying for it or directing it or anything like that, . . . including anybody in the embassies overseas." That statement, Abrams testified, "was completely honest and completely wrong."	

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		Abrams testified he gave the Secretary, the public, the press and Congress that statement because nobody in the USG who knew the facts waved him off. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 171-72, 174.)	
86/10/14-200 OCTOBER 14, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: GEORGE'S HPSCI TESTIMONY GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Kerr. Let me turn to another area completely, and that is the testimony that you gave to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on October 14, 1986. You will recall that that testimony was given shortly after the Hasenfus plane was shot down. "Mr. George. I do, sir. "Mr. Kerr. And you will recall that you made an opening statement in which you, at page 4, stated categorically that the Central Intelligence Agency was not involved directly or indirectly in arranging, directing or facilitating resupply missions conducted by private individuals in support of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. "Do you recall making that statement? "Mr. George. I know I did. "Mr. Kerr. Whatever you knew then, as of today you know that that statement is incorrect? "Mr. George. The statement -- let me try to -- I don't want to say that I know that statement is incorrect. Let me tell you what I think and then jump me. "As an institution, the Central Intelligence Agency did not basically organize and conduct the Hasenfus flight or the other highly complicated	

private-benefactor activities. Yes, you are right. Reading it legally and tightly, and I will apologize, I would like to apologize to Senator Cohen, and if he were here, I would apologize to Senator Nunn. You could say I was wrong.

"One, I did not know about the [redacted] incident. And two, technically speaking, we had received permission a year before to pass vectoring information through the FDN, which would then get in the hands of the private benefactors. I am told it is an incidental detail that the Hasenfus flight did not receive that information. But technically, I apologize. I'm wrong.

"In a larger sense, I would like to tell you, because I spent every breathing minute from October '84 to this date, it was not the overall attention or activity of the CIA to direct or participate in the Hasenfus flight."
(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 31-32.)

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THE HASENFUS CRASH: ABRAMS' HPSCI TESTIMONY
GEORGE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Kerr. Apart from what the Agency itself was doing, you also were present when Mr. Abrams was asked some questions, which appear at page 17 of the [HPSCI] transcript. [See 86/10/14-200.]

"Chairman Hamilton asked whether or not the same denial applies to the United States Government across the board. You said that you couldn't speak for the entire United States Government, simply for the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Mr. Abrams did not have that qualm. He, in essence, said he could speak for the government, and that that activity had not taken place.

"As of the time that you were listening to Mr. Abrams make that statement, you knew that statement was not correct, didn't you?

"Mr. George. I was surprised he made the statement. I don't deal with Mr. Abrams often. He deals with the chief of our Latin American Division. My contacts at the State Department are Ambassador Abramowitz and Ambassador Armacost.

"You know, I perceived that the National Security Council was and had been in some manner participating in some way in supplying the contras, and that had grown on me. I saw it sort of coming when I was director of congressional affairs in the Spring of '84 when talk began, can't we get private support if we lose the Boland fight.

"Everybody -- Bill Casey, Ollie North, certainly the rest of the White House -- never talked to me about it. They were very good about it. People could have started telling me things and I could have been put in a very embarrassing position. They didn't.

"I was surprised that Abrams made that statement. It was so categorical.

"The question is, should I leap up and say 'hold it, Elliott, what about -- excuse me, all you members of HPSCI, but Elliott and I are now going to discuss what we know about' -- I didn't have the guts to do it or I didn't do it.

"Mr. Kerr. The members may want to pursue that with you.

"My question is less on jumping up and down and more on what you knew at the time. You knew as of October, '86, that Colonel North had a direct and indeed controlling interest in the aircraft and the like that were being used by the private benefactors.

"Mr. George. I wouldn't use those words. I would never say he had a direct and contolling interest. I never said that.

"Mr. Kerr. Is it not a fact per your testimony in deposition that Colonel North had offered to sell to the CIA through you the aircraft of his project in Central America?

"Mr. George. As we reached the end of fiscal year '86 --

"Mr. Kerr. So that would have been --

"Mr. George. -- and the vote was perceived by the White House that [redacted.] I don't have a date, but as you and I have discussed, I received a phone call from Colonel North. He didn't say to me, 'I own, control, run, manage and fully have these airplanes.' He said, 'Would you like to buy some airplanes?' And he discussed the private-benefactor airplanes.

"Mr. Kerr. In terms of placing that in time, that would have occurred before October 14, 1986, correct? The new fiscal year had begun at that point?

"Mr. George. You have studied it. I can't argue with you. You know what my thinking was, was I wouldn't buy those planes if they were the last three planes in Central America."
(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 33-35. On

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George's knowledge of North's activities, see 86/05/15-450 [the Erria], 86/07/15-230 [sale of private benefactors' equipment to the CIA].)

86/10/14-301
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THE HASENFUS CRASH: ABRAMS' HPSCI TESTIMONY
GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. Cohen. You indicated you were quite surprised that Elliott Abrams made a statement before the House Intelligence Committee that no one in the United States Government had any knowledge about U.S. participation direct or indirect with respect to the Hasenfus matter, and that you remained silent.

"[Redacted] testified yesterday that he sat there at the same table and decided he wasn't going to be the first one to break rank, that he was aware the statement was incorrect as well, but that he felt as the junior member of that team he should not be the first one to step forward.

"You may recall that I asked Elliott Abrams during the open sessions whether or not he felt betrayed by a number of different people, particularly apparently since there were some sitting at the same table who knew what he was saying was incorrect. I believe he indicated at the time, yes, he had even called the White House to say, 'Is this the White House line, am I doing the right thing,' before he made the statement.

"The question I have is in response to what you said today. You said, I guess I didn't have the guts to challenge Elliott Abrams at that hearing. The question I raise is, why not?

"I must tell you, and we know this, you and I have been at many individual meetings, had a panel of witnesses, sometimes one of us will pose a question and there will be a conference between the members and saying, wait a minute, don't say this, don't say that. It is done all the time. It is done all the time at a conference. Whenever you have a tripartite panel as such, there is always kind of a little conference in response to a question that one of us might pose.

"Why at that moment, when something as critical as the issue of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua was posed by the House Intelligence Committee, didn't you at that point just pull Elliott aside and say, 'Hold on a second; you're making a statement which is not correct'?

"Mr. George. Two things. Excuse me.

"I was overly -- I don't want to use the word 'ob[s]essed'. I don't like it. Overly taken with trying to protect the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Whatever my strengths and weaknesses, I bopped around a lot of time, you have, too, we know the troubles we were in in the seventies. I was almost megalomaniacal in trying to prove one thing. That we were not involved in that activity because it would have been illegal.

"That was the thrust of my testimony to the HPSCI and you may or may not recall I made the same sort of statements, if you don't I will tell you -- to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in front of whom I also appeared. I perceived my charter too small. I really took off out of the building to come down here on the Hill and make that point, that we were not doing it.

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		"Secondly, I found the statements so categorical on the part of Mr. Abrams, it wasn't sort of well, we are not in the State Department and maybe they are not here in that. It was so categorical, it was the sort of thought that went through my mind -- excuse me, Elliott, but maybe you are the only guy in town that hasn't heard this news. You know, there's a three inch nexis press run about Ollie North and the contras. There was a staff meeting, if I understand correctly, between the HPSCI and Ollie North somewhere in the summer of 1986 discussing Ollie North and the contras. I've just -- I'm just sort of amazed, and yes, I can only apologize that I didn't sort of say -- and we have, Senator, and I know we have, because you and I have been at this a long time. Off the record, please, couldn't you discuss something with Elliott. I didn't. I should have." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 40-43.)	
86/10/14-302 OCTOBER 14, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: ABRAMS' HPSCI TESTIMONY GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Cohen. Well, Elliott went back to the State Department and apparently some of his aid[e]s said[,] Elliott, you may have misled the committee in terms of another appearance on the Hill. "Mr. George. It's a terribly categorical statement that no one in the Government of the United States of America is involved in any way whatsoever with the contras.	

"Mr. Cohen. On another occasion he testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and was asked a question by Senator Bradley concerning solicitations. He omitted the Brunei solicitation. He went back to the State Department and apparently he was concerned enough about it, he wanted to correct the record in December of 1985 [sic (1986)]. I'm just wondering in terms of what happened with Elliott Abrams when he made a misstatement or didn't reveal something to the committee that he should have, he was corrected by his superiors as such and suggested that he come back to the Hill.

"I'm curious in terms of that particular session that you all had with the HPSCI, didn't someone either [redacted] discuss this with you, say, 'Wait a minute, we have got the [redacted] vector information activity, that that statement that Elliott made is not quite right; perhaps we should take this up with the HPSCI on a following day.

"Should we tell Chairman Stokes and say look, this wasn't quite accurate.[] We were sitting there. We remained silent. We were not asked the question. Had we been asked, we might have said this, 'but we think you should know about the follow[ing].'

"Why wasn't that done?

"Mr. George. Why there was no follow-up, Senator Cohen, I am unable to answer.

"Excuse me. [Redacted] reminds me -- well, he kn[o]ws more about Central America than I do. I'm sure you don't mind me having this three-way conversation for a moment.

"My statement that the CIA had no involvement whatsoever with the Hasenfus flight, as you know, was later corrected, both with the HPSCI and with the SSCI after we found out the information about [redacted.] I think the question was why didn't we correct Elliott Abrams' statement.

"Mr. Cohen. The problem I have is that at the time he made a statement, you know -- if you didn't know, certainly [redacted] knew that we, through [redacted,] were, in fact, providing flight vector information directly to the contras. Isn't that true?

"Mr. George. We learned afterwards that [redacted] -- I guess we knew before that [redacted] had provided it directly. We learned afterwards he had provided more of it and we knew that we provided it indirectly through [redacted] and the FDN radio cutouts. That's correct, Senator Cohen.

"Mr. Cohen. It was known that he had provided flight vector information at the time Elliott was making a statement. It wasn't you had to wait --

"Mr. George. It was not you had to wait, check the books, or call your grandmother. You are quite right. I agree with you."
(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 43-45. See id. at 77-81.)

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THE HASENFUS CRASH: GEORGE'S HPSCI TESTIMONY
GEORGE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Boland. With respect to the Hasenfus shoot-down and also your appearance before the

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		House Select Committee on Intelligence -- on October 14, 1986, after the downing of the aircraft, you and [redacted] and Secretary Abrams briefed the House Permanent Select Committee[] on Intelligence. "Mr. George. We did. "Mr. Boland. You made a categorical statement, you have done it today, and in your deposition, denying any direct or indirect CIA involvement with arranging, facilitating or directing the resupply missions and indicating that the CIA had no knowledge of the resupply operation. "Had you discussed the statement you were about to make to the committee with [redacted] prior to your appearance before the committee? "Mr. George. I do not recall talking in detail about that specific categorical statement with [redacted.] "Mr. Boland. And he didn't mention [redacted] activities to you before? "Mr. George. I don't think we had any idea of the size of [redacted] activities until after the hearing -- is that correct? [Sic.] "Mr. Boland. Had the Central American [redacted] been contacted for information on the Hasenfus flight prior to your appearance before the committee? "Mr. George. If you will excuse me, I will ask. "(Counsel conferring with witness.) "Mr. George. We asked all our [redacted] what, if anything, they knew about the Hasenfus	

flight after it went down, and they all replied they knew absolutely nothing.

"Mr. Boland. Was that [redacted] report to you too?

"Mr. George. Yes, sir.

"Mr. Boland. The resupply operation had been going on -- there were a number of flights prior to the October 6th shoot-down of the Hasenfus plane.

"Mr. George. Yes, sir.

"Mr. Boland. Because the resupply operation, by that method, started sometime I think in April of '86 -- are you telling me that [redacted] had no information with respect to that operation vis-a-vis a military operation, finding out where to drop the supplies, where they were going, and then getting in touch with the contras or with Colonel North on the communication equipment that was supplied to him by Colonel North?

"Mr. George. You know, after the fact, he did have contact with the private benefactors and with Colonel North.

"Mr. Boland. Is it your testimony that when you appeared before the committee, the CIA had no knowledge of who was involved in the resupply operation?

"Mr. George. I could not state it that way, Mr. Chairman.

"Mr. Boland. Put it any way you want.

"Mr. George. The CIA had general knowledge of the resupply operation. [Redacted.] We knew they were down there.

"The private benefactors had arrived in force

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		in late '85 and early '86. We knew they were there and what they were doing, and over and over we sent telegrams and cables and telegrams to our people to stay away from them because we could have nothing to do with that operation. That other -- here is where I get myself in trouble -- other than what we were allowed to do under the Boland Amendment which allowed us to provide intelligence to them and other such support." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 67-70.)	
86/10/14-400 OCTOBER 5-14, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: C/CATF's HPSCI TESTIMONY C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Carome. I take it that you learned in early October that the Hasenfus plane had been shot down, is that right? "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Carome. At that point in time, you didn't have any doubt, did you, that this was one in a series of Southern Front resupply missions you had been receiving reports on for a long time? "[C/CATF.] The answer was I didn't have any doubt about it, but I turned out to be wrong, it wasn't. It was a supply flight to the FDN, and it was a totally different flight. So the supposition that it had been going to the Southern Front was wrong, it was going to FDN and was not one in the continuum of those flights going into the South and involving [redacted] as best I have been able to piece together. "Mr. Carome. You didn't have any doubt who it was running that flight, did you? "[C/CATF.] No.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

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		"Mr. Carome. I would like you to turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 39. Exhibit 39 is excerpts of testimony which you and others gave to the House Intelligence Committee on October 14, 1986, about a week after the Hasenfu[s] flight went down. I refer you first to page 17 in the exerpts about half way through. At that point, Mr. Clair[] George has just finished making his opening statement in which he has denied any CIA involvement in the flight, Mr. Abrams has also made a statement and he continues here on page 17, both of them, or Mr. George denies any CIA involvement, and then Mr. Abrams denies any U.S. Government involvement in the flight. Is that a fair summary of what the testimony was from those two gentlemen? "[C/CATF.] I reviewed that testimony and both the text, the transcript and my recollection from that, that would be a fair presentation of it, yes. "Mr. Carome. You were sitting there next to Mr. George and Mr. Abrams, weren't you? "[C/CATF.] Yes. I don't think I was sitting next to Mr. Abrams. I was sitting next to George on the end, as I recall it. "Mr. Carome. At the point where Mr. George and Mr. Abrams were making these denials of U.S. knowledge or involvement, you made an affirmative decision at that point to remain silent, didn't you? "[C/CATF.] I think the decision was made before that point. "Mr. Carome. By you?	

"[C/CATF.] Yes. Well, let me now make a comment. I said there were three things I deeply regret in this undertaking. One was the involvement of [redacted] which bothers me the most, because it touches the most people and really was traumatic.

"Second was the involvement of [redacted] because it was not part of the way that it was supposed to be.

"Third is his testimony. I am troubled by it then, I am troubled by it now. I am not very happy about it. Probably it was the most difficult decision I have made in my life. I had a lot of facts racing around in my head. The decision that was taken, and I don't think it was taken actively, I don't think it was taken sort of like almost acquiescence, was to answer the questions narrowly defined. I think Elliott Abrams has testified to you a lot on this subject, and you will look at the construction of Clair[] George's discussions, I talk for the agency, I cannot talk for the U.S. Government.

"Who was behind the flights? I didn't know where the money was coming from. I hadn't tied it altogether in a nice neat package. We took answers that I would best describe to you as cute, not the way I testify to Congress now or before or after. I was troubled by that. I am troubled by it now. There is not a lot I can do about it. You can go over this testimony word by word and beat me about the head and shoulders by it, and I will take it. It was what it is. You have got the facts. Judge for yourselves."

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		(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 56-59; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 39.)	
86/10/14-401 OCTOBER 5-14, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: C/CATF's HPSCI TESTIMONY C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Carome. You were in fact glad at the time that these specific questions weren't being put to you, you were grateful that you were not being directly asked the questions, is that right? "[C/CATF.] Absolutely. Some of you that know me know I like to talk. I express my opinions. I enjoy testifying in front of Congress. This is one time I think if you look at the transcript, I was uniquely silent. I did what my mamma taught me not very well, I spoke when spoken to. "Mr. Carome. But there came a time when you were asked some questions and did give some answers, didn't you? "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Carome. I refer to page 20 of this testimony. The Chairman asks, 'Do you know who that group was or is?' "Mr. George answered: 'This is who the private benefactor group is.' Mr. George answers: 'I do not. I told you, Mr. Chairman, and I know this may cause some serious questioning, but we told our people to stay away from them.' "Then the Chairman says, 'You don't know whose airplane that was?' "And Mr. George answers: 'I have no idea -- I read -- except what I read in the paper.' "Then the Chairman asks: 'I understanding,	

but you don't know?'

"And then you answer: 'No, we do not know.'

"Was that an honest answer you gave?

"[C/CATF.] That was an honest answer. It was not a complete answer. I didn't know that Fred [sic] Dutton was running those flights. I didn't know Bill Cooper was on those flights. I didn't know Buzz Sawyer was on those flights. I didn't know how they were arranged. I did not know what happened after Gadd had quit. I did not know how the funding worked. I did not know where the money came from. There were a lot of details I didn't have. That was an honest answer, not a complete answer.

"Mr. Carome. I would like to go to page 21 where you say, at the bottom of page 20, 'We knew in come cases much less frequently that they were flying [redacted] Nicaragua for the purpose of resupply, but as to who was flying the flights and who was behind them, we do not know.'

"The Chairman asks: 'And you still don't?'

"And you answer: 'No.'

"Now, that was a false answer, wasn't it? You knew who was flying those flights?

"[C/CATF.] Let's go back again. I want to make one thing very, very clear. I don't lie and I don't provide false answers, and if I'm put in a situation that is untenable, I will find some way to avoid lying. Lying in my business is a kiss of death, a Judas kiss. I didn't know who was flying those flights.

"Mr. Carome. Or who was behind them, is what you said?

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		"[C/CATF.] You could have put me on a rack and I couldn't have told you who the pilots were, who was managing them. I at that time suspected, but didn't know that General Secord was involved with them. I had no idea where the money was coming from. Had you made me guess, I would have said it was coming from some of the gentlemen that you had in front of this committee, the donors, some of the people -- I would not have known that the money was being obtained in the manner that it was obtained. The pieces weren't together. It is not a lie. I could have been more forthcoming to the committee, but I frankly was not going to be the first person to step up and do that. You may call that a cowardly decision, some may call it a brave decision, it is a controversial decision, but so long as others who knew the details, as much as I, who knew more than I, were keeping their silence on this, I was going to keep my silence. That may be false loyalty, it may be folly, but I said before that I worked for the administration and I was to support the administration, and to stay within the bounds of the law. That answer was an attempt to do that and you can criticize me for it. I have no excuse for the answer and I have to stand by whatever accrues from it. "As I said, we can continue to pick this apart and I think you will find the same answer." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 60-63; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 39. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 80-81, 227-29 [C/CATF's 10/14/86 testimony].)	

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

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DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/10/14-402 OCTOBER 14, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: C/CATF's HPSCI TESTIMONY C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. . . . I want to start out with a question involving your testimony on October 14, 1986. I don't pose the question in any way to beat up on you. You already have been very forthcoming about your manner of conduct that day before the House committee. But as I recall, you said that you had decided before you got there not to speak up first, that is not to answer fully, and, of cour[s]e, you told us today you regret that decision, and I certainly respect you for the forthcoming manner in which you testified about it, but I guess what I w[an]t to get at is the question of what were the reasons for your decision? . . . [S]pecifically I would ask you to tell us whether you were trying to protect Ollie North, were you trying to protect contra aid, were you trying to protect Mr. [C]asey? "Just give us some idea, some semblance of what went into that decision, if you can. "[C/CATF.] I can try. It is very complicated, and very personal, and I think it was strictly, one, to put it in a broad spectrum, I was a member of the team, I was a member of the administration team, I wasn't going to break ranks with the team. I didn't know it all, I knew bits and pieces of it. "I think I probably -- I knew more certainly than anybody else at the agency with -- I don't know where Director Casey was because I will parenthetically say he never talked to me about	

these things, I respect him for it. I couldn't comment on Oliver North's testimony relative to Director Casey. I just don't know where he was because he was very good about not drawing me into these things, not forcing me into awkward positions.

"My frame of mind was to protect, was to be a member of the team, not to get out ahead, to try to get through this, focus on what I had been focusing on, the new program which was upcoming which I knew would be a management challenge of the first order, and get on to that and try to get through where we were, and to do it without lying, try to go through as best we could.

"I would point out to you, I don't mean this as a cop out, I was not the senior witness at that table. And I was not going to get out ahead of other people who were there, and I played a passive role as best I could."

[2 pages redacted in their entirety.]
(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 90-93.)

86/10/14-405
OCTOBER 14,
1986

C/CATF's HPSCI TESTIMONY: WHAT HE THOUGHT GEORGE KNEW

C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. DeWine. . . . Again, the time in October of 1986, October 14 when you were in front of the House Intelligence Committee. Clair George, could you tell me -- when you walked into that meeting that day, what you thought he knew at that point? . . .

"[C/CATF.] I will try to go over it. I thought that Clair George knew that Ollie North was involved in causing things to happen for the resistance forces and that he was facilitating to some degree or to a real degree the activities of the private benefactors, the donors, so on and so forth and had been, was the Administration's point man for rallying and directing private aid to the resistance forces.

"I didn't think that he had the same level of detail that I had, but he had the -- I felt he had the broad outlines and knew in general details that Ollie -- general details what Ollie had been up to without the specificity we have gone into and that I have talked to about the committees today, but enough certainly to know, as I think did a great m[]an[y] people in Washington, frankly, about what Ollie was doing. I would like to sort of quote what I said in my final comment to the grand jury, really up until today one of the toughest questions I have been asked by the foreman.

"He said, [redacted] you knew and developed this information over this point in time, why didn't you report it to somebody?

"And my answer was, to whom should I report?

"People from Capitol Hill? To the White House? To the State Department? To Langley? The Pentagon? They knew Ollie North was around the Central American operation. If people wanted to look at it in depth, it was there to see.

"It was no secret in Washington. And that is really -- I thought that Clair had a general understanding of what was going down as did a great number of people in Washington. I did not think it was a great secret.

"Mr. DeWine. Very quickly, as your testimony continued that day, did your understanding change at all? Did that change it in any way? I don't know that it did.

"[C/CATF.] As I recollect, I don't think my recollection -- my understanding changed. I thought that Clair was answering the questions on a narrow basis, focusing on the agency. I think if you look at the construction of his questions that is exactly what he was doing.

"[Redacted.]"

(C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 159-61. See id. at 136-39 [C/CATF's 10/14/86 testimony, generally]. See also id. at 133-36 [C/CATF's silence during Abrams' testimony].)

86/10/14-410
OCTOBER 14,
1986

C/CATF's HPSCI TESTIMONY: WHAT HE THOUGHT ABRAMS KNEW

C/CATF ACCOUNT:

"Mr. Mitchell. You were asked this morning about your testimony to the Intelligence Committees following the downing of the Hasenfus flight. I want to ask you about Secretary Abrams' testimony on the same panel before you . . . and any conversations you had with him. When he was before this committee, I was told that his testimony regarding that was in his words completely honest and completely wrong. [Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 171-72.] He said that he was unaware at the time he testified that his categorical denial of any involvement by U.S. Government officials was inaccurate.

"He also made that same statement in public several times. He testified that he was not corrected by any other officials after he made those categorical statements and, therefore, repeated them and continued to believe them to be true. Indeed, the lack of being informed otherwise by other officials apparently contributed to his confidence in their accuracy.

"Now, you apparently testified this morning about your testimony at the hearing. My question is: Did you ever tell Mr. Abrams that his information was not accurate, either after a hearing or at any time thereafter during that period of several weeks when he repeated those same inaccurate statements in public?

"[C/CATF.] I don't recall having done that, calling him aside and saying 'You are not right on that point.' I don't recall that.

"Mr. Mitchell. Why didn't you? If you were present when a government official made statements to committees of Congress and then repeated them in public which you knew were inaccurate, if you had been in Mr. Abrams' position, wouldn't you have appreciated someone telling him you had better stop saying that, it is not true?

"[C/CATF.] I didn't know what the status of Mr. Abrams' knowledgeability was. I thought, and I don't know the man, I am not going to impeach his testimony, I don't want to do that, but take away conversations that I had with Ollie North, various things, any glimpse I saw by then of my operational activities and the understanding of just the know-how operations and how that unfolded, I didn't quite know how he got to where he got to, and I didn't ask him how he got there. I didn't get involved with it. I didn't understand, I didn't ask him about it. I just left [sic] it sit there.

"It's all part of a passivity that I described to the committee just to get through troubled waters and get on to the next program.

"Mr. Mitchell. I understand you felt in an awkward position then and feel in an awkward position now.

"Let me state it more directly, what you are telling us is that at that time your state of mind was you thought that Elliott Abrams knew the facts and believe [sic] he was stating them, making false statements.

"[C/CATF.] No, I felt that Elliott Abrams --

"Mr. Mitchell. The statements were false, he acknowledges that now. The question is whether he knew they were false.

"[C/CATF.] I don't know what was in his mind, and I can't speculate on that.

"Mr. Mitchell. What did you think at that time? I am not asking you to speculate now. I am asking what you believed at that time.

"[C/CATF.] I will tell you my reaction. I was taken aback by the statement, and I have subsequently talked to Mr. George. Mr. George was taken aback by his statement. I don't know, maybe I incorrectly assumed, therefore, because I have tremendous respect for Assistant Secretary Abrams, maybe I assume, which I did, I just kept my mouth shut. [Sic.]

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		"Mr. Mitchell. Is it fair to say, although you had no specific information about the state of his knowledge, you were taken aback, you thought he knew the facts? "[C/CATF.] Not the facts. I thought he would have a broad brush understanding, as did a lot of other people, Ollie was in and around those things. Again, I didn't know how much detail. I didn't know how he got to that statement, and I left him with that statement and said he has got to be comfortable with himself, he's there, and that's that." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 166-69. See id. at 133-36 [C/CATF on Abrams' testimony, 10/14/86].)	
86/10/16-100 OCTOBER 16, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: REPORT OF NO U.S. INVOLVEMENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS tells GPS that HASENFUS plane shot down; no US involvement; it is a private operation." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/10/24-100. See 86/10/14-100 [Abrams' report to Shultz].)	
86/10/17-100 OCTOBER 17, 1986			FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION ALLEN MEMO, Part 1: Memo from Charles Allen to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on "Ghobanifar [sic] [Redacted] Channel" states: "1. My meeting yesterday with Roy M. Furmark, New York representative of Adnan Khashoggi, only

served to underscore the serious concerns that I outlined to you in my memorandum of 14 October [Ex. OLN 313]. Indisputedly, we must endeavor to effect an orderly, damage-limiting shutdown of the Ghobanifar [redacted] channel now before serious--perhaps irrevocable--damage is done to current initiatives to free American hostages in Lebanon and to establish links with moderate factions in the Iranian Government.

"2. Furmark, in a brief conversation with me on 16 October, made the following points:

"--He has known Ghobanifar since January 1985 and has detailed knowledge of the Ghobanifar [redacted] channel (although he never mentioned [redacted] by name).

"--He has met with Ghobanifar many times and participated in discussions in the summer of 1985 on the need for rapprochement between the US and Iran. He acknowledged that rapprochement was not just a national security issue, but that he, Ghobanifar, Khashoggi, and others saw a potentially lucrative market if relations were reestablished between Tehran and Washington.

"--The idea of providing Iran with military equipment in exchange for American hostages--seen as a way of commencing a dialogue with Iran--also originated in the summer of 1985 and he along with Ghobanifar, traveled to Tel Aviv in August 1985 where they met with a number of Israeli officials including Amiran [sic] Nir, Israeli Special Assistant to the Prime Minister for Combatting Terrorism. Subsequently, arms were delivered to Tehran in September 1985, a development that

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			resulted in the release of Benjamin Weir. "--After a number of false starts in late 1985 and early 1986, Khashoggi agreed to finance another arms transaction in May 1985, just prior to Bud MacFarlane's [sic] secret visit to Tehran. He borrowed money from a number of Canadian financiers. On the basis of a signature loan, he borrowed a total of $15 million at 20 percent, agreeing to repay principal and interest in 30 days. Everyone anticipated that the MacFarlane visit would result in resolution of the hostage crisis. "--Unfortunately, this did not occur, and only $8 million has been paid by the Iranians for the equipment received. Of this, $5 million has been used to pay back one creditor; the remaining $3 million has been used to cover expenses and for other matters. No profit has been realized, and Khashoggi owes the Canadians $10 million." (JHICI Ex. OLN 314. Text of memo continues in next 2 entries.)
86/10/17-101 OCTOBER 17, 1986			FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION ALLEN MEMO, Part 2: [Text of Allen memo continues from preceding entry:] "--The current financing was complicated by the fact that Iranian officials in the Prime Minister's Office complained about the price of the Hawk spare parts that were shipped, asserting that the cost was five or six times what should have been charged. Many of the delivered items, moreover, did not work or were for a different

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			model of the Hawk missile system. "--Iranian officials, after having paid $8 million in cash, claim that no additional funds are owed to Ghobanifar [sic] or Khashoggi. The shipment of the Hawk spare parts to Tehran, however, resulted in the release of Father Lawrence Jenco. "3. Furmark stated that the current situation has left Ghobanifar and Khashoggi with $10 million of indebtedness and no prospects for resolving this indebtedness. According to Furmark, Ghobanifar and, by virtue of his financial involvement in the scheme, Khashoggi, are being blamed by the Canadian creditors for this situation. The Canadian entrepreneurs, who have investments in oil, gold, mining, and real estate, reportedly are aggressive, tough-minded individuals who have influential contacts in Washington. They have told Khashoggi that unless some payment on the principal is forthcoming, they would begin to inform individuals like Senators Leahy, Moynihan, and Cranston around 15 October about this back-channel deal with Iran and how they have been swindled. Furmark, while stating that he was not authorized to provide the names of the Canadian investors, asserted that we should not underestimate the determination of the Canadians. He claimed they have a reputation for dealing roughly with those who do not meet their obligations. Khashoggi allegedly is trying to get them to extend the 15 October deadline, but was uncertain as to whether he would be successful in this effort.

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			"4. Furmark stated that he spent two days last week in London talking to Ghobanifar. He stated that Ghobanifar is telling the truth about these transactions and insisted that the Iranian entrepreneur had not made any profit off this deal. He stated that Ghobanifar was in a 'devastated' condition without any constructive ideas on how to pull himself out of his current financial morass. Khashoggi, who also has financial problems, is not in a position to repay the Canadian creditors. Furmark stated that he had worked for many years in the oil business and was a good judge of individuals who were attempting a swindle. In this case--regardless of other Ghobanifar business deals--he was convinced that the Iranian was essentially telling the truth." (JHICI Ex. OLN 314. Text of Allen memo continues in next entry.)
86/10/17-102 OCTOBER 17, 1986			FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION ALLEN MEMO, Part 3: [Text of Allen memo continues from preceding entry:] "5. Furmark stated that everyone had agreed to keep this back-channel arrangement with Iran 'highly secret' but that if the situation remained static, he is absolutely certain that the Canadians will talk and that the matter will eventually become public knowledge. He recommended that the US consider at least a partial shipment of additional arms to Iran in order to maintain some credibility with the

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			Iranians in the Prime Minister's Office and to provide Ghobanifar [sic] with some capital so that the investors can be repaid partially and so that Ghobanifar can borrow money to finance additional shipments. This would keep the process rolling and could result in release of additional hostages. Furmark offered to meet with me in New York next week in order to report fully on his involvement in these transactions. "6. Comment: I find Furmark's detailed knowledge of the Ghobanifar [redacted] link deeply troubling. Regardless of who is at fault on the financing--and we know that Ghobanifar is not to be trusted--the exposure of these back-channel dealings will almost certainly have a crippling effect on the new channel that has now been opened between the United States and [redacted.] The risk of exposure is growing daily, and I again believe that you must advise Admiral Poindexter that a group be formed that is knowledgeable of the Ghobanifar [redacted] channel to consider how to cope with this burgeoning problem. If this is not done immediately, I predict an exposure of this activity in the near future. At a minimum, we need to find ways to stave off disclosure for 60-90 days while we work the [redacted] channel tactically to get our hostages released. Furmark showed no indication that he was aware of the new channel, but we know Ghobanifar is aware." (JHICI Ex. OLN 314.)
86/10/18-100 OCTOBER 18,		STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRA AID: APPLICABILITY: Funds made available to the	

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1986 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1987		President FUNDS AVAILABLE: $100 Million USE OF FUNDS: $70 Million unrestricted; $30 Million humanitarian aid only PERMISSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES: Not mentioned PERMISSIBILITY OF SOLICITING OTHER NATIONS: Not mentioned (JHICI Chart VII.)	
86/10/18-140 1985-86		CONTRA FUNDING: THE $100 MILLION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it--apart from more restrictive legislation in this period, 1986 and earlier in 1985--you were going to Congress--by you I mean the administration and the NSC--asking Congress to loosen up Boland? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it a fact that you were going to Congress, and you asked Congress for the humanitarian aid and the $100 million, and to loosen restrictions on intelligence sharing? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And were you concerned that if you told Congress the truth of what the NSC was doing that Congress would not give you the legislation that you were asking for? "[Conferring with Counsel.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. The problem, as I have stated, I didn't want Congress to know the details of how we were implementing the President's policy, and I frankly think that there were many members up here that had a general idea, but if it	

didn't become a topic of discussion between us, I think it was recognized that that possibility existed.

"On the other hand, we had great difficulty, and this whole operation was being operated on what I thought was a shoe string, and we needed substantially larger sums of money in order to do what I thought was necessary.

"Now, in the early days of the earlier versions of the Boland Amendment, I numerous times recommended that we not agree to these compromises, and finally in 1986, when I took over, I got everybody to agree we wouldn't compromise, and we got the $100 million. I wish we had done that earlier. I think it was a mistake that we compromised earlier.

"Mr. LIMAN. But the man we elected to the highest office in this country made the decision the other way before, correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. But I think we gave him bad advice.

"Mr. LIMAN. And are you saying that because you believe that you gave him bad advice that you felt that you had to conceal what you were doing at the NSC?

"Mr. BECKLER. Objection, Mr. Chairman. This ought to be--this is another conclusion by Mr. Liman.

"Mr. LIMAN. It is a question.

"Mr. BECKLER. It sounds like a question, but it is a conclusion.

". . . ."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 155-59.)

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86/10/18-150 SOMETIME IN 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: AIRLIFTING "MIXED LOADS" NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified an airlift was "funded . . . out of the $27 million in humanitarian assistance": "Mr. LIMAN. Did the airlift include the drops of lethal supplies behind enemy lines? "Mr. NORTH. It is my distinct recollection, Counsel, that we came to the committees to use a portion of the $27 million appropriated by the Congress, under what came to be called the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, for the purpose of, one, communications equipment; number two, mixed loads. Mixed loads meant you took beans and Band-Aids and boots and bullets, and we got authorization to do that from the Congress. "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [I]n connection with this money, do you have any recollection of giving instructions on allocation? "Mr. NORTH. Not specifically, no. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you participate-- "Mr. NORTH. I am not saying that I didn't. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you participate in the briefing of the congressional committees on this subject? "Mr. NORTH. On the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Association Office? "Mr. LIMAN. Yes. "Mr. NORTH. Yes, I believe I did. "Mr. LIMAN. When you briefed them, did you tell them that some of the $27 million was going to be used to carry bullets?	

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		"Mr. NORTH. No. As I recall, and I may be recalling incorrectly, we came back to the Congress after the appropriations of the $27 million and sought and obtained permission to provide intelligence and communication support and to deliver mixed loads. "I may be imagining that, and I have been accused of having fantasies, but that is a fairly distinct recollection on my part. "Mr. LIMAN. In fact, you know that the law was changed to permit intelligence information and advice; you recall that? "Mr. NORTH. Subsequently it was changed to provide $100 million in full assistance. "Mr. LIMAN. That is correct. "Mr. NORTH. That is what I am referring to, Counsel." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 123-25.)	
86/10/18-200 OCTOBER 18, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: THE $100 MILLION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [In 1986] you were actively seeking from Congress aid for the contras? ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, we were. "Mr. NIELDS. And you eventually obtained it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. And I would like to make a point on that particular subject, and that is that the President requested on the 25th of February, '86, the $100 million for the contras. It took eight months, until October 18, 1986, to get that funding through. The Senate voted on it	

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		first rather promptly. The House, by legislative maneuvering, held up the passage of that appropriation for a total of six months. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it you eventually got the $100 million? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Finally, in October of '86. "Mr. NIELDS. And that was in a public bill? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. So that the public was aware now that the United States Government was going to give military aid to the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. There weren't any significant restrictions in the legislation. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that following the passage of that bill, the professional intelligence agencies carrying out the provision of military aid to the contras would make periodic reports to the Congress? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe there was a requirement for that. It has been a long time since I've looked at the legislation. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it one can assume, we hope that those reports made to Congress concerning their carrying out of this congressional legislation would be trustful? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, certainly, because we are talking about the expenditure of proposed funds. "Mr. NIELDS. . . .[A]nd I take it that was what you were seeking to have happen? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, because we knew that we needed substantially more money to carry out an	

effective program than we could raise any other way. And furthermore, we wanted a strong public U.S. commitment to the contras in their fight against the communist Sandinistas, and the way to do that was through legislated appropriations.

"Mr. NIELDS. So you were seeking a public bill providing for military aid to the contras to be carried out by the U.S. Government with truthful, periodic reports about how the money was spent to Congress?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. My question to you is this: if that is what you were seeking to have happen, why was it, when the NSC was carrying out military support for the contras, you felt it necessary to withhold information from the Congress?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Because we weren't using appropriated funds. They were private, third-country funds.

"Mr. NIELDS. Which was the reason to withhold information from Congress when they inquired about it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Two reasons. One, we wanted to--we wanted to return to a covert implementation of the policy. If it had been--if it had become public as to exactly what we were doing, there would have been all sorts of press inquiries down in Central America. It would have been a very hot political issue. It would have caused problems for our friends and supporters in Central America, and if we had revealed all those details because the press understood it was a controversial, political issue in the Congress, there would have

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		been a lot of attention to it, which would have essentially destroyed our ability to carry on the support for the contras under those very difficult situations. "The second point was that we didn't want more restrictive legislation introduced in some new form of the Boland Amendment. I knew that it would be controversial and that there were different interpretations of the Boland Amendment. "I felt that we were on strong legal ground with what we were doing and it was consistent with the President's policy, and I simply didn't want any outside interference." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 47-50.)	
86/10/18-201 OCTOBER 18, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: THE $100 MILLION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. The first thing you have said is that you wanted to return to a more covert way of supporting the contras, but at the same time you were seeking a public declaration by the U.S. Congress that we were supporting the contras-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. But that doesn't-- "Mr. NIELDS. Followed by periodic reports by the intelligence agencies to Congress about how they were carrying it out, isn't that true? "Mr. POINDEXTER. But by that time, I mean if we got the appropriation, we would have had a majority of Congress in favor of the appropriation as, in fact, we eventually achieved. There would have been less likelihood of leaks at that point, and just because we have got a public declaration	

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		that we are going to provide $100 million does not mean that we are going to go public with exactly how we are implementing it. "I, frankly, haven't followed the implementation of the program and I don't have access to information in my present position, so I am not quite sure what is happening, but I think in one of the exhibits you have a note of a meeting I had with the President some time in 1986 in which I discussed with him the fact that even though we were going to get a public appropriation, we needed to devise a method so that the implementation of that program could remain covert. "Mr. NIELDS. The second reason that you gave, as I understood it, was that this was a hot political issue and you didn't want any outside interference? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the outside interference we are talking about was Congress, and I take it the reason they were inquiring about Colonel North's activities, the Government's activities in support of the contras, was precisely so that they could fulfill with information their constitutional function to pass legislation, one way or the other. Isn't that true? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I suppose that is true. "Mr. NIELDS. And that you regarded as outside intereference? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The point was, and still is, that the President has the constitutional right and, in fact, the constitutional mandate to	

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		conduct foreign policy. His policy was to support the contras. "Congress had put some restrictions on the use of proposed funds. Those restrictions didn't apply to private funds. They didn't apply to third-country funds. "And the restrictions in the Boland Amendment, as I have said, did not apply to the NSC staff." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 50-52.)	
86/10/18-250 OCTOBER 18, 1986		CONTRA FUNDING: THE $100 MILLION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. TRIBLE. . . . When should National Security Advisors and their top assistants be assumed to tell the truth, and when is it their right or prerogative not to do so, and I think that is a fair question and I think it is central to what we are about. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Ideally, Senator, good faith, and I think that is basically what you are talking about, is a two-way street. The problem is that in this struggle that we have ongoing now between our way of life, democracy and the totalitarianism represented by the Soviet Union, we are often faced with many, many issues that have lots of shades of grey. "The world is not black or white, the world is a very complex, dangerous place. Sometimes you have to make very tough decisions. "In the cases that I have been involved with, I have done my best to use my best judgment to help make those decisions and in some cases make those decisions.	

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"The example that I would like to cite about good faith being a two-way street is the thing that I have referred to several times up to this point about the last hundred million dollars that the Congress appropriated. It took eight months for this Congress to appropriate those funds while men in Central America that were fighting for their freedom were dying. Now, I don't think that is good faith.

"Now, the ex-Speaker of the House, in my view, this is my personal assessment, held up bringing that issue to a vote in the House for four months, for four of those eight months, even after both houses had voted, a majority of them, for the hundred million dollars, he held up bringing the issue to a conference and putting it into an instrument that the President could sign for an additional two months.

"So one man, who was not elected by all the people, was responsible, in my view, for holding up that funding for a period of six months.

"Now, that is just one example of what I consider to be the lack of good faith on the part of some members of the Congress. Now, that is not an ideal situation.

"I acknowledge that. But sometimes you have got to cope with things the way they are. That is what we were trying to do."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 103-04.)

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86/10/18-251 FEBRUARY 25 - OCTOBER 18,		CONTRA FUNDING: TIP O'NEILL'S ROLE AND HOW THE $100 MILLION PASSED THROUGH CONGRESS BOLAND RESPONSE TO POINDEXTER:	

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1986		"Mr. BOLAND. . . . Mr. Chairman, I want to put to bed the canard raised yesterday with reference to Speaker O'Neill dragging his feet and over a period of eight months dragging out the last bill for providing for $100 million for contra aid, $70 million for military assistance and $30 million for humanitarian assistance. "I would like to read a chronology on the passage of that particular bill. That is a nice word, 'chronology', we have heard it often in these hearings. "February 25th, President Reagan's request for $100 million [w]ent to Congress. On March 20th, the request was defeated in the House by 210 to 222. On March 27th, the request was approved in the Senate 53 to 47. On April 16, the second House vote, which was an urgent supplemental, the President's request was tabled by almost a solid vote on the Republican side and some Democrats on the Democratic side voting for the Hamilton substitute providing for $27 million in humanitarian aid. On June 25, the House approve[d] a request for the military construction appropriation bill 221 to 209. If I remember correctly, that was the first appropriation bill that was passed in 1986. "On August 13th, the Senate passed a military construction bill containing the contra funds. August 14, recess begins. September 8th, recess ends. September 25th, the continuing resolution passed both Houses with contra aid included. October 3rd, the continuing resolution passed the Senate. October 15th, the continuing resolution	

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		conference agreement passed the House. On October 16th, the continuing resolution conference agreement passed the Senate. On October 18th, the continuing resolution was signed by the President. "Mr. Chairman, that is the chronology of the last appropriation for contra aid that appeared in 1986, and that is the correct--those are the correct dates with reference to that particular bill." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 44-45. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 169-75 [C/CATF testimony on how Tip O'Neill and partisan politics delayed the 1986 Contra aid bill], 223-25 [Rep. Boland's response].)	
86/10/18-255 1984-86		THE BOLAND AMENDMENTS AND NSC STAFF ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. HATCH. . . . But regarding Boland, would you say that you were trying to comply with the law while still attempting to pursue the President's policies; is that right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, sir. That was our objective. "Mr. HATCH. Okay. Boland didn't really apply to the President, did it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We did not think so. "Mr. HATCH. I don't know of one person who has any semblance of constitutional authority or law or background who will say that it did. Now, I have to admit there are some questions beyond that, but there [is] plenty of room to debate it. "There was nothing in Boland, though, or in any of these Boland Amendments that prohibited	

private donations to the contras, was there?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We didn't see any after--

"Mr. HATCH. I don't see any either. Private donations could be made to the contras. Even though they seem to be something awful, the fact is they could be made to the contras. There was nothing in Boland that prohibited foreign governments from donating to the contras, was there?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No. Nothing at all.

"Mr. HATCH. Not a thing. So foreign governments were totally capable of donating to the contras; is that right?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, they were.

"Mr. HATCH. There was nothing in Boland that prohibited a private supply operation in support of the contras, was there?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We didn't see any prohibition against that.

"Mr. HATCH. I don't see any prohibition against that either. There was no mention in Boland of the National Security Council; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. HATCH. As a matter of fact, if we in the Congress had wanted Boland to cover the National Security Council, it seemed to me we would have put them in there; is that right?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would think so, but I think that that really makes the constitutional issue very apparent if you try to do that.

"Mr. HATCH. Well, you raised another issue. If we did put the National Security Council in the

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		Boland Amendments, we really raise a big constitutional issue, whether or not the Congress can impose-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. "Mr. HATCH. --and micro-manage in a purely Executive function or at least what some would argue would be a purely Executive function." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 166-69.)	
86/10/18-300 SOMETIME IN THE FALL 1986		CIA SOLICITATION PROPOSAL FOR CONTRA AID C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. In your May 1 deposition, you indicated that there had been a CIA approach [redacted] in the fall of 1986 after the $100 million contra aid program had been enacted. This was apparently developed in conversations between Director Casey and an individual who had good connections with [redacted.] You were directed to dispatch one of your deputies to meet with the person in New York. Can you tell us why CIA sought to solicit aid for the contras in a foreign government just after Congress had provided $100 million for the contras? "[C/CATF.] Yes, I can. The -- when we did our budget for the program and we projected it out, I projected that if we did everything we wanted to get done, we would have probably an eight or a ten million dollar shortfall off the 100 million. "I think you will reflect back to my conversations in response to counsel Carome's question about the Sultan of Brunei [see 86/06/00-166] -- when I said some $10 million, I	

had already done some calculation about money and where we were and said that 8 million would give us a margin or bridge or would have liked to have had in the $100 million program. [Sic.]

"There had been ample discussion about solicitation of funds. As you know, it is a practice that we have used to augment other programs. We have briefed the committees on them fully, and it was a -- something that Director Casey and I had talked about and had talked about in interagency group meetings.

"We felt it was very important and I think Congressman Hamilton will recall getting the prohibition on solicitation off of us so we could go out and do those things and the Director came up with this opportunity, and I said, 'right on, boss, we could maybe get that five or six million dollars, and that will allow me to buy two or three more airplanes and do some things and it will be a good thing.'

"So he did and that was the purpose for it. I might tell you that in managing the program we have not done some things that we would have done had we had that money, but we have cut and scrimped and put things together and done without it because after the Iran-contra problem broke, I said politically it is just too sensitive to go out both in terms of other government reactions and Congress to solicit, so we haven't done it. But that was the intent and purpose of it.

"Mr. Stokes. Would it have been your intention to brief the Intelligence Committees about this if it had gone through?

"[C/CATF.] Yes. The Director and I discussed the law and I said that with the new law passed, we can do these things. I vaguely recall that we ran it past some of our lawyers, I think the officer of mine who actually did it, I was on a trip at the time, ran it past a lawyer. We had every intention to have accounted for it within the structure of the program and to report it to Congress, absolutely.

"(Counsel conferring with witness.)

"[C/CATF.] My attorney from the task force advises me during the negotiations of the administrative annex by which we account to Congress for the $100 million, which is a unique document, we discussed how we would handle solicited money. He recalls we actually may have even touched on the possibility of [redacted] money. I don't recall that specifically, but I do recall with your financial person who monitors the finance discussing how we would account for solicited money.

"So it was our intention to be absolutely forthcoming.

"Mr. Stokes. What amount were you asking for, do you recall?

"[C/CATF.] We didn't have a specific figure in mind. We were just talking. They never got that far. It was exploratory, the intermediary was going to go to [redacted] and hold the discussions, come back and talk to us about it. I did not go to the meetings and the officer who went to the meeting and who actually conducted it didn't get into details of amounts.

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		"I think you may have his memorandum, if you don't, I do, and he lays out what happened there. He did not actually get around to soliciting money or discussing amounts. He laid out needs and so on." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 98-101. See id., at 113-20 [C/CATF mentioned Brunei but not the CIA approach for third-country aid to the Contras during the C/CATF's testimony before the SSCI on 12/19/86].)	
86/10/21-100 OCTOBER 21, 1986			LEDEEN AGAIN ASKS FOR A MEETING WITH SHULTZ DoS CHRONOLOGY: "LEDEEN calls HILL again about meeting with GPS. He states that a 'grand strategy' involving a strategic relationship with Iran had gone off track with regard to hostages." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] continues at 86/10/26-100. On Ledeen's first request for a meeting, see 86/09/16-100.)
86/10/21-810 OCTOBER 21, 1986			U.S. HOSTAGE SEIZED IN LEBANON: Edward Austin Tracy, an illustrator and Quran seller, is kidnapped in Lebanon (CRS IB85183 [11/13/86 update], at 4.)
86/10/22-100 OCTOBER 22, 1986			GENEVA MEETING: ARMS SHIPMENT WORKED OUT SUMMARY: North, Secord, and an Israeli official meet in Geneva to iron out the details of the next arms shipment to Iran. They agree that the 500 TOWs headed for Iran (under the arrangement worked out

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			within the 9-Point Plan; see 86/10/08-307) would be taken from the 508 TOWs sent to Israel in May (see 86/05/24-200) and rejected as inadequate by the Israeli Defense Forces. The United States would then supply Israel with another 500 replacement missiles. (Iran-Contra Report, at 258-59 [citing Israeli Historical Chronology]. On the delivery of the TOWs, see below at 86/10/28-100.)
86/10/23-100 OCTOBER 23, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: REPORT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: On October 23, 1986, the Chief of the Latin American division of the CIA tells Abrams that the Agency has an indication that its senior representative in Costa Rica had some involvement in the Hasenfus flight. At 7 a.m. the next day, Abrams tells Charles Hill (Shultz' Executive Assistant) and Nick Platt (Executive Secretary of the DoS) what he has learned. Abrams then informs Shultz "when I found out that there was potentially a legal problem here." With the Secretary's concurrence (Abrams thinks), they decide to "wait and see what [the Inspector General's] investigation came up with before we did anything. As it happened, that investigation finally sort of melted into the criminal investigation which was undertaken right after November 25." Abrams testified "[T]he public believed what the Secretary of State believed and what I believed . . . ." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 183, 210.)	